The Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003-2009

by Richard North

Ministry of Defeat is a devastating account of military and strategic incompetence. When Tony Blair insisted that British Armed Forces form part of the invasion of Iraq, little attention was paid as to how this might work out in practice or what the consequences might be. Here we have for the first time a detailed account of just what an abject failure Britain's military intervention in Iraq has been. The British Army is scheduled to leave Iraq in July 2009, ahead of schedule, and the full story of the campaign needs to be told. Richard North presents in considerable detail one of the most painful and lasting legacies of the Blair era.

265 pages, Hardcover

First published May 31, 2009

Reviews

[Al · Rating 4 out of 5]

A forceful and really useful challenge to reassuring accounts of Britain’s campaign in Iraq. North pays particular attention to the relationship between institutional decisions, equipment and what soldiers were actually being asked to achieve. The detail gives the criticism practical weight, although the polemical conclusions still deserve scrutiny. An engaging account that makes accountability difficult to separate from military effectiveness. Worth reading for the questions it raises about how failures were recognised, explained and allowed to continue.