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Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67
In 1957, Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for creating the United Nations Emergency Force during the Suez crisis. The award launched Canada’s enthusiasm and reputation for peacekeeping. Pearson’s Peacekeepers explores the reality behind the rhetoric by offering a detailed account of the UNEF’s decade-long effort to keep peace along the Egyptian-Israeli border. While the operation was a tremendous achievement, the UNEF also encountered formidable challenges and problems. This nuanced account of Canada’s participation in the UNEF challenges perceived notions of Canadian identity and history and will help Canadians to accurately evaluate international peacekeeping efforts today.
- GenresNonfictionHistory
254 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 21, 2018
Men in the Middle
A wonderful summary of the different sides in this conflict and the political, logistic and bureaucratic forces at work.
Carroll suggests that Eisenhower's insistence that war was not an option paradoxically made Nasser bolder and made war more likely. Nasser, regarded as an unproven leader on the international stage, was seeking both personal and national prestige. He played the Soviets against the Americans to get loans for the Greater Aswan dam, sponsored fedayeen attacks against Israeli towns and military targets and nationalized Suez as a personal statement that he was ridding Egypt of the last remnants of colonial rule. The Canadians (Pearson, St. Laurent, Robertson) thought that Britain's invasion of Suez was mistake; the British thought that the Canadians were being a bit disloyal; the French wanted to give Nasser a black eye over his support for Algeria; the Americans wanted to keep the Soviets out. Egypt traded cotton for a massive amount of arms from Czechoslovakia, which in turn rattled Israel. Australia (Menzies) also saw Suez as a vital trade route for them, more so than England, which took the challenge to it's trade routes to India and the East fairly seriously. India however leaned towards the side of the Egyptians. The Soviets for their part used the crisis opportunistically, proposing a joint Russian/American peace force (which was unacceptable to the Americans and it was doubtful that the Soviets had the manpower) and threatening on Nov 5 to annihilate Paris and London with nuclear weapons if they did not back down, distracting from their invasion of Hungary the previous day.
Canadian General E. L. M. Burns had been commanding UNTSO, the UN Truce Supervisory Organization stationed in Sinai, and Pearson's idea was to persuade the parties to withdraw by expanding the UN mandate to include peacekeeping by inserting UN troops from non-aligned countries into the Sinai. Nasser accepted the notion but, when learning that Canada intended to send "The Queen's Own Rifles" regiment, objected because of the name. Canada insisted that General Burns experience in UNTSO was essential for the mission's success, but compromised by contributed administrative and logistic personnel instead of armed troops. As it turned out, except for the Yugoslavs, none of the other troops arrived prepared either for the climate or for an extended stay, and most wound up quite dependent on Canada taking this role.
Funding problems at the UN were covered in detail. Many of the western nations (except for France) thought that peacekeeping should be handled as a mandatory levy paid by all UN members in proportion to their dues. The Soviets (who were two years behind in their general dues) and non-aligned countries argued that contributions should be voluntary. Pearson became quite frustrated as the debate was time consuming and in most cases the amount being debated was a few thousand dollars - at most the cost of a couple of diplomatic banquets or an ambassador's limousine. When we get into the 60s peacekeeping proves to be a major UN cost, but I was surprised to note that it was UNOC (United Nations Operation in the Congo), not UNEF was the cause of most of the expenses.
The material on every day problems was quite interesting. Soldiers would insert their bed posts in cans with oil to dissuade scorpions from climbing in. Frequently there were traffic accidents involving strays from Bedouin flocks. In one case a Bedouin argued that because his goat was pregnant he was owed 50% more in compensation. After that only pregnant animals seemed to be prone to accidents. The usual problems of military life occur - getting letters from home, lining up at a ham shack for patched conversations from home, celebrating Christmas in the desert, communication problems with a multilingual force, alcohol, recreation, turnover and leave.
The book concludes with a discussion of Nasser's request that UNEF withdraw in May of 1967 as part of the general rise in Arab-Israeli tensions. It's a detailed account of the sequence of events, including Nasser's threat made towards Canadian troops if they did not withdraw within 48 hours. (pp 173). Carroll is critical of the UN for complying so quickly, but the request itself was legal and he regards the fault belongs to the original framing of the mandate, which needed the clause in order to get general agreement. UNEF was supposed to be a temporary measure to keep the peace, however efforts towards making peace permanent were tragically neglected.
Caroll should be congratulated for providing an objective account that is free of the usual political bias on Mideast topics. It's a good read and IMV an excellent source for understanding and researching this topic.
A wonderful summary of the different sides in this conflict and the political, logistic and bureaucratic forces at work.
Carroll suggests that Eisenhower's insistence that war was not an option paradoxically made Nasser bolder and made war more likely. Nasser, regarded as an unproven leader on the international stage, was seeking both personal and national prestige. He played the Soviets against the Americans to get loans for the Greater Aswan dam, sponsored fedayeen attacks against Israeli towns and military targets and nationalized Suez as a personal statement that he was ridding Egypt of the last remnants of colonial rule. The Canadians (Pearson, St. Laurent, Robertson) thought that Britain's invasion of Suez was mistake; the British thought that the Canadians were being a bit disloyal; the French wanted to give Nasser a black eye over his support for Algeria; the Americans wanted to keep the Soviets out. Egypt traded cotton for a massive amount of arms from Czechoslovakia, which in turn rattled Israel. Australia (Menzies) also saw Suez as a vital trade route for them, more so than England, which took the challenge to it's trade routes to India and the East fairly seriously. India however leaned towards the side of the Egyptians. The Soviets for their part used the crisis opportunistically, proposing a joint Russian/American peace force (which was unacceptable to the Americans and it was doubtful that the Soviets had the manpower) and threatening on Nov 5 to annihilate Paris and London with nuclear weapons if they did not back down, distracting from their invasion of Hungary the previous day.
Canadian General E. L. M. Burns had been commanding UNTSO, the UN Truce Supervisory Organization stationed in Sinai, and Pearson's idea was to persuade the parties to withdraw by expanding the UN mandate to include peacekeeping by inserting UN troops from non-aligned countries into the Sinai. Nasser accepted the notion but, when learning that Canada intended to send "The Queen's Own Rifles" regiment, objected because of the name. Canada insisted that General Burns experience in UNTSO was essential for the mission's success, but compromised by contributed administrative and logistic personnel instead of armed troops. As it turned out, except for the Yugoslavs, none of the other troops arrived prepared either for the climate or for an extended stay, and most wound up quite dependent on Canada taking this role.
Funding problems at the UN were covered in detail. Many of the western nations (except for France) thought that peacekeeping should be handled as a mandatory levy paid by all UN members in proportion to their dues. The Soviets (who were two years behind in their general dues) and non-aligned countries argued that contributions should be voluntary. Pearson became quite frustrated as the debate was time consuming and in most cases the amount being debated was a few thousand dollars - at most the cost of a couple of diplomatic banquets or an ambassador's limousine. When we get into the 60s peacekeeping proves to be a major UN cost, but I was surprised to note that it was UNOC (United Nations Operation in the Congo), not UNEF was the cause of most of the expenses.
The material on every day problems was quite interesting. Soldiers would insert their bed posts in cans with oil to dissuade scorpions from climbing in. Frequently there were traffic accidents involving strays from Bedouin flocks. In one case a Bedouin argued that because his goat was pregnant he was owed 50% more in compensation. After that only pregnant animals seemed to be prone to accidents. The usual problems of military life occur - getting letters from home, lining up at a ham shack for patched conversations from home, celebrating Christmas in the desert, communication problems with a multilingual force, alcohol, recreation, turnover and leave.
The book concludes with a discussion of Nasser's request that UNEF withdraw in May of 1967 as part of the general rise in Arab-Israeli tensions. It's a detailed account of the sequence of events, including Nasser's threat made towards Canadian troops if they did not withdraw within 48 hours. (pp 173). Carroll is critical of the UN for complying so quickly, but the request itself was legal and he regards the fault belongs to the original framing of the mandate, which needed the clause in order to get general agreement. UNEF was supposed to be a temporary measure to keep the peace, however efforts towards making peace permanent were tragically neglected.
Caroll should be congratulated for providing an objective account that is free of the usual political bias on Mideast topics. It's a good read and IMV an excellent source for understanding and researching this topic.
April 4, 2021
What a great book. Very easy to read, very detailed and most importantly objective.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews