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Christian Theistic Evidences
When defending Christianity, we often play by man’s rules, letting secular science and philosophy determine the cards we’re allowed to bring to the table. But can we effectively defend the primary authority of Scripture if we start with other sources of authority that relegate it to minor status from the outset? K. Scott Oliphint provides a foreword and explanatory notes in this retypeset syllabus, originally from Cornelius Van Til’s famous Christian Evidences class at Westminster Seminary. Van Til argues for the defense of a pure, full-fledged Christianity, unadulterated by a scientific methodology founded on non-Christian assumptions. He offers us instead a Christian philosophy and methodology for defending the faith that presupposes the absolute authority of the triune God of Scripture.
148 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1976
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About the author
Cornelius Van Til
149 books122 followersCornelius Van Til, was a Christian philosopher, Reformed theologian, and presuppositional apologist.
Biographical sketch
Born on May 3, 1895, in Grootegast, The Netherlands he was the sixth son of Ite and Klazina Van Til, who emigrated to the United States when "Kees," as he was known to friends, was 10. He grew up helping on the family farm in Highland, Indiana.
Van Til graduated from Calvin College in 1922, receiving a ThM from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1925 and his PhD from Princeton University in 1927. He began teaching at Princeton, but shortly went with the conservative group who founded Westminster Theological Seminary, where he taught for forty-three years of his life as a professor of apologetics.
He was also a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from the 1930s until his death in 1987, and in that denomination, he was embroiled in a bitter dispute with Gordon Clark over God's incomprehensibility known as the Clark-Van Til Controversy in which, according to John Frame, neither man was at his best and neither quite understood the other's position.
Van Til's thought
Van Til is perhaps best known for the development of a fresh approach to the task of defending the Christian faith. Although trained in traditional methods he drew on the insights of fellow Calvinistic philosophers Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd to formulate what he viewed as a more consistently Christian methodology. His apologetic focused on the role of presuppositions, the point of contact between believers and unbelievers, and the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian worldviews.
Source: Theopedia
Biographical sketch
Born on May 3, 1895, in Grootegast, The Netherlands he was the sixth son of Ite and Klazina Van Til, who emigrated to the United States when "Kees," as he was known to friends, was 10. He grew up helping on the family farm in Highland, Indiana.
Van Til graduated from Calvin College in 1922, receiving a ThM from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1925 and his PhD from Princeton University in 1927. He began teaching at Princeton, but shortly went with the conservative group who founded Westminster Theological Seminary, where he taught for forty-three years of his life as a professor of apologetics.
He was also a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from the 1930s until his death in 1987, and in that denomination, he was embroiled in a bitter dispute with Gordon Clark over God's incomprehensibility known as the Clark-Van Til Controversy in which, according to John Frame, neither man was at his best and neither quite understood the other's position.
Van Til's thought
Van Til is perhaps best known for the development of a fresh approach to the task of defending the Christian faith. Although trained in traditional methods he drew on the insights of fellow Calvinistic philosophers Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd to formulate what he viewed as a more consistently Christian methodology. His apologetic focused on the role of presuppositions, the point of contact between believers and unbelievers, and the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian worldviews.
Source: Theopedia
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July 9, 2022
In popular opinion, if Van Til’s presuppositional method is true, then what is the use of evidences? Indeed, we are told that Van Til wrote an entire book on evidences. So he did. The book itself is quite interesting and worth your time. Among Van Til’s works, it is not that difficult. We will see at the end if he gave a positive case with evidences.
Butler
I think CVT does a decent job summarizing Butler’s approach. I, for one, have never found Butler’s approach all that tempting, nor would, I imagine, many classical apologists today. For Butler, analogical reasoning is “reasoning about unknown possibilities from the known constitution of nature” (Van Til, 2).
With Van Til I agree that Butler’s analogy for a future life is quite weak. I cannot imagine anyone who seriously employs this today.
Hume’s Scepticism
Hume’s foundation: what is the nature of the connection between ideas? If an idea recalls another idea, it is a general idea. On the other hand, there is no connection between particular ideas (18). Our ideas are merely contiguous. The relevance to Butler is obvious: “there is simply no logical relation between the past and future” (19). Moreover, probability, so crucial to Butler’s project, cannot really explain the relations between ideas.
How seriously should one take Hume’s criticisms of Butler? Hume’s epistemology has not held up very well through the centuries. I am not defending Butler, but if one can prove that Hume’s epistemology is bunk, then why should we be particularly impressed with his criticisms of Butler?
Idealistic Reconstruction
These idealists agreed with Hume’s critique of Butler, but did not think Hume’s sceptism was warranted. Kant is CVT’s target here.
I do not care too much for discussions of Kant. Far more interesting, however, is CVT’s discussion of James Orr. He notes, probably correctly, Orr’s “Hegelian or idealist argument” (37). CVT wonders whether Hegelian arguments are safe enough to use to dismantle Kant. Hegelians sought to unify “pure rationality” (Plato’s world of forms) with fact. What the Hegelians would soon realize is that “pure being” is just as unintelligible as “pure nothing.”
CVT then gives a good analysis of F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. One may surmise that CVT got his idea of “brute fact” from these men. He hints as much (41). For example, you cannot count unless you already had the idea of a number system. These men came very close to overcoming the limitations of pure rationality.
Unfortunately, as CVT points out (but perhaps does not fully use), such a view more or less vanquishes the need for any facts (42). If every fact must be placed into a system of interpretation before it can have any meaning, then it is hard to see, if pressed consistently, why such a fact should be needed at all. That’s not CVT’s main criticism. The main problem for idealism is that it sees “the Absolute growing out of our own conception of reality.” The problem is obvious: how can the Absolute make sense of facts when it itself emerges from our own system of facts?
Christianity and its Factual Defense
CVT is quite clear “that if we seek to defend the Christian religion by an ‘appeal to the facts of experience’ in accord with the current scientific method, we shall have to adulterate Christianity beyond recognition” (49). Rather, we begin with another set of facts, the first of which is our being chosen by God. As all facts are created by God, “fact and interpretation are co-extensive” (51).
Indeed, he says “For us there can be no true interpretation of facts without miracle” (52). Whether this statement is true or not, this is not usually how miracles work. If one needs the proper framework to interpret a miracle, it’s not clear then why one needs a miracle.
Van Til does allow that we can appeal to facts, just not to brute facts (57). Rather, we appeal to God-interpreted facts. Any interpretation must line up with God’s interpretation. The rather obvious question, which he does not pursue, is how do we know our interpretation is God’s interpretation? The rest of the chapter is a juxtaposition of attacks on brute fact, limiting concepts, and bare possibility.
Actual Evidences
One might think upon reading this chapter title CVT would give actual evidences for God or show how evidences function within a larger system. He does not. He surveys current conceptions of God (usually immanentistic) by leading thinkers and why they are bad.
Creation and Providence
CVT examines the idea of causation. CVT ties Kant’s view of causation with Leibniz. I think there is something to that. Geisler himself made a similar criticism of Leibniz: such a view of causation is immanentistic. CVT shows how idealist systems cannot have a creation because the Absolute is always already unfolding. The closest Van Til gets to offering evidence iis his claim that man must first see himself as a creature.
Where Van Til is Correct
I agree that “facts” must also involve, at least in theory, a philosophy of fact (33).
Criticisms
Van Til said that those who seek a priori proof of God prove too much. In other words, if God’s existence is necessary, so is man’s (25). What I think he means is that God’s existence is correlative to man’s on this scheme. It is not clear how it is. Maybe on Leibniz’s scheme it is.
CVT said Aquinas assumed “the virtual identity of his intellect” with that of God’s (36). This is almost certainly false. In fact, it sounds a lot like Gordon Clark.
Conclusion
As it stands this book is quite interesting. CVT gives many lucid discussions of Idealism and British Hegelianism. One should note, however, that this book does not seek to give evidences for Christianity. What it does it evaluate the philosophies of fact of the leading thinkers of the day.
Butler
I think CVT does a decent job summarizing Butler’s approach. I, for one, have never found Butler’s approach all that tempting, nor would, I imagine, many classical apologists today. For Butler, analogical reasoning is “reasoning about unknown possibilities from the known constitution of nature” (Van Til, 2).
With Van Til I agree that Butler’s analogy for a future life is quite weak. I cannot imagine anyone who seriously employs this today.
Hume’s Scepticism
Hume’s foundation: what is the nature of the connection between ideas? If an idea recalls another idea, it is a general idea. On the other hand, there is no connection between particular ideas (18). Our ideas are merely contiguous. The relevance to Butler is obvious: “there is simply no logical relation between the past and future” (19). Moreover, probability, so crucial to Butler’s project, cannot really explain the relations between ideas.
How seriously should one take Hume’s criticisms of Butler? Hume’s epistemology has not held up very well through the centuries. I am not defending Butler, but if one can prove that Hume’s epistemology is bunk, then why should we be particularly impressed with his criticisms of Butler?
Idealistic Reconstruction
These idealists agreed with Hume’s critique of Butler, but did not think Hume’s sceptism was warranted. Kant is CVT’s target here.
I do not care too much for discussions of Kant. Far more interesting, however, is CVT’s discussion of James Orr. He notes, probably correctly, Orr’s “Hegelian or idealist argument” (37). CVT wonders whether Hegelian arguments are safe enough to use to dismantle Kant. Hegelians sought to unify “pure rationality” (Plato’s world of forms) with fact. What the Hegelians would soon realize is that “pure being” is just as unintelligible as “pure nothing.”
CVT then gives a good analysis of F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. One may surmise that CVT got his idea of “brute fact” from these men. He hints as much (41). For example, you cannot count unless you already had the idea of a number system. These men came very close to overcoming the limitations of pure rationality.
Unfortunately, as CVT points out (but perhaps does not fully use), such a view more or less vanquishes the need for any facts (42). If every fact must be placed into a system of interpretation before it can have any meaning, then it is hard to see, if pressed consistently, why such a fact should be needed at all. That’s not CVT’s main criticism. The main problem for idealism is that it sees “the Absolute growing out of our own conception of reality.” The problem is obvious: how can the Absolute make sense of facts when it itself emerges from our own system of facts?
Christianity and its Factual Defense
CVT is quite clear “that if we seek to defend the Christian religion by an ‘appeal to the facts of experience’ in accord with the current scientific method, we shall have to adulterate Christianity beyond recognition” (49). Rather, we begin with another set of facts, the first of which is our being chosen by God. As all facts are created by God, “fact and interpretation are co-extensive” (51).
Indeed, he says “For us there can be no true interpretation of facts without miracle” (52). Whether this statement is true or not, this is not usually how miracles work. If one needs the proper framework to interpret a miracle, it’s not clear then why one needs a miracle.
Van Til does allow that we can appeal to facts, just not to brute facts (57). Rather, we appeal to God-interpreted facts. Any interpretation must line up with God’s interpretation. The rather obvious question, which he does not pursue, is how do we know our interpretation is God’s interpretation? The rest of the chapter is a juxtaposition of attacks on brute fact, limiting concepts, and bare possibility.
Actual Evidences
One might think upon reading this chapter title CVT would give actual evidences for God or show how evidences function within a larger system. He does not. He surveys current conceptions of God (usually immanentistic) by leading thinkers and why they are bad.
Creation and Providence
CVT examines the idea of causation. CVT ties Kant’s view of causation with Leibniz. I think there is something to that. Geisler himself made a similar criticism of Leibniz: such a view of causation is immanentistic. CVT shows how idealist systems cannot have a creation because the Absolute is always already unfolding. The closest Van Til gets to offering evidence iis his claim that man must first see himself as a creature.
Where Van Til is Correct
I agree that “facts” must also involve, at least in theory, a philosophy of fact (33).
Criticisms
Van Til said that those who seek a priori proof of God prove too much. In other words, if God’s existence is necessary, so is man’s (25). What I think he means is that God’s existence is correlative to man’s on this scheme. It is not clear how it is. Maybe on Leibniz’s scheme it is.
CVT said Aquinas assumed “the virtual identity of his intellect” with that of God’s (36). This is almost certainly false. In fact, it sounds a lot like Gordon Clark.
Conclusion
As it stands this book is quite interesting. CVT gives many lucid discussions of Idealism and British Hegelianism. One should note, however, that this book does not seek to give evidences for Christianity. What it does it evaluate the philosophies of fact of the leading thinkers of the day.
May 2, 2016
There is a lot of misunderstanding today concerning the role of evidence in Cornelius Van Til’s apologetics which makes this book a valuable primary source for those who want to understand Van Til’s view. I think understanding Van Til’s position is important whether one agrees with him or not. This is especially relevant given the rising popularity of Presuppositional apologetics. This particular volume is the second edition of the book and it has helpful footnotes with commentaries from the editor K. Scott Oliphant who is currently the professor of Presuppositional apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary (this is where Van Til taught at when he was alive). In this review I shall look first at Oliphant’s contribution and then the rest of the book that was penned by Van Til.
Oliphant’s Contribution
Oliphant’s editorial footnote wasn’t as frequent as I expected. It seems as the book progresses there were less of it but I don’t necessarily see that as a bad thing after all it’s better to have helpful comments and explanations here and there rather than having a book that over-analyze and eventually read everything into Van Til that isn’t there. It seems most of Oliphant’s inserted footnotes is to explain who the names and figures were that Van Til cited, which is helpful given that the book was written decades ago and many of whom Van Til interacted with is largely forgotten or they were technical academic specialists. The biggest contribution that’s uniquely Oliphant comes from his discussion in the introduction of the book about Alvin Plantinga and the contemporary discussion about foundationalism. This essay from Oliphant is good in its own right. Those who wonder about the similarities and differences between Plantinga’s and Van Til’s approach towards the defense of the faith and epistemology would find Oliphant’s discussion useful. Van Til lived before much of the critical discussion about foundationalism in academia so to see an heir of Van Til and a contemporary Van Tillian scholar give a Presuppositionalist’ perspective definitely pushes Presuppositionalism forward.
Van Til’s Christian Theistic Evidences
Van Til begins the book with a chapter on “the history of evidences” that is largely a critique of Bishop Butler’s apologetics. Butler is famous for his work titled Analogy of Religion. Van Til’s critique of Butler is largely theological. Butler’s styled apologetics is seen today in much of what we call evidential apologetics so Van Til’s critique shouldn’t be seen as a historical academic exercise. Van Til then moves to a critique of Hume in chapter two and Kant and the idealists in chapter three. This largely follows the chronological order these philosophers appeared in the history of philosophy. His look at these philosophers are relevant critique of Butler in that these non-Christian philosophers noted the inadequacy of naïve evidentialism which Van Til points out but Van Til also points out the problem with these philosophers and their ideologies.
The rest of the chapters in the book was arranged more topically rather than chronologically with the history of philosophy. I appreciate Van Til’s examination of non-Christian scientific method and their assumptions found in chapters five through seven with it broken down according to theological evidences, creation and providence and finally teology. I also appreciated Van Til’s look at psychology in general and psychology of religion specifically (chapters eight and nine).
An ongoing theme in Van Til’s critiques of various philosophies is the idea of “brute facts.” Here in the book and also from Oliphant’s notes I’ve finally understand what Van Til meant by “brute facts,” which conveys the idea that facts are not created by God and are just “out there.” Throughout the rest of the book Van Til gives a survey of just how vastly held the concept of brute facts is in the realm of unbiblical philosophy and secular science.
There was some moments in the book that I found very quotable and indeed have been quoted elsewhere by other Presuppositionalists. For those who are interested with Van Til’s apologetics and would want to read Van Til himself as a primary source I do highly recommend the book. I must say though at times I wonder if Van Til could have wrote more about philosophy of evidences from a practical stand point. I think the fact that this book was originally a syllabi that Van Til made clear was not intended to be a book didn’t help with some of the way the materials was presented. Even as a Van Tillian myself I do think a practical philosophy of Christian theistic evidences wasn’t Van Til’s strong point. It took other men that followed him to develop this more. Nevertheless I recommend this book.
NOTE: This book was provided to me free by P&R Publishing and Net Galley without any obligation for a positive review. All opinions offered above are mine unless otherwise stated or implied.
Oliphant’s Contribution
Oliphant’s editorial footnote wasn’t as frequent as I expected. It seems as the book progresses there were less of it but I don’t necessarily see that as a bad thing after all it’s better to have helpful comments and explanations here and there rather than having a book that over-analyze and eventually read everything into Van Til that isn’t there. It seems most of Oliphant’s inserted footnotes is to explain who the names and figures were that Van Til cited, which is helpful given that the book was written decades ago and many of whom Van Til interacted with is largely forgotten or they were technical academic specialists. The biggest contribution that’s uniquely Oliphant comes from his discussion in the introduction of the book about Alvin Plantinga and the contemporary discussion about foundationalism. This essay from Oliphant is good in its own right. Those who wonder about the similarities and differences between Plantinga’s and Van Til’s approach towards the defense of the faith and epistemology would find Oliphant’s discussion useful. Van Til lived before much of the critical discussion about foundationalism in academia so to see an heir of Van Til and a contemporary Van Tillian scholar give a Presuppositionalist’ perspective definitely pushes Presuppositionalism forward.
Van Til’s Christian Theistic Evidences
Van Til begins the book with a chapter on “the history of evidences” that is largely a critique of Bishop Butler’s apologetics. Butler is famous for his work titled Analogy of Religion. Van Til’s critique of Butler is largely theological. Butler’s styled apologetics is seen today in much of what we call evidential apologetics so Van Til’s critique shouldn’t be seen as a historical academic exercise. Van Til then moves to a critique of Hume in chapter two and Kant and the idealists in chapter three. This largely follows the chronological order these philosophers appeared in the history of philosophy. His look at these philosophers are relevant critique of Butler in that these non-Christian philosophers noted the inadequacy of naïve evidentialism which Van Til points out but Van Til also points out the problem with these philosophers and their ideologies.
The rest of the chapters in the book was arranged more topically rather than chronologically with the history of philosophy. I appreciate Van Til’s examination of non-Christian scientific method and their assumptions found in chapters five through seven with it broken down according to theological evidences, creation and providence and finally teology. I also appreciated Van Til’s look at psychology in general and psychology of religion specifically (chapters eight and nine).
An ongoing theme in Van Til’s critiques of various philosophies is the idea of “brute facts.” Here in the book and also from Oliphant’s notes I’ve finally understand what Van Til meant by “brute facts,” which conveys the idea that facts are not created by God and are just “out there.” Throughout the rest of the book Van Til gives a survey of just how vastly held the concept of brute facts is in the realm of unbiblical philosophy and secular science.
There was some moments in the book that I found very quotable and indeed have been quoted elsewhere by other Presuppositionalists. For those who are interested with Van Til’s apologetics and would want to read Van Til himself as a primary source I do highly recommend the book. I must say though at times I wonder if Van Til could have wrote more about philosophy of evidences from a practical stand point. I think the fact that this book was originally a syllabi that Van Til made clear was not intended to be a book didn’t help with some of the way the materials was presented. Even as a Van Tillian myself I do think a practical philosophy of Christian theistic evidences wasn’t Van Til’s strong point. It took other men that followed him to develop this more. Nevertheless I recommend this book.
NOTE: This book was provided to me free by P&R Publishing and Net Galley without any obligation for a positive review. All opinions offered above are mine unless otherwise stated or implied.
September 30, 2016
This is an interesting book. Primarily it seems to prove how presuppositionalism is needed to defend Christianity. Van Til shows through various scientific and philosophical fields that once they deny the triune God as the back of all things they will inevitable be hostile to Christianity. There is no middle ground.
However this is a technical work that I think requires an understanding of a history of philosophy to make sense of it. The footnotes do an admirable job of helping you understand but it's not enough (or it wasn't for me).
I'd recommend other works of Van Til over this.
However this is a technical work that I think requires an understanding of a history of philosophy to make sense of it. The footnotes do an admirable job of helping you understand but it's not enough (or it wasn't for me).
I'd recommend other works of Van Til over this.
January 17, 2018
This book contains Van Til’s philosophy of facts, followed somewhat haphazardly through the loci of systematic theology, in which he lays the groundwork for his apologetic. The main idea is that there are no ‘brute facts’ (i.e. facts about the world that would be as they are even without the Triune God ‘behind’ them). Any apologetic beginning from the supposed neutral ground of ‘brute facts’ will never arrive at the fullness of Christian revelation. In a sense, Van Til is largely indebted to Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Hume ‘shattered’ the evidential apologetic of Bishop Butler. Afterwards, Kant and Hegel paved the way for ‘transcendental’ argumentation, although, on the whole, their thought was inimical to Christianity. In following ‘brute facts,’ secular science has come to the conclusions of indeterminacy, the rejection of God, and the denial of biblical creation and its telos. These conclusions have permeated the ‘sciences,’ of which Van Til gives special attention to psychology.
Van Til posits that some Christians saw the evidential edifice of apologetics falling and took recourse in one of two alternatives: a historical apologetic or fideism. He sees historical apologetics, founded upon testimony, as falling prey to the same error as evidentialism, an appeal to ‘brute facts,’ while fideism has traded ‘reason’ for ‘experience.’ In regard to theistic proofs, Van Til believes that a posteriori arguments only lead to a finite god. The cosmological argument, for example, does this, in addition to removing all human freedom (*everything has a cause*). He also believes that a priori arguments can only lead to a god with blank identity. Van Til specifically has in mind here the ontological argument. It may yield a god that is necessary, immutable, simple, omnipotent, etc., but does not yield the Triune God. He also thinks that the ontological argument makes creation itself necessary (i.e. it removes all ontological contingency). In all, there is no common ground, no ‘facts’ which the Christian can appeal to in order to persuade the unbeliever. Building ‘probability’ for theism, the resurrection, etc. is a dead end leading only to a god other than the one detailed in Scripture. And in the long run, appeal to brute facts leads to the denial of Christian revelation altogether. Either way, man has set himself up autonomously to ‘judge’ truth.
So how does Van Til propose to defend Christianity? Transcendental argumentation. Where evidential and historical apologists are satisfied with probabilistic evidences and theistic proofs, which Van Til sees as perfectly valid but concluding with a god other than that of the Bible, Van Til strikes at the foundational presuppositions of non-Christian systems. Where they reason wrongly, they are following the concept of ��brute facts;’ where they reason rightly, they are presupposing facts that only the Christian system can account for. Moreover, since Van Til has ruled out testimony and evidences founded upon neutral ‘brute facts,’ the alternative he is left with is authority. The truth of the Christian religion must be taken on the authority of Scripture, and behind Scripture, the Triune God of Christian revelation. Van Til does leave some room for evidences, but he is perfectly clear that evidences can never be appealed to apart from the Triune God and Scripture which provide their content and meaning.
There are three major points where I agree with Van Til: (1) That apologetics should concern itself with the foundations of various systems of thought. We should ask, ‘What is being presupposed?’ (2) That synergistic forms of Christianity (Arminianism, Romanism, etc.) necessarily wed the apologist of said system to the use of a posteriori argumentation. Man’s rational faculties are unhindered by the fall, and his choice is indeterministic. A priori arguments and their implications ‘ruin’ this theological scheme. (3) Cosmological argumentation removes human freedom. It makes everything deterministic in the physical sense. Synergists still love arguing cosmologically, but alas they’re up to the neck in contradictions anyway.
The area in which I disagree with Van Til is on the ontological argument. In my opinion, the ontological argument does for ‘being’ what Van Til sees the transcendental argument doing for ‘facts.’ He stresses the antithesis of ‘God or absurdity,’ but what of ‘God or non-being?’ I’m not sure why he didn’t see this. Neither am I sure how the transcendental argument is not an a priori theistic proof alongside the ontological argument. Maybe he was just too wedded to Kantian criticism or he thought the Christian doctrine of creation is sufficient after the epistemological problem has been solved, or else I’m just missing something in my estimation of what he’s saying.
I do think every apologist should read this book. The material is heavy, and Van Til’s thought is not as easily accessible as that of his followers, but undoubtedly there are colossal implications for apologetics therein which all apologists can glean from. Unfortunately in our day, his apologetic is often reduced to zingers such as “By what standard?” and “You’re borrowing from my worldview!” There’s so much more, and what better place to learn than straight from the horse’s mouth? Also, while I think many classical apologists do take Van Til seriously, he is often easily dismissed by evidential and historical apologists. They only do themselves a disservice in doing so.
Van Til posits that some Christians saw the evidential edifice of apologetics falling and took recourse in one of two alternatives: a historical apologetic or fideism. He sees historical apologetics, founded upon testimony, as falling prey to the same error as evidentialism, an appeal to ‘brute facts,’ while fideism has traded ‘reason’ for ‘experience.’ In regard to theistic proofs, Van Til believes that a posteriori arguments only lead to a finite god. The cosmological argument, for example, does this, in addition to removing all human freedom (*everything has a cause*). He also believes that a priori arguments can only lead to a god with blank identity. Van Til specifically has in mind here the ontological argument. It may yield a god that is necessary, immutable, simple, omnipotent, etc., but does not yield the Triune God. He also thinks that the ontological argument makes creation itself necessary (i.e. it removes all ontological contingency). In all, there is no common ground, no ‘facts’ which the Christian can appeal to in order to persuade the unbeliever. Building ‘probability’ for theism, the resurrection, etc. is a dead end leading only to a god other than the one detailed in Scripture. And in the long run, appeal to brute facts leads to the denial of Christian revelation altogether. Either way, man has set himself up autonomously to ‘judge’ truth.
So how does Van Til propose to defend Christianity? Transcendental argumentation. Where evidential and historical apologists are satisfied with probabilistic evidences and theistic proofs, which Van Til sees as perfectly valid but concluding with a god other than that of the Bible, Van Til strikes at the foundational presuppositions of non-Christian systems. Where they reason wrongly, they are following the concept of ��brute facts;’ where they reason rightly, they are presupposing facts that only the Christian system can account for. Moreover, since Van Til has ruled out testimony and evidences founded upon neutral ‘brute facts,’ the alternative he is left with is authority. The truth of the Christian religion must be taken on the authority of Scripture, and behind Scripture, the Triune God of Christian revelation. Van Til does leave some room for evidences, but he is perfectly clear that evidences can never be appealed to apart from the Triune God and Scripture which provide their content and meaning.
There are three major points where I agree with Van Til: (1) That apologetics should concern itself with the foundations of various systems of thought. We should ask, ‘What is being presupposed?’ (2) That synergistic forms of Christianity (Arminianism, Romanism, etc.) necessarily wed the apologist of said system to the use of a posteriori argumentation. Man’s rational faculties are unhindered by the fall, and his choice is indeterministic. A priori arguments and their implications ‘ruin’ this theological scheme. (3) Cosmological argumentation removes human freedom. It makes everything deterministic in the physical sense. Synergists still love arguing cosmologically, but alas they’re up to the neck in contradictions anyway.
The area in which I disagree with Van Til is on the ontological argument. In my opinion, the ontological argument does for ‘being’ what Van Til sees the transcendental argument doing for ‘facts.’ He stresses the antithesis of ‘God or absurdity,’ but what of ‘God or non-being?’ I’m not sure why he didn’t see this. Neither am I sure how the transcendental argument is not an a priori theistic proof alongside the ontological argument. Maybe he was just too wedded to Kantian criticism or he thought the Christian doctrine of creation is sufficient after the epistemological problem has been solved, or else I’m just missing something in my estimation of what he’s saying.
I do think every apologist should read this book. The material is heavy, and Van Til’s thought is not as easily accessible as that of his followers, but undoubtedly there are colossal implications for apologetics therein which all apologists can glean from. Unfortunately in our day, his apologetic is often reduced to zingers such as “By what standard?” and “You’re borrowing from my worldview!” There’s so much more, and what better place to learn than straight from the horse’s mouth? Also, while I think many classical apologists do take Van Til seriously, he is often easily dismissed by evidential and historical apologists. They only do themselves a disservice in doing so.
September 29, 2023
Honestly, this book was quite dissapointing. This was one of the books I was most excited about, because I thought Van Til would talk more about the classical arguments for God and the role of evidence in his framework, but it ended up being a lot more of the same as a lot of his other writings: Here's why Butler, idealists, etc. are wrong. Much of it was very technical, and the only chapter that I was truly edified by was his chapter on Hume. Luckily, I got through the book quickly so I didn't get stuck in a rut like I did with his book on Common Grace.
August 13, 2019
This book was originally written as a syllabus for a seminary course that Van Til taught at WTS. I began reading it in order to get a better grasp on his apologetic for a term paper. To that end, I recommend chapter 4 and the appendix as the best material (in this volume) for getting a grasp on what Van Til's apologetic method and philosophy entails. That doesn't mean you shouldn't read the whole book--you certainly should!
May 22, 2018
THe best book of Van Til if you are looking for a refutation of "evidential apologetics" and of unbelief in general. SHow how only the God of the Bible can provide us foundations for any kind of knowledge, science and wathever. Good insights and diagnosis of recent science in 20th century (James Jeans, Arthur Eddington for example). Some treatment of psychology.
February 18, 2017
As with every time I read a work by Van Til, I am impressed with the depth of content and scholarship that is faithful to God's Word! As a Reformed Scholastic, I enjoyed it!
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