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The Morality of Law
In a lengthy new concluding chapter labeled "A Reply to Critics," Lon L. Fuller extends and clarifies his definition of the relation between law and morality put forward in the first (1964) edition of The Morality of Law. His original argument distinguishes between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, both of which bear on the design and operation of social institutions: the former by setting the necessary preconditions of any purposive social endeavor, the latter by suggesting the directions for such endeavor. In the revised edition, Fuller takes accurate aim at the school of legal philosophy called the New Analytical Jurists and continues his long-running debate with his major intellectual antagonist, H.L.A. Hart. Although the author calls the new chapter "A Reply to Critics," his expressed reason for undertaking it indicates that it is more than that: "As critical reviews of my book came in, I myself became increasingly aware of the extent to which the debate did indeed depend on 'starting points' - not on what the disputants said, but on what they considered it unnecessary to say, not on articulated principles but on tacit assumptions. What was needed, therefore, it seemed to me, was to bring these tacit assumptions to more adequate expression than either side has so far been able to do." There is no question that Mr. Fuller here gives the assumptions of his side adequate expression. “The volume must be regarded as an important contribution of general interest to the study of the nature and function of law…Trenchant comment abounds throughout the book, and there is an immense amount of the most valuable material here, as well as considerable food for the thought…his book deserves to reach a very wide audience.” – Law Times.
“The book is a provocative one which is certain to excite much academic comment here and abroad.” – Harvard Law Record.
“Although fully intelligible to the undergraduate, this book is likely to receive its warmest reception form advanced students of the philosophy of law, who will welcome the relief provided from the frequently sterile tone of much recent work in the field.” – Choice
“The book is a provocative one which is certain to excite much academic comment here and abroad.” – Harvard Law Record.
“Although fully intelligible to the undergraduate, this book is likely to receive its warmest reception form advanced students of the philosophy of law, who will welcome the relief provided from the frequently sterile tone of much recent work in the field.” – Choice
262 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1964
33 people are currently reading
879 people want to read
About the author
Lon L. Fuller
32 books25 followersLon Luvois Fuller was a noted legal philosopher, who wrote The Morality of Law in 1964, discussing the connection between law and morality. Fuller was professor of Law at Harvard University for many years, and is noted in American law for his contributions to the law of contracts. His debate with H. L. A. Hart in the Harvard Law Review (Vol. 71) was of significant importance for framing the modern conflict between legal positivism and natural law. Fuller was an important influence on Ronald Dworkin, who was one of his students at Harvard Law.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
May 29, 2012
Fuller argues that law should be understood as an on-going enterprise of "subjecting human conduct to rules." As such an enterprise, there are basic conditions which need to be met by any set of laws: the laws must be general, made public, future-oriented, understandable, coherent, possible to obey, stable, and enforced. Fuller calls these eight conditions "the morality that makes laws possible," and his careful exploration of each condition, with connections to actual disputes, demonstrates that, well, things can get complicated, and law won't serve its function unless the lawmakers and the administrators are intelligent, practical, and fair. This means the positivists and realists are wrong: law does require some fundamental connection to moral norms in order to really be law, though Fuller stops well short of requiring law to reflect any full-blown set of moral dicta.
October 28, 2019
Won the debate but lost the ability to write award.
March 11, 2012
This is a very interesting book by Fuller who is an avid proponent of natural law. His theories of interpretation are invaluable. This is a must read for anyone interested in legal philosophy.
May 25, 2023
My magnum opus is 'information control'. Since I do not want to appeal to authority, nor do I want to self-promote, I must simply claim that logically-sound ethics is one of the two most suppressed fields of study in the world right now (right behind *true* economics).
Lon L. Fuller discovered a dichotomy within ethics - a proper dichotomy. In fact, his discovery is so profound that it serves as the sole dichotomy within the field, meaning that ethics is vastly simpler than psychology, which has several dichotomies within (introverted/extroverted, for instance).
The significance of his discovery is threefold. Fundamentally, it gives us a way to consistently think about morality and ethics in a profound way, along with a way to categorize villainy. It turns out, there are only two archetypes of villain and one type of loser (the two are not synonymous). Additionally, his dichotomy gives us a way of determining if a law is just or now, since law is merely institutionalized ethics/morality. Lastly, where ethics is what man ought to or ought not to do, economics is what man does do or does not do; and Fuller's dichotomy perfectly reflects economics. Naturally, ethics as a lens of human desire and economics as a lens of human nature should reflect one another.
As for critics, I am familiar with their [lack of] arguments, or their 'feelings'. I have yet to encounter a sound counterargument to Fuller's dichotomy. A proper counterargument would be of the following:
i) the dichotomy does not describe the set of all things (ethics) that it sets out to describe
ii) the two ends of the dichotomy (aspiration vs duty) are not mutually exclusive
Naturally, given the nature of the government official and his lackeys, most of the critiques and censorship of Fuller's work are statist critiques, and therefore, logically unsound. If any are offended by my stance on this, please find me online.
Lon L. Fuller discovered a dichotomy within ethics - a proper dichotomy. In fact, his discovery is so profound that it serves as the sole dichotomy within the field, meaning that ethics is vastly simpler than psychology, which has several dichotomies within (introverted/extroverted, for instance).
The significance of his discovery is threefold. Fundamentally, it gives us a way to consistently think about morality and ethics in a profound way, along with a way to categorize villainy. It turns out, there are only two archetypes of villain and one type of loser (the two are not synonymous). Additionally, his dichotomy gives us a way of determining if a law is just or now, since law is merely institutionalized ethics/morality. Lastly, where ethics is what man ought to or ought not to do, economics is what man does do or does not do; and Fuller's dichotomy perfectly reflects economics. Naturally, ethics as a lens of human desire and economics as a lens of human nature should reflect one another.
As for critics, I am familiar with their [lack of] arguments, or their 'feelings'. I have yet to encounter a sound counterargument to Fuller's dichotomy. A proper counterargument would be of the following:
i) the dichotomy does not describe the set of all things (ethics) that it sets out to describe
ii) the two ends of the dichotomy (aspiration vs duty) are not mutually exclusive
Naturally, given the nature of the government official and his lackeys, most of the critiques and censorship of Fuller's work are statist critiques, and therefore, logically unsound. If any are offended by my stance on this, please find me online.
December 24, 2020
Yup, I pushed through it front to back. Fuller is a good writer, fairly easy to read. 3-stars, however, as I believe Hart takes the edge in their famous debate on whether or not there is a necessary relationship between law and morality. I read most of Hart's The Concept of Law in conjunction with this, but not all, which is why I won't review it separately.
So what do I think? Well I'm glad you asked -- *pushes up glasses* -- I actually wrote a (monotonous? potentially successful? downright bad? -- I'll never know since COVID snuffed out our grades for my final semester) paper contrasting both sides of the Fuller-Hart debate from the perspective of Kant's Doctrine of Right. Exciting stuff, eh? No? Well, too bad, here's the introduction AND the concluding paragraph (yes, I have a horrible habit for jumping to the conclusion to see what's what), just so you can get a taste, cause I KNOW you're interested (and because I can be a bit of a snob, or maybe I just feel like sharing something no one cares about? No, no, it's interesting, it is, lol):
"In the 1960s, Lon L. Fuller and H. L. A. Hart prominently debated the relationship between law and morality. In The Morality of Law, Fuller insists that law has a distinctive inner morality, a set of formal principles that enable it to function as a system governing human conduct. In The Concept of Law, Hart denies any necessary connection between law and morality, instead describing laws as conventional rules that acquire validity in accordance with criteria that arise as a matter of social practice. This paper does not attempt to resolve the debate between the two scholars, but rather considers and contrasts the their positions from the perspective of Immanuel Kant’s theory of law in the hope that Kant’s abstraction from practical considerations may shed light on the merits of each side of the debate.
In The Doctrine of Right, Kant holds that law exists solely to enable people to act in accordance with mutual freedom; paradoxically, corollaries of this notion may support both Hart’s position that law need not accord with any concept of morality and Fuller’s view that law must have an internal morality which guides its formal structure. Taken together, Hart and Kant demonstrate that law need not be just to be law; law exists because it must exist for complex societies to function. Fuller and Kant, on the other hand, emphasize that the idea of a legal system necessitates an obligation on the government to aspire to make the legal system more effective (in terms of reciprocity between the government and citizens) and, relatedly, more just (in terms of honouring human freedom). Granted, Hart’s view of law as a social construction posits that a government need not comply with any such obligation for a legal system to exist; and, moreover, Fuller’s inner morality of law says nothing about substantive justice, despite its relevance to Kant’s view of laws as authorized manifestations of freedom. These discrepancies between the modern legal scholars and Kant signal, more than anything, the practical thrust of their approaches. Hart asks where law comes from in practice, and Fuller asks what law should do in practice, whereas Kant attempts to abstract from practice as much as possible by describing human society solely in terms of its legal character. Taken together, we may be able to better understand both what law is and what law should be."
[Okay, now jumping to the conclusion, which is just a jibber-jabbering regurgitation of the introduction, and which, reading both together now, will not help bridge the massive denseness of this paper for someone who hasn't already read all three scholars . . . oops.]
"Hart reminds us that law is not necessarily good, whereas Fuller insists that law should aspire to be (at least formally) good, which views need not be mutually exclusive. Considering freedom as our one innate right provides theoretical support for the practical view that the existence of a legal system is a matter of convention, for it is by reason of our innate freedom that we cannot interact without positive law to determine what belongs to each. But freedom as a framework right also requires us to view law purposefully as something that, while not necessarily promoting anyone’s idea of justice or morality, puts an obligation on those who create and apply the law to respect and promote citizens’ freedom. That this obligation need not be honoured as a matter of practice does not detract from the worth of the idea. Conceiving of such an obligation, compliance with which does not tell us whether law exists but rather whether there is law in its most complete form, may serve as a powerful tool to help judges purposefully interpret, bridge gaps between, and provide general limitations on competing rights and values; it also implies that an invitation to consider moral principles (as criteria recognized by a conventional rule of recognition) is not really necessary for such to be at home in judicial decision-making, for the concept of a framework right is not a matter of convention but an underlying idea that may guide judges’ thought processes regardless. This view reminds us that there can never be a regime of perfect justice because that is a regime of freedom, and freedom itself does not have any limits. We are also reminded that, in practice, law itself does not rule: convention does, which is why we cannot demand that the law, to be law, be just. But we can conceive of a morality of aspiration—law should manifest freedom—inherent in the project nonetheless."
Hmm. Where was I?
So what do I think? Well I'm glad you asked -- *pushes up glasses* -- I actually wrote a (monotonous? potentially successful? downright bad? -- I'll never know since COVID snuffed out our grades for my final semester) paper contrasting both sides of the Fuller-Hart debate from the perspective of Kant's Doctrine of Right. Exciting stuff, eh? No? Well, too bad, here's the introduction AND the concluding paragraph (yes, I have a horrible habit for jumping to the conclusion to see what's what), just so you can get a taste, cause I KNOW you're interested (and because I can be a bit of a snob, or maybe I just feel like sharing something no one cares about? No, no, it's interesting, it is, lol):
"In the 1960s, Lon L. Fuller and H. L. A. Hart prominently debated the relationship between law and morality. In The Morality of Law, Fuller insists that law has a distinctive inner morality, a set of formal principles that enable it to function as a system governing human conduct. In The Concept of Law, Hart denies any necessary connection between law and morality, instead describing laws as conventional rules that acquire validity in accordance with criteria that arise as a matter of social practice. This paper does not attempt to resolve the debate between the two scholars, but rather considers and contrasts the their positions from the perspective of Immanuel Kant’s theory of law in the hope that Kant’s abstraction from practical considerations may shed light on the merits of each side of the debate.
In The Doctrine of Right, Kant holds that law exists solely to enable people to act in accordance with mutual freedom; paradoxically, corollaries of this notion may support both Hart’s position that law need not accord with any concept of morality and Fuller’s view that law must have an internal morality which guides its formal structure. Taken together, Hart and Kant demonstrate that law need not be just to be law; law exists because it must exist for complex societies to function. Fuller and Kant, on the other hand, emphasize that the idea of a legal system necessitates an obligation on the government to aspire to make the legal system more effective (in terms of reciprocity between the government and citizens) and, relatedly, more just (in terms of honouring human freedom). Granted, Hart’s view of law as a social construction posits that a government need not comply with any such obligation for a legal system to exist; and, moreover, Fuller’s inner morality of law says nothing about substantive justice, despite its relevance to Kant’s view of laws as authorized manifestations of freedom. These discrepancies between the modern legal scholars and Kant signal, more than anything, the practical thrust of their approaches. Hart asks where law comes from in practice, and Fuller asks what law should do in practice, whereas Kant attempts to abstract from practice as much as possible by describing human society solely in terms of its legal character. Taken together, we may be able to better understand both what law is and what law should be."
[Okay, now jumping to the conclusion, which is just a jibber-jabbering regurgitation of the introduction, and which, reading both together now, will not help bridge the massive denseness of this paper for someone who hasn't already read all three scholars . . . oops.]
"Hart reminds us that law is not necessarily good, whereas Fuller insists that law should aspire to be (at least formally) good, which views need not be mutually exclusive. Considering freedom as our one innate right provides theoretical support for the practical view that the existence of a legal system is a matter of convention, for it is by reason of our innate freedom that we cannot interact without positive law to determine what belongs to each. But freedom as a framework right also requires us to view law purposefully as something that, while not necessarily promoting anyone’s idea of justice or morality, puts an obligation on those who create and apply the law to respect and promote citizens’ freedom. That this obligation need not be honoured as a matter of practice does not detract from the worth of the idea. Conceiving of such an obligation, compliance with which does not tell us whether law exists but rather whether there is law in its most complete form, may serve as a powerful tool to help judges purposefully interpret, bridge gaps between, and provide general limitations on competing rights and values; it also implies that an invitation to consider moral principles (as criteria recognized by a conventional rule of recognition) is not really necessary for such to be at home in judicial decision-making, for the concept of a framework right is not a matter of convention but an underlying idea that may guide judges’ thought processes regardless. This view reminds us that there can never be a regime of perfect justice because that is a regime of freedom, and freedom itself does not have any limits. We are also reminded that, in practice, law itself does not rule: convention does, which is why we cannot demand that the law, to be law, be just. But we can conceive of a morality of aspiration—law should manifest freedom—inherent in the project nonetheless."
Hmm. Where was I?
May 8, 2012
Not bad. The distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration is important. Most important point raised in this book is that the positivist idea that law can be separated from the complex and not quantifiable subjective human aspects is bunk. You cannot separate the mechanics of law from its purpose.
December 11, 2023
“If I were asked, then, to discern one central indisputable principle of what may be called substantive natural law… I would find it in the injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire… and if men will listen, that voice, unlike that of the morality of duty, can be heard across the boundaries and through the barriers that now separate men from one another.” -Lon Fuller
Are all laws morally right? Should all morally wrong things remain illegal? To whom do we owe “good behavior” and who is a part of a particular moral community? All good questions, and all of which are analyzed in depth in this book. The morality of law, its concept, where it came from, and what it is meant to do- those are the subject of Fuller’s inquiry. In this book he sets up what I believe to be one of the most thoroughly persuasive and straightforward interpretation of the foundations of law, using surprisingly interesting hypothetical instances to make his point (the tales of Rex the King- an idiot who is trying to make laws work and the problem of the Grudge Informer- should you punish people who have worked out their grudges by legal means and how?). I really liked this book, despite the fact that I was reading it for research. However, I think Fuller’s points needed more practical direction in some areas. I realize this was mainly philosophical work, but he references the modern era’s takes on trusting the natural law often without addressing them (in my mind). As a result, this feels quite dated.
Overall though, such a solid, informative work that explains law well to anyone remotely interested
Are all laws morally right? Should all morally wrong things remain illegal? To whom do we owe “good behavior” and who is a part of a particular moral community? All good questions, and all of which are analyzed in depth in this book. The morality of law, its concept, where it came from, and what it is meant to do- those are the subject of Fuller’s inquiry. In this book he sets up what I believe to be one of the most thoroughly persuasive and straightforward interpretation of the foundations of law, using surprisingly interesting hypothetical instances to make his point (the tales of Rex the King- an idiot who is trying to make laws work and the problem of the Grudge Informer- should you punish people who have worked out their grudges by legal means and how?). I really liked this book, despite the fact that I was reading it for research. However, I think Fuller’s points needed more practical direction in some areas. I realize this was mainly philosophical work, but he references the modern era’s takes on trusting the natural law often without addressing them (in my mind). As a result, this feels quite dated.
Overall though, such a solid, informative work that explains law well to anyone remotely interested
January 5, 2024
Nesse clássico da jusfilosofia, resultado de palestras ministradas em 1963, Fuller postula que o direito se orienta por uma moral do dever: moralidade de requisitos básicos para a vida social. Então, argumenta que o bom senso dá alguns padrões objetivos para uma moralidade do dever que orienta as sanções do direito.
A partir disso, sugere que o direito dispõe de uma "moralidade interna". Os requisitos dessa moralidade são: generalidade, promulgação, leis prospectivas, leis claras, leis não contraditórias, leis que não preconizam o impossível, leis constantes no tempo, congruência do Estado com as normas postas. Para Fuller, "infrações à moralidade do direito tendem a se tornar cumulativas".
Fuller diz que sua concepção é uma variação de direito natural. A moralidade interna é uma "versão processual do direito natural" (p. 119). Trata-se do modo de construir o direito. Então, diz que "o direito é o desafio de submeter a conduta humana ao governo das normas" (p. 129). Passa o restante do livro contestando outras concepções que integram a jurisprudência analítica do direito: Hart, Kelsen, etc, ao sustentar que o direito exige alguma relação com as normas morais para ser direito.
A partir disso, sugere que o direito dispõe de uma "moralidade interna". Os requisitos dessa moralidade são: generalidade, promulgação, leis prospectivas, leis claras, leis não contraditórias, leis que não preconizam o impossível, leis constantes no tempo, congruência do Estado com as normas postas. Para Fuller, "infrações à moralidade do direito tendem a se tornar cumulativas".
Fuller diz que sua concepção é uma variação de direito natural. A moralidade interna é uma "versão processual do direito natural" (p. 119). Trata-se do modo de construir o direito. Então, diz que "o direito é o desafio de submeter a conduta humana ao governo das normas" (p. 129). Passa o restante do livro contestando outras concepções que integram a jurisprudência analítica do direito: Hart, Kelsen, etc, ao sustentar que o direito exige alguma relação com as normas morais para ser direito.
July 20, 2023
It is a category error to give works like this a star rating, because that's not really the point of reading them. Fuller is significant not because his work is 'good' but simply because it is significant. He makes the strongest case possible for a kind of watered-down natural law fitting for a liberal, secular society, but in this regard was on a bit of a fool's errand, as the passing of six decades has shown. Ultimately modern liberalism cannot sit alongside a doctrine of natural right - the two tug in fundamentally different directions, as all of our contemporary debates about trans rights, abortion, euthanasia, divorce, etc., show. With that said, he also demonstrates the basic emptiness of legal positivism and its disconnection to the reality of lawmaking, which in itself is important.
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December 26, 2024'Legal morality can be said to be neutral over a wide range of ethical issues, but it cannot be neutral in its view of man himself.'
'There can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted.'
'Moral principles cannot function in a social vacuum or in a war of all against all.'
'Lawgiving not only involves a relationship with persons, but responsibilities to them.'
'There can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted.'
'Moral principles cannot function in a social vacuum or in a war of all against all.'
'Lawgiving not only involves a relationship with persons, but responsibilities to them.'
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 15, 2017
Fuller's claim is that we cannot properly understand the law if we separate it from the ideal of the rule of law: the relationship is really one of equivalence, for the rule of law and law are just different ways of talking about the same idea. Students studying Jurisprudence will find this book invaluable to their study of the theory of law. Highly recommended!
April 5, 2020
I agree more with Fuller's arguments in the Hart-Fuller debate. But, the way this book is written just reminds me of the meme about lawyers not being able to speak/write normal English. Some of the debate sounded quite emotionally-driven and personal, which was a bit amusing to read.
June 1, 2021
"Я вважаю, що якби нам довелося обирати принцип, який виправдовує й надихає будь-яке людське прагнення - ми знайшли б його в меті підтримання зв'язку зі своїми собратами." - одна з найгуманістичніших книжок світової літератури)
June 23, 2023
The first chapter and the appendix were quite strong. I did not get as much out of the rest as I would have liked, but that is probably my own fault. I should probably read Hart's "Concept of Law" to gain a more complete understanding.
November 17, 2025
An unjustly neglected classic in the philosophy of law. Chapters 1 and 2 are excellent and essential. 3 and 4 are skippable. But the reply to critics is tremendous. Fuller is a delightful writer - wise, insightful, and often quite funny.
Highly recommended!
Highly recommended!
November 11, 2020
Idealist in the best (philosophic) sense; indeed, quite unnatural it is, contrary to how it is usually described. What could be more unnatural than morality, in law or otherwise?
November 15, 2022
I learned a lot from this book, definitely a bit dry at times, but I appreciated Fuller’s dedication to examples and his polite response to critics.
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December 4, 2025well-...ciekawe jak ja napisze ten esej
December 13, 2025
More King Rex allegories would have been appreciated
law
September 27, 2011I liked it. It had some vague bits in there, but that probably has something to do with the discrepancy between the time of release and me reading it in 2011. For me, it held some really interesting thoughts on law and if I have the time, I'd be very happy to read it again.
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January 10, 2015buku yang luar biasa
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