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Stanford Nuclear Age Series
The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban missile crisis was the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War and the most perilous moment in American history. In this dramatic narrative written especially for students and general readers, Sheldon M. Stern, longtime historian at the John F. Kennedy Library, enables the reader to follow the often harrowing twists and turns of the crisis.
Based on the author’s authoritative transcriptions of the secretly recorded ExComm meetings, the book conveys the emotional ambiance of the meetings by capturing striking moments of tension and anger as well as occasional humorous intervals. Unlike today's readers, the participants did not have the luxury of knowing how this potentially catastrophic showdown would turn out, and their uncertainty often gives their discussions the nerve-racking quality of a fictional thriller. As President Kennedy told his advisers, “What we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don't know the ending of.”
Stern documents that JFK and his administration bore a substantial share of the responsibility for the crisis. Covert operations in Cuba, including efforts to kill Fidel Castro, had convinced Nikita Khrushchev that only the deployment of nuclear weapons could protect Cuba from imminent attack. However, President Kennedy, a seasoned Cold Warrior in public, was deeply suspicious of military solutions to political problems and appalled by the prospect of nuclear war. He consistently steered policy makers away from an apocalyptic nuclear conflict, measuring each move and countermove with an eye to averting what he called, with stark eloquence, “the final failure.”
Based on the author’s authoritative transcriptions of the secretly recorded ExComm meetings, the book conveys the emotional ambiance of the meetings by capturing striking moments of tension and anger as well as occasional humorous intervals. Unlike today's readers, the participants did not have the luxury of knowing how this potentially catastrophic showdown would turn out, and their uncertainty often gives their discussions the nerve-racking quality of a fictional thriller. As President Kennedy told his advisers, “What we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don't know the ending of.”
Stern documents that JFK and his administration bore a substantial share of the responsibility for the crisis. Covert operations in Cuba, including efforts to kill Fidel Castro, had convinced Nikita Khrushchev that only the deployment of nuclear weapons could protect Cuba from imminent attack. However, President Kennedy, a seasoned Cold Warrior in public, was deeply suspicious of military solutions to political problems and appalled by the prospect of nuclear war. He consistently steered policy makers away from an apocalyptic nuclear conflict, measuring each move and countermove with an eye to averting what he called, with stark eloquence, “the final failure.”
256 pages, Paperback
First published January 18, 2005
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October 5, 2021
By the summer of 1973, when the Watergate scandal shook the nation and presidential aide Alexander Butterfield revealed that President Nixon had installed a voice-activating taping system to covertly record his White House meetings and discussions, the heroic version of the Cuban Missile Crisis, promoted by John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and other insiders, had already been established and widely accepted. It depicted President Kennedy as successfully resisting the Soviet Union's nuclear provocation and winning a definite victory over the Communist adversary.
This myth did not stand for long, though, because due to the growing opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1970s, key foreign policy documents were declassified and revealed to the public that John F. Kennedy and his administration, in fact, bore considerable responsibility for the Cuban Missile Crisis. The war Kennedy waged against Cuba was kept secret from Americans, but could not be concealed from the Soviet intelligence and from Cuba. Operation Mongoose, which included sabotage and subversion against the Cuban economy, plots to overthrow and/ or assassinate Castro, and “contingency plans” to blockade, bomb, or re-invade Cuba, became one of the largest clandestine operations in CIA history, “involving some four hundred agents, an annual budget of over $50 million and a variety of covert, economic, and psychological operations." Mongoose was headed by Robert Kennedy, whom even CIA director of operations Richard Bissel considered "a wild man" on the subject.
President John F. Kennedy himself acknowledged during the Crisis that Cuba was a fixation of the American government, not a serious threat. By October 1962 this “fixation” had already led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco and to state-supported sabotage and murder attempts. It also contributed significantly to Khrushchev’s decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. His initial explanation for his decision was truthful: he had not planned to use the missiles to threaten the security of the United States, but rather to discourage further American attempts to attack Cuba.
As the Ex Comm tapes on which Stern bases his study demonstrate, though, while John Kennedy's clandestine war on Fidel Castro did trigger the Cuban Missile Crisis, during the week the world stood still the President displayed remarkable intellectual and political skill, single-handedly steered his hawkish advisers and the two rival superpowers away from mutual nuclear destruction. His Second World War experience fighting the Japanese in the South Pacific taught him that war, even without atomic weapons, was unpredictable, destructive, and uncontrollable. A Cold Warrior in public, in private he distrusted the military, was skeptical about military solutions to political problems, and horrified by the prospect of global nuclear war.
In the insider accounts of participants, and especially in Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days, President Kennedy's efficient management of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during that nightmarish week in October 1962 is understated. Commenting on a version of Bobby's memoir written six months after his brother's assassination, special assistant and confidant Kenneth O’Donnell remarked, "I thought Jack was President during the missile crisis.” Bobby, who was running for a Senate seat from New York, allegedly replied, "He’s not running, and I am.”
Indeed, as the Ex Comm tape recordings reveal, John F. Kennedy's handling of the Crisis had been much more consistent and effective than the Attorney General wrote it was. The President never lost his temper and remained all but imperturbable in the face of severe opposition from the Joint Chiefs, the ExComm, and Congressional leaders. When General Curtis Lemay declared that imposing a naval blockade instead of invading was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich," and the navy, army, and marine chiefs unanimously agreed that the only viable solution in Cuba was "the full gamut of military action by us," for instance, Kennedy insisted that a Soviet nuclear strike on American cities would result in 80–100 million casualties: “you’re talkin’ about the destruction of a country.” The point, he tried to persuade the hawks, “is to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation. . . . We’ve got to have some degree of control.”
During some of the meetings, and especially during exchanges with General LeMay and Senators Russell and Fulbright, the President was exasperated by their doctrinaire thinking and lack of imagination. The recordings prove that before making a decision, he discussed every major option in exhaustive detail. He rejected advice in favor of aggression over and over again and persisted in working our a solution different than nuclear war. President John F. Kennedy was not guided by the collective (lack of) wisdom of the Ex Comm advisers, but dragged them kicking and screaming towards a peaceful solution.
According to Stern, the Ex Comm's stubborn opposition in fact did the President a favor. His inclination to accept the Cuba-Turkey trade Khrushchev proposed was fortified by the fact that everyone was firmly against it.
The tapes also dispel the myth of the renowned "Trollope Ploy," which gained its popularity thanks to Thirteen Days. One of the best known incidents of the Crisis was Khrushchev's sending Kennedy a letter on October 26, in which he proposed to remove the missile from Cuba if the American government pledged not to invade the island nation, and then, on October 27, publicly changing his first offer by demanding that the United States also withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. In his account, Robert F. Kennedy claims that he suggested accepting the proposal in Khrushchev’s first letter and ignoring the second message. This allegedly brilliant diplomatic strategy came to be called the “Trollope ploy” after a plot device by nineteenth-century British novelist Anthony Trollope, in which a woman interprets a casual romantic gesture as a marriage proposal.
However, the Trollope ploy was simply never put into action. President Kennedy, as the October 27 tapes chronicle, persistently argued that Khrushchev’s Saturday offer could not be ignored because it had been made public, and his eventual answer to the Soviet leader did not ignore the Saturday proposal, but encouraged postponing the settlement of less pressing international issues to a time when the urgent danger would be removed. "JFK ultimately offered the Kremlin a calculated blend of Khrushchev’s October 26 and 27 proposals: the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, an American non-invasion pledge (contingent on U.N. inspection), a willingness to talk later about NATO-related issues, and a secret commitment to withdraw the Jupiters from Turkey," writes Stern. Although his brother pressured him a lot not to give up on Khrushchev's first offer, the President was skeptical and realized the Soviet leader would not give up on his public proposal.
Overall, President John F. Kennedy rose above the Cold War ideology and stood alone against his whole gung ho counsel for thirteen days. After the Crisis was successfully averted, he confided to his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith: "You will never know how much bad advice I had.” Now, thanks to the secret recordings John Kennedy never imagined would be made available to the general public, we know.
THE WEEK THE WORLD STOOD STILL is a fascinating narrative analysis of the Ex Comm meetings during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Drawing upon Kennedy's tape recordings, Sheldon M. Stern traces exactly what occurred behind close doors and unravels the mystery of who really played the crucial role in steering the hawks away from a nuclear war. I highly recommend this book to anyone, who has read, or is going to read, Robert F. Kennedy's memoir, Thirteen Days, or who is convinced President John F. Kennedy was an uncompromising Cold Warrior.
This myth did not stand for long, though, because due to the growing opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1970s, key foreign policy documents were declassified and revealed to the public that John F. Kennedy and his administration, in fact, bore considerable responsibility for the Cuban Missile Crisis. The war Kennedy waged against Cuba was kept secret from Americans, but could not be concealed from the Soviet intelligence and from Cuba. Operation Mongoose, which included sabotage and subversion against the Cuban economy, plots to overthrow and/ or assassinate Castro, and “contingency plans” to blockade, bomb, or re-invade Cuba, became one of the largest clandestine operations in CIA history, “involving some four hundred agents, an annual budget of over $50 million and a variety of covert, economic, and psychological operations." Mongoose was headed by Robert Kennedy, whom even CIA director of operations Richard Bissel considered "a wild man" on the subject.
President John F. Kennedy himself acknowledged during the Crisis that Cuba was a fixation of the American government, not a serious threat. By October 1962 this “fixation” had already led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco and to state-supported sabotage and murder attempts. It also contributed significantly to Khrushchev’s decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. His initial explanation for his decision was truthful: he had not planned to use the missiles to threaten the security of the United States, but rather to discourage further American attempts to attack Cuba.
As the Ex Comm tapes on which Stern bases his study demonstrate, though, while John Kennedy's clandestine war on Fidel Castro did trigger the Cuban Missile Crisis, during the week the world stood still the President displayed remarkable intellectual and political skill, single-handedly steered his hawkish advisers and the two rival superpowers away from mutual nuclear destruction. His Second World War experience fighting the Japanese in the South Pacific taught him that war, even without atomic weapons, was unpredictable, destructive, and uncontrollable. A Cold Warrior in public, in private he distrusted the military, was skeptical about military solutions to political problems, and horrified by the prospect of global nuclear war.
In the insider accounts of participants, and especially in Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days, President Kennedy's efficient management of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during that nightmarish week in October 1962 is understated. Commenting on a version of Bobby's memoir written six months after his brother's assassination, special assistant and confidant Kenneth O’Donnell remarked, "I thought Jack was President during the missile crisis.” Bobby, who was running for a Senate seat from New York, allegedly replied, "He’s not running, and I am.”
Indeed, as the Ex Comm tape recordings reveal, John F. Kennedy's handling of the Crisis had been much more consistent and effective than the Attorney General wrote it was. The President never lost his temper and remained all but imperturbable in the face of severe opposition from the Joint Chiefs, the ExComm, and Congressional leaders. When General Curtis Lemay declared that imposing a naval blockade instead of invading was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich," and the navy, army, and marine chiefs unanimously agreed that the only viable solution in Cuba was "the full gamut of military action by us," for instance, Kennedy insisted that a Soviet nuclear strike on American cities would result in 80–100 million casualties: “you’re talkin’ about the destruction of a country.” The point, he tried to persuade the hawks, “is to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation. . . . We’ve got to have some degree of control.”
During some of the meetings, and especially during exchanges with General LeMay and Senators Russell and Fulbright, the President was exasperated by their doctrinaire thinking and lack of imagination. The recordings prove that before making a decision, he discussed every major option in exhaustive detail. He rejected advice in favor of aggression over and over again and persisted in working our a solution different than nuclear war. President John F. Kennedy was not guided by the collective (lack of) wisdom of the Ex Comm advisers, but dragged them kicking and screaming towards a peaceful solution.
According to Stern, the Ex Comm's stubborn opposition in fact did the President a favor. His inclination to accept the Cuba-Turkey trade Khrushchev proposed was fortified by the fact that everyone was firmly against it.
The tapes also dispel the myth of the renowned "Trollope Ploy," which gained its popularity thanks to Thirteen Days. One of the best known incidents of the Crisis was Khrushchev's sending Kennedy a letter on October 26, in which he proposed to remove the missile from Cuba if the American government pledged not to invade the island nation, and then, on October 27, publicly changing his first offer by demanding that the United States also withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. In his account, Robert F. Kennedy claims that he suggested accepting the proposal in Khrushchev’s first letter and ignoring the second message. This allegedly brilliant diplomatic strategy came to be called the “Trollope ploy” after a plot device by nineteenth-century British novelist Anthony Trollope, in which a woman interprets a casual romantic gesture as a marriage proposal.
However, the Trollope ploy was simply never put into action. President Kennedy, as the October 27 tapes chronicle, persistently argued that Khrushchev’s Saturday offer could not be ignored because it had been made public, and his eventual answer to the Soviet leader did not ignore the Saturday proposal, but encouraged postponing the settlement of less pressing international issues to a time when the urgent danger would be removed. "JFK ultimately offered the Kremlin a calculated blend of Khrushchev’s October 26 and 27 proposals: the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, an American non-invasion pledge (contingent on U.N. inspection), a willingness to talk later about NATO-related issues, and a secret commitment to withdraw the Jupiters from Turkey," writes Stern. Although his brother pressured him a lot not to give up on Khrushchev's first offer, the President was skeptical and realized the Soviet leader would not give up on his public proposal.
Overall, President John F. Kennedy rose above the Cold War ideology and stood alone against his whole gung ho counsel for thirteen days. After the Crisis was successfully averted, he confided to his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith: "You will never know how much bad advice I had.” Now, thanks to the secret recordings John Kennedy never imagined would be made available to the general public, we know.
THE WEEK THE WORLD STOOD STILL is a fascinating narrative analysis of the Ex Comm meetings during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Drawing upon Kennedy's tape recordings, Sheldon M. Stern traces exactly what occurred behind close doors and unravels the mystery of who really played the crucial role in steering the hawks away from a nuclear war. I highly recommend this book to anyone, who has read, or is going to read, Robert F. Kennedy's memoir, Thirteen Days, or who is convinced President John F. Kennedy was an uncompromising Cold Warrior.
January 8, 2022
This was a work read.
Well put together narrative that draws extensively from the verbatim records
Well put together narrative that draws extensively from the verbatim records
November 22, 2017
I recently read a book about the Cuban Missile Crisis called, The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis by Sheldon M. Stern. This book takes an inside look at the secret ExComm meetings held between President Kennedy and a group of government officials during the crisis that almost led the world to nuclear war. More specifically, the book highlights the secret recordings that the president took during the meetings, without the knowledge of the other members of ExComm, save his brother Robert. It includes personal insights from each official and shares how they wanted to deal with the crisis.
In writing this book, the author listened to every single recording of these secret meetings. The author decided to present these conversations in narrative form. This narrative style is the best way to relate to the event because it brings an up close and personal view of how people across America during the Cuban missile crisis lived moment by moment not knowing if they would live to see another day. Even though I knew the ending, the book still kept me in suspense until the issue was finally resolved. This book seeks to clarify already known information, as well as bring forth the previously classified information, to give the reader the best possible understanding of the event and everything that transpired. In that sense, the book did a marvelous job of telling the story.
In my opinion, the book is lacking in several aspects. While the narrative format was a refreshing take on the nonfiction style, I found myself wanting to skim through some parts. Since the book focused mainly on the conversations at the ExComm meetings, the book did drag on at times. The author included every conversation in the finest detail from all persons in the meetings. This became somewhat repetitive. Overall, this book was a refreshing new take on an extremely important event in history.
In writing this book, the author listened to every single recording of these secret meetings. The author decided to present these conversations in narrative form. This narrative style is the best way to relate to the event because it brings an up close and personal view of how people across America during the Cuban missile crisis lived moment by moment not knowing if they would live to see another day. Even though I knew the ending, the book still kept me in suspense until the issue was finally resolved. This book seeks to clarify already known information, as well as bring forth the previously classified information, to give the reader the best possible understanding of the event and everything that transpired. In that sense, the book did a marvelous job of telling the story.
In my opinion, the book is lacking in several aspects. While the narrative format was a refreshing take on the nonfiction style, I found myself wanting to skim through some parts. Since the book focused mainly on the conversations at the ExComm meetings, the book did drag on at times. The author included every conversation in the finest detail from all persons in the meetings. This became somewhat repetitive. Overall, this book was a refreshing new take on an extremely important event in history.
February 9, 2025
Read this for class. It was fine, but I am shocked by how little of the literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis mentions any historical context. I don’t even think it clearly explained the Bay of Pigs, which feels….important, to say the least.
June 6, 2017
This book offers a narrative summary of the taped deliberations of JFK's Executive Committee (EXCOM) of his National Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It also deftly provides larger context and descriptions of outside events throughout the crisis.
What stands out most is the delicate way that JFK managed these meetings and how he resisted almost unanimous opposition to his preferred course of action from the EXCOM members, especially the Joint Chiefs. Although I have never been a fan of the Kennedy hagiography that has emerged over the years, with all its myths of JFK's sainthood and almost other-worldly wisdom, it is difficult not to marvel at his performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
JFK appears steady and thoughtful in his approach. The more bellicose members of the EXCOM were difficult to manage, but he didn't falter. This book provides a fascinating picture of the secret deliberations that could very well have launched a global nuclear confrontation. Luckily for all mankind, JFK was resolute and wise even when it seemed that the supposed best minds in the US government were against his thinking.
What stands out most is the delicate way that JFK managed these meetings and how he resisted almost unanimous opposition to his preferred course of action from the EXCOM members, especially the Joint Chiefs. Although I have never been a fan of the Kennedy hagiography that has emerged over the years, with all its myths of JFK's sainthood and almost other-worldly wisdom, it is difficult not to marvel at his performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
JFK appears steady and thoughtful in his approach. The more bellicose members of the EXCOM were difficult to manage, but he didn't falter. This book provides a fascinating picture of the secret deliberations that could very well have launched a global nuclear confrontation. Luckily for all mankind, JFK was resolute and wise even when it seemed that the supposed best minds in the US government were against his thinking.
September 24, 2019
The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis by Sheldon Stern is a condensed narrative telling of the Cuban Missile Crisis within President John F. Kennedy's Executive Committee for the National Security Council. Its a difficult book to judge for quality's sake, since for the most part the author is really only a mildly intrusive editorializing agent trying to convey some points and details that add context for some of the discussions, usually for when things go quite badly. That said, the book itself is a good reference text for someone interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and wants to take a step away from the myths and popular historical approaches. I've got mixed feelings about the book, but overall the impression is favorable. I'd say it does exactly what it sets out to do, but little more.
85/100
85/100
April 8, 2022
Stern takes a critical and fascinating moment in world history, the point at which the planet approached destruction, and renders it into plodding prose. How does one make nuclear war boring? Read Stern to find out.
Read 20%.
Read 20%.
June 22, 2017
Drawing from recordings of meetings and conversations in the Kennedy White House.
May 1, 2023
This is probably one of the best books I read about the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is thorough and very informative.
November 21, 2012
The now available White House tape transcripts reveal the real discussions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Stern allows the principals to speak while giving a narrative context. Shows how Kennedy was not the hard-charging Cold Warrior during these talks, but the voice of reason against those who wanted to bomb away.
March 28, 2013
Good read. I knew a good bit about the crisis already but this book thanks to the fact it's based on real transcripts gives great insight. Hard not to respect Kennedy for what he did in facing down so many hawks in his administration who wanted a more hostile course of action that likely would have ended civilisation as we know it.
January 25, 2016
I have read a few books on the Cuban Missle Crisis but this is the first I have read that involves the actual tapes that were recorded at the meetings of the Kennedy Whitehouse. This is an amazing book. The people of the United States did not know at the time how close to nuclear war we really were. You can feel the intensity and stress as you read this book. Truly amazing.
December 10, 2010
I now understand the Cold War a little bit better. It was hard understanding how people could be so afraid and it made how people felt scared the world would end real to me. I didn't get that until now.
May 16, 2013
It was interesting, but I found it tedious at times, and found myself skimming through bits.
July 14, 2013
Reads as one long conversation between President Kennedy and his staff and advisors. Gets very tedious at times.
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews