World War Two: Behind Closed Doors. Laurence Rees

by Laurence Rees

When do you think the Second World War ended? If the end of the war was supposed to have brought 'freedom' to countries that suffered under Nazi occupation, then for millions it did not really end until the fall of Communism. In the summer of 1945 many of the countries in Eastern Europe simply swapped the rule of one tyrant, Adolf Hitler, for that of Joseph Stalin. Why this happened has remained one of the most troubling questions of the entire conflict, and is at the heart of Laurence Rees' dramatic book. In World War Behind Closed Doors , Rees provides an intimate 'behind the scenes' history of the West's dealings with Joseph Stalin - an account which uses material only available since the opening of archives in the East as well as new testimony from witnesses from the period. An enthralling mix of high politics and the often heart-rending personal experiences of those on the ground, it will make you rethink what you believe about World War II.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, War, Politics, Russia, Military History

442 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2008

About the author

In addition to writing, Rees has also produced films about World War II for the BBC.

In New York in January 2009, Laurence was presented with the ‘Lifetime Achievement Award’ by ‘History Makers’, the worldwide congress of History and Current Affairs programme makers

In 2011 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate (DUniv) by The Open University(UK).

Reviews

[Boudewijn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is really about Stalin. He was the one who both dealt with Hitler and Churchill and Roosevelt. Stalin is portrayed as an unscrupulous dictator who managed to use his diplomatic mastery to delude both Churchill and Roosevelt, but got deluded on his own by Hitler. When Churchill and Roosevelt saw the real Stalin, it was already to late. Interesting book about an interesting man and I really liked Laurence Rees's writing style.

[Ina Cawl · Rating 4 out of 5]

What a great book about the intrigues and secret deals between our four main Characters
1- Hitler
2- Stalin
3- Churchill
4- Roosevelt
A shocking Surprising and Exhilarating book.
truly this book will intrigue us and change how we believed how the war happened
a must read book

[Христо Блажев · Rating 4 out of 5]

Дипломатическата страна на Втората световна война: http://knigolandia.info/book-review/t...

Книгата по своята същност е допломатическа история на войната – за разлика от повечето други книги, акцентът не е върху бойните действия, върху подялбата на Полша, разгрома на Франция, въздушната война над Острова, 22 юни 1941 г., Москва, Сталинград, Курск, Нормандия, Берлин. Напротив, Рийс се фокусира върху не по-малко важните отношения между знаковите лидери на воюващите страни. Но за мен лично най-интересна е първата глава, която е по тема, която обикновено се подминава с няколко думи и някоя снимка на Молотов и Рибентроп. Говоря, разбира се, за нацистко-съветския пакт и подялбата на Полша, като топлите отношения продължават буквално до ранните часове на оная юнска утрин. Рийс задълбава в преговорите около пакта, непознатата ми досега тайна съветска военна помощ за германците, пътуванията на дипломати между двете столици и в крайна сметка какво кара Сталин до последно да разчита, че може да избегне атаката.

CIELA Books
http://knigolandia.info/book-review/t...

[Vadym · Rating 4 out of 5]

Вирізані цитати тут: https://vadymklymenko.com/blog/lauren...

[Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

Книгата проследява в подробности отношенията между Сталин, Чърчил и Рузвелт в периода от 1939 до края на ВСВ и съвсем малко след това. Германия изобщо не участва в тази история. Обърнато е внимание на начина на правене на политика по време на война, което отвсякъде си е мръсна работа.
Лорънс Рийс развива две линии на историята – от една страна са политиците и от другата – редовите войници и цивилните. Включени са нещо като интервюта с участници във войната –войници, офицери, дипломати на ниски длъжности, секретари, оцелели цивилни. Може би иска да покаже как решения, взимани в комфорта на конферентни и банкетни зали, на пълен стомах и пияна глава се отразяват върху милиони хора, които нямат нито контрол, нито вина за съдбата си. Ако това са тайните на ВСВ, то те от много отдавна не са тайни, особено по нашите географски ширини. Според Рийс Западният свят има (или е имал) романтично отношение към участието на Великобритания и САЩ във ВСВ, а това е напълно погрешно, защото двете държави са допуснали сериозни политически грешки, подлости, неспазени обещания спрямо останалите народи в Европа. Поради тази причина са умрели милиони, голяма част от тях по особено мъчителен начин.
Отдавна не е тайна какво са правили руснаците, американците и британците през ВСВ. Не е тайна как Сталин, Чърчил и Рузвелт са разделили света. Или как вторият фронт е открит с поне две години закъснение, как убитите от страна на САЩ, Великобритания и останалите съюзници са 400 хил, а убитите руснаци – 27 милиона. Не съм поразена от политиката, която са водили Съюзниците. Войната е мръсна работа, няма страна, която да остане почтена по време на война. Не е имало и няма да има. Така че ласкавото отношение на Рузвелт към Сталин, предателството спрямо Полша, лъжите за Катин – нищо от това не може да ме шокира, дори и да не ми беше известно. Авторът се опитва да дава морална оценка на това или онова поведение, но на мен ми звучи нелепо и смешно. Всъщност преценявам от позицията на 2025 година, а не на 2008, когато е писана книгата. През последните три години международният ред се промени и немислими преди неща вече са приемливи, дори нормални. На фона на днешния ден съглашенията от преди 80 години ми изглеждат напълно логични, макар да го казвам с огромно съжаление.

[Volodymyr · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a great book, and I would definitely recommend it to anyone who has at least some interest in the topic (WW2). This isn't your typical boring historical book full of raw facts, but rather a captivating narrative about the key people people in the war (Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt). It is based on the logs of the meetings that took place between them, personal opinions of important political figures (e.g. foreign ministers of US/UK), and many other sources that are never used when writing a "proper" historical book. This way you get a unique glance at approaches used by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, as well as their personalities.

For example, Roosevelt preferred to send his pawns to Churchill or Stalin when he had to negotiate an action that could potentially upset the other of the two (instead of doing it himself). When he got caught, he blamed the pawn and claimed that he personally had no intention of doing the item in question. Or you get to see Stalin's brilliance when it came to Machiavellian techniques of preserving power - for example after the war was over, he relocated his star general and war hero (Zhukov) into a minor region, as Zhukov was a threat to his power. There are many more (including countless executions and imprisonments).

Out of the three, it appears that Stalin had the most cunning to get what he wanted as the result of the negotiations - it is very unfortunate how easily US and UK gave up the fates of Central and Eastern Europe, although that was the price of saving lives of their soldiers.

Lastly, one of the key objectives of this book was to disprove WW2 as the war between the good and the evil. There is no question that Nazis were evil, nor there are any questions about noble intentions of US and UK (using the word "action" here would be a stretch - the book illustrates that). Everything changes when you throw USSR into the mix. With countless repressions, starting wars against peaceful countries and genocide that killed millions on their hands already (before WW2), USSR proceeded with mass murder of civilians, mass deportations of minorities and mass rape. Therefore, it is quite hard to label them as "good" (to say the least).

TLDR: read this book!

[Marysya · Rating 4 out of 5]

Книга про тотальну несправедливість і безкарність радянської влади, боягузливість і цинічний прагматизм союзників, їхнє небажання приймати реальність (вони також заглядали в очі Сталіна) і відповідати за наслідки своїх дій; жорстокість та безчинства солдатів червоної армії на окупованих територіях, чиї нащадки повторюють їхні "подвиги" зараз в Україні.
І найголовніше - це зрада - зрада союзниками Польщі (кордони і долю якої визначали без неї - діалог Черчилля і Миколайчика дуже показовий), зрада ідеалів та принципів Атлантичної хартії. Польський кейс тут дуже трагічний і болючий, бо певним чином нагадує українську ситуацію зараз, де ми також залежимо від підтримки та позицій наших союзників.
Якщо ви читали книгу автора про Гітлера і Сталіна, то ця буде моментами повторюватись, лише зміщуючи акцент на Сталіна.
Якщо ще нічого не читали про Альянс і стосунки між союзниками, то ця книга дуже добра для знайомства з даною темою.

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Книгата не трябва да се казва "тайните" на ВСВ (впрочем заглавието на английски е друго), а по-скоро -"неудобните истини" на ВСВ. Вкаменените поддръжници на СССР и "отечествената" война, но също и безкритичните американо- и англофили, дори да прочетат книгата, твърдо съм убеден, че няма да повярват на написаното за пакта "Рибентроп-Молтов", за "Катин", за Полша, за Техеран и Ялта. Това би противоречало на един десетилетно налаган и идеологизиран прочит на историята. Не 50, а поне 100 години трябва да минат, за да се проумее случилото се през 30-те и 40-те на миналия век. Книгата на Рийс е увлекателно написана и се чете много бързо. За да не тежи, към дипломатическата фактология са добавени много лични спомени на свидетели, интервюирани лично от автора. Жалко единствено, че няма научен апарат, но това е цената на популярната история.

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

-Principalmente, de la URSS y sus relaciones con los diferentes implicados en la Segunda Guerra Mundial.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. Relato más político que militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial principalmente (que no de forma exclusiva) desde la perspectiva de la Unión Soviética y de las diferentes relaciones que mantuvo con los beligerantes en la contienda en distintos momentos, de sus actividades sobre sus propios súbditos y de las actitudes de sus líderes.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Rajat Jain · Rating 5 out of 5]

My takeaways after reading this book:

* Dictators are the most powerful people on earth: Stalin > FDR. Xi Jinping > Trump/Obama today. FDR always had elections to fight. Stalin never. Amazing how the Allies bent over backwards to appease Stalin.

* Above was also the "cost" they had to pay to ensure Allied casualties were limited. The "cost" of such enormous power to Stalin was 26M Russians (not that he cared about them). Allies had as much casualties in total (or even lesser!) as the Russians lost in single battles (Kursk/Stalingrad).

* Churchill: biggest hypocrite. Amazing how he kept talking about freedom and democracy and yet never wanted to let go of the British Empire (or never hesitated to orchestrate the Bengal famine, but kept taking offence on the Polish massacre).

* Was Stalin even worse than Hitler? Decisively so, in my opinion.

* FDR: One of the best political leaders of the 20th century. Reaffirmed by this book.

[Chris Wray · Rating 5 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed this, and found it arresting, stimulating and accessible. A rare combination! In some ways, it is a history of the Second World War, albeit one that takes a unique approach. More than that, it is a book about relationships - especially those between the 'big three' Allied leaders, and how those relationships shaped both the progress of the war and our subsequent understanding of it. Furthermore, it is a book about Joseph Stalin, whose shadow lies heavily on almost every page.

Rees begins by reminding us that the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War was long "denied a proper place in our culture because it was easier than facing up to a variety of unpalatable truths. Did we, for example, really contribute to the terrible fate that in 1945 befell Poland, the very country we went to war to protect? Especially when we were taught that this was a war about confronting tyranny?" He then asks, even more pointedly, whether the actions of our two great heroes, Roosevelt and Churchill, contributed to large swathes of Eastern Europe remaining under tyranny for another forty-five years. Rees insightfully contends that the best way to start unpacking these questions is to focus on Stalin, and this immediately brings the moral ambiguity of Britain and the USA's position into sharp focus. Stalin was as happy working with the Nazis as the Western democracies, being solely motivated by self-interest. Rees comments that "The Soviet Communists and the German Nazis had a lot in common - not ideologically, of course, but in practical terms. Each of them respected the importance of raw power. And each of them despised the values that a man like Franklin Roosevelt held most dear, such as freedom of speech and the rule of law." Stalin never attained such mutual interest and understanding with either Churchill or Roosevelt, and disturbingly was at his most relaxed when carving up Europe with von Ribbentrop. As with many uncomfortable truths in the Soviet Union, these facts were publicly ignored and suppressed.

The fundamental nature of Stalinism was obvious from the outset, and the injustices and atrocities committed after the end of the war mirrored those already committed in Eastern Poland between 1939 and 1941. Both Churchill and Roosevelt knew exactly what kind of man, and what kind of regime, they were dealing with, as neither was enthusiastic about the forced alliance with Stalin. Churchill memorably described it as akin to a pact with the Devil. The need for this alliance is unquestionable, and equally clear is the fact no one was going to be able to change either Stalin or his regime. But as Rees points out, what is much less justifiable is the apparent change in heart displayed by both Churchill and Roosevelt as time went on, culminating in their, apparently, sincere statements after Yalta in February 1945 that Stalin, "meant well to the world" and was "reasonable and sensible." This sea change forms the meat of the book, and it is worth quoting Rees at length: "Roosevelt and Churchill were sophisticated politicians, and it is wrong to suppose that they were simply duped by Stalin. No, something altogether more interesting - and more complicated - takes place in this history. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to win the war at the least possible cost to their own respective countries, in both human and financial terms. Keeping Stalin 'on-side', particularly during the years before D-Day when the Soviets believed they were fighting the war almost on their own, was a difficult business and required, as Roosevelt would have put it, 'careful handling'. As a result, behind closed doors, the Western leaders felt it necessary to make hard political compromises. One of them was to promote propaganda that painted a rosy picture of the Soviet leader; another was deliberately to suppress material that told the truth about both Stalin and the nature of the Soviet regime. In the process, the Western leaders might easily, for the sake of convenience, have felt they had to 'distort the normal and healthy operation of their intellectual and moral judgements' as one senior British diplomat was memorably to put it during the war."

The 'great man' view of history might be unpopular in academic circles, but it's hard not to see some validity in it when reading this. Rees does a great job of unpacking the characters of the main protagonists, especially Stalin and Roosevelt. Stalin was a terrifying individual, and it is striking how readily and unashamedly he resorted to straightforward brutality, even in front of the other Allied leaders. He was also a shrewd politician, and 'handled' Churchill and Roosevelt much more ably than they could manage him. I was reminded of a statement in Tim Bouverie's excellent book on appeasement, that Chamberlain had never encountered someone quite like Hitler during his political life. I think that also holds for Churchill and Roosevelt's interactions with Stalin. Embarrassingly, Churchill was to state explicitly that where Chamberlain had failed with Hitler, he would succeed with Stalin. Equally embarrassingly, Roosevelt convinced himself that he had established a connection with Stalin and could 'handle' him. The subject also tends to expose the less attractive aspects of Roosevelt's personality. While undoubtedly a great leader, he had an unfortunate tendency towards duplicity and outright dishonesty when it suited him. He constructed barriers of deniability between himself and any ideas he floated by using emissaries like Hopkins and Harriman, and had a habit of concealment, preferring to retain control of events by keeping others in the dark. As Rees concludes, "Stalin was practical, suspicious and looking for the advantage of the moment; Roosevelt presented an extraordinary mix of crafty, workaday politician and idealistic dreamer." Churchill's character isn't as filled out as the other two Allied leaders, which seems appropriate in the wider context of Britain, as decreasing in power and influence compared to the Soviet Union and USA. This became especially clear during the Tehran Conference, when, in the words of Lord Moran, "The PM is appalled by his own impotence."

While the book is primarily about the relationship between the three Allied leaders, Poland is an important member of the supporting cast, and one who appears on the stage at the most inconvenient moments. Soviet aggression in Poland was treated differently to German aggression, and the diplomatic traffic from the time indicates the reluctance to guarantee to the Poles that Britain aimed to recover all their territory. Partly pragmatic, this was also reflective of the fact that considering Poland's Eastern boundary as somewhat 'fluid' might be to Britain's advantage. This is significant "because the Second World War took on the mantle of an entirely 'moral' war, almost a modern-day crusade against evil...but from the first, behind the scenes there was a clear balance to be struck between 'morality' and traditional, old-fashioned, national self-interest."

Rees does a fine job of outlining all the main events (Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, and so on) that are relevant to the developing relationship between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. As none of those individual events is the focus of the book, none of them is considered in much detail. However, Rees has constructed a coherent narrative that enables the reader to understand the significance that each piece makes to the whole. The Atlantic Conference and the resulting Atlantic Charter only served to highlight the clash between the conflicting priorities of doing what is right and doing what is in our self-interest. As Rees memorably puts it, the Atlantic Charter represents nobility of ideal, while much of the relationship with Stalin was purely pragmatic politics. The Charter also represents the conflict evident within Roosevelt, between the practical and hard-headed politician and the internationalist-statesman visionary. In any case, the gulf between these stated ideals and the reality of Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe as the war went on was to be a source of intense embarrassment and discomfort to the Western democracies.

The Tehran conference, rather than Yalta, is convincingly pinpointed as the moment when the Allies determined the fate of post-war Europe, and the boundaries of Poland and Germany agreed there were largely those realised in 1945. This was utterly opposed to the views expressed, particularly by Churchill, only two years earlier. Partly this reflected the fact that the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was a fait accompli, but also represented a stated change in attitude towards both the Soviet Union in general and Stalin in particular. We must conclude that both Roosevelt and Churchill were unwise and wrong in their approach. As Rees puts it passionately, "If Churchill had stated, in effect: 'We accept that the Soviet claims for Poland and other disputed territory such as the Baltic States are wrong - they are unjust - but there is no practical method of putting this right', that would have been the reality. But he felt he could not say that - this was, remember, a 'moral' war - and it was thought essential for the Allies to present a united front to the world to prevent their enemies gaining heart from public discord between them. So Churchill persuaded himself that Stalin and the Soviets had changed. He (and Roosevelt) leapt on any sign that Stalin was a person who kept his word and who wanted to deal cooperatively and honestly with the West to make a better post-war world."

On Yalta, Rees concludes that it was not the point at which "dirty deals were done as the war came to an end - dirty deals that brought dishonour to the otherwise noble enterprise of fighting the Nazis." The central issues and challenges related both to the rest of the war and the post-war world had already been discussed and resolved in principle at Tehran. Little was discussed at Yalta that was substantially new, but the conference did represent the final high point in the West's optimistic dealings with Stalin before new Cold War realities took hold. Churchill was especially aware of this, as Roosevelt was already dying (he would pass away two months later). Regarding Yalta itself, Churchill was not taken with it and amusingly referred to it as "the Riviera of Hades...if we had spent ten years on research, we could not have found a worse place in the world."

The military progress of the war is also weaved skilfully into the narrative, with the Soviet desire for a second front as a constant refrain. Another theme is the gradual strengthening of the Soviet position as they simultaneously pushed Germany westwards and grew in military ability and power. Interestingly, there is a contrast between Hitler and Stalin here as the former interfered more and more in military affairs, while the latter was on the opposite trajectory (which he made up for with a massive dose of paranoia at what his generals might be planning).

Rees raises some pointed questions on how Churchill and Roosevelt conducted themselves towards Stalin, asking, "What would Stalin have done if the Western Allies had kept to their original line and postponed any commitment on borders until the war was over?... Would he have thrown away all cooperation with Churchill and Roosevelt merely because they would not - without the consent of the Poles - agree to move the borders of the whole country? That is surely unlikely. But, it might be argued, what would have been the point in causing this angst when Stalin would shortly have possession of all this territory and could do what he liked anyway? There was never any serious chance of the West fighting the Red Army to get this land back. However, there is a clear difference between recognising that one country has occupied another country by force majeure and legitimising that occupation. Maybe it is naïve to expect politicians to stick to the principles they have freely signed up to - like those enshrined in the Atlantic Charter - but the corrosive cynicism that results when they don't is often worse." There is no better example of this cynicism than in Britain and the USA's treatment of the Poles. This was absolutely shameful, from the failure to fight their corner in discussions with Stalin, to the cover-up of Katyn, to the gradual sidelining of the Polish government in exile, to their eventual exclusion from the Victory Parade in London in 1946.

Rees concludes his book by asking whether the Western Allied leaders could have prevented Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe by acting differently during their partnership with Stalin. Practically, the only way to prevent this would have been to occupy this territory before the Red Army could do so - and the only way to that was to bring D-Day forward at least to 1943 or to enter into a partnership with a German government from which the Nazis had been removed. Neither of these scenarios seems feasible. Nevertheless, Rees is surely right to contend that "there was a middle way which might have been pursued politically during the war...which recognised the value of the Soviet Union as a fighting ally, but which reaffirmed the policy that, as Churchill put it in January 1942, the Western Allies adhered 'to those principles of freedom and democracy outlined in the Atlantic Charter and that these principles must become especially active whenever any question of transferring territory is raised.' Ultimately, this course of action might have accomplished little in practical terms. Perhaps Stalin would still have exercised control over much of Eastern Europe. But for sure, the Western Allies would at least have lived up to the principles that they said they were fighting the war to protect." This forces us to question the extent to which the Second World War was a 'moral' war. For sure, the Nazi regime was immoral beyond imagining, and the principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter were noble. But adding the Soviet Union to the mix undoubtedly taints the actions of the Western leaders, many of whom turned out to be ignoble, even wrong and immoral, in themselves.

Laurence Rees has written an uncomfortable and thought-provoking book, and in reading it, I found myself repeatedly reflecting on the enduring power of the stories we would rather tell about ourselves, rather than seeking the truth. We need to stop seeing the Second World War merely as a 'moral' war but also as a more conventional one, where power politics and national self-interest were major factors. As Rees himself puts it, "The central popular myth that surrounds the war, a kind of Hollywood version of the history, is that this is a simple story of an alliance of good people who fought an alliance of bad people. It's an immensely consoling way of looking at the past, and it's sad to let it go. But let it go we must."

[Jose Luis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Libro de 4.5 estrellas.
Segundo libro que leo del autor y si valió la pena. Recomendado.

Me pareció la lectura mucho mejor que el libro de Dresde: 1945. Fuego y oscuridad

Valió la pena la lectura, el descubrir que Stalin (El tío Joe) fue peor que Hitler y el poder de convencimiento que tenía con Churchill y Roosevelt para obtener lo que quería.

El libro va relatando la relación de Stalin con los demás líderes al transcurrir la SGM, desde un punto de vista político y salpicado de relatos de las personas que les tocó vivir las decisiones que se tomaron y que cambiaron el mundo.

Conocer el lado político de la SGM y no tanto militar te muestra que muchas decisiones son basadas en los votantes/elecciones y no por razones militares, humanitarias o morales.

Al libro le faltó una bibliografía y las notas vienen en la parte final y no al pie de página, no afecta la lectura pero para mi le resta puntos.

[Olia Tersina · Rating 5 out of 5]

Хочете почитати більше про Другу світову війну, то вам сюди: до книжок Лоренса Ріса. І я рада, що в нього ще є три книжки, перекладені українською, теж щодо цієї теми.

Цей автор є для мене чудовим відкриттям в сфері компетентних істориків, які ще й пишуть цікаво, не сухими фактами, живою мовою та й розкривають важливі питання, які на уроках історії взагалі не були досліджені та вважалися менш важливими.

Ця книжка цікава таким: згадуються основні події та битви Другої світової, і вони пов’язані з певними перемовинами чи іншими політичними подіями, і це не нудно читати; є багато свідчень очевидців: автор зробив колосальну роботу, бо були опитані і люди, які жили в совєтському союзі, і люди, що перебували під владою нацистів у Німеччині, і люди, які були окуповані однією з цих двох країн; автор засуджує дії сталіна та його влади і детально аргументує це засудження (мені іноді здавалося, що я читаю українського автора, а не британського, наскільки він ненавидить цей режим на сторінках текстів); та останнє і не менш важливе: це детальний аналіз злочинів, які безпосередньо пов’язані з війною, а саме Катинська трагедія, депортації народів (зокрема кримських татар) та зґвалтування, здійснені совєтськими військовими, це важливо знати і розуміти на чому базується політика совєтського союзу (а зараз вже й росії): на страху, залякуванні, тортурах, жертвах та відсутності демократії.

Щодо дій Черчилля та Рузвельта під час Другої світової, то теж є більше запитань, ніж відповідей, але автор постійно наводить їх мотиви, чому вони чинили так, а не інакше, дружили більше зі сталіним, ніж не дружили, то тому і розумієш, наскільки специфічна політика, що зараз, що тоді, і насамперед кожен політик захищає свої інтереси та інтереси своєї держави, хоч, як несправедливі його дії для інших народів, наприклад, для поляків під час Другої світової.

Тому раджу читати цю книжку, бо вона пояснює і дає зрозуміти перебіг війни не лише на полі бою, а й на політичній арені.

[Venkateswaran · Rating 4 out of 5]

When I took up this book, I expected more descriptions of battlefield action. But this book is more an analysis of causes and effects of decisions made by the big 3. Still surprisingly, it is a good page turner

The whole book provides an amazing analysis of Stalin the man. While it is clear that someone manipulated someone else, it is not exactly clear who the victim of manipulation was. Were Roosevelt & Churchill more sensible in allowing the Soviet union to bear the brunt of the German war machine and concede political gains to Stalin in return? Or was this Stalin's plan all along?

Ultimately quite a few myths that I had about WW II were completely busted foremost among those being that the war was a moral one of good against evil. Germany soviet union pact before WWII was not taught to me. Clearly, historians choose to omit inconvenient truths.

Ultimately realpolitik won over morality. In the whole of history, has it ever been any different

[Kaarthik Anebou · Rating 5 out of 5]

For all WW II avid readers - a must read. All diplomacy is cloaked under selfish motives. All people are the same, they are no different from each other when it comes to executing something for improving their power - read as "protecting their nation & independence of world countries". Surprising to see that all these Allies already have colonies & they talk of independence and world order. From my recollections on other books I have read the atrocities by Allied powers is perhaps on par with what Hitler did to Germany. Overall, all participants (countries against the "Axis") are keen to know what they will get once the war is over.

[Taras Dmytrus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Цікава книжка яка показує не дуже популярні погляди на західних союзників. Їхню цинічність і лицемірство заради власної вигоди. Як легко вони готові пожертвувати мільйонами життів людей з республік срср заради того щоб вберегти власні. Як легко вони забувають про свої ідеали якщо мова йде про те щоб не гнівити і, можливо, навіть сподобатись озвірілому тирану Сталіну.

В мене враження що за ці 80 не так багато й змінилось дивлячись на перебіг війни України з Росією.

В першу чергу ця книжка про поляків, про несправедливість щодо них. Мабуть про несправедливість і трагедії України і інших країн які тоді були затягнуті в Совєцкий союз ще не такі цікаві чи як то кажуть «на часі». Сподіваюсь колись і цей час настане.

[Naz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Those who would think that women are too emotional to be leaders need look no further than this engrossing tale of messy AF bitches that comprised the Big Three (Churchill, FDR, & Stalin).

[Artem Kuz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ось підзаголовок до "За лаштунками війни": "Сталін, нацисти і Захід".

Виходячи з такого порядку вказаних сутностей, ядром книги стоїть саме персона сталіна, його характер та відносини з союзниками - спочатку з німецькими а потім і з західними. І хоч по факту так воно і є, але все ж, всю дорогу мені йшлося більше про аналіз рефлексій британців+американців. Автор концентрує свою увагу на співпраці західних політиків з совіцькою владою на всіх етапах 2св, і часто-густо фокусується саме на етичній стороні таких відносин, надаючи слово учасникам подій та свідкам.

Особливе місце в цій книзі займає випадок розстрілу польських офіцерів в Катині. Цей жорстокий військовий злочин - вчинений росіянами - став ключовим випробуванням для цінностей дипломатів західного світу. Коли факт масових вбивств стає відомим на загал, свою потужність розкрутила сталінська машина пропаганди - вона звинувачувала німців надаючи всім на світі вигадані аргументи, що повністю суперечили наявним у західних розвідок фактам.
Публічно питання стало ребром, і союзники вибрали русняву сторону з словами а ля "я вірю, повірив", хоч самим їм було достеменно відомо хто саме влаштував різанину. Поодинокі союзницькі голоси, що намагалися дати широкій публіці чесну справедливу оцінку, були притлумлені політичним тиском з боку керівників їхніх держав. Ясна річ у такої позиції були очевидні причини - срср на момент викриття вже був союзником, Черчиль катався у москву припити з сталіним, Рузвельт стверджував що легко справиться з "дядечком Джо", а визнавати дружні стосунки з варварами було вже якось неприкольно. А у поляків в екзилі, між іншим, ніби ніхто нічого не питав.

Вдруге у поляків нічого не спитали коли сталін на переговорах з союзниками недвозначно виклав вимогу залишити за ним східну Польщу, читай західну Україну. Черчилі і рузвельти все порішали з вусатим чортом за закритими дверима і пообіцяли своїм виборцям, що за їхньої каденції на Польщі започаткується свята демократія але тіко є один нюанс - то буде демократія по-домашньому - по 2 коп. і з одного стакана.

Для мене ця книжка стала доволі неочікувано багатою на сюрпризи які або кардинально ламали мої фактологічні знання про 2св або якісно доповнювали їх.

Одним з таких стало для мене й те, що прем'єр ЮК був певен, що сталін не суб'єктний гравець, а ним ніби-то смикають якісь містичні маршали, і саме тому одного дня дружаня Джо покладистий, а іншого злий як пес. Історія показала, що насправді прилизана пліснява крутила ними як циган сонцем. Отут я хотів би побачити ще одне гротескне кіно про сталіна, де він типу бухає з Черчилем в кремлі, вони тепло обіймаються, похлопують по плечах одне одного, мужички добре сидять, англієць тішиться як слон, а після п'янки сталіну одразу доповідають з нквд про результати прослушки з кімнати британського прем'єра.

Взагалі, з дистанції часу, зараз багато речей видаються нонсенсом. Ну от наприклад як же можна було до останнього крутити по радіо і газетам свою американську пропаганду, мовляв, сталін прикольний тіп з екзотичної країни балалайок і порваних баянів?
Як можна було знову і знову довіряти словам людини яка обманює, бреше і триндить шо дише? І як можна було дійти до того, щоб, замість озвучених раніше принципів свободи і демократії (Атлантична хартія), в результаті говорити з сибірською гниллю його мовою сфер впливу і, бляха, віддати йому пів-Європи під російську майже окупацію?

Звісно, не можна ставити знак рівності між західними лідерами і сталіним, все ж автор просить зважати, що перші були досить обмежені в свободі дій, і хоч так чи так, але мусили домовлятися із російським злом (з тих пір досі неосудженим).
Проблема в тому, що результатом таких домовленестей настають сякі-такі мир і спокій у одних і нестерпний до болі пиздець у інших.

Одну зірочку не додаю бо вважаю, що в введеному контексті Лоренс Ріс міг би знайти побільше місця для долі саме українців в період війни, адже це немаловажлива складова історії тортур, депортацій і геноциду, і все це йшло в пакеті з добрим "дядечком Джо" а значить мало мати місце в переговорах і домовленостях з союзниками.

[Юлія Курій · Rating 4 out of 5]

Сама назва книги «За лаштунками війни: Сталін, нацисти і Захід» чудово підкреслює, що говоритиметься про ті домовленості, де спочатку союзниками були Німеччина та СССР, а потім СССР буде входити до антигітлерівської коаліції. Так би мовити, побував на двох сторонах барикад.
Та навіть після нападу 1941 року, при перших зустрічах з союзниками, Сталіна вже більш цікавив повоєнний світ, де йому буде обов’язково східна частина Польщі, яку він так «визволив» всього за два роки до того, на пару розділивши Польщу з нацистами. Загалом автор піднімає моральність та етичність багатьох рішень, що були прийняті британцями та американцями, співпрацюючи зі Сталіним. Особливе місце посідає в цій історії Катинська трагедія - жахливий злочин радянської влади. І та ж радянська влада, використовуючи рупор своєї пропаганди, пробувала звинуватити німців, надаючи вигадані аргументи, спотворюючи дійсність( час інший, методи ті самі).
В публічній площині союзники, звісно ж, не зробили нічого. Зрештою, вони ж самі потім і приїхали на Ялтинську конференцію, де всього 9 місяців перед тим було насильницьки виселено кримських татар. Про репресіі, депортації, переслідування було відомо, та Рузвельт і Черчиль шукали в Сталіна « дядечка джо», пробуючи домовитися та розділити «сфери впливу» у повоєнній Європі.

Окреме місце в книзі відведене питанню зґвалтованню жінок «визволених» країн радянськими солдатами. Ще один злочин за який ніхто не поніс покарання.
Непокаране зло повертається, а СССР вийшла з війни переможцем, диктуючи світу вже нові умови та починаючи нову, «Холодну війну».

Книга чудова, рекомендую до прочитання, та оцінила на 4 з 5, бо був момент, де на початку автор пише:

«На початку ХХ століття це вишукане місто [Львів] входило до складу Австро-Угорської імперії, після Першої світової війни стало частиною Польщі, у період з 1939 по 1941 рік було в складі Радянського Союзу. Згодом воно належало нацистській імперії, а потім знову увійшло до Радянського Союзу, поки в 1991 році, зрештою, не стало частиною незалежної України.»
Дивно, бо був і Листопадовий Чин, ЗУНР, акт злуки УНР і ЗУНР, а тут «зрештою» став українським Львів аж у 91 році.

[Pedro Manuel Pastor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Impresionante lectura sobre las vicisitudes más irreverentes del mayor conflicto armado de la historia, centrado del lado del dirigente que tenía la sartén por el mango en todo momento: Stalin.
Este grandísimo malnacido, con la aquiescencia de los comebolsas Churchill y Roosevelt (el primero un ególatra alcohólico y el segundo un enfermo minusválido con delirios de grandeza), no tuvo ningún problema para, primero, masacrar al pueblo polaco, y después, arrancarle la soberanía y el territorio a sus habitantes. Lamentable que el mundo que hoy conocemos esté cimentado sobre la inmensa escoria que detalla este libro, y más lamentable aún que haya gente y políticos (sin ir más lejos, en España) que apoyen o defiendan al mayor golfo de la historia, como es el borracho de Stalin. Churchill debería ser declarado enemigo de la humanidad por su participación en las conferencias de Teherán y Yalta... pero ya son harinas de otro costal.
Recomiendo encarecidamente la lectura de este libro a cualquiera que crea saber todo sobre la WWII, ya que dará otra visión a lo que se aprende en la escuela o lo que se ve en películas. Un 10 para el trabajo de su autor.

[H Hornbacher · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was at once a fascinating book and a book I could barely find the spirit to finish. It's subject matter has been interesting to me since I was in grade school and the expose of political strategy and intrigue was superb. But the depth of human pain exposed in the book was heavy on my heart and I could only get through a little before I had to stop and digest all the cruelty of humanity for a day.

This is not the lovely sugary WWII that is given in the history books and it set me as judge over the Allies and their choices. It took some time to work through how I felt about what they did and how they did it. I'm still not fully at peace with my thoughts and will be thinking about it for awhile. I guess in all aspects it was a good book and engaged me thoroughly but at the same time repulsed me.

In the end Rees discusses what the Allies could have done to change how things went and I really liked that it had that discussion. It could have explored the subject more deeply in my opinion.

[Paul Coughlan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Two things make this book a very good read:
1. The witness testimony that Rees uses throughout to illustrate the key elements of the WW2 story, chilling, disturbing, at times haunting and unforgettable
2. The insight into the ruthlessness of Stalin and how he steamrollered/fooled/deceived Roosevelt and Churchill whenever he was in a position to do so throught the war
One point that Rees brings out very strongly is that while the Western Allies beat Germany they left another, arguably crueler, dictatorship in place in Eastern Europe, wherein lies Poland, the very country that Britian and France went to war in the first place to defend.
The one aspect of the book that doesn't quite work is the mix of witness statements and high politics and military commentary that Rees uses throughout the book, but that is a minor criticism indeed.
It is very readable, as Rees's stuff usually is.
Highly recommended.

[Michael Flanagan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Laurence Rees has delivered yet again. Behind closed doors is a look at the Big Three (Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt) and their dealings with each other. The book is full of intrigue and insights into diplomacy of the era as well as a study of these three big personalities. As Usual Rees threads his narrative with eye witness accounts of the behind the scene going on's as well as from those who where effected by their decisions.

I would like to think myself well read in the World War 2 era, but this book introduced me to key historical event's which are barely mentioned in other text. The author's ability to be able to put these in context and compare with other more well known events left me awe struck.

This book easily matches the high standards already set by this author in his other books of the period; I can't wait till his next offering.

[Anelia · Rating 4 out of 5]

Книгата е добра. Не се разглеждат толкова военните действия, колкото политическите отношения между Чърчил, Рузвелт и Сталин. Единственият й недостатък според мен е, че докато обстановката във Великобритания, Америка, Русия и Полша е представена изключително подробно и се проследява случващото се в тези страни през целия период на войната, за Германия, Италия и Япония не се казва почти нищо. В този смисъл останаха въпроси без отговор.

[Ralitsa Mitova · Rating 5 out of 5]

Това е втората ми прочетена книга относно темата за Втората Световна Война написана от историка Лорънс Рийс ( Първата книга бе "Харизмата на Хитлер" ). И в тази книга фактите са внимателно подбрани ( няма излишна пропаганда и обвинителна, заемаща дадена страна информация), историите и заключенията са на много високо ниво. Авторът пише брилянтно, обосновано и лесносмилаемо. Книгите му са задължителни за прочит за тези, които се вълнуват от ВСВ.

[iain meek · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written but very sad history of the alliance between the West and Stalin culminating in the loss of Poland as a free country and the descent of the iron curtain. A pity Roosevelt and Churchill did not agree.

A big thank you to my stepdaughter, Nicky, who gave me this as a present. I hope that history does not repeat itself!

[Mehmet Koç · Rating 4 out of 5]

Impressive and totally tragic 'back-channel' history of the WWII...
"Western powers wanted to win the war at the least cost possible, an in pursuit of that goal they - to paraphrase Churchill- made an alliance with the Devil"

[Alex Robinson · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating overview of how political necessity made the Western powers overlook what a monster Stalin was (they could not have beat the Nazis without the USSR).

[Alex Atterbury · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not a comfy read, but it cures one of the false view that Allied leaders in WWII were the moral guardians of the world.

[Alexander Dekov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Много интересна и занимателна книга. Авторът изследва редица малко известни моменти от историята на Втората световна война, както и хвърля светлина върху много популярните етапи от войната.