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Strategy and History
Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age
A stimulating new inquiry into the fundamental truth of strategy - its purpose, place, utility, and value. This new study is animated by a startling the concept of strategic victory must be summarily discarded. This is not to say that victory has no place in strategy or strategic planning. The outcome of battles and campaigns are variables within the strategist's plan, but victory is a concept that has no meaning there. To the tactical and operational planner, wars are indeed won and lost, and the difference is plain. Success is measurable; failure is obvious. In contrast, the pure strategist understands that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategy therefore connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. It shapes and guides military means in anticipation of a panoply of possible coming events. In the process, strategy changes the context within which events will happen. In this new book we see clearly that the goal of strategy is not to culminate events, to establish finality in the discourse between states, but to continue them; to influence state discourse in such a way that it will go forward on favorable terms. For continue it will. This book will provoke debate and stimulate new thinking across the field and strategic studies.
240 pages, Hardcover
First published April 14, 2004
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
January 5, 2020
Yep, this one gets a rare 5-stars from me. Easily one of my favorite books on strategy now.
December 19, 2016
I found this a very challenging book. I read and re-read several passages in this book in hopes of truly comprehending the meaning of Dr. Dolman’s arguments and how they can be applied in practice. Even now, I’m still not sure I do. The author deems this work a “philosophy of strategy”, intended to shape the thinking of practicing strategists. The main theme revolves around the distinction between tactical and strategic thinking. Historically, strategists have approached war linearly: win enough (or key) battles = win the war = achieve desired end state. Dr. Dolman suggests that this is really a tactical approach, not a strategic one. History has proved you can win all the battles and lose the war. Likewise you can win a war yet be worse off strategically (a Pyrrhic victory).
Dr. Dolman sums up the distinction between strategists and tacticians as follows: “The tactical thinker seeks an answer. And while coming to a conclusion can be the beginning of action it is too often the end of critical thinking. The strategist will instead search for the right questions; those to which the panorama of possible answers provides insights and spurs ever more questions. No solutions are possible in this construct, only working hypotheses that the strategist knows will one day be proven false or tossed aside. Strategy is thus an unending process that can never lead to conclusion. And this is the way it should be: continuation is the goal of strategy—not culmination” (pg 4).
In this counterintuitive approach to strategy, the military strategist must discard the notion of victory. Strategy is not about winning but about attaining continuing advantage. Victory in war is not the end of discourse between states just as winning an election is not the end of politics. As relations continue between states after war, the goal should be to influence future discourse in such a way that it will go forward on favorable terms. Consequently, strategists must concentrate less on determining specific actions to be taken and more on manipulating the structure within which all actions are determined.
While this is brilliant in theory, how is it to be carried out in practice? The very way in which Dr. Dolman has defined strategy seems to eliminate any practical method of application for the strategist. The most challenging passage for me was on page 10: “It may seem intuitive that the strategist must have an end in mind, a goal to be achieved, at least to conceptually organize and make sense of the series of actions that are to be taken. Not so…” His follow-on explanation is simply an argument that circles back to his definition of strategy: Strategy does not have an end so strategists cannot select an end to plan for. To Dr. Dolman, Strategy is not matching means to ends but manipulating the processes and parameters that determine the means and ends. But how does one practically manipulate the rules and conditions that shape the arena in which tactical actions occur? After finishing the book it is still unclear to me. In differentiating the purpose of strategy and tactics, he seeks to prevent the requirements of the means or ends from taking over the strategic process (for example, the body-count mentality that substituted for strategy in Vietnam). Again, this seems incredibly brilliant when considered purely theoretically, but its still very unclear how this works in practice.
The remaining chapters throw in a smorgasbord of other concepts, trends, or theories (Game Theory, Chaos Theory, Complexity Theory, Network-Centric Warfare, and a host of physics concepts including Einstein’s relativity, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Schrodinger’s cat, etc.) that do much to make you think deeply but don’t really add substantially to Dr. Dolman’s core argument.
In the final chapter, Dr. Dolman notes that this book “may prove frustrating to the military practitioner who sees that no manual for strategy, no doctrine for strategic design, is provided…This does not mean that the following is a discussion of the unreal or ethereal. Pure Strategy is an eminently practical book, intended for practicing strategists” (pg 187). I tend to agree with the first half of this statement and disagree with the second. Earlier in the book, Dr. Dolman noted that Antoine de Jomini’s Art of War was preferred by military practitioners to Clausewitz’s more cerebral On War because it was full of practical advice. If forced to choose one word to describe this book it would be “cerebral.” There is so much packed in this book that is challenging and thought provoking that it merits more time and consideration by military strategists…yet I fear its very academic, philosophical approach will doom it to obscurity even though they would benefit from the challenge this book poses to typical, linear military thinking about strategy.
Dr. Dolman sums up the distinction between strategists and tacticians as follows: “The tactical thinker seeks an answer. And while coming to a conclusion can be the beginning of action it is too often the end of critical thinking. The strategist will instead search for the right questions; those to which the panorama of possible answers provides insights and spurs ever more questions. No solutions are possible in this construct, only working hypotheses that the strategist knows will one day be proven false or tossed aside. Strategy is thus an unending process that can never lead to conclusion. And this is the way it should be: continuation is the goal of strategy—not culmination” (pg 4).
In this counterintuitive approach to strategy, the military strategist must discard the notion of victory. Strategy is not about winning but about attaining continuing advantage. Victory in war is not the end of discourse between states just as winning an election is not the end of politics. As relations continue between states after war, the goal should be to influence future discourse in such a way that it will go forward on favorable terms. Consequently, strategists must concentrate less on determining specific actions to be taken and more on manipulating the structure within which all actions are determined.
While this is brilliant in theory, how is it to be carried out in practice? The very way in which Dr. Dolman has defined strategy seems to eliminate any practical method of application for the strategist. The most challenging passage for me was on page 10: “It may seem intuitive that the strategist must have an end in mind, a goal to be achieved, at least to conceptually organize and make sense of the series of actions that are to be taken. Not so…” His follow-on explanation is simply an argument that circles back to his definition of strategy: Strategy does not have an end so strategists cannot select an end to plan for. To Dr. Dolman, Strategy is not matching means to ends but manipulating the processes and parameters that determine the means and ends. But how does one practically manipulate the rules and conditions that shape the arena in which tactical actions occur? After finishing the book it is still unclear to me. In differentiating the purpose of strategy and tactics, he seeks to prevent the requirements of the means or ends from taking over the strategic process (for example, the body-count mentality that substituted for strategy in Vietnam). Again, this seems incredibly brilliant when considered purely theoretically, but its still very unclear how this works in practice.
The remaining chapters throw in a smorgasbord of other concepts, trends, or theories (Game Theory, Chaos Theory, Complexity Theory, Network-Centric Warfare, and a host of physics concepts including Einstein’s relativity, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, Schrodinger’s cat, etc.) that do much to make you think deeply but don’t really add substantially to Dr. Dolman’s core argument.
In the final chapter, Dr. Dolman notes that this book “may prove frustrating to the military practitioner who sees that no manual for strategy, no doctrine for strategic design, is provided…This does not mean that the following is a discussion of the unreal or ethereal. Pure Strategy is an eminently practical book, intended for practicing strategists” (pg 187). I tend to agree with the first half of this statement and disagree with the second. Earlier in the book, Dr. Dolman noted that Antoine de Jomini’s Art of War was preferred by military practitioners to Clausewitz’s more cerebral On War because it was full of practical advice. If forced to choose one word to describe this book it would be “cerebral.” There is so much packed in this book that is challenging and thought provoking that it merits more time and consideration by military strategists…yet I fear its very academic, philosophical approach will doom it to obscurity even though they would benefit from the challenge this book poses to typical, linear military thinking about strategy.
April 15, 2019
Brilliant. One of the best expositions on what is strategy - as distinct from tactics or operational thinking - I've yet encountered. Dolman argues that where tactics is about a culmination of events, bounded within the rules of the structure (the physical battle or campaign), strategy is a continuation that requires a manipulation of the system.
This is a deep and wise book, with brilliant ideas bursting off the page. As Dolman acknowledges in the final chapter, while the debate is often about whether strategy is an art or a science, this book (like say, Gatz' History of Military thought, or event Clausewitz On War) is an attempt at Strategy as Philosophy. Going beyond the practice to the underlying conceptual elements, and working out their relationships with other parts of human behaviour.
Though well read I found this a very slow book to read. There is much to chew through. It's also sometimes a little erratic. Dolman raises ideas and paths without fully pursuing them, and despite the subtitle and early set up of the book, there's very little about Space and Information domain conflict as a specific part of strategy. This is for the best, given the actual contribution of the book is profound.
Strongly Recommended.
This is a deep and wise book, with brilliant ideas bursting off the page. As Dolman acknowledges in the final chapter, while the debate is often about whether strategy is an art or a science, this book (like say, Gatz' History of Military thought, or event Clausewitz On War) is an attempt at Strategy as Philosophy. Going beyond the practice to the underlying conceptual elements, and working out their relationships with other parts of human behaviour.
Though well read I found this a very slow book to read. There is much to chew through. It's also sometimes a little erratic. Dolman raises ideas and paths without fully pursuing them, and despite the subtitle and early set up of the book, there's very little about Space and Information domain conflict as a specific part of strategy. This is for the best, given the actual contribution of the book is profound.
Strongly Recommended.
October 24, 2013
A book about the "philosophy of strategy." Dolman's focus is on drawing and emphasising the distinction between the tactician and the strategist. He does this successfully through an examination of the sciences of decision-making, chaos and complexity. Though parts of the book are difficult to fully comprehend (I'm still coming to terms with the coin-toss tree), overall Dolman does an excellent job of establishing the basic tenets of the philosophy of science. Though I walk away from this book with an overall appreciation of that strategy is about favourable continuation, while tactics is about favourable culmination, it is Dolman's statement on p.130 that has given me the greatest food for thought ... " A tactician is trained. A strategist becomes."
May 23, 2014
Wow, incredible treatise on strategy based on a quantum, adaptive, net-centric, and politically-constrained model of modern warfare -- all driving toward continuation vs culmination. Perhaps the most influential book on strategy for me - especially with regard to the definition of "winning/losing," and what role the "end state" plays in strategy. While I have minor disagreements with Dolman on strategic openness (vs secrecy) and the implications of stealth on command of the air, this book clearly and profoundly gets to the heart of what strategy ought to be. I would have loved to see Dolman's perspective on "force" with respect to advancements in space and cyber, but that might have detracted from this work.
May 25, 2013
Excellent book by Dr. Dolman. Although you only need to read the first 50 pages to get the meat of the text!
January 2, 2021
This book challenged my views of strategy, and in particular notions on end states that we are so familiar with from campaign plans and strategy documents that guide action towards definable end states.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews