The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose

by Anthony C. Zinni, Tony Koltz

Tony Zinni commands attention on the battlefield, at peace talks, in politics, and across the media spectrum. When he stood up and called for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation in 2006, the media paid attention, and when The Battle for Peace was published, the media--and the American public--applauded its bold new vision of America's role in the world. Widely acclaimed for its clear and practical approach to promoting a more stable and peaceful world through realism and pragmatic cooperation, this book has become even more relevant as we veer dangerously close towards confrontation with Iran. In a new afterword, General Zinni provides additional insight into the war in Iraq, how to deal with Iran, and more.

Genres: Military Fiction, Africa, History, War, Politics, International Relations

240 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2006

Reviews

[FellowBibliophile KvK · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very clear and very accessible! Pulls no punches!

Whereas Andrew Bacevich repeatedly reiterates the Dolchstosselegend by blaming American civilians for thanking Veterans at baseball games, and whereas Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile write low-ley hagiographies of Westmoreland (as does Bacevich in his singling out Creighton Abrams) and their fellow incompetent careerist non-Distinguished Service Cross-winning fellow ossifers writ large, General Zinni openly condemns his fellow generals. He points out how he had a viable plan for Iraq, but how the REMF Joint Chiefs of Staff sabotaged it by going behind his back and bully the State Department into pulling their personnel from General Zinni's operation.

General Zinni also clearly and courageously says that trigger pullers like David Bellavia and Clint Romesha have no time for "strategy," whereas Pee Haich Dees in military drag like Andrew Bacevich, Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile said that America lost Vietnam and Iraq because of "strategy." On a related note, General Zinni also courageously says that "wonks"--i.e. Pee Haich Dees like Andrew Bacevich, Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile--are the problem with today's military.

But the best part of this book is General Zinni's candid admission of the core problem with today's military, a statement that must have had Bacevich, Porch and Gentile--none of who ever rose to skipper CENTCOM in stark contrast to General Zinni, which suggests that even Congress saw that Bacevich, Porch and Gentile had some major malfunction--purple with rage. General Zinni says that the major problem with today's military is that it is trying to refight World War II.

As well, General Zinni openly identifies demographic problems that Bacevich, Porch and Gentile are far to pusillanimous to even mention.

[Glenn Robinson · Rating 5 out of 5]

A quick, concise and well thought book on how fragile society is and how much is needed to maintain order. Ideas for leaders to work hard to find ways to solve issues in parts of the world where there is instability and that we must work to find ways to do so. While written in the 2005-06 time frame, the ideas are fresh today and some of the issues are still present, such as the nuclear threats from North Korea, Pakistan and other nations.

[Lewis Smith · Rating 3 out of 5]

General Zinni "talks a good game". But, all of his ideas for a "new world order" are likely impossible to implement without a very dominant type of world governing organization (maybe a newer, stronger, more "aligned" U.N. ?!?!), that is also flexible enough to allow for (inevitable) future changes. He sounds good, but . . . .

[Alan · Rating 2 out of 5]

I saw a few of Gen Zinni's speeches while I was taking war college courses and he always seemed interesting and thought provoking. So I was looking forward to my first experience reading one of his books. I am pretty disappointed. He offers many generalized, vague observations and ideas with very little specificity. He offers praise here and there to people or ideas that are half-baked, including GEN Shinseki's prediction that the war in Iraq would require 400,000-500,000 troops (the Surge by comparison peaked around 150,000). My main complaint is that he uses a lot of words, most often unfocused, when a few direct words would do. Rather than a 200+ page book, this would have been more worth reading if it was about 10 pages of his Viet Nam observations followed by 20 pages of SPECIFIC recommendations for a standing strategic-level JIATF/JIACG coordination center. The endlessly repetitive re-hashing of the same general points over and over gives the impression that this book began life as a collection of essays/speeches that perhaps a ghost-writer attempted to knit into a whole.

I find it odd that Gen Zinni's time in the CENTCOM area was so close to or overlapping with milestone events - Battle of Mogadishu (Blackhawk down), attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Khobar Towers, USS COLE, Sudan's offer to turn over Osama bin Laden - but he doesn't mention any of these.

The final point of irritation I mention in passing, because I respect Zinni the man and his career of service, is some unbecoming commentary on the GW Bush administration. I find it hard to believe that Zinni doesn't know better than the tripe coming out of the NY Times and Washington Post, but most of his comments about Bush decisions, invading Iraq, forming coalitions etc seem to be lifted straight from that wing of yellow journalism. Ill-informed or just deliberately maliciously misleading. I expected more integrity or at least more effort to be informed coming from such an accomplished Marine. He seems to have placed more stock in gaining leftist editors' approval than in truth-telling... Among several examples, perhaps most blatant is his buy-in to the myth that Bush 43 chose "go it alone" over building coalitions. Tell that to the families of British and Polish troops and those of several other countries who gave their lives alongside our servicemen in Iraq. When Zinni published this book in 2006, was he still ignorant that France, Germany and Russia were standing by Saddam, and opposing the coalition to oust him, because they were earning billions in kickbacks from helping Saddam evade UN sanctions? The sanctions Bush was supposed to give more time to work (read, give France, Germany and Russia more billions in blood money)? Or did he simply decide it would be more comfortable hanging out inside the DC beltway if he sounded like those armchair Washington Post critics?

[Dolly · Rating 3 out of 5]

I met Gen Zinni when he was a three-star General, visiting the troops in Saudi Arabia. I always admired him and his no-nonsense approach. This was an interesting book and a surprisingly quick read.

It's well-written, although I feel like the last few chapters were a bit rushed and could've been expanded on a bit. The afterward felt like a pretty sharp jab at the administration, but he doesn't really offer clear solutions, other than additional layers of bureaucracy. Integrated bureaucracy, but bureaucracy nonetheless. As a military member, I find his thoughts to be convincing, but I'm not so sure they'd be as well accepted outside of this milieu.

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ideas of stovepiped organizations with little shared agendas but massively shared missions: refer to Executive Branch grand national strategy and supporting agencies/departments lack of coordinated strategioes

[Jaime Hernandez · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good overview of the world but fails to grasp (in 2006 no less) the gravity of our nation's fiscal health and the unraveling Sunni-Shia rift. I do recommend this book for those looking to understand joint headquarters inner workings and interagency groups and task forces.

[Anne · Rating 3 out of 5]

an interesting take on our government and the state of the miltary

[Syed · Rating 2 out of 5]

good insight of internal military politics

[Toesnorth's mom]

good