Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore

by Tim Huxley

Surrounded by larger, more populous nations, Singapore has been acutely aware of its vulnerability since separating from the Malaysian federation in 1965. This work offers a study of the Singapore Armed Forces, and an assessment of the country's military capability and strategic outlook.

Genres: Military Fiction, Nonfiction

360 pages, Paperback

First published December 1, 2000

Reviews

[Seng Wee Wong · Rating 5 out of 5]

Despite being published in year 2000, the book still contain insightful content regarding Singapore's military. The author is very well versed in the history of Singapore and how the country's historical background affected Singapore leaders in making decision akin to the state of the Singapore Armed Forces.

As a member of the Singapore Armed Forces (NSman), I am surprised by the amount of information the author is able to find from open sources. Many of the information remains relevant to this day. The author did a thorough research on the subject matter. Some of this comments on the defence issues resonated with me, e.g he has doubts on the effectiveness of a largely citizen armed forces where the reservist personnel may not give their full commitment towards national defence.

As of 2019, many of the information in the book may be outdated. Nonetheless this is a good starting point for people interested to understand Singapore's defence better.

(I think bulk of the information in the book should be classified though...)

[Mai Thi Ngoc Tu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Informative, factual. I've skimmed through some parts related to history, political relations or specific equipment that I don't understand their significance.

'The SAF is an armed force; it is not a civilian corporation. Its mission is to defeat its enemies, ruthlessly and completely. It is an instrument of controlled fury, designed to visit death and destruction on its foes . . . soldiers must have steel in their souls . . . must learn in war to kill and not flinch, to destroy and not to feel pity, to be a flaming sword in the righteous cause of national survival.' (Lee Hsien Loong)

Knowledge I've gotten

1. Rationale behind the compulsory and universal 13 year NS including 10 year reservist till 40/50 yo for all 18yo citizens, PRs as well as civil servants and students. Capabilities: highly educated, well trained, technically proficient, though laking combat experience.
a) Upon Singapore separation in 1965, Singapore’s population was 75% Chinese, 15% Malay. Many Malay soldiers, even those originally from Singapore, preferred not to serve in the armed forces of a state which the Chinese would inevitably dominate politically as well as socially.
b) Upon Britain force withdrawal in 1968, it was clear that within four years Singapore by 1971 would have to take full responsibility for its own defence.
c) Difficulties in building up the strength of regular army: defence spending, insufficient volunteers/population.
d) Internal securities Riots - internal PAP believed that NS could perform a vital nation-building role by providing young Singaporeans from different classes and ethnic groups with a common experience which would inculcate national consciousness, discipline and a sense of social responsibility.
e) Manpower resource mobility. During wartime, servicemen who completed their full-time NS are battle-ready, combat-ready, war-ready, operationally-ready during peacetime. During peacetime, it contributes substantially to the international reputation of Singapore’s workforce for discipline,efficiency and flexibility.

2. Total Defence, a concept first enunciated in 1984 to ‘unite all sectors of society— government, business and the people— in the defence of the country’. (Military, Psychological, Social, Economic, Civil). Defend policies: diplomacy and deterrence. Military strategy: ‘poisonous shrimp’ (small, but indigestible by predators).
Psychologically,
a) ‘Singapore is our homeland. This is where we belong.’
b) ‘Singapore is worth defending. We want to keep our heritage and our way of life.’
c) ‘Singapore can be defended. United, determined and well prepared we shall fight for the safety of our homes and the future of our families and children.’
d) ‘We must ourselves defend Singapore. No one else is responsible for our security.’
e) ‘We can deter others from attacking us. With Total Defence, we can live in peace.’

3. Strategic vulnerabilities
a) Given high dependence on Malaysia water and food supplies, physical separation with outside worlds puts economic well being and national survival at stakes.
b) Extremely small land area means the republic has no territorial strategic depth: it cannot yield territory to an aggressor with the expectation of later regaining it.
c) Geopolitical & ethnical complex: 3.2m resident population sandwiched between much more populous neighbors (Malaysia 22m, Indonesia 220m) that both have Muslim majorities and Chinese minorities --> divided loyalties could potential lead to linkage breaks both internally and externally

4. Discriminations in progression
a) Race: Muslim (3c, 1980s)
b) Education: leaders of high calibre who can think, plan and innovate at a high level of sophistication (1980s-1990s)
c) Gender: women are confined to certain vocations in NS. Reason: small cohort, limited fitness level. Requirement: the recruitment of women allows males to be released for front line combat duties (1980s-present)

5. Mobilitisation for operational readiness of all 3 services (Army, Navy, Air Force)
In 1995 recall exercise, more than 90% of 5000 NSmen has responded within 6 hours --> At a press of a button, SAF could field a quarter of a million men, deploy 3 battle-ready divisions within hours.
a) Communication
- Silent: mobile phones, pager calls
- Open: radio, TV broadcasts locally & detergent messages to neighbors --> bring home to Singapore’s wider population the potential need for a rapid transition to a war footing
b) Transportation: MRT stations close to major army camps
c) Weapon & Major equipment: NS in duty bring out
d) Personal equipment: helmets, webbing, water bottles, mess tins are kept at home --> can go straight into field

6. Air Force
a) Air bases: Tengah, Paya Lebar, Sembawang, Changi, Seletar
b) Emergency Runway: expressways, roads, parks & golf courses (helicopters)
c) Does not depend on reservists

7. Navy
a) Vessels: on permanent patrol in Singapore Straits and further afield.
b) Backup: standby task force of MGB & MCV, fully armed and at immediate notice for sea.
c) Does not depend on reservists

8. Dual career for scholar SAF officers as political and administrative roles: active SAF personnel are prohibited from joining any political party, even the PAP.

9. Paramilitary forces: Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), Singapore Police Force (SPF), National Cadet Corps (NCC), Youth Flying Club (YFC)

[naveen · Rating 4 out of 5]

An academically detailed journey into the history of the SAF from its inception in the mid 60s to the late 1990s. This book is a primer for anyone interested in Defence strategy of Singapore. But, for those that want to skip the painstaking sieved details, they may choose to read the conclusion at the end of every chapter. Reading this book i can see that Huxley has put in a lot of time and effort to write this book.

[Kes · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book - it starts with a brief history of the Singapore Armed Forces and the defence threats Singapore faced; the concerns and considerations of the government (especially how National Service did a good job at reducing the unemployment rate by taking the men out of the workforce for 2.5 years).

I thought the part where the author quoted at length from an essay on the bureaucratisation of the government was prescient as well:

In what was by Singaporean standards a strikingly forthright article, in 1975 Chan Heng Chee contended that Singapore had become an ‘administrative state’, in which ‘the meaningful political arena is shifting, or has shifted to the bureaucracy’. Chan pointed out that:

. . . whilst this is a universal trend and problem, the bureaucracy in Singapore plays a . . . pre-eminent role because of the vast deployment of governmental development activities in non-conventional areas. It is the extension into an entirely new range of activities in the charge of civil servants that a greater awareness of the bureaucrats’ role and its consequences must be grasped as they run important ministries, statutory institutions and private companies.

She went on to argue that:

The growth of government activities through the statutory boards and private companies has increased the scope of power of the civil servants who are placed in charge . . . In any real life situation, the traditional dichotomy between politics and administration is academic. Administrators are politicians in their own way. In Singapore, the division between the administrator and the politician is particularly blurred because it is unstated official policy to politicise the administrators and entrust them with major power in decision-making . . .

Chan expressed concern that while ‘the bureaucrats have not usurped power because the political leadership is strong’, there was ‘no assurance that the next generation of political leaders will possess the same authority and control over the bureaucrats’. There was, in her view, a danger that the civil servants—wielding ‘power and privilege without accountability to the public’—might become Singapore’s ‘real rulers’. Another aspect of the blurring of the dichotomy between administration and politics in Singapore was the transfer of a number of senior civil servants into parliament and ministerial positions during the 1970s and 1980s: the civil service was ‘the favoured recruiting ground for future PAP political leaders’.

The history of Singapore is also entwined with the PAP, and there's a fair bit about PAP's succession concerns too, such as:

By 1993, however, it was widely rumoured in Singapore that Lee Kuan Yew, concerned about the shadow cast over the future leadership succession by his son’s illness, had adopted George Yeo as a protégé. Teo Chee Hean is known to ‘follow’ Goh Chok Tong, who has spoken publicly of his strenuous and ultimately successful efforts to recruit the former. Lim Hng Kiang and Lim Swee Say, though, are believed to be more closely affiliated with Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong than with Goh.

It's a well-cited book and really interesting reading - especially in hindsight where we can see how things have changed (and not changed) since 2000.

[mantareads · Rating 3 out of 5]

Even 22 years after its publication, this book was very useful in helping me to better contextualise my NS experiences. The frank assessment of reservists' fighting ability was also very refreshing, and made me realise how little we talk about the SAF's weaknesses.

Better signposting would have helped. Sometimes the logical flow of Huxley's book structure is not readily apparent. Some segments felt like they went on for a very long time, while others read like the author ran out of things to say.

For instance, i was expecting to read more about Singapore's defence relations with Thailand, especially given the two countries' roles in providing support for US forces during the Vietnam War. I think a little more historical context and analysis, especially with geopolitical considerations would have rounded the highly-descriptive text a little more smoothly.

[azra rizal · Rating 5 out of 5]

Insightful

Detail study of the most densely populated country in the world with defence spending matching only to Qatar and Israel.

Total Defense doctrine that includes civillian, politicians and business - Citizen Army.

Must read to understand what made Singapore it is today.

[Meowcatz · Rating 3 out of 5]

24 years has passed, all the equipment, exercises etc listed are long outdated. You get some fun tidbits, but I feel there is nothing of significant value. It is a rehash of open source material, a summary if you will of the history of SAF.

[Choong Chiat · Rating 4 out of 5]

A comprehensive and informative account of the defence system and capability that the city-state of Singapore has.



However, it was perhaps overly-descriptive and somewhat lacking in analysis. The little analysis the book did have could have been further developed and expanded upon. That said, the book did provide several interesting factoids or speculative information about Singapore's defence system and capability.



Also, in light of how this book was first published in 2000 and the plethora of changes that have been put in place by Singapore with regards to its defence system and capability, it is perhaps timely for an updated and, ideally, expanded version of the book to be written and published. Of course, admittedly, these changes are perhaps too recent for quality research and analysis to be done regarding them.



On the overall, I would recommend this book to anyone interested to learn more about the history and development of Singapore's defence system and capability.

[Caleb Liu · Rating 3 out of 5]

Surprisingly accurate assesment of the Singapore Armed Forces rationale, tactics, units and capabilities given the secrecy governing the Singapore military. Huxley apparently got much of his information over internet chat sites. We invited him to an inaugural Oxford Singapore forum where I recall the fact that he wore bright red socks!

[Thamrong · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tim Huxley's well research on the metamorphoses of the City State's armed force. It describes how the tiny Singapore religiously developed her armed forces from a fragmented infantry regiments, a left over after separation with Malaysian federation, into an efficient fighting force. Today the Singapore army, navy and the air force are reputed to be the best and strongest in the region.

[Debbie Kamonchabird]

good