Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays by Bertrand Russell would not be an easy read for people unfamiliar with either logic or mathematics. In the book, the author grapples with philosophical causality and consequence, and, for many a general reader, the author’s translation of apparently simple ideas into the language of algebra might appear a complication for complication’s sake. This would, however, be a mistake. There are occasions when a generalization clarifies, when the particular complicates by association.
One memorable aspect of the book is the section in which Russell deals with reality, as sensed by an observer. At some length he describes the process by which objects are sensed and maintains that from a perspective of the object perceived, no two views of the universe, no two views of reality can ever be the same. He even suggests that as a result the sensory input might even have different existences for different observers, different existences, even, across time. My viewpoint is not yours, even when we are looking at the same object. But the reality is that we can both sometimes agree what it is that we are seeing. Russell, of course, does not limit the argument to sight. This descriptive agreement happens despite the fact that what we see independently differs, despite the fact that the individual memory records are also bound to differ.
That we can, as individual observers with differing viewpoints, agree on what we see points, I believe, to a flaw in Russell’s argument. Without resorting to platonic essences, we all possess, whether pre-programmed or learned, a vast store of examples of type, which can be recalled and tested against sensory inputs. The fact that we as individuals see tables of different shapes, even of different colours depending merely on the fall of light, does not stand in the way of both of us matching the experience past and present with the idea of table. Since we can also agree on the classification, there are grounds to claim that the table exists in the universe of our sensory input, despite the fact that our memories and sensations of it differ. Were we as observers to exchange places, we would probably both reach the same conclusion. The table therefore has existence, though our perceptions of it have changed.
This all becomes problematic, of course, when the observed phenomenon is not already part of our perception and thus absent from our classification system. Then we must, as a race of rational animals, resort to third-party, perhaps mechanical perceptions and measurements of phenomena. In that case, following repeated extra-human observations, human beings can attempt to establish shared classification. The conclusions we draw from these perceptions are what we generally refer to as science.
This book was written in 1910, but today it still challenges, despite the completely changed scientific landscape. It does, however, still use language to analyse language, so if it finds holes that is only to be expected. Russell alludes to this limitation thus in criticism of the philosophy of Bergson: “The rest of Bergen’s philosophy consists in reporting, through the imperfect medium of words, the knowledge gained by intuition, and the consequence complete condemnation of all the pretended knowledge derive from science and common sense.”
The fact that the book dates from the first decade of the twentieth century means that we have to accept this language: “the theoretical understanding of the world, which is the aim of philosophy, is not a matter of great practical importance to animals, or savages, or even to most civilized men.” The sentiment is that ivory towers may be sufficiently separate from reality as to be irrelevant, which translates to today’s thinking.
The pursuit of philosophy, however, must be rooted in what is generally accepted as real: “…it is only so that we can account for the complacency, with which philosophers have accepted the inconsistency of their doctrines with all the common and scientific facts, which seem best established, and most worthy of belief.”
The particularism of personal experience is also recognized: “…all our thinking, consists of convenient, fictions, imaginary congealing of the stream: reality flows on, in spite of all our fictions, although it can be lived, it cannot be conceived in thought.”
Russell, it has to be remembered, was on some issues a radical. In explaining that causality, as generally perceived, might be teleological and therefore invalid, he manages to throw in a firecracker: “…the law of causality, I believe, like much that passes must among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously, supposed to do no harm.”
And, in the age of social media, one of the book’s parting comments is apposite: “…this is merely to say that we cannot make a judgment or a supposition without knowing what it is that we are making our judgment or supposition about.”
Bertrand Russell’s Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays is eventually still a stimulating and enlightening read.