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La Grande Italia: Il mito della nazione nel XX secolo
La Grande Italia traces the history of the myth of the nation in Italy along the curve of its rise and fall throughout the twentieth century. Starting with the festivities for the fiftieth anniversary of the unification of Italy in 1911 and ending with the centennial celebrations of 1961, Emilio Gentile describes a dense sequence of events: from victorious Italian participation in World War I through the rise and triumph of Fascism to Italy’s transition to a republic.
Gentile’s definition of “Italians” encompasses the whole range of political, cultural, and social actors: Liberals and Catholics, Monarchists and Republicans, Fascists and Socialists. La Grande Italia presents a sweeping study of the development of Italian national identity in all its incarnations throughout the twentieth century. This important contribution to the study of modern Italian nationalism and the ambition to achieve a “great Italy” between the unification of Italy and the advent of the Italian Republic will appeal to anyone interested in modern European history, Fascism, and nationalism.
Best Books for Special Interests, selected by the American Association of School Librarians, and Best Books for Regional General Interests, selected by the Public Library Association
Gentile’s definition of “Italians” encompasses the whole range of political, cultural, and social actors: Liberals and Catholics, Monarchists and Republicans, Fascists and Socialists. La Grande Italia presents a sweeping study of the development of Italian national identity in all its incarnations throughout the twentieth century. This important contribution to the study of modern Italian nationalism and the ambition to achieve a “great Italy” between the unification of Italy and the advent of the Italian Republic will appeal to anyone interested in modern European history, Fascism, and nationalism.
Best Books for Special Interests, selected by the American Association of School Librarians, and Best Books for Regional General Interests, selected by the Public Library Association
523 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1997
46 people want to read
About the author
Emilio Gentile
73 books61 followersEmilio Gentile (born 1946 in Bojano) is an Italian historian specializing in the ideology and culture of fascism. Gentile is considered one of Italy's foremost cultural historians of fascist ideology. He studied under Renzo De Felice and wrote a book about him.
Gentile is a professor at the Sapienza University of Rome. He considers fascism a form of political religion. He also applied the theory of political religion to the United States after the September 11 attacks.
Gentile is a professor at the Sapienza University of Rome. He considers fascism a form of political religion. He also applied the theory of political religion to the United States after the September 11 attacks.
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March 14, 2016
Emilio Gentile is one of the leading historians of italian fascism, famed for his contribution to the study of the movement as a "political religion", one of the most dynamic frameworks of enquiry in the past twenty years. In the present book, which might be the most important one published in english on the subject of italian nationalism, Gentile approaches the fractured and multifaceted concept of the nation through one century of italian history, stretching from the unification in 1861 down to the jubilee celebrations of 1961.
Nation -and nationalism all the more- is a contentious concept in modern history: it is at the heart of both the liberal revolutions that heralded the democratic era in which the West still position itself today, and simultaneously it is stigmatised as the root of the many dictatorships and the "civil war" which has shaken Europe in the first half of the XXth century, leading to totalitarianism, the most cogent and programmatic denial of liberal democratic values. Theories of nationalism abound and it would seem from the start, some have seen the nation as a functional delusion (“Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation” said Ernest Renan) while others see it as the manifestation within the culture and world-politics of determinations, either biological or geographical, which give an immanently separate identity to particular groups (formulated in its most coherent version by the contemporary "ethno-symbolic" school);
Gentile leans towards the constructionist side, alongside scholars like Hobsbawn or Gellner, who see nations being "invented" during the modern period, generally as a functional mean to the ongoing modernisation process, embodied for example in the napolenic code. In his introduction he states that his book aims to remain value-neutral and despite focusing on the nation as "myth", understood here in sorelian terms as "a constellation of beliefs, ideas, ideals or values combined and compacted into a symbolic image that arouses in the individual and the masses strong conviction, enthusiasm, and the desire to act" (XIV), will not give the nation a positive or negative connotation. This is laudable especially for a book that covers three very different regimes, each with their own relationship to the nation, conceived often in essentialistic terms as a permanent feature that link the general will to its own history: this attitude highlights the deep shifts in content and form which the myth of the nation undergoes, and in particular its function, not only in the liberal period of state formation, but even in the post-war republic era, where its weakness allowed for the polarisation of the political landscape.
The first period treated is probably the one I am the most interested in, stretching from the unification down to the March on Rome, and as such it is unsurprising that I found it lacking: Gentile's approach throughout the book is part chronological and part conceptual, separating different forms taken by the myth of the nation within given political contexts. Thus for the liberal era, he covers Giobertian and Mazzinian sonderweg nationalism and their roots in religious rhetoric, the rise of imperialism and the thinning of the principle of nationalities in favour of opportunistic "realism", the umbertian reaction against the bourgeois hypocrisy and the many permutation of those concepts which fuelled the culture of this epoch.
The book is excruciatingly researched, most of the text being a collage of quotations taken from famous and less famous ideologists across the political spectrum, from clerical reactionaries to socialists, which does a great job representing the variety of positions – but also leaves very little room for contextualisation: the author admits being to strapped for space, and knowing the breadth of Gentile's culture and grasp of Italian cultural history, one cannot help but think that three books rather than one would have been a better solution. As a result the book will probably be better suited to people already having some knowledge of italian history. Similarly the relatively narrow national focus I find to obscure the scope of nationalism, which in Italy more than elsewhere was rooted in an international phenomenon, in continuous dialogue with France and England in particular.
The second period is that of Fascism, which the author clearly knows well, allowing him to explain, from the point of view of the concept of the nation, the deep changes the regime underwent from the twenties to the thirties. Gentile does not mention it but the first program of the fascist party, years before its accession to power in 1922, the so-called San Sepolcro program, actually had "third-worldist" elements, referring to the unyielding support the party intended to give to the every oppressed nationalities in the world, rejecting vocally "imperialism to the possible detriment of other peoples" : whether this was a mere manoeuvre to gain itself political legitimacy on the world-stage or a pandering to the syndicalist elements of the party, which would be much weakened by the later absorption of the ANI, is still debated, but certainly this shows how strong was the "myth of the nation" and its corollary of the principle of nationalities in the twenties. By the thirties of course, this had receded if not totally disappeared in favour of an increasingly statist and totalitarian organisation and a rhetoric of imperialism which would reach its apex with the campaign of Abyssinia.
But from the start Fascism had developed, under the guidance of its official philosopher Giovanni Gentile, a particular approach to nationalism which was at pain to differentiate itself from that advocated by its French and, in particular, German counterparts: grounded in voluntaristic and modernist dynamics, the nation was conceived as something not inherited from the foggy sources of ethnic history, but as a project, as a community continuously created and re-created. The notion is already visible in the umbertian period among nationalists like Papini or Prezzolini, but as it is digested by the Party and the Fascist regime, the creation of the nation becomes the monopoly of the state. In Gentile's mystical conception of the state, the individual, the state and the nation become a holy trinity which in turn create and sustain each others.
By now my reader might have gathered that the concept of nationalism is very much muddled, both by its intrinsically rhetorical character and by the fact that it remained throughout its history a site of contention between opposing political forces: at no point can we see any agreement on what the nation is or should be, and Gentile is adamant not to provide us with a clear definition which often leaves his reader gasping for air in the thickening mixture of concepts and expressions. That is both the weakness of the book, which at times become a bit of harrowing read, and its strength, in that it refuses any simplification or standardisation.
The fall of the regime and the subsequent establishment of the republic seems at first to herald the end of this by now over-inflated concept: everyone seem understandably eager to distance themselves from the fascist "style" and throughout Europe, and in Italy in particular, the post—war reconstruction also seem to point towards increasing internationalism, be it under the guidance of US plans, within the burgeoning project of European Union or as part of the longer soviet tradition. The short-lived alliance of the Resistance parties, eager to legitimize themselves as "liberator of the nation" but also very much aware of having actually been freed from without, do not however stay away for long from the rhetorical sirens of the nation.
The two great forces that were to steer the wheel of republican Italy for the next half-century, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, despite both being originally hostile to the nation (the papacy forbade for catholics to participate in Italian political life well into the XXth century, and the communists of course condemned the the Risorgimento as a bourgeois revolution) from the fifties onward bend over backwards, trying to claim again, inspired maybe say Gentile, by the Fascists, a monopoly on the nation, excluding the opposing faction from the national community.
By the time the book reaches the jubilee of 1961, the memory of the Risorgimento and the national project seems all but moribund, drowning in rhetorical outbursts which fail to arouse in the population the sentimental force of a civic tradition. Globalisation and consumerism have deflated national identity more efficiently that any "de-fascistisation" could have hoped to be.
The book is excellent history – a history of "discourse" rather than facts – but I cannot help but regret that Gentile did not engage more with theory: first of all because the absence of a definition of nation forces the narration to remain fragmentary and sometimes a little dishevelled, and also because I believe that already at the time of its writing, 1997, the "death of the nation" was already proving to be an illusion and a very relevant issue to discuss in the context of contemporary politics. Gentile has elsewhere addressed contemporary issues (the religious rhetoric of the Bush years for example) and his work on italian nationalism leaves us with many questions both in terms of his own position and in those of the future of the myth.
Can the coming post-secular age also remain post-national, or are the two mutually exclusive? How does the functional nationalism of the developing world relate to the national traditions of the West, and to its present post-national paradigm? And most recently how do the rekindled fires of nationalist rhetoric, "making american great again" and the nationalist revivals in Easter Europe fit within a globalised discourse?
Nation -and nationalism all the more- is a contentious concept in modern history: it is at the heart of both the liberal revolutions that heralded the democratic era in which the West still position itself today, and simultaneously it is stigmatised as the root of the many dictatorships and the "civil war" which has shaken Europe in the first half of the XXth century, leading to totalitarianism, the most cogent and programmatic denial of liberal democratic values. Theories of nationalism abound and it would seem from the start, some have seen the nation as a functional delusion (“Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation” said Ernest Renan) while others see it as the manifestation within the culture and world-politics of determinations, either biological or geographical, which give an immanently separate identity to particular groups (formulated in its most coherent version by the contemporary "ethno-symbolic" school);
Gentile leans towards the constructionist side, alongside scholars like Hobsbawn or Gellner, who see nations being "invented" during the modern period, generally as a functional mean to the ongoing modernisation process, embodied for example in the napolenic code. In his introduction he states that his book aims to remain value-neutral and despite focusing on the nation as "myth", understood here in sorelian terms as "a constellation of beliefs, ideas, ideals or values combined and compacted into a symbolic image that arouses in the individual and the masses strong conviction, enthusiasm, and the desire to act" (XIV), will not give the nation a positive or negative connotation. This is laudable especially for a book that covers three very different regimes, each with their own relationship to the nation, conceived often in essentialistic terms as a permanent feature that link the general will to its own history: this attitude highlights the deep shifts in content and form which the myth of the nation undergoes, and in particular its function, not only in the liberal period of state formation, but even in the post-war republic era, where its weakness allowed for the polarisation of the political landscape.
The first period treated is probably the one I am the most interested in, stretching from the unification down to the March on Rome, and as such it is unsurprising that I found it lacking: Gentile's approach throughout the book is part chronological and part conceptual, separating different forms taken by the myth of the nation within given political contexts. Thus for the liberal era, he covers Giobertian and Mazzinian sonderweg nationalism and their roots in religious rhetoric, the rise of imperialism and the thinning of the principle of nationalities in favour of opportunistic "realism", the umbertian reaction against the bourgeois hypocrisy and the many permutation of those concepts which fuelled the culture of this epoch.
The book is excruciatingly researched, most of the text being a collage of quotations taken from famous and less famous ideologists across the political spectrum, from clerical reactionaries to socialists, which does a great job representing the variety of positions – but also leaves very little room for contextualisation: the author admits being to strapped for space, and knowing the breadth of Gentile's culture and grasp of Italian cultural history, one cannot help but think that three books rather than one would have been a better solution. As a result the book will probably be better suited to people already having some knowledge of italian history. Similarly the relatively narrow national focus I find to obscure the scope of nationalism, which in Italy more than elsewhere was rooted in an international phenomenon, in continuous dialogue with France and England in particular.
The second period is that of Fascism, which the author clearly knows well, allowing him to explain, from the point of view of the concept of the nation, the deep changes the regime underwent from the twenties to the thirties. Gentile does not mention it but the first program of the fascist party, years before its accession to power in 1922, the so-called San Sepolcro program, actually had "third-worldist" elements, referring to the unyielding support the party intended to give to the every oppressed nationalities in the world, rejecting vocally "imperialism to the possible detriment of other peoples" : whether this was a mere manoeuvre to gain itself political legitimacy on the world-stage or a pandering to the syndicalist elements of the party, which would be much weakened by the later absorption of the ANI, is still debated, but certainly this shows how strong was the "myth of the nation" and its corollary of the principle of nationalities in the twenties. By the thirties of course, this had receded if not totally disappeared in favour of an increasingly statist and totalitarian organisation and a rhetoric of imperialism which would reach its apex with the campaign of Abyssinia.
But from the start Fascism had developed, under the guidance of its official philosopher Giovanni Gentile, a particular approach to nationalism which was at pain to differentiate itself from that advocated by its French and, in particular, German counterparts: grounded in voluntaristic and modernist dynamics, the nation was conceived as something not inherited from the foggy sources of ethnic history, but as a project, as a community continuously created and re-created. The notion is already visible in the umbertian period among nationalists like Papini or Prezzolini, but as it is digested by the Party and the Fascist regime, the creation of the nation becomes the monopoly of the state. In Gentile's mystical conception of the state, the individual, the state and the nation become a holy trinity which in turn create and sustain each others.
By now my reader might have gathered that the concept of nationalism is very much muddled, both by its intrinsically rhetorical character and by the fact that it remained throughout its history a site of contention between opposing political forces: at no point can we see any agreement on what the nation is or should be, and Gentile is adamant not to provide us with a clear definition which often leaves his reader gasping for air in the thickening mixture of concepts and expressions. That is both the weakness of the book, which at times become a bit of harrowing read, and its strength, in that it refuses any simplification or standardisation.
The fall of the regime and the subsequent establishment of the republic seems at first to herald the end of this by now over-inflated concept: everyone seem understandably eager to distance themselves from the fascist "style" and throughout Europe, and in Italy in particular, the post—war reconstruction also seem to point towards increasing internationalism, be it under the guidance of US plans, within the burgeoning project of European Union or as part of the longer soviet tradition. The short-lived alliance of the Resistance parties, eager to legitimize themselves as "liberator of the nation" but also very much aware of having actually been freed from without, do not however stay away for long from the rhetorical sirens of the nation.
The two great forces that were to steer the wheel of republican Italy for the next half-century, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, despite both being originally hostile to the nation (the papacy forbade for catholics to participate in Italian political life well into the XXth century, and the communists of course condemned the the Risorgimento as a bourgeois revolution) from the fifties onward bend over backwards, trying to claim again, inspired maybe say Gentile, by the Fascists, a monopoly on the nation, excluding the opposing faction from the national community.
By the time the book reaches the jubilee of 1961, the memory of the Risorgimento and the national project seems all but moribund, drowning in rhetorical outbursts which fail to arouse in the population the sentimental force of a civic tradition. Globalisation and consumerism have deflated national identity more efficiently that any "de-fascistisation" could have hoped to be.
The book is excellent history – a history of "discourse" rather than facts – but I cannot help but regret that Gentile did not engage more with theory: first of all because the absence of a definition of nation forces the narration to remain fragmentary and sometimes a little dishevelled, and also because I believe that already at the time of its writing, 1997, the "death of the nation" was already proving to be an illusion and a very relevant issue to discuss in the context of contemporary politics. Gentile has elsewhere addressed contemporary issues (the religious rhetoric of the Bush years for example) and his work on italian nationalism leaves us with many questions both in terms of his own position and in those of the future of the myth.
Can the coming post-secular age also remain post-national, or are the two mutually exclusive? How does the functional nationalism of the developing world relate to the national traditions of the West, and to its present post-national paradigm? And most recently how do the rekindled fires of nationalist rhetoric, "making american great again" and the nationalist revivals in Easter Europe fit within a globalised discourse?
July 26, 2016
It took me a long time to get through this excellent book on the changing concept of nationalism in modern Italy. Mostly, that was because I had taken on too many books of a somewhat heavy nature. I put this on hold so that I could turn my attention to this. It was worth the wait.
Having said that, I am now going to cop out of a proper review because all that I have to say, and more has been written already by Bertrand in his review of the book. If you are interested in the history of the conceptual development of Fascism, the concept of nationalism in Italy or, simply how the manipulation of patriotism or nationalism can lead to disillusionment and disaster, this is a good book. I would recommend that you read up on Italian political history from the 1850s on before hand though as the author, Emilio Gentile takes such knowledge for granted.
In any event, read Bertrand's review. It is phenomenal. Really.
Having said that, I am now going to cop out of a proper review because all that I have to say, and more has been written already by Bertrand in his review of the book. If you are interested in the history of the conceptual development of Fascism, the concept of nationalism in Italy or, simply how the manipulation of patriotism or nationalism can lead to disillusionment and disaster, this is a good book. I would recommend that you read up on Italian political history from the 1850s on before hand though as the author, Emilio Gentile takes such knowledge for granted.
In any event, read Bertrand's review. It is phenomenal. Really.
September 14, 2024
Hot take, Italian fascism is more interesting and worth scholarly study than German fascism, as it is not laden with the blinding normative baggage of the "Satan on Earth" Nazis.
I've been told Emilio Gentile is a respected scholar in the realms of twentieth-century fascism and nationalism, and after reading this, I can see why. This book was absolutely brilliant, clearly analyzing the history of nationalism in Europe through the early history of the Italian state. My only complaint was the most recent 60 years were covered in a single paragraph, and I daresay I felt a little robbed. Still, I would absolutely recommend this to anyone interested in learning more about the History of Italy or European nationalism.
I've been told Emilio Gentile is a respected scholar in the realms of twentieth-century fascism and nationalism, and after reading this, I can see why. This book was absolutely brilliant, clearly analyzing the history of nationalism in Europe through the early history of the Italian state. My only complaint was the most recent 60 years were covered in a single paragraph, and I daresay I felt a little robbed. Still, I would absolutely recommend this to anyone interested in learning more about the History of Italy or European nationalism.
April 16, 2015
Prima di passare ad un commento, un consiglio: leggete l’introduzione (sarei tentato di dire che da sola vale il libro); se la condividete, non mancherete di apprezzare il ponderoso studio di Emilio Gentile, altrimenti lasciate il libro sullo scaffale. Non vi aspettate, inoltre, che – al di la’ dell’introduzione – ci si avventuri in temi di attualità: e’ un libro di storia, e si ferma al 1961, primo centenario dell’unita’ (oltre si e’ nella cronaca).
E ora il commento: da un lato nihil sub sole novum, in quanto la storia e’ sempre quella :-), ma dall’altro il tema e l’impostazione del libro – pur meno neutra di quanto non sembri - meriterebbero che se ne rendesse obbligatoria la lettura in tutte le scuole (magari insieme al diritto costituzionale, in quella materia che ai miei tempi esisteva solo sulla carta e che dovrebbe chiamarsi educazione civica). Se non altro perché tutti abbiano chiara la differenza tra sentimento nazionale, coscienza nazionale e statale e mito nazionalistico, ma anche del perché i primi due manchino cosi’ tanto in Italia e ogni tanto (ri)affiori il solo mito.
Una storia di come il mito della nazione – nelle sue varie forme - si e’ evoluto a partire dal 1911 (primo giubileo dello Stato unitario), come si e’ trasformato nel velleitarismo fascista (a mio avviso in realtà il fascismo ha tentato di sostituirsi alla nazione, come aveva ben notato Croce) e come si e’ successivamente involuto (soprattutto a causa dell’identificazione di pressoché ogni sentimento per la nazione con il fascismo, quale si e’ operata dopo la II guerra mondiale). Tutto impeccabilmente esposto e molto approfondito, e dal mio punto di vista perfettamente condivisibile. L’unico appunto che posso fare e’ che trovo l’ambito storiografico troppo angusto per un argomento che appartiene alle scienze della politica. Nondimeno, grazie all’abilità dell’A. nel sistematizzare l’argomento e nel dargli un’impostazione ineccepibile, nulla manca, in realtà: basta saperlo trovare. A titolo d’esempio, il ruolo (più che le mere posizioni) delle sole ideologie “forti” nel secondo dopoguerra italiano (comunismo e cattolicesimo), entrambe ontologicamente sovrannazionali. Ruolo che va al di la’ del mero fatto che entrambe hanno cercato di appropriarsi del mito della nazione (a mio avviso unicamente per fini strategici) contribuendo ad ideologicizzare nuovamente la nazione. Idem dicasi del ruolo dell’idea federalista, che fino al 1961 – ma anche oltre – costituiva semplicemente una fuga dalla storia per rifugiarsi in qualcosa di talmente vago ed evanescente da appartenere unicamente al mondo degli ideali, lasciando quindi totalmente sguarnito il mondo reale - una sorta di alibi per non affrontare il problema della nazione. Con queste premesse, che si spingono ben oltre il 1961, temo peraltro che parlare nel 2005 – anche se in termini cauti – di rinascita del sentimento nazionale (V. introduzione) sia stato molto ottimistico (nonostante l’eccellente lavoro di Ciampi). Inoltre, sarebbe valsa la pena annotare che tutti i miti fondanti delle varie incarnazioni della Terza Italia sono miti di incompletezza: il Risorgimento Tradito, la Vittoria Mutilata, la Rivoluzione Incompiuta, la guerra abbandonata, la Resistenza tradita anch’essa… per non parlare di una Costituzione frutto di compromessi, del consociativismo che ne e’ conseguito, di una II Repubblica che e’ un annuncio retorico… Non stupisce quindi che il mito della Nazione stessa sia anch’esso un mito (ed una realtà) di incompiutezza (mia opinione, non dell’A.).
Ho peraltro la presunzione di ritenere che l’Autore potrebbe non dissentire da tale considerazione.
Comunque, in attesa che esca un nuovo volume aggiornato al terzo giubileo della Nazione, 4 stelle meritate, ed ingresso a pieno diritto nei miei favorites.
E ora il commento: da un lato nihil sub sole novum, in quanto la storia e’ sempre quella :-), ma dall’altro il tema e l’impostazione del libro – pur meno neutra di quanto non sembri - meriterebbero che se ne rendesse obbligatoria la lettura in tutte le scuole (magari insieme al diritto costituzionale, in quella materia che ai miei tempi esisteva solo sulla carta e che dovrebbe chiamarsi educazione civica). Se non altro perché tutti abbiano chiara la differenza tra sentimento nazionale, coscienza nazionale e statale e mito nazionalistico, ma anche del perché i primi due manchino cosi’ tanto in Italia e ogni tanto (ri)affiori il solo mito.
Una storia di come il mito della nazione – nelle sue varie forme - si e’ evoluto a partire dal 1911 (primo giubileo dello Stato unitario), come si e’ trasformato nel velleitarismo fascista (a mio avviso in realtà il fascismo ha tentato di sostituirsi alla nazione, come aveva ben notato Croce) e come si e’ successivamente involuto (soprattutto a causa dell’identificazione di pressoché ogni sentimento per la nazione con il fascismo, quale si e’ operata dopo la II guerra mondiale). Tutto impeccabilmente esposto e molto approfondito, e dal mio punto di vista perfettamente condivisibile. L’unico appunto che posso fare e’ che trovo l’ambito storiografico troppo angusto per un argomento che appartiene alle scienze della politica. Nondimeno, grazie all’abilità dell’A. nel sistematizzare l’argomento e nel dargli un’impostazione ineccepibile, nulla manca, in realtà: basta saperlo trovare. A titolo d’esempio, il ruolo (più che le mere posizioni) delle sole ideologie “forti” nel secondo dopoguerra italiano (comunismo e cattolicesimo), entrambe ontologicamente sovrannazionali. Ruolo che va al di la’ del mero fatto che entrambe hanno cercato di appropriarsi del mito della nazione (a mio avviso unicamente per fini strategici) contribuendo ad ideologicizzare nuovamente la nazione. Idem dicasi del ruolo dell’idea federalista, che fino al 1961 – ma anche oltre – costituiva semplicemente una fuga dalla storia per rifugiarsi in qualcosa di talmente vago ed evanescente da appartenere unicamente al mondo degli ideali, lasciando quindi totalmente sguarnito il mondo reale - una sorta di alibi per non affrontare il problema della nazione. Con queste premesse, che si spingono ben oltre il 1961, temo peraltro che parlare nel 2005 – anche se in termini cauti – di rinascita del sentimento nazionale (V. introduzione) sia stato molto ottimistico (nonostante l’eccellente lavoro di Ciampi). Inoltre, sarebbe valsa la pena annotare che tutti i miti fondanti delle varie incarnazioni della Terza Italia sono miti di incompletezza: il Risorgimento Tradito, la Vittoria Mutilata, la Rivoluzione Incompiuta, la guerra abbandonata, la Resistenza tradita anch’essa… per non parlare di una Costituzione frutto di compromessi, del consociativismo che ne e’ conseguito, di una II Repubblica che e’ un annuncio retorico… Non stupisce quindi che il mito della Nazione stessa sia anch’esso un mito (ed una realtà) di incompiutezza (mia opinione, non dell’A.).
Ho peraltro la presunzione di ritenere che l’Autore potrebbe non dissentire da tale considerazione.
Comunque, in attesa che esca un nuovo volume aggiornato al terzo giubileo della Nazione, 4 stelle meritate, ed ingresso a pieno diritto nei miei favorites.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews