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154 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 385
I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that you may prove me to be one.

Stalin was a communist.
Stalin committed mass genocide.
Therefore all communists will commit mass genocide.
Stalin was an atheist.
Stalin committed mass genocide.
Therefore all atheists will commit mass genocide.
Stalin breathed oxygen ...

Yet one of the most beguiling things about the dialogue is that, in the end, after exposing the sophists' ludicrous tactics, Socrates refuses to condemn them, even when given an opportunity to do so during the framing narrative's ending by the skeptical Crito, who doesn't quite buy Socrates' hyperbolic endorsement of the two men as paragons of wisdom. So while it's clear from the progression of his discussion with the sophists that we're not to take their logic seriously, it's less clear what we're supposed to take away from it all. Is any exercise of reason, however faulty and misguided, a worthy enterprise? Or is Socrates just trolling Crito by asking him to take the sophists' classes with him? In the end, all we're left with is his closing advice to Crito: "pay no attention to the practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather, give serious consideration to the thing itself: if it seems to you negligible, then turn everyone from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you to be what I think it is, then take heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and yours, as the proverb says" (307c). While the general sentiment---pursue truth!---isn't out of keeping for Socrates, I do find his skepticism about the practitioners of philosophy a bit odd, considering his own dialogic method of philosophizing, which by definition requires a partner. I suppose the point is to pursue wisdom itself rather than those who claim to be able to teach it. In any case, though there's not a lot to take away, philosophically (aside from some tentative forays into the nature of knowledge and the possibility of teaching virtue), it's a lot of fun following Euthydemus's contortions.
“…they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end…such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false.”
Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog?
Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him.
Then you beat your father, he said.
And he who says that thing says that which is?
Yes.
And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie.
Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not.
Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?
True.
And that which is not is nowhere?
Nowhere.
And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?
I think not, said Ctesippus.
Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?
Nay, he said, they do something.
And doing is making?
Yes.
And speaking is doing and making?
He agreed.
Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is.