Defining Eternity
Aquinas, Thomas. 1993. “Summa Theologiae, 1a.10.q, 1.” Opera Omnia, Leonine edn., vol. iv. In Aquinas: Selected Philosophical Writings, translated by Timothy A. McDermott, 209-211. New York: Oxford University Press.
This essay analyzes the definition of eternity. The process by which this essay arrives at the definition of the concept of eternity is by identifying the issue, raising the philosophical question, proposing the philosophical answer, and breaking down the predicate-terms of the proposition and their relationships.
The issue of the text is whether God is eternal. This issue then prompts the definition of eternity. To define eternity, the philosophical question, “What is eternity?” is raised in the text. This question seeks the formal definition of the concept and it seeks the essence, nature, and intention of that concept.
In the text, the philosophical proposition is, “Eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” (1a.10.q, 1, co.)
This proposition is divided into four (4) predicate-terms.
The first predicate-term is the noun “possession”. This is the supreme genus of eternity. The word “possession” here means the act of possessing. The text supports this explanation by stating, “To possess something is to hold it firmly and unmovingly. So to signify eternity’s unchangeableness and constancy Boethius used the word possession.” (1a.10.q, 1, ad. 6) Hence, eternity is the act of possessing or having an asset or property. What is this asset or property? It is endless life.
The second predicate term is “of endless life”; it is a differentia. In this phrase, “life” is the direct object of possession, and “endless” is the adjective that modifies “life”. First, I want to examine the word “life”. Eternity is the possession of life, so whatever exists only but is not alive can not be eternal. Anything that does not have life such as material things, for example, a rock, a chair, or a book, can not be eternal. What differentiates what is alive and what is not alive or simply existing is activity. The text states “That which exists in eternity is, in fact, also alive.” (1a.10.q, 1, ad. 2). Activity is the movement from one place to another, and duration is the movement from one point in time to another point in time. Therefore, anything that is alive is one that has duration. The text supports this when it states that “Life covers activity too, while existence doesn’t, and the flow of duration is more apparent in activity than in existence: time, for example, measures changes.” (1a.10.q, 1, ad. 2) What is alive, compared to what is not alive or simply existing, has activity. Things that simply exist do not have activity, so, they do not have duration, and therefore can not be eternal. However, duration has two kinds: with ends and without ends. Here we are talking about a duration that has no ends, hence the word “endless” that modifies the word life. The text states that “things existing in eternity are endless, lacking both beginning and end (for both may be called ends)”. (1a.10.q, 1, co.) There are beings that have beginnings, durings, and endings, they are called mortals. There are also beings that have beginnings, durings, but no endings, they are called immortals. Then, there are beings that have no beginnings or endings, but with durings, they are called eternal beings.
The third predicate term for "possession of endless life" is "complete." This term is used to describe eternity because it emphasizes that eternity is not simply a series of temporal instants or "nows." In the text, it says, "to deny that it [eternity] is temporal instantaneity he calls it complete" (1a.10.q, 1, ad. 5). The reason "complete" is used to describe eternity is because everything that exists in eternity is in a complete and unchanging state, without any sense of succession or progress from one "now" to the next. This explanation is based on the supporting text and reflects the relationship between the differentia and the genus.
The fourth predicate term is "simultaneously whole," which differentiates "possession of endless life." The text supports this by stating that "Eternity is called whole not because it has parts but because it has nothing lacking to it" (1a.10.q, 1, ad. 3). This means that eternity is whole and lacks nothing, unlike the temporal world that is characterized by constant change and imperfection. The adverb "simultaneously" modifies "whole" and emphasizes that eternity is not limited by time, as stated in the text, "deny that eternity is time" (1a.10.q, 1, ad. 5). Time is a measure of change and progression, while eternity is timeless and encompasses all moments, past, present, and future, all at once. The sense of wholeness that eternity brings is beyond the limitations of time and is not subject to change or decay.
In this essay, the definition of eternity was examined by following this process: First, identifying the issue. Second, asking the philosophical question. Third, proposing a philosophical answer, and lastly, analyzing the proposition's constituent terms and their relationships.