Subtitle: Evolution, Extinction, and Economics.
The cover of my copy of this book shows the dodo bird, the betamaxx, a car which I'm going to guess is the Edsel, and the Titanic. As you can tell from this, Paul Ormerod is not content to examine failure in just one field. Businesses and species, technologies and ecosystems are all examined. We discover that the term "half-life" can be usefully deployed when looking at members of the Largest 100 Companies in the United States list, and also to species. Failure is a complex topic.
It is also, in some ways, an apt description of this book.
This assessment is in many ways overly harsh. Ormerod can write well, he can mesh an historical anecdote with analysis of the underlying principle it illustrates, he can find an apt metaphor or thought experiment to clarify some rather abstract principles. I thoroughly enjoyed 90% of this book.
What Ormerod does a good job of showing is that, in sufficiently complex systems, failure is not just inevitable, it is not far off from random. The analogy with the half-life of a radioactive element is apt, and mathematically descriptive. Very large companies are not much more likely to succeed than small ones (once you get past the first few years of a small company's existence, in other words once you have established that the small firm was ever really a going concern). The current success (however you measure it) of a species is not much indication of its likelihood to be around in a million years' time. Ormerod has done some original research (using computer models) into the reasons for all of this, and a good job of surveying what others have done as well.
The short version is, there is no such thing as a good strategy. You can know everything about a firm, or species', strategy, and still not know if it is better or worse than another's. Competition between firms, individuals, or species, is an inherently non-linear system, with each member impacting the fate of the others so that it is inherently impossible to model accurately. Given this fact, while each CEO probably has a strategy, and if it is successful will believe in his heart of hearts that he is deserving of that success, the underlying reality is that the faces of those who appear on Forbes, Fortune, or the Wall Street Journal are distinguished from their peers primarily by being luckier.
Why do things fail? Because the world is chaotic, in the precise mathematical sense as well as the ordinary one. So far, so good.
Then, in the last chapter ("What Is to Be Done?"), Ormerod tries to tie these strands together. I am somewhat disappointed in this book simply because of how impressive it had been up to that point. Failure is a big topic, and my brief summary above can only hint at the splendid analysis of it which he presented. Perhaps, Ormerod should have stopped there, answering the question of the book's title and not attempting to go further. But, go there he did.
What is to be done? Let the market decide.
Ok, it's not that I disagree with this, for the most part, but that's all you've got? You don't have anything to say about how our society copes with failure (or fails to do so), except don't have too much government? No other useful lessons you can draw from the fact that failure does not happen in the manner that Adam Smith, Keynes, Friedman, Darwin, Dawkins or Gould described it?
For example: given that failure is always a risk, and inherently unpredictable, is there anything in our extensive use of outsourcing (putting your company's fate in the hands of others halfway around the word) that we should be reconsidering? What about building an energy system that depends upon oilfields we cannot control. What about our financial systems, have you anything to say about a system where banks are "too big to fail", once we have concluded that no matter how big, you may fail, and more or less without notice? What about our electricity generation and transmission grid, or our insurance industry, or our bond market. Are these in need of any changes, once we have concluded that failure is not an unfortunate departure from the norm, but rather the ongoing norm, like death and taxes?
Perhaps, though, I ask too much of Ormerod. Perhaps it will have to await another mind to take the work he has done, or expertly explained, and carry it forward to a conclusion about "What Is to Be Done". In the meantime, to disabuse ourselves of the idea that failure can, with sufficient prudence and diligence, be avoided, the first 13 chapters of Ormerod's book are a great read.