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Why the South Lost the Civil War
In this widely heralded book first published in 1986, four historians consider the popularly held explanations for southern defeat―state-rights disputes, inadequate military supply and strategy, and the Union blockade―undergirding their discussion with a chronological account of the war's progress. In the end, the authors find that the South lacked the will to win, that weak Confederate nationalism and the strength of a peculiar brand of evangelical Protestantism sapped the South's ability to continue a war that was not yet lost on the field.
624 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 1986
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October 31, 2012
Why the South Lost the Civil War by Richard V. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr. is a chronologically organized explanation of the reasons that the Confederacy failed to win the United States Civil War although they had the advantage over the North in regards to manpower and resources. In their thesis, the authors argue that it was not any sole factor but a combination of factors that led to victory by the North. The authors write that the major reasons are rapid degradation of morale and the resulting lack of the will to win.
The book is neatly organized into five sections and separated into seventeen chapters. The prologue contains only one chapter that deals with the explanation of the historiography of the result of the Civil War. Here, the authors downplay many historians’ theories that economic and industrial factors were the only factors that decided the outcome of the war. Instead, they state their aforementioned thesis here attributing the South’s loss to the diminishment of morale and the resulting lack of will to make war. They also summarize their argument here and explain how they will prove it.
Part II, “Physical and Moral Factors” is separated into four chapters. The first, titled, “Military Performance and Responsibilities” explains the strength of each army, the standing of each of their leaders, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. In the next chapter, the authors downplay the significance of the Union blockade and show that it was not successful because it was weakly organized and inefficient. They write that because of the problems that the blockade had, that it did not have an effect on the outcome of the war. Third, in “Southern Nationalism,” the authors explain their belief that the South lacked nationalism and was separated into distinct local societies. They write that they, “believe that the Confederacy functioned as a nation only in a technical, organizational sense, and not in a mystical or spiritual sense” (66), implying that the South was not strongly tied together and led to their demise. Finally, “Religion and the Chosen People” discusses how the South’s religious beliefs led to their loss in the Civil War. The authors write that both sides thought that God was on their side in the beginning, and eventually when the South began losing, they saw their losses as God’s work and as a sign that they were supposed to lose the war.
The third part of the book, “Military Stalemate and Internal Problems” deals with the fighting and strategy of both sides throughout the war and relates the consequences of events on the South’s morale. In “First Blood,” the authors write about the early strategies of both sides and declare that after victories neither side would follow the retreat of the losers, creating bloody battles and large loss of life as well as the stalemate that created the four-year long war. “Trial by Battle” deals with much of the same and describes the strategy of both sides that contributed further to the stalemate between the North and South attributing it to the defensive strategy or either side. In, “The Politics of Dreams,” the authors explain Jefferson Davis’ attempt to destroy the North’s morale by invading Maryland and Kentucky and having them join the South. Northern victories in response to the raids by the South helped to do the opposite of what Davis wanted and solidified morale in the North. In the next chapter, the authors deal with the Union Navy’s dominance in the West and the positive effect it had on the North by creating more victories and reducing southern morale. The rest of the part III deals with the State-Rights conflict that contributed to the localism and the lack of unity in philosophy led to another mark on morale in the South.
Part IV, “The Dissolution of Military Power and Public Will: The South Reconciles Itself to Defeat,” deals with exactly what it says. In the first chapter of the section, the authors explain the last battles of the war and how that was the final stamp on the morale of the South. The next two chapters talk about the effect that religion had on the way that the South dealt with losing the war and how they found solace in the fact that their loss was God’s doing and that it was his will for slavery to be ended. Finally, in the last chapter in the section, the authors explain the effect that the war had on the South including how the end of slavery created and forced whites to reinforce their slavery with the new Black Codes and that the South gained victory by further industrializing and gaining a sense of unity.
The book ends with a reiteration of the author’s thesis and states that the South lost the Civil War because of a variety of factors, not limited to economic and industrial issues, but also because of morale problems and the lack of unity in the Confederacy.
Why the South Lost the Civil War is an important piece of the historiography of the Civil War because it views the war from a different perspective. The authors have created a different look at the reason that the South lost the war by explaining that the South lacked the will to continue, although they could have, and that morale was the reason for that. Of course, this is opposite to the major thesis of many historians who write that the South lost primarily because of economic and/or industrial reasons.
Reviews of the book are mixed. Some write that the thesis is strong and well supported while others say the opposite. The book is heralded by all as an intriguing look at the cause for the South’s loss in the Civil War, but they point out some problems. One is that the book, which according to the authors is to prove their thesis in a set of short essays, turns out to be lengthy and long-winded. Next, reviewers state that some of the supporting evidence that the authors use is bent to support their thesis and does not portray what they are meant to. Another criticism is that the states-rights argument is on shaky footing and lacks support. Those who praise the article argue that it is an excellent piece of revisionist work that has its place in the discussion on the result of the Civil War.
The book is well written and well organized. Its thesis is strong and the support that the authors give to support it is pertinent and provides sufficient support as proof. Contrary to the beliefs of some reviewers, the evidence that the authors use does not seem to be out of context. The states-rights issue in the book is the lengthiest section, showing that the authors realized that it needed the most support and with that, they made it believable that the South was plagued by the localism that created the lack of support and common cause for winning the war. Overall, Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still provide an interesting and revisionist thesis and provide enough evidence and detail to persuade their audience enough to consider their viewpoint.
The book is neatly organized into five sections and separated into seventeen chapters. The prologue contains only one chapter that deals with the explanation of the historiography of the result of the Civil War. Here, the authors downplay many historians’ theories that economic and industrial factors were the only factors that decided the outcome of the war. Instead, they state their aforementioned thesis here attributing the South’s loss to the diminishment of morale and the resulting lack of will to make war. They also summarize their argument here and explain how they will prove it.
Part II, “Physical and Moral Factors” is separated into four chapters. The first, titled, “Military Performance and Responsibilities” explains the strength of each army, the standing of each of their leaders, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. In the next chapter, the authors downplay the significance of the Union blockade and show that it was not successful because it was weakly organized and inefficient. They write that because of the problems that the blockade had, that it did not have an effect on the outcome of the war. Third, in “Southern Nationalism,” the authors explain their belief that the South lacked nationalism and was separated into distinct local societies. They write that they, “believe that the Confederacy functioned as a nation only in a technical, organizational sense, and not in a mystical or spiritual sense” (66), implying that the South was not strongly tied together and led to their demise. Finally, “Religion and the Chosen People” discusses how the South’s religious beliefs led to their loss in the Civil War. The authors write that both sides thought that God was on their side in the beginning, and eventually when the South began losing, they saw their losses as God’s work and as a sign that they were supposed to lose the war.
The third part of the book, “Military Stalemate and Internal Problems” deals with the fighting and strategy of both sides throughout the war and relates the consequences of events on the South’s morale. In “First Blood,” the authors write about the early strategies of both sides and declare that after victories neither side would follow the retreat of the losers, creating bloody battles and large loss of life as well as the stalemate that created the four-year long war. “Trial by Battle” deals with much of the same and describes the strategy of both sides that contributed further to the stalemate between the North and South attributing it to the defensive strategy or either side. In, “The Politics of Dreams,” the authors explain Jefferson Davis’ attempt to destroy the North’s morale by invading Maryland and Kentucky and having them join the South. Northern victories in response to the raids by the South helped to do the opposite of what Davis wanted and solidified morale in the North. In the next chapter, the authors deal with the Union Navy’s dominance in the West and the positive effect it had on the North by creating more victories and reducing southern morale. The rest of the part III deals with the State-Rights conflict that contributed to the localism and the lack of unity in philosophy led to another mark on morale in the South.
Part IV, “The Dissolution of Military Power and Public Will: The South Reconciles Itself to Defeat,” deals with exactly what it says. In the first chapter of the section, the authors explain the last battles of the war and how that was the final stamp on the morale of the South. The next two chapters talk about the effect that religion had on the way that the South dealt with losing the war and how they found solace in the fact that their loss was God’s doing and that it was his will for slavery to be ended. Finally, in the last chapter in the section, the authors explain the effect that the war had on the South including how the end of slavery created and forced whites to reinforce their slavery with the new Black Codes and that the South gained victory by further industrializing and gaining a sense of unity.
The book ends with a reiteration of the author’s thesis and states that the South lost the Civil War because of a variety of factors, not limited to economic and industrial issues, but also because of morale problems and the lack of unity in the Confederacy.
Why the South Lost the Civil War is an important piece of the historiography of the Civil War because it views the war from a different perspective. The authors have created a different look at the reason that the South lost the war by explaining that the South lacked the will to continue, although they could have, and that morale was the reason for that. Of course, this is opposite to the major thesis of many historians who write that the South lost primarily because of economic and/or industrial reasons.
Reviews of the book are mixed. Some write that the thesis is strong and well supported while others say the opposite. The book is heralded by all as an intriguing look at the cause for the South’s loss in the Civil War, but they point out some problems. One is that the book, which according to the authors is to prove their thesis in a set of short essays, turns out to be lengthy and long-winded. Next, reviewers state that some of the supporting evidence that the authors use is bent to support their thesis and does not portray what they are meant to. Another criticism is that the states-rights argument is on shaky footing and lacks support. Those who praise the article argue that it is an excellent piece of revisionist work that has its place in the discussion on the result of the Civil War.
The book is well written and well organized. Its thesis is strong and the support that the authors give to support it is pertinent and provides sufficient support as proof. Contrary to the beliefs of some reviewers, the evidence that the authors use does not seem to be out of context. The states-rights issue in the book is the lengthiest section, showing that the authors realized that it needed the most support and with that, they made it believable that the South was plagued by the localism that created the lack of support and common cause for winning the war. Overall, Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still provide an interesting and revisionist thesis and provide enough evidence and detail to persuade their audience enough to consider their viewpoint.
November 20, 2025
I have wanted to read this book, written in 1986 by 4 Southern college historians, for a long time. It is a very dense book, at times hard to read (especially when 1800's military writings / hornbooks such as Von Clausewitz and Jomini are frequently quoted and referenced) - but I think it was worth the effort of reading. The authors' consensus is that the outcome of the Civil War was not inevitable, at least up until 4Q1864, and that the South's defeat was due as much to a lack of nationhood/oneness/kinship as to more frequently cited but not necessarily fatal issues. Eg, the Union had much more economic resources, a bigger population, and fielded armies with a grand total of 31% more troops than the South did, and the South had slightly more casualties than the North that had an attrition effect - but at the end of the war neither side had succeeded in destroying the other's armies and the South could have chosen to prolong the war with a problematic guerilla warfare campaign (President Davis favored this but Generals Lee and [Joseph)] Johnston did not). Also, the oft-cited Union Naval Blockade did have success in the western end, the Mississippi and other rivers, but the Atlantic Coast blockade was full of holes and the Confederates had pretty good success getting shipments through. The authors indicate that President Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had a big impact, that his study and knowledge of military issues were both positive factors for the Union victory, and that the admission and surprisingly good performance of Black soldiers in the Union Army from 1863-1865 was a big asset as well. The agrarian planning of the South as a whole - producing more cotton and less food crops than optimal for wartime - is also mentioned. The Confederate army desertion rate in 1864-1865 was also a key problem for the South. (I would have thought that General Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign and General Sherman's march thru the South would have been cited as crushing the Southern will to fight in the last year, but I did not see this stated by the authors.)
The authors also discuss the efforts of the South immediately after the War to create a Lost Cause myth (e.g. pp. 415-417, 426). Some of this was very troubling for a Northerner like me to read!
The authors also discuss the efforts of the South immediately after the War to create a Lost Cause myth (e.g. pp. 415-417, 426). Some of this was very troubling for a Northerner like me to read!
July 27, 2024
This book seeks to answer the question of what caused the South to lose the Civil War. The author of this book claims that Confederate nationalism was weak, causing Confederates to simply lack the will to win. I find that claim to be a bit silly. I live in the South, and I can tell you for free that a lot of these people still subscribe to Confederate nationalism, are involved in hate groups, and align with modern political parties who advocate racial violence and other disgraceful rhetoric. The nationalism is alive and well. That is not the reason the South lose the Civil War. In actuality, the widespread devastation to infrastructure, farmland, supply chains, and loss of life due to war and disease had a massive impact on the outcome of the Civil War. Other issues that the South faced were military tactics, inadequate leadership, and desertion.
I have had this book on my shelf for a while and have avoided reading it due to lack of interest. I am currently taking an American Slavery class and hoped that this book would be useful for a couple of assignments, so I went ahead and read it. Unfortunately, I found it lacking. I cannot recommend this book.
I have had this book on my shelf for a while and have avoided reading it due to lack of interest. I am currently taking an American Slavery class and hoped that this book would be useful for a couple of assignments, so I went ahead and read it. Unfortunately, I found it lacking. I cannot recommend this book.
April 30, 2023
I enjoyed it overall. Somewhat dense at times but a worthwhile read. Still somewhat skeptical of their thesis though.
June 8, 2023
Scattered, almost random series of essays about the Civil War and all nebulously linked by the question "Why did the South Lose?" Some discussion of military matters, some discussion of other historians, a discussion on slavery, and union strategy. Many of the essays are interesting, some aren't. And many don't really explain "why the South lost". But I give the authors credit for doing some great research based on some great books and source material.
Off topic: Another reviewer talked about the authors use of "Dated books" and being written in ye olden days of 1985. LOL! The Civil war was 120 years old when "Why the South Lost the Civil war" was written. All the Civil war participants were dead. All the written source material about the war had been published. What "new" and "modern" information about the Civil War has come to light since 1985, that the authors didn't have access to? Answer? None. Why would there be?
That aside, I'd give the book a mediocre rating due to its uneven nature and too much generalization. Those with a beginners knowledge of the issues may find it more fascinating.
Off topic: Another reviewer talked about the authors use of "Dated books" and being written in ye olden days of 1985. LOL! The Civil war was 120 years old when "Why the South Lost the Civil war" was written. All the Civil war participants were dead. All the written source material about the war had been published. What "new" and "modern" information about the Civil War has come to light since 1985, that the authors didn't have access to? Answer? None. Why would there be?
That aside, I'd give the book a mediocre rating due to its uneven nature and too much generalization. Those with a beginners knowledge of the issues may find it more fascinating.
November 7, 2016
This is a well researched book and well footnoted. The premises are not necessarily new but most were new to me. Why did the South collapse in 1865 when it still had the ability to keep fighting. Was it religion? Was it the fact that the Confederacy was abandoning slavery? Clearly the blockade did not work. Clearly they still had significant assets in the field. Clearly the lines of supply were still strong. The conclusion is somewhat inconclusive.
February 17, 2015
These four historians refute the prevalent reasons South lost Civil War that I had thought were agreed on by everyone. Interesting and doesn't have to be read in sequence. After finishing had to go online and there are historians who disagree with findings but their arguments made lots of sense.
October 18, 2025
The authors put forward a well researched explanation as to why the Confederacy lost the Civil War. They present evidence that they end up analyzing and asserting the south lacked the will to win. This theory has been very controversial. Read with that in mind.
July 21, 2008
a history prof. had me read this text in uni. it helped me understand that there are many voices in history, not merely the victors.
February 6, 2010
Very extensive analysis of the inherent problems of maintaining and sustatining a slave culture in an increasingly modern world.
October 12, 2011
Repititious toward the end, but good. South didn't lose militarily - still had large territory and industry. Lost the will to fight.
March 21, 2012
Excellent analysis of some of the many factors which played a part in the defeat of The Confederacy. Unfortunately, a little dry at times.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews