This was an extremely insightful look at the strategic and diplomatic calculus that led to the US involvement in Korea. The US sent the Soviets and Chicoms signals that they were not including Korea in the Pacific defensive perimeter. This included a withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula in 1949, as well as a speech made by Dean Acheson on US security concerns in the Pacific rim, in which he failed to even mention Korea or Taiwan. Kim Il Sung received the green light for an invasion from Stalin, and the Chicoms were reluctant allies. The author packs a tremendous amount of detail and analysis in this work, which is divided into three parts. Stueck ties the origins of the Cold War with events in Korea and examines why we see this as the Korean War, and not the Korean Civil War, through the lens of the Truman Doctrine and Syngman Rhee's relationship with Congress and the president. In the second part, Stueck examines the reasons for Chinese intervention, which seem obvious in hindsight. US success after Inchon changed the military and political goals, leading UN forces to reach beyond the culminating point of attack. He also does a good job in analyzing how and, more importantly, why the US worked so hard to keep this a limited war, in the context of increasing military committments to Europe. Stueck describes how the Chinese, after pushing the UN south of the 38th parallel, went beyond the culminating point of victory, and how this led to the armistice talks. Finally, Stueck describes the relationship between Korea and the US from 1945 to the present. This work stays at the 20,000 ft level and does not descend into operational narrative. It clearly lays out the diplomatic and strategic considerations of both sides, and provides a clear view of the birth of the Cold War and future nuclear policy.