Psychologism: The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge

by Martin Kusch

First published in 1995. When did psychology become a distinct discipline? What links the continental and analytic traditions in philosophy? Answers to both questions are found in this extraordinary account of the debate surrounding psychologism in Germany at the turn of the century. The trajectory of twentieth century philosophy has been largely determined by this anti-naturalist view which holds that empirical research is in principle different from philosophical inquiry, and can never make significant contributions to the latter's central issues. Martin Kusch explores the origins of psychologism through the work of two major figures in the history of twentieth century philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl. His sociological and historical reconstruction shows how the power struggle between the experimental psychologists and pure philosophers influenced the thought of these two philosophers, shaping their agendas and determining the success of their arguments for a sharp separation of logic from psychology. A move that was crucial in the creation of the distinct discipline of psychology and was responsible for the anti-naturalism found in both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions in philosophy. Students and lecturers in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, cognitive science and history will find this study invaluable for understanding a key moment in the intellectual history of the twentieth century.

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Science, History, History Of Science

352 pages, Hardcover

First published September 7, 1995

Reviews

[VII · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was just to boring to read, even though I find the topic interesting. His method is interesting, I just don't like what it is to read a book that uses it.

The method he uses is similar to the ones Bloor and Latour use for their sociology of science. What they care about is to find out what exactly happens before we come to accept something as fact or what they call blackboxed. It becomes something that is taken completely for granted and it doesn't even occur to anyone to challenge it. To show this they go back to history and usually emphasize sociological reasons like conflicts between scientists and their interests, while prohibiting themselves from invoking concepts like true or rational as this is precisely what is up for grabs in this process in which a statement becomes accepted as fact. Generally, I find this idea very interesting.

Kush, in this book, aims to do the same to philosophers, for the specific issue of psychologism. There is no precise definition for it, but, roughly, it is the idea that we can explain everything using science and more specifically psychology. So this book is full of quotes by mostly German philosophers of the era of Husserl and Frege that provide their reasons for rejecting this idea, and also includes some commentary of the social dynamics that were at work at that age. I actually think I am making it much more interesting than it is. The amount of research involved is admirable but the result is so dry that I doubt anyone without a phd level of interest in this would tolerate it. Maybe reading the first two chapters and the conclusion to learn about the method is worth it.

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great, rigorously researched investigation of the relationship between philosophy and the new science of psychology around the turn of the century. Is philosophy based on psychology, or is psychology a part of philosophy? Or are philosophy and psychology entirely independent disciplines? These were hotly debated questions, and although many of the disputes seem pedantic (e.g., is arithmetic based on psychological generalizations, or is it an ideal objectivity outside of space and time?), the disputants saw it as anything but trivial: for them, truth, science, and culture were all on the line! If one accepted that the principle of non-contradiction was only the result of humans' mental capacities, then skepticism surely necessarily followed, after which nihilism was but a short step...

I'm sympathetic to the sociology of knowledge, which Kusch explains well. He wants to consider the dispute over psychologism both internally—considering the logical arguments for and against—as well as externally—by looking at the social and material conditions at the time, such as professorships, wartime, and personal feuds. He shows—convincingly, to my mind—how Frege and Husserl critiqued the new applications of psychology to philosophy; how these critiques were live discussions, rather than definitive closures; how philosophy and psychology professors battled each other in public, both in good and bad faith, for academic standing; how World War 1 and the Weimar Republic's culture contributed to the separation of philosophy and psychology, and thus the division of intellectual labor; and how "history is written by the victors," such that Husserl and phenomenology were considered to be the repudiators of psychologism and philosophical naturalism.

The debates themselves were interesting and sometimes amusing. Obviously, the exchanges are quite dense, since logic, metaphysics, and science are all implicated. However, because I have plenty of background knowledge in this area, I could follow along pretty well. And it helps that Kusch does a good job wading through the debate and explaining both sides. Like I said, it could be amusing because the combatants would get heated, resorting to sarcasm, personal attacks, and name-calling. Even better, the Psychologismus-Streit basically devolved into a Salem Witch Trial/McCarthyite Red Scare, or what Kusch deems a "merry-go-round of charge and countercharge" (115). Essentially, it became the Spider-Man pointing at Spider-Man meme: Everyone accused everyone else of being a psychologicist, only to then be accused themselves. This was because nobody could actually agree what constituted psychologism. Some of the definitions were too narrow (e.g., equating logical laws with self-evident intuitions), while others were too broad (e.g., any correspondence theory of truth).

In treating this episode of intellectual history sociologically, Kusch wants to illustrate, first, that philosophy, like science, is not as pure either as it wants to be or as it presents itself; and second, that, pace Hegel, the development of philosophy is not necessary but contingent, that "Philosophical controversies are abandoned rather than resolved" (277). Kusch thinks it's a shame that philosophy and psychology parted ways and that they view each other with mutual suspicion; the split between them, he suggests, is more artificial than proponents of either suppose. As someone with interests in both disciplines, I'm sympathetic to this view; additionally, my preference for phenomenology has recently been moderated by an unease regarding transcendentalism, so reading this has been a refreshing and reassuring experience. Husserl's move away from descriptive psychology toward transcendental idealism and phenomenologists' general disdain toward empirical psychology have always unnerved me to some degree, which is why Kusch's presentation of the dispute as an interested, human one has been a real delight.