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George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon
Stephen Sears posits that "General McClellan's importance in shaping the course of the Union during the Civil War was matched only by that of President Lincoln and Generals Grant and Sherman." and yet the "Young Napoleon" has been relegated to the shadows by historians of that great conflict.
The youngest in his class at West Point, McClellan was, by age thirty-five, commander of all the Northern armies; he fought the longest and largest campaign of the time and the single bloodiest battle in the nation's history; at thirty-seven, he was nominated for the presidency of the United States by the Democratic party but was soundly defeated by Abraham Lincoln, whom McClellan held in contempt. Believing beyond any doubt that Confederate forces were greater than his and that enemies at his back conspired to defeat him, he equally believed that he was God's chosen instrument to save the Union.
Drawing entirely on primary sources, Stephen Sears has given u the first full picture of the contradictory McClellan, a man possessed by demons and delusions.
The youngest in his class at West Point, McClellan was, by age thirty-five, commander of all the Northern armies; he fought the longest and largest campaign of the time and the single bloodiest battle in the nation's history; at thirty-seven, he was nominated for the presidency of the United States by the Democratic party but was soundly defeated by Abraham Lincoln, whom McClellan held in contempt. Believing beyond any doubt that Confederate forces were greater than his and that enemies at his back conspired to defeat him, he equally believed that he was God's chosen instrument to save the Union.
Drawing entirely on primary sources, Stephen Sears has given u the first full picture of the contradictory McClellan, a man possessed by demons and delusions.
510 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1988
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631 people want to read
About the author
Stephen W. Sears
61 books220 followersStephen Ward Sears is an American historian specializing in the American Civil War.
A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.
Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.
A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.
Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews
November 29, 2015
A well-written and evenhanded, if not particularly engaging biography of the enigmatic McClellan. McClellan was, of course, a child prodigy,a good businessman, a superb engineer, a great organizer, and an excellent administrator. He also made fairly wise choices when it came to the army’s other leaders. These skills, with a good helping of luck, would bring him success at many points of his life; his time as commander of the Army of the Potomac was clearly not one of these instances.
McClellan’s fundamental weakness, Sears argues, was his inability to deal with uncertainty. In his entire tenure as commander McClellan planned and fought only one battle (Antietam). The outcome of the army’s other battles had little to do with McClellan’s actions, and charges of moral cowardice were frequently leveled. Sears shows how spectacularly McClellan failed the country and the army that he genuinely loved. The theme of McClellan’s failure is a repetitive one in Sears’ book, but only because it is fitting. Sears presents all of this in a clear, organized and intelligent manner.
Clearly, McClellan was not just another Union general. He was a national leader with a vision for his army and was well-loved by his own men for reasons that are still difficult to comprehend. These aspects are as integral to McClellan as his indecision, paranoia and vanity.
An excellent look at McClellan in all of his brilliance and folly.
McClellan’s fundamental weakness, Sears argues, was his inability to deal with uncertainty. In his entire tenure as commander McClellan planned and fought only one battle (Antietam). The outcome of the army’s other battles had little to do with McClellan’s actions, and charges of moral cowardice were frequently leveled. Sears shows how spectacularly McClellan failed the country and the army that he genuinely loved. The theme of McClellan’s failure is a repetitive one in Sears’ book, but only because it is fitting. Sears presents all of this in a clear, organized and intelligent manner.
Clearly, McClellan was not just another Union general. He was a national leader with a vision for his army and was well-loved by his own men for reasons that are still difficult to comprehend. These aspects are as integral to McClellan as his indecision, paranoia and vanity.
An excellent look at McClellan in all of his brilliance and folly.
December 29, 2023
George B. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac are practically synomous because of his work in building it into the force it would become after the debacle of First Manassas This book does a fine job in detailing how McClellan's efforts to turn it into a winning army were only partially successful. He gave them new pride in themselves and a willingness to fight, but his own failings in the 7 Days Campaign in Virginia and the Antietam Campaign in Maryland robbed his army of the victories they needed so badly.
Stephen Sears makes no apologies for McClellan's mistakes on the battlefield or in his dealings with Washington. His incessant demands for more troops because he was 'outnumbered' was just one of his problems that he brought on himself. He also created enemies because of his strict adherence to just fighting for the Union; he continued to deny that the cause of emancipation of the slaves had no place in the war. He hoped to 'persuade' the South to return to the Union if their 'property' was respected.
His delusions, his refusal to accept criticism, and belief that the administration was filled with his enemies all led to his downfall. Not that he didn't have enemies such as Stanton and most of the Radical Republicans, but he couldn't seem to realize that his actions or in truth his inactions in always promising to fight, but rarely doing so led to his final removal from command after Antietam.
McClellan had one more chance at glory when he ran for president in 1864. Unfortunately, he was forced to run on a peace platform which he didn't agree with and lost handily. He died at a fairly young age, still believing that he had been in the right, and that when his memoirs were published everyone would see the truth. Unfortunately, he died before they were finished, and they were left to someone else--someone who did him no favors.
I am not a McClellan fan, but I still found this book interesting because it added to my knowledge of a man who was his own worst enemy. He could have had it all, but instead he let it get away from him.
Stephen Sears makes no apologies for McClellan's mistakes on the battlefield or in his dealings with Washington. His incessant demands for more troops because he was 'outnumbered' was just one of his problems that he brought on himself. He also created enemies because of his strict adherence to just fighting for the Union; he continued to deny that the cause of emancipation of the slaves had no place in the war. He hoped to 'persuade' the South to return to the Union if their 'property' was respected.
His delusions, his refusal to accept criticism, and belief that the administration was filled with his enemies all led to his downfall. Not that he didn't have enemies such as Stanton and most of the Radical Republicans, but he couldn't seem to realize that his actions or in truth his inactions in always promising to fight, but rarely doing so led to his final removal from command after Antietam.
McClellan had one more chance at glory when he ran for president in 1864. Unfortunately, he was forced to run on a peace platform which he didn't agree with and lost handily. He died at a fairly young age, still believing that he had been in the right, and that when his memoirs were published everyone would see the truth. Unfortunately, he died before they were finished, and they were left to someone else--someone who did him no favors.
I am not a McClellan fan, but I still found this book interesting because it added to my knowledge of a man who was his own worst enemy. He could have had it all, but instead he let it get away from him.
July 5, 2017
When I read military history I make a serious effort not to pass judgment on the commanders or soldiers for perceived mistakes or poor judgment (Barring the committing of atrocities). I have never been in combat, much less led men in combat, and I think it is unfair to sit in the safety of my home 150 years after the fact and condemn someone as a fool or a coward. Generally there is a lot going on beyond the popular narrative that has emerged over the years that can explain away, or at the very least mitigate the decisions these soldiers and officers made that have been scrutinized and condemned as the years pass. And so, after reading both Shelby Foote's Narrative of the Civil War and Stephen Sears' (The author of this book) books on Antietam, The Peninsular Campaign and Chancellorsville, I was determined to give McClellan a fair shake.
Despite his youth and owing to his charisma, successes in a minor campaign in Western Virginia at the very beginning of the war, and reputation in the pre-war Army as a man of ability and intellect (He had written a cavalry manual, invented a saddle that had been adopted by the calvary, and been selected as an observer in the Crimean War), McClellan was granted control of the Army of the Potomac, which was badly demoralized following a major loss at First Bull Run.
Even General McClellan's detractors credit him with turning a green and freshly whipped army into an impressive and proud professional army in these early days of the war. Sears is no different and gives credit where credit is due, painting McClellan in these days as an inspiring and gifted organizer and motivator. McClellan was the toast of the Union, and seemed poised to enter the pantheon of triumphant American heroes (At least in the view of the North).
But as we all know, it was not to be. McClellan dragged his feet despite repeated urgings forward by superiors, the press and his colleagues. Suggestions, and later orders, by no less than the President of the United States were second-guessed, ignored or mocked. When McClellan finally did move the army forward, "to the gates of Richmond" he hesitated at the critical moment, and shrunk away from the challenge in front of him, largely in part because of his mistaken belief that the Confederate Army in front of him was three times the size it really was. A second chance at glory on the battlefield of Antietam presented itself months later, and despite winning a great victory, a lack of boldness and the general mismanagement of several components of the campaign, as well as the ever-present greatly miscalculated size of the army opposing prevented McClellan from landing the knockout blow against the CSA many were expecting. It was his last military command, and the glory would go to Grant, Sherman and Lincoln, while McClellan was forgotten in the grand scheme American history, and vilified by those who cared to study deeper.
What could explain this? In all my Civil War readings the facts are clear enough, but the reason was always a mystery. Was McClellan a coward? A fool? Was he, as some have suggested, attempting to preserve the Confederacy to force a peace and discredit Lincoln and his administration?
Sears' book does a great job of letting us get to know McClellan the person. Using McClellan's private correspondence, which was prolific, we get a wonderful sense of who he was. Unfortunately, the man that emerges is a braggart, overly sensitive to criticism, petty, and prone to delusions of grandeur. He insults and slanders all those whom he is subordinate too, attributing their short-sightedness, incompetence and selfishness as the cause for all his setbacks and mistakes both in his private and public careers. He is unable to admit any faults or mistakes and even in his best moments he sees himself as the one man smart enough and brave enough to lead the nation through it's darkest hour. It is not all negative, as McClellan comes across as extremely intelligent, a doting father and husband, and truly concerned for the lives of all the men under his command.
Sears' book also does a stellar job at allowing us to understand the political climate of the time through newspaper articles, columns and political correspondence. Central to understanding McClellan as a general and as a man is understanding the conflict between Northern Democrats (McClellan was a staunch Democrat and anti-abolitionist) and Republicans (Lincoln's party). It is an important dimension of the Northern war effort that is all too often overlooked. I found this aspect of the book the most illuminating in understanding why McClellan behaved the way he did: He was paranoid that Lincoln and his administration were setting him up for failure to discredit him as a future political opponent by withholding proper reinforcements and logistical support and forcing him into battle before he was fully equipped.
This book will not vindicate McClellan, but it does give him a fair shake. For all the pomposity and mistakes, Sears firmly dispels the notion that McClellan was attempting negotiate a peace with the CSA. McClellan was a patriot through and through. Furthermore, McClellan suffered from malaria he contracted in the Mexican-American war and was probably dealing with the illness during his campaigns. The much-referenced "Quaker Guns"-logs painted to look like artillery the CSA used to prevent a Union advance on the thinly held Bull Run battlefield-that have been cited as a major embarrassment for McClellan were not as important as it seems. The Union war plan had long-since ceased to include an advance in that direction. Furthermore, McClellan is shown to be a brilliant administrator and motivator, able to get the massive Army of the Potomac organized and in fighting shape and winning the love of his men even after their defeats on the battlefield.
I found this book to be among the most important I have read on the Civil War, and I think it is essential reading for a deeper understanding of the Eastern Theater. I would also say I believe this book is important to read even if you have no interest in the Civil War. I think many of the lessons of McClellan's career in the Army of the Potomac are universal. Despite all the talent and momentum that McClellan had he always believed he was the smartest man in the room and refused to take accountability for anything. This lack of perspective and critical thinking led to his inability to accept honest advice and counsel, an inability to learn from his mistakes, his refusal to delegate appropriately, and eventually his growing paranoia that lesser minds were working to discredit him. Were I a CEO I would make this book mandatory reading within my company.
The only thing keeping me from giving this book a full 5 stars is that Sears does not go into detail when it comes to the actual fighting and battles of McClellan's campaign. I know that is unfair, as Sears has written remarkable books that go very much in detail about the Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, and that the point of this book was to focus on McClellan the man and general. However, I think if the battles were more fleshed out and we were made to understand how truly awful the combat was and how badly casualties and survivors of the Army of the Potomac were suffering and enduring it would have given the book a greater weight. As is stands, this book succeeds brilliantly as a supplement to Sears' other works, as well as other books on the Eastern Theater.
Despite his youth and owing to his charisma, successes in a minor campaign in Western Virginia at the very beginning of the war, and reputation in the pre-war Army as a man of ability and intellect (He had written a cavalry manual, invented a saddle that had been adopted by the calvary, and been selected as an observer in the Crimean War), McClellan was granted control of the Army of the Potomac, which was badly demoralized following a major loss at First Bull Run.
Even General McClellan's detractors credit him with turning a green and freshly whipped army into an impressive and proud professional army in these early days of the war. Sears is no different and gives credit where credit is due, painting McClellan in these days as an inspiring and gifted organizer and motivator. McClellan was the toast of the Union, and seemed poised to enter the pantheon of triumphant American heroes (At least in the view of the North).
But as we all know, it was not to be. McClellan dragged his feet despite repeated urgings forward by superiors, the press and his colleagues. Suggestions, and later orders, by no less than the President of the United States were second-guessed, ignored or mocked. When McClellan finally did move the army forward, "to the gates of Richmond" he hesitated at the critical moment, and shrunk away from the challenge in front of him, largely in part because of his mistaken belief that the Confederate Army in front of him was three times the size it really was. A second chance at glory on the battlefield of Antietam presented itself months later, and despite winning a great victory, a lack of boldness and the general mismanagement of several components of the campaign, as well as the ever-present greatly miscalculated size of the army opposing prevented McClellan from landing the knockout blow against the CSA many were expecting. It was his last military command, and the glory would go to Grant, Sherman and Lincoln, while McClellan was forgotten in the grand scheme American history, and vilified by those who cared to study deeper.
What could explain this? In all my Civil War readings the facts are clear enough, but the reason was always a mystery. Was McClellan a coward? A fool? Was he, as some have suggested, attempting to preserve the Confederacy to force a peace and discredit Lincoln and his administration?
Sears' book does a great job of letting us get to know McClellan the person. Using McClellan's private correspondence, which was prolific, we get a wonderful sense of who he was. Unfortunately, the man that emerges is a braggart, overly sensitive to criticism, petty, and prone to delusions of grandeur. He insults and slanders all those whom he is subordinate too, attributing their short-sightedness, incompetence and selfishness as the cause for all his setbacks and mistakes both in his private and public careers. He is unable to admit any faults or mistakes and even in his best moments he sees himself as the one man smart enough and brave enough to lead the nation through it's darkest hour. It is not all negative, as McClellan comes across as extremely intelligent, a doting father and husband, and truly concerned for the lives of all the men under his command.
Sears' book also does a stellar job at allowing us to understand the political climate of the time through newspaper articles, columns and political correspondence. Central to understanding McClellan as a general and as a man is understanding the conflict between Northern Democrats (McClellan was a staunch Democrat and anti-abolitionist) and Republicans (Lincoln's party). It is an important dimension of the Northern war effort that is all too often overlooked. I found this aspect of the book the most illuminating in understanding why McClellan behaved the way he did: He was paranoid that Lincoln and his administration were setting him up for failure to discredit him as a future political opponent by withholding proper reinforcements and logistical support and forcing him into battle before he was fully equipped.
This book will not vindicate McClellan, but it does give him a fair shake. For all the pomposity and mistakes, Sears firmly dispels the notion that McClellan was attempting negotiate a peace with the CSA. McClellan was a patriot through and through. Furthermore, McClellan suffered from malaria he contracted in the Mexican-American war and was probably dealing with the illness during his campaigns. The much-referenced "Quaker Guns"-logs painted to look like artillery the CSA used to prevent a Union advance on the thinly held Bull Run battlefield-that have been cited as a major embarrassment for McClellan were not as important as it seems. The Union war plan had long-since ceased to include an advance in that direction. Furthermore, McClellan is shown to be a brilliant administrator and motivator, able to get the massive Army of the Potomac organized and in fighting shape and winning the love of his men even after their defeats on the battlefield.
I found this book to be among the most important I have read on the Civil War, and I think it is essential reading for a deeper understanding of the Eastern Theater. I would also say I believe this book is important to read even if you have no interest in the Civil War. I think many of the lessons of McClellan's career in the Army of the Potomac are universal. Despite all the talent and momentum that McClellan had he always believed he was the smartest man in the room and refused to take accountability for anything. This lack of perspective and critical thinking led to his inability to accept honest advice and counsel, an inability to learn from his mistakes, his refusal to delegate appropriately, and eventually his growing paranoia that lesser minds were working to discredit him. Were I a CEO I would make this book mandatory reading within my company.
The only thing keeping me from giving this book a full 5 stars is that Sears does not go into detail when it comes to the actual fighting and battles of McClellan's campaign. I know that is unfair, as Sears has written remarkable books that go very much in detail about the Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, and that the point of this book was to focus on McClellan the man and general. However, I think if the battles were more fleshed out and we were made to understand how truly awful the combat was and how badly casualties and survivors of the Army of the Potomac were suffering and enduring it would have given the book a greater weight. As is stands, this book succeeds brilliantly as a supplement to Sears' other works, as well as other books on the Eastern Theater.
January 16, 2018
I really enjoyed this biography. I came away from it with a bit of respect for General McClellan that I didn't expect to find. His antics as a soldier might have been ridiculously comical, but he apparently did a fantastic job as governor of New Jersey. That surprised me. I also appreciate how the author could discuss General McClellan's silliness without making fun of him or being disrespectful.
June 11, 2020
In American Civil War lore, names like Lincoln, Grant and Sherman were ranked among the heroes who saved the Union. Less can be said about George Brinton McClellan, who ranked low on the list. However, the author stated that McClellan was equal in importance with the likes of Lincoln and Grant in shaping the history. The great men theory says that history often rests upon shoulders of few chosen men, who stood taller from others. McClellan of course, became the antithesis of such theory.
A child prodigy, McClellan graduated second highest of his West Point Class. His stature as one of America’s pre-war greatest military minds allowed him to be appointed as US Commander-in-chief and commander of Union’s biggest army, the Army of the Potomac (after backstabbing his own mentor first). However, this was where McClellan became known for his future (bad) reputation. While being a good engineering officer, and highly popular among the common ranks, he was repeatedly haunted by his own delusion of facing Confederate enemies who were larger in number than his (which was funny considering he led the largest Union Army).
This delusion led to overcautiousness and him being a general pain in Lincoln’s backside for consistently asking for more reinforcements to calm his fear against his phantom enemies. While able to formulate plan to ensure that Union has general strategy to win the war, he was timid in its execution, allowing his enemy, General Lee of Army of Northern Virginia to dictate the tempo of the battles while having inferior numbers on his disposal. When McClellan plans caught a snag, he became stunned and incapable of thinking what to do, leaving his suitability as field commander much to be desired. In short, McClellan was often being presented with chance to win the Civil War by beating the confederates earlier, yet his shortcomings prevented him to seize it. To be fair, his situation was not helped by general incompetence of Union’s military officers, leading to a meme situation where Lincoln fired generals one after another.
First tasked with defending Washington from Confederates trying to cross the Potomac, he wasted time by being afraid of smaller enemy who fooled him by disguising logs as cannon batteries, leading him to be dismissed from position of Commander-in-Chief. Next, he forayed into Peninsular Campaign, where his army got licked by General Lee, allowing Lee to push for Maryland, hoping to stoke secessionist sentiments there. McClellan met him once again in Battle of Antietam, fighting to a stalemate in the bloodiest battle in Civil War history, where McClellan was fueled more by desire to avoid defeat rather than seize victory. This marked a turning point of fortune for both Union and Confederate, and McClellan unwittingly enabled Lincoln to issue Emancipation Proclamation (something that McClellan opposed) from a position of relative strength.
McClellan had been a conservative in his political outlook, and while he was a patriot who wished for Union to be preserved and believed that Confederates must be destroyed, he also believed that reunion must be reached without abolishing slavery. He also professed a dislike for Lincoln and Radical Republicans (imagine yourself calling Lincoln a ‘Gorilla’). Being dismissed after Antietam, McClellan dabbled into politics by joining the Democratic Party, standing as its presidential candidate in 1864 election which amounted for a political suicide in which the party was divided sharply among War Democrats (who advocated for war) and Peace Democrats or Copperheads (who demanded immediate cessation of war and negotiated peace) leading to a very confused campaign which was wholly disastrous in face of highly popular president Lincoln.
After this loss, he worked on various jobs, writing various good articles on military issues (which he was capable to do when not writing about himself), serving competently as one-term governor of New Jersey, and most importantly, writing his own memoir, which the only copy was burned and when he rewrote it, it was only halfway finished when he died. His friend, who decided to finish it, ended up lowering McClellan’s reputation by exposing his private letters to his wife, including his private thoughts of Lincoln (which came to be regarded as some sort of god by the time of publishing of this said memoir), condemning him forever in eyes of history.
In the end, all I can say is that while McClellan is overall a competent man, he chose to be incompetent during the times when he was expected to shine, in vice of his timidness bordering on delusion. He failed to grow as a commander, consistently repeating same mistakes over and over. His personal distaste of working together with civilians and politicians also becoming his shortcoming, preventing him to cooperate to the utmost with Lincoln’s administration (leaving me amazed by his impertinence against Lincoln and Lincoln’s incredible patience when dealing with McClellan). Overall, this book was an interesting read for me, and certainly an eye-opener, for it clarifies where McClellan stands in history (although still not in a very good position, though).
A child prodigy, McClellan graduated second highest of his West Point Class. His stature as one of America’s pre-war greatest military minds allowed him to be appointed as US Commander-in-chief and commander of Union’s biggest army, the Army of the Potomac (after backstabbing his own mentor first). However, this was where McClellan became known for his future (bad) reputation. While being a good engineering officer, and highly popular among the common ranks, he was repeatedly haunted by his own delusion of facing Confederate enemies who were larger in number than his (which was funny considering he led the largest Union Army).
This delusion led to overcautiousness and him being a general pain in Lincoln’s backside for consistently asking for more reinforcements to calm his fear against his phantom enemies. While able to formulate plan to ensure that Union has general strategy to win the war, he was timid in its execution, allowing his enemy, General Lee of Army of Northern Virginia to dictate the tempo of the battles while having inferior numbers on his disposal. When McClellan plans caught a snag, he became stunned and incapable of thinking what to do, leaving his suitability as field commander much to be desired. In short, McClellan was often being presented with chance to win the Civil War by beating the confederates earlier, yet his shortcomings prevented him to seize it. To be fair, his situation was not helped by general incompetence of Union’s military officers, leading to a meme situation where Lincoln fired generals one after another.
First tasked with defending Washington from Confederates trying to cross the Potomac, he wasted time by being afraid of smaller enemy who fooled him by disguising logs as cannon batteries, leading him to be dismissed from position of Commander-in-Chief. Next, he forayed into Peninsular Campaign, where his army got licked by General Lee, allowing Lee to push for Maryland, hoping to stoke secessionist sentiments there. McClellan met him once again in Battle of Antietam, fighting to a stalemate in the bloodiest battle in Civil War history, where McClellan was fueled more by desire to avoid defeat rather than seize victory. This marked a turning point of fortune for both Union and Confederate, and McClellan unwittingly enabled Lincoln to issue Emancipation Proclamation (something that McClellan opposed) from a position of relative strength.
McClellan had been a conservative in his political outlook, and while he was a patriot who wished for Union to be preserved and believed that Confederates must be destroyed, he also believed that reunion must be reached without abolishing slavery. He also professed a dislike for Lincoln and Radical Republicans (imagine yourself calling Lincoln a ‘Gorilla’). Being dismissed after Antietam, McClellan dabbled into politics by joining the Democratic Party, standing as its presidential candidate in 1864 election which amounted for a political suicide in which the party was divided sharply among War Democrats (who advocated for war) and Peace Democrats or Copperheads (who demanded immediate cessation of war and negotiated peace) leading to a very confused campaign which was wholly disastrous in face of highly popular president Lincoln.
After this loss, he worked on various jobs, writing various good articles on military issues (which he was capable to do when not writing about himself), serving competently as one-term governor of New Jersey, and most importantly, writing his own memoir, which the only copy was burned and when he rewrote it, it was only halfway finished when he died. His friend, who decided to finish it, ended up lowering McClellan’s reputation by exposing his private letters to his wife, including his private thoughts of Lincoln (which came to be regarded as some sort of god by the time of publishing of this said memoir), condemning him forever in eyes of history.
In the end, all I can say is that while McClellan is overall a competent man, he chose to be incompetent during the times when he was expected to shine, in vice of his timidness bordering on delusion. He failed to grow as a commander, consistently repeating same mistakes over and over. His personal distaste of working together with civilians and politicians also becoming his shortcoming, preventing him to cooperate to the utmost with Lincoln’s administration (leaving me amazed by his impertinence against Lincoln and Lincoln’s incredible patience when dealing with McClellan). Overall, this book was an interesting read for me, and certainly an eye-opener, for it clarifies where McClellan stands in history (although still not in a very good position, though).
January 14, 2014
I have read much about the Civil War, but I've never fully understood McClellan or what made him tick until I read this biography. I recommend it to anyone who has an abiding interest in the Civil War.
August 10, 2017
I found this book to be dry and overly long. Also felt like a hatchet job. McClellan did do some things right!
December 20, 2024
This review, no one will probably like. I am of a small group of those who look at McClellan in a different light than most. Sears may be a great historian, but one of his main arguments against McClellan is based on hindsight. Yes, McClellan did believe he was always outnumbered. In fact, he sometimes believed it to be double his own strength. But how was he possibly supposed to know what the true strength was? McClellan didn’t have access to the Official Records or any sources that Sears and us history lovers do. So how can we judge him based on that? Sears at one point essentially states that based on what McClellan knew, he didn’t do that bad. Then why continue to lambast him for something he couldn’t have possible known! It may seem delusional for someone to believe the Confederate strength being so much, but it was widely believed at the time. (Both Sherman and Halleck believed in it.) I don’t believe McClellan was totally deluded by this. At Antietam, he attacked an enemy he believed to be nearly double his strength frontally, on the high ground! (And also, is this move not being aggressive?)
Sears also repeatedly criticizes McClellan for not being at the front. An Army Commander’s position is not at the front. It is at the rear. It would have been stupid for McClellan to do that. If he’s at the front of the ‘main battle’ and something goes wrong elsewhere, no one will be there to settle the situation. I can’t understand why he believes a General should be at the front micro managing affairs. That’s what leads to failure more than anything. McClellan did go to the front when he needed to, but like a good General, he stayed behind where one should be! Sears is a military historian, yet acts like some newspaper reporter when it comes to this. He should know better. Does he do this because he simply doesn’t like McClellan? That I do not know.
He also doesn’t mind saying why others chose to do certain things, like Lincoln sending 3 separate departments under no 1 commander to chase down Jackson, which obviously wasn’t going to work, and puts the blame on bad luck and weather, but won’t use those as considerations for McClellan’s own failures. Same with why the Navy didn’t want to help McClellan on the fear of the Merrimack. Yet when it comes to McClellan, he has to criticize, or place him in the wrong for fears that seemed realistic and reasonable to him as well? What a hypocrite!
He also criticizes McClellan for not attacking Richmond head on during the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan’s army rarely exceeded 100,000, whereas, the Confederates army numbered anywhere from 60-90,000. (Some other put their numbers as high as 110,000) In the early part of modern warfare, the defenders always have an advantage especially in prepared positions. Sometimes you needed 3 attackers to equal 1 defender. All major cities that were captured during the Civil War were after a siege, i.e. Richmond, after Petersburg was besieged for 9 months, Vicksburg after a siege of a month and a half, and Atlanta after a similar timeline for its siege. Others like Nashville were simply abandoned. The idea that McClellan could have done so, with an exposed right flank, and no naval support, is simply ridiculous. McClellan would’ve suffered heavy losses and probably would’ve achieved nothing, just like every major head on assault against prepared positions. (Picketts Charge, Hood at Franklin, Burnside at Fredericksburg, and Grant at both Cold Harbor and Vicksburg.) Sears is a Civil War historian, he should know this. Yet it seems he doesn’t, or he ignorantly places unrealistic expectations on McClellan. I can’t understand it. Does he place these expectations on him to cover up Lincoln’s own mistakes? Maybe.
One thing I found surprising was that one of his chapters is titled “Opportunity of a Lifetime”. Of course it’s about the famous Lost Orders. Yet he criticizes McClellan for believing Longstreet (Lee’s main body) was in Boonsboro as stated by the orders, when he was in Hagerstown. He thinks McClellan should have used this order to destroy Lee’s army, yet also criticizes him for following it to the letter. Yes Andrew Curtin, Governor of Pennsylvania did report Longstreet being at Hagerstown, but why should McClellan believe that when in his hands was an order written by Lee himself? It’s mind boggling!
If you want to read this book, read this with an open mind. Before you read this, I recommend reading McClellan’s memoirs first, even though they aren’t complete. It will give you a good jump off point into understanding where McClellan was coming from. McClellan may have not been the best General, but he shouldn’t be judged based on what we know 160 years after his career ended. That’s what happens too much with McClellan.
Sears also repeatedly criticizes McClellan for not being at the front. An Army Commander’s position is not at the front. It is at the rear. It would have been stupid for McClellan to do that. If he’s at the front of the ‘main battle’ and something goes wrong elsewhere, no one will be there to settle the situation. I can’t understand why he believes a General should be at the front micro managing affairs. That’s what leads to failure more than anything. McClellan did go to the front when he needed to, but like a good General, he stayed behind where one should be! Sears is a military historian, yet acts like some newspaper reporter when it comes to this. He should know better. Does he do this because he simply doesn’t like McClellan? That I do not know.
He also doesn’t mind saying why others chose to do certain things, like Lincoln sending 3 separate departments under no 1 commander to chase down Jackson, which obviously wasn’t going to work, and puts the blame on bad luck and weather, but won’t use those as considerations for McClellan’s own failures. Same with why the Navy didn’t want to help McClellan on the fear of the Merrimack. Yet when it comes to McClellan, he has to criticize, or place him in the wrong for fears that seemed realistic and reasonable to him as well? What a hypocrite!
He also criticizes McClellan for not attacking Richmond head on during the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan’s army rarely exceeded 100,000, whereas, the Confederates army numbered anywhere from 60-90,000. (Some other put their numbers as high as 110,000) In the early part of modern warfare, the defenders always have an advantage especially in prepared positions. Sometimes you needed 3 attackers to equal 1 defender. All major cities that were captured during the Civil War were after a siege, i.e. Richmond, after Petersburg was besieged for 9 months, Vicksburg after a siege of a month and a half, and Atlanta after a similar timeline for its siege. Others like Nashville were simply abandoned. The idea that McClellan could have done so, with an exposed right flank, and no naval support, is simply ridiculous. McClellan would’ve suffered heavy losses and probably would’ve achieved nothing, just like every major head on assault against prepared positions. (Picketts Charge, Hood at Franklin, Burnside at Fredericksburg, and Grant at both Cold Harbor and Vicksburg.) Sears is a Civil War historian, he should know this. Yet it seems he doesn’t, or he ignorantly places unrealistic expectations on McClellan. I can’t understand it. Does he place these expectations on him to cover up Lincoln’s own mistakes? Maybe.
One thing I found surprising was that one of his chapters is titled “Opportunity of a Lifetime”. Of course it’s about the famous Lost Orders. Yet he criticizes McClellan for believing Longstreet (Lee’s main body) was in Boonsboro as stated by the orders, when he was in Hagerstown. He thinks McClellan should have used this order to destroy Lee’s army, yet also criticizes him for following it to the letter. Yes Andrew Curtin, Governor of Pennsylvania did report Longstreet being at Hagerstown, but why should McClellan believe that when in his hands was an order written by Lee himself? It’s mind boggling!
If you want to read this book, read this with an open mind. Before you read this, I recommend reading McClellan’s memoirs first, even though they aren’t complete. It will give you a good jump off point into understanding where McClellan was coming from. McClellan may have not been the best General, but he shouldn’t be judged based on what we know 160 years after his career ended. That’s what happens too much with McClellan.
August 19, 2019
Very few folks were as certain of their destinies as George B. McClellan and very few were ever proven
more wrong. He had one royal high opinion of himself and little good to say of others. Especially the
president he served Abraham Lincoln.
McClellan was born in 1826 to a prominent Philadelphia family. His father was a doctor and a Democrat and George became the latter. He opted for the military and got a West Point appointment
and graduated with honors in the Corps of Engineers.
His Mexican War was distinguished, McClellan managed to serve with major commanders Zachary
Taylor and Winfield Scott with some time out to acquire malaria which plagued him his whole life.
Post the war McClellan served as a surveyor for railroad routes in the new Oregon territory. Only a
guy marked as a comer in the army would be given the job of observer at the Crimean War. He was
present at the siege of Sevastopol. Afterward he resigned his commission to get rich in the railroad
construction business.
McClellan did have a happy home life with Ellen Marcy. They were a devoted couple for the length
of their marriage. When the Civil War began he came back to the army. He was for preservation
of the union, but wanted no messing with the South's peculiar institution of slavery.
His first assignment was in the area that would become West Virginia and he won a battle at a place
called Rich Mountain. After the defeat at Bull Run the North was desperate for some good news
from any quarter. McClellan was young, popular, and charismatic. He was soon getting the major
command of the war with the Army of the Potomac.
McClellan kept a diary and for his historical reputation he should have burned. Nobody was spared in that diary including his president. He was a great organizer, but was reluctant to use what he organized. That reluctance caused him to be relieved.
But he got a second chance when the guy who replaced him John Pope muffed it big time at the
second Battle of Bull Run. McClellan was reinstated and given his head.
When he was finally forced to fight a battle it was the bloodiest of the Civil War. Robert E. Lee crossed into Maryland and forced a fight with McClellan at Antietam. It was a slugfest with the
Union forcing Lee back across the Potomac.
McClellan was praised for the victory and damned for not pursuing Lee more aggressively. A point
argued by military historians to this day. But Lincoln had enough of McClellan's bad mouthing him
behind his back. He was relieved and that marked the end of his military career.
But the Democrats were seeking a candidate to oppose Lincoln in 1864 and McClellan got himself
drafted at 38 still the youngest man nominated for president by a major party. For a while it looked good for him as progress was not being made. But two generals named Grant and Sherman
started making real progress.
These were two guys like so many others McClellan thought little of. But they pulled it out for
Lincoln. The Electoral College saw him carrying only New Jersey and Delaware and the margin was
212 to 21.
McClellan was rich enough and never had to worry about where a next meal was coming from for
his family. He was always a willing campaigner for Democrats. IN 1878 the Democrats elected
him Governor of New Jersey. His three year term was a steady but unspectacular reign marked
by efficient administration and balanced budgets.
McClellan died suddenly in 1885 at 59 and his Civil War memoirs were published. They did little
for his historic reputation.
Note the title of Stephen W. Sears work The Young Napoleon. McClellan certainly thought of himself that way. This book will show how far short he fell from that accolade.
more wrong. He had one royal high opinion of himself and little good to say of others. Especially the
president he served Abraham Lincoln.
McClellan was born in 1826 to a prominent Philadelphia family. His father was a doctor and a Democrat and George became the latter. He opted for the military and got a West Point appointment
and graduated with honors in the Corps of Engineers.
His Mexican War was distinguished, McClellan managed to serve with major commanders Zachary
Taylor and Winfield Scott with some time out to acquire malaria which plagued him his whole life.
Post the war McClellan served as a surveyor for railroad routes in the new Oregon territory. Only a
guy marked as a comer in the army would be given the job of observer at the Crimean War. He was
present at the siege of Sevastopol. Afterward he resigned his commission to get rich in the railroad
construction business.
McClellan did have a happy home life with Ellen Marcy. They were a devoted couple for the length
of their marriage. When the Civil War began he came back to the army. He was for preservation
of the union, but wanted no messing with the South's peculiar institution of slavery.
His first assignment was in the area that would become West Virginia and he won a battle at a place
called Rich Mountain. After the defeat at Bull Run the North was desperate for some good news
from any quarter. McClellan was young, popular, and charismatic. He was soon getting the major
command of the war with the Army of the Potomac.
McClellan kept a diary and for his historical reputation he should have burned. Nobody was spared in that diary including his president. He was a great organizer, but was reluctant to use what he organized. That reluctance caused him to be relieved.
But he got a second chance when the guy who replaced him John Pope muffed it big time at the
second Battle of Bull Run. McClellan was reinstated and given his head.
When he was finally forced to fight a battle it was the bloodiest of the Civil War. Robert E. Lee crossed into Maryland and forced a fight with McClellan at Antietam. It was a slugfest with the
Union forcing Lee back across the Potomac.
McClellan was praised for the victory and damned for not pursuing Lee more aggressively. A point
argued by military historians to this day. But Lincoln had enough of McClellan's bad mouthing him
behind his back. He was relieved and that marked the end of his military career.
But the Democrats were seeking a candidate to oppose Lincoln in 1864 and McClellan got himself
drafted at 38 still the youngest man nominated for president by a major party. For a while it looked good for him as progress was not being made. But two generals named Grant and Sherman
started making real progress.
These were two guys like so many others McClellan thought little of. But they pulled it out for
Lincoln. The Electoral College saw him carrying only New Jersey and Delaware and the margin was
212 to 21.
McClellan was rich enough and never had to worry about where a next meal was coming from for
his family. He was always a willing campaigner for Democrats. IN 1878 the Democrats elected
him Governor of New Jersey. His three year term was a steady but unspectacular reign marked
by efficient administration and balanced budgets.
McClellan died suddenly in 1885 at 59 and his Civil War memoirs were published. They did little
for his historic reputation.
Note the title of Stephen W. Sears work The Young Napoleon. McClellan certainly thought of himself that way. This book will show how far short he fell from that accolade.
August 10, 2019
While the "Great Man Theory" of history surely is exaggerated in some respects, what about the "Lesser Man Theory"? Can history turn not on the machinations of a superior person, but rather the failings of one person, burdening the rest of that person's community with the stain of defeat, or at the very least lack of victory?
Stephen Sears makes a compelling case that General George McClellan fits squarely into the "Lesser Man Theory" with his biography of the Civil War general and Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Despite McClellan's vast organizational skills and deftness in re-establishing the Army of the Potomac after First Bull Run, the general repeatedly hinders his own potential victory, and that of the North, by his hesitation, dithering, over-cautiousness, and, as President Lincoln declared, a decided case of the "slows." McClellan, via the abysmal intelligence-gathering operation of the Army of the Potomac, brings to life the lyrics of George Washington in the play "Hamilton": outgunned, outmanned, outnumbered, outplanned. Unlike for Washington, though, the lyrics ring false for McClellan - he inevitably overestimates the size of Johnston's and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, stating that there are consistently 20,000, and as many as 50,000-75,000, more troops under his enemy's aegis.
And so, believing he is outnumbered, McClellan proceeds to unwind the gains of his Peninsula Campaign, retreating down the York Peninsula and throwing away the gains he had achieved in marching his army so close to Richmond. More damaging to McClellan's legacy, though, in Sears' telling, is the general's behavior during Second Bull Run and subsequently at Antietam. At Second Bull Run, McClellan fails to adequately support John Pope's effort, leading to vast dissension within the army (and his eventual reinstatement as head of that army).
Next, in possession of General Lee's exact battle plans for the Maryland Campaign, McClellan sits idle for hours and hours and hours, passing up an opportunity to crush Lee and end the war. Indeed, even in the battle itself, McClellan relishes the fact that he is saving his reserves, rather than delivering the final, knock-out blow.
It is fitting that McClellan ends his Civil War career in a losing presidential contest to Lincoln. Lincoln may not have acted as a great commander at all times, but he understood the nature of the war far more correctly than McClellan, who always wanted to fight a limited war for Union, not abolition.
Sears is no master storyteller, as the prose can be quite dry and the battles told with sparing details (particularly Antietam, in this case). If Lincoln has garnered the words of renowned authors and historians in the ages, perhaps it is fitting that McClellan's story is written in a plodding manner, lacking that spark of great biographies. McClellan is indeed the Lesser Man in this telling, and readers are left to ponder what would have happened to the country had McClellan been a resurrection of Napoleon rather than a sad, distorted reflection of that emperor.
Stephen Sears makes a compelling case that General George McClellan fits squarely into the "Lesser Man Theory" with his biography of the Civil War general and Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Despite McClellan's vast organizational skills and deftness in re-establishing the Army of the Potomac after First Bull Run, the general repeatedly hinders his own potential victory, and that of the North, by his hesitation, dithering, over-cautiousness, and, as President Lincoln declared, a decided case of the "slows." McClellan, via the abysmal intelligence-gathering operation of the Army of the Potomac, brings to life the lyrics of George Washington in the play "Hamilton": outgunned, outmanned, outnumbered, outplanned. Unlike for Washington, though, the lyrics ring false for McClellan - he inevitably overestimates the size of Johnston's and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, stating that there are consistently 20,000, and as many as 50,000-75,000, more troops under his enemy's aegis.
And so, believing he is outnumbered, McClellan proceeds to unwind the gains of his Peninsula Campaign, retreating down the York Peninsula and throwing away the gains he had achieved in marching his army so close to Richmond. More damaging to McClellan's legacy, though, in Sears' telling, is the general's behavior during Second Bull Run and subsequently at Antietam. At Second Bull Run, McClellan fails to adequately support John Pope's effort, leading to vast dissension within the army (and his eventual reinstatement as head of that army).
Next, in possession of General Lee's exact battle plans for the Maryland Campaign, McClellan sits idle for hours and hours and hours, passing up an opportunity to crush Lee and end the war. Indeed, even in the battle itself, McClellan relishes the fact that he is saving his reserves, rather than delivering the final, knock-out blow.
It is fitting that McClellan ends his Civil War career in a losing presidential contest to Lincoln. Lincoln may not have acted as a great commander at all times, but he understood the nature of the war far more correctly than McClellan, who always wanted to fight a limited war for Union, not abolition.
Sears is no master storyteller, as the prose can be quite dry and the battles told with sparing details (particularly Antietam, in this case). If Lincoln has garnered the words of renowned authors and historians in the ages, perhaps it is fitting that McClellan's story is written in a plodding manner, lacking that spark of great biographies. McClellan is indeed the Lesser Man in this telling, and readers are left to ponder what would have happened to the country had McClellan been a resurrection of Napoleon rather than a sad, distorted reflection of that emperor.
October 14, 2019
Most readers who pick up a book about McClellan are interested mostly in his wartime service and that is exactly what they get here. Sears does an excellent job of describing various engagements without going into so much detail that he looses the reader. He also gives a very good account of how the General became the favorite of his troops. Basically, McClellan took care of his men and looked out for their welfare. So much so that his desire to avoid casualties became one of his downfalls and Sears is quick to point out McClellan's faults, of which there were many. Overall though, Sears seems to be a little hard on his subject and gives him little credit even when it is due. For example, in dealing with how quickly McClellan got his army reorganized and back in fighting form after 2nd Manassas Sears only points out that it was accomplished. In fact, I really can't see any other general on either side putting an army back together after a devastating defeat and having it on the move in such a short time.
On the other hand, as Sears points out McClellan seemed to be absolutely incapable of committing his army to battle. Of course the intelligence he was getting from Allan Pinkerton didn't help as the famous detective always over estimated Confederate strength by at least fifty percent. McClellan took these reports to heart as he did reports from officers who had obviously interviewed Confederate plants who fed them false information. Clearly these problems didn't help but some of the figures of enemy strength were just downright silly and the General should have been able to sense that. Instead he always seems to have taken the worst scenario to heart and he wasted chance after chance to inflict major defeats on the Confederates. McClellan was indeed his own worst enemy. Although John B. Magruder does get some long overdue credit in this book for his theatrical tactics that kept McClellan frozen in place several times on the peninsula. Hopefully someday, someone will do a good biography on Magruder.
Sears also deals with the General's relationship with the Lincoln Administration and he does so in an excellent manner. Both McClellan and Lincoln seem to have been a little over sensitive about each other on occasion but McClellan was much worse than Lincoln. On the other hand the General wasn't just paranoid about Secretary Stanton. Stanton was indeed out to get him, as were radical members of Congress.
The author is a little hard on McClellan but overall this is an excellent book. Sears has grown as a historian since he wrote this volume but this is still probably the definitive work on Little Mac, and probably always will be. To understand the war in the east one must try to come to grips with McClellan and his personality. This book will go a long way in helping you do just that.
On the other hand, as Sears points out McClellan seemed to be absolutely incapable of committing his army to battle. Of course the intelligence he was getting from Allan Pinkerton didn't help as the famous detective always over estimated Confederate strength by at least fifty percent. McClellan took these reports to heart as he did reports from officers who had obviously interviewed Confederate plants who fed them false information. Clearly these problems didn't help but some of the figures of enemy strength were just downright silly and the General should have been able to sense that. Instead he always seems to have taken the worst scenario to heart and he wasted chance after chance to inflict major defeats on the Confederates. McClellan was indeed his own worst enemy. Although John B. Magruder does get some long overdue credit in this book for his theatrical tactics that kept McClellan frozen in place several times on the peninsula. Hopefully someday, someone will do a good biography on Magruder.
Sears also deals with the General's relationship with the Lincoln Administration and he does so in an excellent manner. Both McClellan and Lincoln seem to have been a little over sensitive about each other on occasion but McClellan was much worse than Lincoln. On the other hand the General wasn't just paranoid about Secretary Stanton. Stanton was indeed out to get him, as were radical members of Congress.
The author is a little hard on McClellan but overall this is an excellent book. Sears has grown as a historian since he wrote this volume but this is still probably the definitive work on Little Mac, and probably always will be. To understand the war in the east one must try to come to grips with McClellan and his personality. This book will go a long way in helping you do just that.
March 28, 2025
“At the age of thirty-four he was named commander of the North's largest army, and then commander of all the Northern armies. At thirty-five he fought the longest and largest campaign of the time, and then the bloodiest single day of battle in the nation's history. At thirty-seven he ran for the presidency against Abraham Lincoln, and it required an act of political suicide by his party to ensure that he would not win…George McClellan's importance in shaping the course of the Union during the Civil War was matched only by that of President Lincoln and Generals Grant and Sherman.”
An excellent portrait of a uniquely insufferable man.
Stephen Sears paints McClellan as an arrogant narcissist, who believed everyone around him was an idiot and anything that went wrong was always someone else’s fault. McClellan is also shown to be a timid commander who constantly overestimated his enemy’s forces and refused to advance unless conditions were absolutely perfect, which they of course never were. Here was a man fundamentally incapable of winning the war.
Sears’s biography is academic, but never boring. He portrays both the man and the events he took part in with objectivity and excellent sourcing.
An excellent portrait of a uniquely insufferable man.
Stephen Sears paints McClellan as an arrogant narcissist, who believed everyone around him was an idiot and anything that went wrong was always someone else’s fault. McClellan is also shown to be a timid commander who constantly overestimated his enemy’s forces and refused to advance unless conditions were absolutely perfect, which they of course never were. Here was a man fundamentally incapable of winning the war.
Sears’s biography is academic, but never boring. He portrays both the man and the events he took part in with objectivity and excellent sourcing.
November 7, 2022
I have read several of Steven Sears’s studies of Civil War campaigns in the Eastern theater. They were all excellent histories — the Peninsula, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg.
This bio of McClellan is of the same quality — very readable, informative, thoroughly researched. Sears masterly illuminates the massive contradictions in McClellan. On one hand Mc validated himself as the premier organizer and motivator of the Army of the Potomac in 1862. However at the same time, he consistently refused to accept his superiority in men and material over the Army of Northern Virginia. Therefore in both the Peninsula and Antietam, when his initial strategic moves brought him to the cusp of “war ending” decisive victory, he “balked”; failed to utilize and deploy his forces to defeat and destroy the Confederates; and therefore allowed Lee’s army to “fight another day”.
This bio of McClellan is of the same quality — very readable, informative, thoroughly researched. Sears masterly illuminates the massive contradictions in McClellan. On one hand Mc validated himself as the premier organizer and motivator of the Army of the Potomac in 1862. However at the same time, he consistently refused to accept his superiority in men and material over the Army of Northern Virginia. Therefore in both the Peninsula and Antietam, when his initial strategic moves brought him to the cusp of “war ending” decisive victory, he “balked”; failed to utilize and deploy his forces to defeat and destroy the Confederates; and therefore allowed Lee’s army to “fight another day”.
November 27, 2023
This was a very enjoyable read, as hard as it is to review the faults of the Army of the Potomac's most narcissistic general/megalomaniac. I came away with a greater understanding of McClellan and his many faults as well as the staying power of his political popularity. It was also enlightening to learn of the poor editing of his posthumous memoir.
In short this is a fascinating study of a very important character in the middle of the American Crisis of the Civil War period. To understand McClellan you must also understand the civil and military political environment of the period and have familiarity with most of the important power players in the country at the time. Sears does an admirable job of providing enough context to support his view of McClellan as man, a general and an (eventually) successful political candidate.
In short this is a fascinating study of a very important character in the middle of the American Crisis of the Civil War period. To understand McClellan you must also understand the civil and military political environment of the period and have familiarity with most of the important power players in the country at the time. Sears does an admirable job of providing enough context to support his view of McClellan as man, a general and an (eventually) successful political candidate.
November 30, 2023
“George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon” by Stephen W. Sears is an excellent biography of McClellan, focusing mostly on McClellan’s activities during the Civil War. Sears is precise in working through the campaigns that involved McClellan, and exact in dissecting McClellan’s actions each time. Of course, Sears has the benefit of hindsight and a century of interpreting the strategies and tactics used during the War, but in almost all cases McClellan is shown to have suffered failure to live up to his moment during the war and delusions of grandeur after. McClellan went from being the youngest in his class at West Point to running for president at age 37, and muddled his way through the Civil War in between those benchmarks. Fascinating if maddening tale of a general who apparently just didn’t have what it took to command in war. Recommended.
February 3, 2023
This was a fairly dry biography on one of the most frustrating people involved in the Civil War. I wanted to read this book because I have enjoyed Sears' other works on the Civil War. The writing in this book did not disappoint, however I felt the book was quite dry at points. It's by no means an apology for McClellan, as it points out his many many flaws which I am glad because I don't think I could have finished a book trying to defend him. McClellan was such a frustrating man, and as I read through this book, my frustration with his constant excuses and lies grew more and more.
Glad I read the book, but I don't need to read anything else about McClellan for a long while.
Glad I read the book, but I don't need to read anything else about McClellan for a long while.
February 21, 2024
A good look at George McClellan. He was a very good administrator but as a field commander, he just couldn't do it. If the enemy didn't react as he planned, he was stuck and wouldn't take a chance on anything. Nothing was his fault; he just couldn't admit he was ever in the wrong or not the right person for the job. He constantly wanted to be in charge of the entire eastern army, felt he was the only one who could save the nation and was downright rude and condescending to those in the Lincoln administration. He did himself no favors with his attitudes and felt history would judge him to be in the right. A sad commentary on his life and failure to grow as a general and person.
May 7, 2020
A fascinating insight into one of the Civil War's most controversial figures. This book reads very easily and has well placed inclusion of primary source quotations. My only complaint is that Sears seems to wrap up the narrative quite quickly after the Battle of Antietam. I was hoping for a bit more of his postwar happenings. Perhaps this is because there just wasn't a lot of source material on that period of General McClellan's life? It was mentioned that his original memoirs got destroyed in a fire (which is quite the historical loss).
June 25, 2025
An interesting read. This author always presents details and clarity. I aways thought, and based on other books that “Mac” was a great organizer but a poor general st best. Always ready to blame others for his battle losses.
August 16, 2021
I love Stephen Sears. I place his writing style alongside Bruce Catton in relation to historical writing and presenting it to the reader as an entertaining story
October 30, 2022
Good biography about a controversial civil war general.
November 17, 2023
~4 Stars~
April 13, 2024
Justly indignant
March 14, 2017
A good biography of McClellan the two time head of the Army of the Potomac who was a great organizer but didn’t like to fight. Exploring his early life, his service during the Mexican War and his short period out of the Army. The bulk of the book deals with his service during the Civil War and his clashes with other generals and in particular President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton and General Scott. Also tells of his campaign against President Lincoln in 1864 and his life post Civil War.
August 20, 2012
Very good biography of McClellan from a very good author. Sears has written books on both of McClellan's major campaigns (To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign & Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam), as well as editing The Civil War Papers Of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865. He knows his subject matter well and, unlike some military biographies, manages not to lose sight of his subject amidst the individual battles.
Sears has chosen to avoid the plethora of conflicting opinions presented in various books about Little Mac. "...an understanding of the man is best found in original, primary sources, and thus biography is drawn entirely from such sources." McClellan certainly had a way of thinking that needs to be understood for one to understood his actions (and often inaction). Fortunately, during the Civil War McClellan wrote very frank daily letters to his wife which were not ever intended for later publication and these offer quite a glimpse into his thinking.
Sears is far from a McClellan apologist; I found it clear from his books on the Peninsular Campaign and Antietam that Sears thinks poorly of McClellan as a general. Despite this, Sears offers what I feel is a very fair biography that exposes the general's flaws and the reasons behind them while giving him deserved credit for his talents and successes. McClellan meant well, but was a deeply flawed individual. I have read some biographies where the author clearly hated the subject and as a result I hated the book; this is not such a book.
Definitely recommended.
Sears has chosen to avoid the plethora of conflicting opinions presented in various books about Little Mac. "...an understanding of the man is best found in original, primary sources, and thus biography is drawn entirely from such sources." McClellan certainly had a way of thinking that needs to be understood for one to understood his actions (and often inaction). Fortunately, during the Civil War McClellan wrote very frank daily letters to his wife which were not ever intended for later publication and these offer quite a glimpse into his thinking.
Sears is far from a McClellan apologist; I found it clear from his books on the Peninsular Campaign and Antietam that Sears thinks poorly of McClellan as a general. Despite this, Sears offers what I feel is a very fair biography that exposes the general's flaws and the reasons behind them while giving him deserved credit for his talents and successes. McClellan meant well, but was a deeply flawed individual. I have read some biographies where the author clearly hated the subject and as a result I hated the book; this is not such a book.
Definitely recommended.
May 27, 2019
There are few generals of the Civil War as controversial as George Brinton McClellan. His command of the Army of the Potomac during the early years of the Civil War generated a storm of criticism and sparked debates still being waged by historians today. Drawing heavily on McClellan’s letters and other documents, Stephen Sears offers a convincing assessment of McClellan and his military career, one that places him squarely in the ranks of McClellan’s critics. His biography of the general reveals McClellan to have been a man with many gifts, of which he was perhaps too well aware. His outsized self-regard generated constant disputes with his superiors, as he saw what was often reasonable arguments as driven by implacable opponents determined to destroy him.
These tendencies were only magnified by the pressures of the command. Had McClellan been as successful as his prewar reputation promised little may have come of this, but his Peninsula campaign was hobbled by "Little Mac"'s insistence on caution, one magnified by a continual fear that he faced an enemy superior in numbers. As a result, he was continually outfoxed by his opponents, making his "Young Napoleon" label (the source of the book's subtitle) ironic rather than accurate. Such was his stature, though, that even after his dismissal he was well-regarded enough to be selected as the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in their losing 1864 campaign.
Sears's focus in this book is on McClellan's Civil War service, as he spends only four of the book’s seventeen chapters on McClellan's life before and after the conflict that defined his historical legacy. Though regrettable in some respects, it is an understandable decision to focus on the years in which he made his greatest historical impact and which continues to generate debate even today. In the end, though, it makes for a sad tale of a man who, for all of his gifts, ultimately came to be defined by his limitations.
These tendencies were only magnified by the pressures of the command. Had McClellan been as successful as his prewar reputation promised little may have come of this, but his Peninsula campaign was hobbled by "Little Mac"'s insistence on caution, one magnified by a continual fear that he faced an enemy superior in numbers. As a result, he was continually outfoxed by his opponents, making his "Young Napoleon" label (the source of the book's subtitle) ironic rather than accurate. Such was his stature, though, that even after his dismissal he was well-regarded enough to be selected as the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in their losing 1864 campaign.
Sears's focus in this book is on McClellan's Civil War service, as he spends only four of the book’s seventeen chapters on McClellan's life before and after the conflict that defined his historical legacy. Though regrettable in some respects, it is an understandable decision to focus on the years in which he made his greatest historical impact and which continues to generate debate even today. In the end, though, it makes for a sad tale of a man who, for all of his gifts, ultimately came to be defined by his limitations.
February 4, 2012
Stephen Sears provides an excellent overview of General George McClellans life and a look at all the controversy of his command. The man regarded as Little Mac or the Little Napoleon was a political general and a superb administrator. McClellan created an excellent administration that served the Army of the Potomac and the United States government throughout the civil war. He organized massive amounts of troops and material and kept them well armed and fed. He was a man of the soldiers and was widely respected by them despite not gaining their votes when he ran against Lincoln (in fact he would only get about 24 percent of the solider vote).
McClellan's faults were his intelligence services and his vain nature that prevented him from reaching huge success. The other side was always presumed to be anywhere between double to seven times the size they actually were and McClellan when he had the advantage such as Antietam refused to press it and always wanted to be 100 percent sure he would win. He was highly risk adverse and for the type of war that needed to be fought he was the wrong general. McClellan also was vain and unforgiving to those above him for the smallest slight and he blamed any secretary of war and any general in Chief along with the President for constraining or limiting his decisions. Being a relatively astute politician until he ran for president Little Mac managed to cause a number of public relations problems for the Lincoln administration.
Overall this is a very well written account of the general that is fair and provides great insight into the man and his command. For those who have always read bits about McClellan through battlefield accounts this is a great way to get the whole story.
McClellan's faults were his intelligence services and his vain nature that prevented him from reaching huge success. The other side was always presumed to be anywhere between double to seven times the size they actually were and McClellan when he had the advantage such as Antietam refused to press it and always wanted to be 100 percent sure he would win. He was highly risk adverse and for the type of war that needed to be fought he was the wrong general. McClellan also was vain and unforgiving to those above him for the smallest slight and he blamed any secretary of war and any general in Chief along with the President for constraining or limiting his decisions. Being a relatively astute politician until he ran for president Little Mac managed to cause a number of public relations problems for the Lincoln administration.
Overall this is a very well written account of the general that is fair and provides great insight into the man and his command. For those who have always read bits about McClellan through battlefield accounts this is a great way to get the whole story.
June 3, 2016
Good book, a great chance to read about a major, but little understood, figure in history. This book presented a very fair appraisal of the Young Napoleon. It laid out his many strong points as a military administrator, logistician, and strategist. But it laid bare the poor quality traits which prevented him from achieving the glory he never sought, but did expect. Sears did a good job putting Little Mac in the context of his times, his ego and sense of divine direction were not unique for his time and place. But, and Sears is commended for advancing this theory, his inability to accept his military advantages (because why would a leader ordained to be the savior of his fellow man in times of difficulty be put in a position of advantage) was his downfall. As Sears cleverly states, "if the situation as he saw it had been the truth, he would be known as a great general." One critique, only in the last few pages do we find that McClellan's memoirs were mostly written after his death by a close, but apparently misguided, friend. An earlier realization of this fact wouldn't have changed the great history the book contains, but would have put much of the commentary in perspective. A great book if you want to read about 'the other side' of history.
January 25, 2016
An excellent biography of a brilliant administrator who could never progress beyond the planning stage. McClellan was a nasty man who could always find someone else to blame for his own shortcomings. If he had followed through on his braggadocio the Civil War probably would have been considerably shorter.
Stephen W. Sears presents a well documented presentation of the "Young Napoleon". McClellan, who was a prodigious letter writer, damns himself over and over particularly with letters to his wife and political confidants. Some of the letters the wrote to President Lincoln and the Secretaries of War are almost unbelievable. McClellan shows himself to a sycophant and backstabber from one day to the next. The man, who clearly had a brilliant mind for organizing, was also his own worst enemy with his unbridled tongue and paranoia.
Stephen W. Sears presents a well documented presentation of the "Young Napoleon". McClellan, who was a prodigious letter writer, damns himself over and over particularly with letters to his wife and political confidants. Some of the letters the wrote to President Lincoln and the Secretaries of War are almost unbelievable. McClellan shows himself to a sycophant and backstabber from one day to the next. The man, who clearly had a brilliant mind for organizing, was also his own worst enemy with his unbridled tongue and paranoia.
August 10, 2012
"George McClellan: The Young Napoleon" is one of the best biographies I have read in awhile. I know the outlines of General McClellan's lack of success during the Civil War, but this biography put meat on the bones. The author is obviously a scholar of the Civil War as the research for this book demonstrates. He used extensive primary materials, including the General's wartime reports and letters to his wife, Mr. Sears is a wonderful writer. And General McClellan is one of the most interesting characters in the Civil War.
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