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Lincoln's Generals
From the moment the battle ended, Gettysburg was hailed as one of the greatest triumphs of the Union army. Celebrations erupted across the North as a grateful people cheered the victory. But Gabor Boritt turns our attention away from the rejoicing millions to the dark mood of the White
House--where Lincoln cried in frustration as General Meade let the largest Confederate army escape safely into Virginia. Such unexpected portraits abound in Lincoln's Generals , as a team of distinguished historians probes beyond the popular anecdotes and conventional wisdom to offer a fascinating
look at Lincoln's relationship with his commanders.
In Lincoln's Generals , Boritt and his fellow contributors examine the interaction between the president and five key generals: McClellan, Hooker, Meade, Sherman, and Grant. In each chapter, the authors provide new insight into this mixed bag of officers and the president's tireless efforts to work
with them. Even Lincoln's choice of generals was not as ill-starred as we think, writes Pulitzer Prize-winner Mark E. Neely, Jr.: compared to most Victorian-era heads of state, he had a fine record of selecting commanders (for example, the contemporary British gave us such bywords for incompetence
as "the charge of the Light Brigade," while Napoleon III managed to lose the entire French army). But the president's relationship with his generals was never easy. In these pages, Stephen Sears underscores McClellan's perverse obstinancy as Lincoln tried everything to drive him ahead. Neely sheds
new light on the president's relationship with Hooker, arguing that he was wrong to push the general to attack at Chancellorsville. Boritt writes about Lincoln's prickly relationship with the victor of Gettysburg, "old snapping turtle" George Meade. Michael Fellman reveals the political stress
between the White House and William T. Sherman, a staunch conservative who did not want blacks in his army but who was crucial to the war effort. And John Y. Simon looks past the legendary camaraderie between Lincoln and Grant to reveal the tensions in their relationship.
Perhaps no other episode has been more pivotal in the nation's history than the Civil War--and yet so much of these massive events turned on a few distinctive personalities. Lincoln's Generals is a brilliant portrait that takes us inside the individual relationships that shaped the course of our
most costly war.
House--where Lincoln cried in frustration as General Meade let the largest Confederate army escape safely into Virginia. Such unexpected portraits abound in Lincoln's Generals , as a team of distinguished historians probes beyond the popular anecdotes and conventional wisdom to offer a fascinating
look at Lincoln's relationship with his commanders.
In Lincoln's Generals , Boritt and his fellow contributors examine the interaction between the president and five key generals: McClellan, Hooker, Meade, Sherman, and Grant. In each chapter, the authors provide new insight into this mixed bag of officers and the president's tireless efforts to work
with them. Even Lincoln's choice of generals was not as ill-starred as we think, writes Pulitzer Prize-winner Mark E. Neely, Jr.: compared to most Victorian-era heads of state, he had a fine record of selecting commanders (for example, the contemporary British gave us such bywords for incompetence
as "the charge of the Light Brigade," while Napoleon III managed to lose the entire French army). But the president's relationship with his generals was never easy. In these pages, Stephen Sears underscores McClellan's perverse obstinancy as Lincoln tried everything to drive him ahead. Neely sheds
new light on the president's relationship with Hooker, arguing that he was wrong to push the general to attack at Chancellorsville. Boritt writes about Lincoln's prickly relationship with the victor of Gettysburg, "old snapping turtle" George Meade. Michael Fellman reveals the political stress
between the White House and William T. Sherman, a staunch conservative who did not want blacks in his army but who was crucial to the war effort. And John Y. Simon looks past the legendary camaraderie between Lincoln and Grant to reveal the tensions in their relationship.
Perhaps no other episode has been more pivotal in the nation's history than the Civil War--and yet so much of these massive events turned on a few distinctive personalities. Lincoln's Generals is a brilliant portrait that takes us inside the individual relationships that shaped the course of our
most costly war.
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1994
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About the author
Gabor S. Boritt
27 books9 followersGabor S. Boritt was the Robert Fluhrer Professor of Civil War Studies and Director of the Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
November 28, 2018
Here are five essays on Lincoln’s command relationships with five of his senior generals. They are as follows by general, author, the nature of the relationship, and my take on it.
George B. McClellan (Stephen W. Sears), over cautious. Sears, who has written extensively on the “Young Napoleon,” covers familiar ground here. Lincoln wanted action, but he was asking the wrong fellow. Finally, he had to relieve him.
Joseph Hooker (Mark E. Neely, Jr.), backing the wrong horse. At least that’s as close as I can come to describing it. Neely is saying that the battle took place in the Wilderness (true) and that was Hooker’s main problem (and some bravado). That essay was the hardest to follow in the book.
George G. Meade (Gabor S. Boritt), over cautious. Lincoln believed the Army of Northern Virginia, trapped by the flooded Potomac, should’ve been destroyed, yet he couldn’t get Meade to do it.
William T. Sherman (Michael Fellman), disobedient. He ignored much of Lincoln’s requests and guidance. Being successful (Atlanta), he could afford to, especially in race relations.
Ulysses S. Grant (John Y. Simon), establishing boundaries. There are things generals do (military) and things (political) reserved for the Commander in Chief. Lincoln taught Grant that.
The chapters on McClellan and Meade were largely familiar ground; the other three less so. Other readers’ mileage may vary.
George B. McClellan (Stephen W. Sears), over cautious. Sears, who has written extensively on the “Young Napoleon,” covers familiar ground here. Lincoln wanted action, but he was asking the wrong fellow. Finally, he had to relieve him.
Joseph Hooker (Mark E. Neely, Jr.), backing the wrong horse. At least that’s as close as I can come to describing it. Neely is saying that the battle took place in the Wilderness (true) and that was Hooker’s main problem (and some bravado). That essay was the hardest to follow in the book.
George G. Meade (Gabor S. Boritt), over cautious. Lincoln believed the Army of Northern Virginia, trapped by the flooded Potomac, should’ve been destroyed, yet he couldn’t get Meade to do it.
William T. Sherman (Michael Fellman), disobedient. He ignored much of Lincoln’s requests and guidance. Being successful (Atlanta), he could afford to, especially in race relations.
Ulysses S. Grant (John Y. Simon), establishing boundaries. There are things generals do (military) and things (political) reserved for the Commander in Chief. Lincoln taught Grant that.
The chapters on McClellan and Meade were largely familiar ground; the other three less so. Other readers’ mileage may vary.
January 2, 2010
The editor, Gabor Boritt, notes what this book is about in his introductory remarks (Page xv): “This book takes a hard look at the interaction of five leading generals with their Civil War commander-in-chief.” The five? George McClellan, Joseph Hooker, George Meade, William Sherman, and Ulysses Grant.
The first chapter looks at the relationship between George McClellan and Lincoln, and is written by Stephen Sears. The chapter notes the rather strange relationship, as Lincoln needed to get up to speed in his role as commander-in-chief. He had a strange relationship with McClellan, whose psychological quirks did not help him. McClellan did not perform well as a field general and was, in the end, fired.
Joseph Hooker? He was an intriguer and a good division and even corps commander. As an army commander? He did not succeed at Chancellorsville. The chapter by Mark Neely described the pressure from Lincoln for aggressive action and the problems facing Hooker in being aggressive. The third chapter explores the relationship between Lincoln and Meade, and is written by the editor himself. Lincoln’s desire for an aggressive attack on Robert E. Lee’s retreating forces created a tension between Lincoln and Meade. Boritt believes that, in fact, Lincoln was right, but that Meade was a cautious soldier. There follow chapters on Lincoln’s relationship with Sherman and Grant.
This is an interesting look at Lincoln’s relationship with some of his commanding generals. People who have read deeply on the Civil War may not find much that is new here. People who want to get a sense of the players and their interactions would probably find this book helpful. Like all edited volumes, there is some unevenness. In the end, though, a useful volume.
The first chapter looks at the relationship between George McClellan and Lincoln, and is written by Stephen Sears. The chapter notes the rather strange relationship, as Lincoln needed to get up to speed in his role as commander-in-chief. He had a strange relationship with McClellan, whose psychological quirks did not help him. McClellan did not perform well as a field general and was, in the end, fired.
Joseph Hooker? He was an intriguer and a good division and even corps commander. As an army commander? He did not succeed at Chancellorsville. The chapter by Mark Neely described the pressure from Lincoln for aggressive action and the problems facing Hooker in being aggressive. The third chapter explores the relationship between Lincoln and Meade, and is written by the editor himself. Lincoln’s desire for an aggressive attack on Robert E. Lee’s retreating forces created a tension between Lincoln and Meade. Boritt believes that, in fact, Lincoln was right, but that Meade was a cautious soldier. There follow chapters on Lincoln’s relationship with Sherman and Grant.
This is an interesting look at Lincoln’s relationship with some of his commanding generals. People who have read deeply on the Civil War may not find much that is new here. People who want to get a sense of the players and their interactions would probably find this book helpful. Like all edited volumes, there is some unevenness. In the end, though, a useful volume.
April 8, 2010
This book is a collection of essays examining the relation between Lincoln and five of his generals: McClellan, Hooker, Meade, Sherman, and Grant. these relations were problematic, both militarily and politically.
It should be kept in mind that the Union war effort was an ad hoc, learn-as-you-go affair. At the war's beginning, the best American commanders had defected to the Confederacy, and the most promising Northern commanders were still to in subordinate positions. The Union genral-in-chief was Winfield Scott, who had held the job since the Mexican War. Also, the concept of president as commander-in-chief was in development. It was not entirely established at war's beginning what kind of authority Lincoln had over his generals in the field.
A lot of this aforementioned development came down to individual personalities. Many in the Northern establishment saw Lincoln as a rustic buffoon, incompetent and unintelligent. Some generals, like McClellan and Sherman, could be openly insubordinate. While Sherman was aggressive and won battles, McClellan was an overly cautious general, always convinced the enemy had the upper hand. Sherman kept his command; McClellan did not.
One of the themes of Lincoln's tenure as commander-in-chief was his search for a fighting general. Often, officers who were superb in as divisional or corps commanders froze when faced with supreme decision-making responsibility in the field. Meade, despite defeating Lee at Gettysburg, was a case in point, failing to follow up his victory by aggressively pursuing and crushing Lee north of the flooded Potomoc river.
In the end, Lincoln appointed Grant as general of the Union forces. Both Grant and Lincoln's supporters would later portray their relationship as a perfect partnership; however, it evolved over time. Lincoln had his misgivings about Grant, and vice versa. That said, they ultimately were of one mind as to strategy and methods. After the war, Grant would reluctantly enter politics to carry on Lincoln's policies.
This is an interesting book, and the essays are good, solid reads. It's probably more interesting for the moderately informed, however. People who are real Civil War buffs won't find anything new in them. There is a good bibliographic essay on the must-read works on the various generals.
It should be kept in mind that the Union war effort was an ad hoc, learn-as-you-go affair. At the war's beginning, the best American commanders had defected to the Confederacy, and the most promising Northern commanders were still to in subordinate positions. The Union genral-in-chief was Winfield Scott, who had held the job since the Mexican War. Also, the concept of president as commander-in-chief was in development. It was not entirely established at war's beginning what kind of authority Lincoln had over his generals in the field.
A lot of this aforementioned development came down to individual personalities. Many in the Northern establishment saw Lincoln as a rustic buffoon, incompetent and unintelligent. Some generals, like McClellan and Sherman, could be openly insubordinate. While Sherman was aggressive and won battles, McClellan was an overly cautious general, always convinced the enemy had the upper hand. Sherman kept his command; McClellan did not.
One of the themes of Lincoln's tenure as commander-in-chief was his search for a fighting general. Often, officers who were superb in as divisional or corps commanders froze when faced with supreme decision-making responsibility in the field. Meade, despite defeating Lee at Gettysburg, was a case in point, failing to follow up his victory by aggressively pursuing and crushing Lee north of the flooded Potomoc river.
In the end, Lincoln appointed Grant as general of the Union forces. Both Grant and Lincoln's supporters would later portray their relationship as a perfect partnership; however, it evolved over time. Lincoln had his misgivings about Grant, and vice versa. That said, they ultimately were of one mind as to strategy and methods. After the war, Grant would reluctantly enter politics to carry on Lincoln's policies.
This is an interesting book, and the essays are good, solid reads. It's probably more interesting for the moderately informed, however. People who are real Civil War buffs won't find anything new in them. There is a good bibliographic essay on the must-read works on the various generals.
May 6, 2023
Learned a lot, but tough to read if you’re not extremely familiar with the details of the Civil War.
October 26, 2025
Published by Oxford University Press in 1995.
Lincoln's Generals is a collection of 5 essays written by scholars of various aspects of the Civil War. In this case, they focused on how Lincoln worked with his various generals, mostly the generals of the Army of the Potomac. They are organized in roughly chronological order.
The first essay was very well-written. It was by Stephen W. Sears and concerned Lincoln and McClellan. The weakest, for me, was the second essay, ostensibly about General Hooker. It's focus was really the macho culture of the time that required men to prove themselves manly by exposing themselves to fire. It wasn't a bad essay, but it really was not about the relationship between Lincoln and Hooker.
The other three essays were about Meade, Sherman, and Grant.
I got an appreciation for the difficulties of Lincoln's political position, especially as the election of 1864 approached. Viewing things from 161 years later, it seems like it was all pre-ordained. The reminder that it was a close thing was welcome.
I rate this collection 5 stars out of 5.
Originally posted here: https://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/2025...
Lincoln's Generals is a collection of 5 essays written by scholars of various aspects of the Civil War. In this case, they focused on how Lincoln worked with his various generals, mostly the generals of the Army of the Potomac. They are organized in roughly chronological order.
The first essay was very well-written. It was by Stephen W. Sears and concerned Lincoln and McClellan. The weakest, for me, was the second essay, ostensibly about General Hooker. It's focus was really the macho culture of the time that required men to prove themselves manly by exposing themselves to fire. It wasn't a bad essay, but it really was not about the relationship between Lincoln and Hooker.
The other three essays were about Meade, Sherman, and Grant.
I got an appreciation for the difficulties of Lincoln's political position, especially as the election of 1864 approached. Viewing things from 161 years later, it seems like it was all pre-ordained. The reminder that it was a close thing was welcome.
I rate this collection 5 stars out of 5.
Originally posted here: https://dwdsreviews.blogspot.com/2025...
August 15, 2019
8/14/2019
May 14, 2025
For a fan of the time period this is a very good look into Lincoln's interaction with commanding Generals. I did find the latter part of the book called , "For Further Readings" cumbersome..
February 17, 2017
good, not great. learned Sherman was a bit of a racist. however, every book i read about Lincoln, have deeper respect for him
July 30, 2011
Chapters written by 5 different Civil War historians
May 7, 2014
This book is a series of short essay’s by historian’s on Abraham Lincoln’s relationships with his various generals, McLellan, Hooker, Meade, Sherman and Grant. Okay read
Read
November 26, 2018Gave me a good overview of the generals Lincoln cycled through as he struggled to win a war bogged down by conflicting interests, paranoia, and laziness. A good book to start with before branching out and studying favorite personalities of the civil war in depth.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews