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Plato and the Good: Illuminating the Darkling Vision
This book is an original interpretation of Plato's enigmatic statements about the idea of the Good. Desjardins starts by reconciling two notoriously difficult and different accounts of the dialectical method found in the Philebus and The Republic. She then shows how they are connected to the four forms of god-given mania in the Phaedrus. Desjardins links god-given mania and the dialectical method to the concept of piety in the Euthyphro and to Plato's defense of Socrates' piety in the Apology. Desjardins' interpretation of the idea of the Good that is presented by Plato in words (logoi) and through dramatic action (erga) is compelling and will inspire everyone interested in Plato's dialogues and the idea of the Good.
- GenresPhilosophy
260 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2003
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July 20, 2026
A Reading Of Plato
Rosemary Desjardins's "Plato and the Good" (2004) reminds the reader why Plato remains a seminal figure of Western thought. Her book is a comprehensive study of Plato focusing on the idea of the good and the nature of piety.
At the outset it is worth mentioning several fundamentals of Desjardins's approach to Plato. These positions are well-warranted and plausible, but they, and the positions they reject, are the subject of endless discussion among careful students of Plato. Perhaps most importantly, Desjardins sees a unity of thought in the dialogues from the earliest to the latest. Thus she does not find a change in teachings from the earliest "aporetic" dialogues through the dialogues of the middle period, such as the "Republic" through the difficult later dialogues such as the "Philebus". Second, Desjardins stresses the internal unity of the dialogues and their dramatic form. The setting of the dialogues, the characters they present, and the dramatic scenes they set (such as the "Euthyphro" in which Socrates engages a young man about to prosecute his father for impiety in a discussion on the meaning of piety) are integral to the meaning of the works and necessary for their understanding. Third, Desjardins sees Plato's most basic purpose in the dialogues as the explanation and justification of the philosophic way of life. Specifically, Plato aims to explain the work of his teacher, Socrates, and to show how it exemplified a life of piety and wisdom.
Desjardins's study thus moves freely from one dialogue to another -- and from one period of Plato's work to another -- and draws intriguing connections between works that are often missed. She wants to show what Plato meant by "the Good", both the good life for human beings and some overriding view of "the Good" as something divine, and why this remains important.
Desjardins begins her analysis with the "Philebus" which seemingly explains a good human life as including elements of both pleasure and knowledge but quickly moves beyond that to elements of dialectic. She proceeds to examine the dialectic of the "Philebus", sometimes called the method of division and to compare it with the famous simile of the divided line in book VI of the "Republic" where Plato offers it as a tantalizing picture of the nature of human knowledge. Desjardins finds the discussion in the "Philebus" consistent with the discussion of the "Republic". She finds Plato offering a theory of emergentism in which knowledge is first based upon sense impressions, combined by mind into three-dimensional objects, and unified into a whole. The search for unity is driven by the drive for coherence, consistency, and integrity and, ultimately by ideals of beauty and goodness. The idea of the good is a power that can direct the course of human endeavor and integrate the individual person with other people and ultimately with the divine. In trying to understand through the good, we can see unity, wholeness, and purpose through apparent chaos and diversity. Explaining the nature of the good is the burden of the first part of Desjardins's study.
In the second part of her study, Desjardins explores Plato's understanding of piety and its relationship to the good. Desjardins concludes that, for Plato, "to share in the generation of ordered wholeness ... is to share in the work of the divine, the 'ergon of the gods' which in the "Euthyphro" is identified as 'piety'. (p.229) Her discussion of piety plays close attention to Plato's early dialogue "Euthyphro" which, for most readers, appears to end inconclusively as Socrates tries to get Euthyphro to realize that he knows nothing of piety. Yet, Desjardins argues, the dramatic structure, the search for truth, and Socrates's character, shown in the "Euthyphro" and in the Platonic corpus shows the reader, in a way that eristic argument cannot, what piety is and how a good human life may be lived.
Desjardins supports her understanding of Plato's conception of piety with diverse readings, including, particularly, the treatment in the "Phaedrus" of divine madness. She also discusses at some length the "Sophist" and "Thaetaetus" together with Plato's dramatization of Socrates's defense of himself from the charge of impiety in the "Apology." Piety and the good life involve a sharing of human beings in the life of the divine. Thus Desjardins concludes, regarding the Platonic/Socratic quest:
"[T]he source of wellbeing and happiness for human beings rests upon fulfillment of a divinely human ergon [function] in which, with loving care we create within ourselves and in the world around us ... the kind of order we recognize as beautiful and call 'reality'. To pursue the task of bringing about beautiful order ... through the exercise of loving care.. proves to be (so the "Phaedrus" also tells us) the comprehensive ergon shared by gods and human beings." (pp.229-230)
This is a difficult study which presents a compelling and coherent view of Plato's thought. As with all works of difficulty and importance, it will not convince all readers. The work is extensively footnoted and Desjardins explains the work of other scholars with whom she agrees or disagrees. I found it rewarding to grapple again with the thought of Plato after an absence from him of some time. This book will appeal to students of serious students of philosophy and of the classics. The book will not, and is not intended to, serve as an introductory text to those readers coming to Plato for the first time.
Robin Friedman
Rosemary Desjardins's "Plato and the Good" (2004) reminds the reader why Plato remains a seminal figure of Western thought. Her book is a comprehensive study of Plato focusing on the idea of the good and the nature of piety.
At the outset it is worth mentioning several fundamentals of Desjardins's approach to Plato. These positions are well-warranted and plausible, but they, and the positions they reject, are the subject of endless discussion among careful students of Plato. Perhaps most importantly, Desjardins sees a unity of thought in the dialogues from the earliest to the latest. Thus she does not find a change in teachings from the earliest "aporetic" dialogues through the dialogues of the middle period, such as the "Republic" through the difficult later dialogues such as the "Philebus". Second, Desjardins stresses the internal unity of the dialogues and their dramatic form. The setting of the dialogues, the characters they present, and the dramatic scenes they set (such as the "Euthyphro" in which Socrates engages a young man about to prosecute his father for impiety in a discussion on the meaning of piety) are integral to the meaning of the works and necessary for their understanding. Third, Desjardins sees Plato's most basic purpose in the dialogues as the explanation and justification of the philosophic way of life. Specifically, Plato aims to explain the work of his teacher, Socrates, and to show how it exemplified a life of piety and wisdom.
Desjardins's study thus moves freely from one dialogue to another -- and from one period of Plato's work to another -- and draws intriguing connections between works that are often missed. She wants to show what Plato meant by "the Good", both the good life for human beings and some overriding view of "the Good" as something divine, and why this remains important.
Desjardins begins her analysis with the "Philebus" which seemingly explains a good human life as including elements of both pleasure and knowledge but quickly moves beyond that to elements of dialectic. She proceeds to examine the dialectic of the "Philebus", sometimes called the method of division and to compare it with the famous simile of the divided line in book VI of the "Republic" where Plato offers it as a tantalizing picture of the nature of human knowledge. Desjardins finds the discussion in the "Philebus" consistent with the discussion of the "Republic". She finds Plato offering a theory of emergentism in which knowledge is first based upon sense impressions, combined by mind into three-dimensional objects, and unified into a whole. The search for unity is driven by the drive for coherence, consistency, and integrity and, ultimately by ideals of beauty and goodness. The idea of the good is a power that can direct the course of human endeavor and integrate the individual person with other people and ultimately with the divine. In trying to understand through the good, we can see unity, wholeness, and purpose through apparent chaos and diversity. Explaining the nature of the good is the burden of the first part of Desjardins's study.
In the second part of her study, Desjardins explores Plato's understanding of piety and its relationship to the good. Desjardins concludes that, for Plato, "to share in the generation of ordered wholeness ... is to share in the work of the divine, the 'ergon of the gods' which in the "Euthyphro" is identified as 'piety'. (p.229) Her discussion of piety plays close attention to Plato's early dialogue "Euthyphro" which, for most readers, appears to end inconclusively as Socrates tries to get Euthyphro to realize that he knows nothing of piety. Yet, Desjardins argues, the dramatic structure, the search for truth, and Socrates's character, shown in the "Euthyphro" and in the Platonic corpus shows the reader, in a way that eristic argument cannot, what piety is and how a good human life may be lived.
Desjardins supports her understanding of Plato's conception of piety with diverse readings, including, particularly, the treatment in the "Phaedrus" of divine madness. She also discusses at some length the "Sophist" and "Thaetaetus" together with Plato's dramatization of Socrates's defense of himself from the charge of impiety in the "Apology." Piety and the good life involve a sharing of human beings in the life of the divine. Thus Desjardins concludes, regarding the Platonic/Socratic quest:
"[T]he source of wellbeing and happiness for human beings rests upon fulfillment of a divinely human ergon [function] in which, with loving care we create within ourselves and in the world around us ... the kind of order we recognize as beautiful and call 'reality'. To pursue the task of bringing about beautiful order ... through the exercise of loving care.. proves to be (so the "Phaedrus" also tells us) the comprehensive ergon shared by gods and human beings." (pp.229-230)
This is a difficult study which presents a compelling and coherent view of Plato's thought. As with all works of difficulty and importance, it will not convince all readers. The work is extensively footnoted and Desjardins explains the work of other scholars with whom she agrees or disagrees. I found it rewarding to grapple again with the thought of Plato after an absence from him of some time. This book will appeal to students of serious students of philosophy and of the classics. The book will not, and is not intended to, serve as an introductory text to those readers coming to Plato for the first time.
Robin Friedman
August 14, 2026
A brilliant work. Desjardins is able to show the unity of Plato's thought through many different dialogues that commentators haven't been able to link for the most part.
She starts by exposing the (heretofore obscure) theme of the Philebus, which she takes to how things come to be through the generative dialectical process. After having established the coherence of the Philebus and the three stages of apeiron, peras, and mikton, she shows how this process is totally convergeant with the divided line of the Republic (and in the last chapter with the epistemology of the 7th letter).
The second part argues that the work of piety in question in the Euthyphro, the one that comes about through our service or participation in the ergon of the gods, is exactly that generative dialectical process, which is characterised in the Phaedrus as the gods "caring for and ordering all things." There is a wonderful interpretation of the four types of divine madness, where the erotic one recapitulates the previous three, which can each be seen as linked with the past (purifying), the present (education of the Muses), and the future (prophetic). These four divine madness are interpreted as showing up in the Euthyphro: both as their corrupted version in the seer who falsely prophecies the verdict of Socrate's trial, falsely purifies himself of miasma by indicting his father, and falsely interprets the myth of Kronos and Zeus mutilating their father (mythical education of the Muses); and in their true version in Socrates interpreting the myth, purifying himself through self-examination, and he prophecizes by elucidating the future implications of Euthyphro's actions, helping him—successfully, according to Diogenes Laertius—reconsider the indictment of his father. The work of intelligence (noûs) is, afterall, intrinsically linked to "seeing in the future."
There are continual references throughout to the Theaetetus, Cratylus, Sophist, and Statesman, (as well as to the so-called "early" dialogues) giving many convincing examples of how they all fit the unified epistemological model presented in different forms in the Philebus, Republic, and 7th letter. I would like to add that the ladder of love of the Symposium would also fit very well in this, but there are few references to that work in the book. Nevertheless this was a memorable reading, and I wish that the dramatic actions were taken as seriously by scholars as Desjardins takes them in this. In fact, I agree that she shows the dramatic erga as representing the necessary second level of the divided line that has to be combined to the third level of discursive definitions given in the dialogues for us to be able to generate the knowledge that is the true interpretation of a given dialogue. If we only take the explicit theoretical accounts (logoi) to interpret Plato alone, those whom we often see as ending up in aporia, then as Desjardins says, it would be akin to a male trying to generate a child by himself, without a female. There seems to be hidden, in this reading of Plato, a response to Kant's critique of (merely) theoretical metaphysics; as we recall, the end of the first critique takes us to the inevitable turn to "practical reason." As I see it, Plato was already aware of this problem, and put the dramatic actions of his characters as the "practical" hermeneutical key to his theoretical accounts. The fourth level of knowledge is arrived at through the continual diagogic combination of second level ergon and third level logos, combination in which the Good is always already glimpsed.
She starts by exposing the (heretofore obscure) theme of the Philebus, which she takes to how things come to be through the generative dialectical process. After having established the coherence of the Philebus and the three stages of apeiron, peras, and mikton, she shows how this process is totally convergeant with the divided line of the Republic (and in the last chapter with the epistemology of the 7th letter).
The second part argues that the work of piety in question in the Euthyphro, the one that comes about through our service or participation in the ergon of the gods, is exactly that generative dialectical process, which is characterised in the Phaedrus as the gods "caring for and ordering all things." There is a wonderful interpretation of the four types of divine madness, where the erotic one recapitulates the previous three, which can each be seen as linked with the past (purifying), the present (education of the Muses), and the future (prophetic). These four divine madness are interpreted as showing up in the Euthyphro: both as their corrupted version in the seer who falsely prophecies the verdict of Socrate's trial, falsely purifies himself of miasma by indicting his father, and falsely interprets the myth of Kronos and Zeus mutilating their father (mythical education of the Muses); and in their true version in Socrates interpreting the myth, purifying himself through self-examination, and he prophecizes by elucidating the future implications of Euthyphro's actions, helping him—successfully, according to Diogenes Laertius—reconsider the indictment of his father. The work of intelligence (noûs) is, afterall, intrinsically linked to "seeing in the future."
There are continual references throughout to the Theaetetus, Cratylus, Sophist, and Statesman, (as well as to the so-called "early" dialogues) giving many convincing examples of how they all fit the unified epistemological model presented in different forms in the Philebus, Republic, and 7th letter. I would like to add that the ladder of love of the Symposium would also fit very well in this, but there are few references to that work in the book. Nevertheless this was a memorable reading, and I wish that the dramatic actions were taken as seriously by scholars as Desjardins takes them in this. In fact, I agree that she shows the dramatic erga as representing the necessary second level of the divided line that has to be combined to the third level of discursive definitions given in the dialogues for us to be able to generate the knowledge that is the true interpretation of a given dialogue. If we only take the explicit theoretical accounts (logoi) to interpret Plato alone, those whom we often see as ending up in aporia, then as Desjardins says, it would be akin to a male trying to generate a child by himself, without a female. There seems to be hidden, in this reading of Plato, a response to Kant's critique of (merely) theoretical metaphysics; as we recall, the end of the first critique takes us to the inevitable turn to "practical reason." As I see it, Plato was already aware of this problem, and put the dramatic actions of his characters as the "practical" hermeneutical key to his theoretical accounts. The fourth level of knowledge is arrived at through the continual diagogic combination of second level ergon and third level logos, combination in which the Good is always already glimpsed.
January 3, 2023
A paradigm-shifting work in the field, Rosemary Desjardin's "Plato and the Good" provides a remarkably clear yet ever provocative reading of Plato's dialogues and his seventh letter to demonstrate the beautiful patterns across the Platonic corpus - patterns leading the dialogical actors (and therefore the readers) to a knowledge and love of the Good, and from there, even into a koinonia with it! This is an exciting, fresh, scholarly, and brisk work - often with new interpretations on each page.
Along with other masterful, contemporary scholars of Plato (e.g. Lloyd Gerson), Desjardins reads Plato in a somewhat radical way because of its conservatism; rejected are the pointless guesses of the last two centuries about "early, middle, and late Plato." Disproven are the absurd notions of the absence of Platonic doctrines outside of the "unwritten" or "oral" reports of Platonic teachings. Gone are the absurd yet popular scholarly hypotheses about Plato's style clashing with his philosophy (or being immaterial to that philosophy). Thrown out are all these and many other popular opinions from some very eminent scholars of the last two centuries. Desjardins points out that the ancient witnesses, for the most part, got Plato correct; and we moderns have mis-read, mis-ordered, and mis-understood him. Diogenes Laertes and Dionysius of Halicarnassus should not be ignored out of turn, but their opinions, and others coming from Plato's students and followers, should be held against all the rest - specifically the dialogues and yes, even the letters.
The thesis that Desjardins advances is a beautiful one, as I mentioned above, and the arguments she weaves together to argue it are so persuasive; I don't think I can read Plato the same way again. I'll now give a brief synopsis of the book and its chapters before offering more evaluations of her work.
Along with other masterful, contemporary scholars of Plato (e.g. Lloyd Gerson), Desjardins reads Plato in a somewhat radical way because of its conservatism; rejected are the pointless guesses of the last two centuries about "early, middle, and late Plato." Disproven are the absurd notions of the absence of Platonic doctrines outside of the "unwritten" or "oral" reports of Platonic teachings. Gone are the absurd yet popular scholarly hypotheses about Plato's style clashing with his philosophy (or being immaterial to that philosophy). Thrown out are all these and many other popular opinions from some very eminent scholars of the last two centuries. Desjardins points out that the ancient witnesses, for the most part, got Plato correct; and we moderns have mis-read, mis-ordered, and mis-understood him. Diogenes Laertes and Dionysius of Halicarnassus should not be ignored out of turn, but their opinions, and others coming from Plato's students and followers, should be held against all the rest - specifically the dialogues and yes, even the letters.
The thesis that Desjardins advances is a beautiful one, as I mentioned above, and the arguments she weaves together to argue it are so persuasive; I don't think I can read Plato the same way again. I'll now give a brief synopsis of the book and its chapters before offering more evaluations of her work.
August 22, 2022
best book on plato ive ever read
October 17, 2013
Definitely an original contribution to Plato scholarship.
To some extent, this is two books somewhat awkwardly combined into one. The first part is essentially a novel reading integrating the method of the Philebus with the Divided Line from the Republic. This is valuable more as an attempt to wean scholars off assigning these dialogues to different periods of Plato's thought with different and inconsistent doctrines than for the particulars of the reading itself, but it offers a promising beginning for further work.
The second part of the book is much more interesting, though, moving from the reference in the Euthyphro to a "glorious ergon [work] which the Gods accomplish by using us as servants" (13e10-11) to the Phaedrus, which speaks of the kala erga (beautiful works) which are "gifts of divine mania" (245b1-2). Desjardins goes on to elaborate a distinctive Platonic piety which consists of pleasing the Gods by caring for innercosmic beings through the four kinds of divinely inspired "madness". Ideally, this part ought to have been expanded into its own book, but I'm grateful for it in any case. Readings that give systematic weight to Platonic piety in a form that is not anachronistic and violent are rare.
My only complaint would be that Desjardins has not given sufficient thought to the significance of the Gods as really existing beings in Plato. This leads her to at least one flagrant misreading, on p. 133, where she claims that Socrates in the Philebus "alternat[es] between referring to 'Aphrodite' on the one hand, and talking more literally or prosaically of the source of pleasure on the other," when this is instead what Philebus himself does, and for which Socrates scolds him, speaking of his own "more-than-human awe in respect to the names of the Gods", and goes on to explain that whereas Aphrodite is unquestionably one, pleasure has various aspects, and its unity may in fact be problematic. Had Desjardins reflected more upon the ontological question posed here, of different modes of unity, she might have been able to present a broader and deeper synthesis of Plato's thought on a theoretical, and not only a practical level.
To some extent, this is two books somewhat awkwardly combined into one. The first part is essentially a novel reading integrating the method of the Philebus with the Divided Line from the Republic. This is valuable more as an attempt to wean scholars off assigning these dialogues to different periods of Plato's thought with different and inconsistent doctrines than for the particulars of the reading itself, but it offers a promising beginning for further work.
The second part of the book is much more interesting, though, moving from the reference in the Euthyphro to a "glorious ergon [work] which the Gods accomplish by using us as servants" (13e10-11) to the Phaedrus, which speaks of the kala erga (beautiful works) which are "gifts of divine mania" (245b1-2). Desjardins goes on to elaborate a distinctive Platonic piety which consists of pleasing the Gods by caring for innercosmic beings through the four kinds of divinely inspired "madness". Ideally, this part ought to have been expanded into its own book, but I'm grateful for it in any case. Readings that give systematic weight to Platonic piety in a form that is not anachronistic and violent are rare.
My only complaint would be that Desjardins has not given sufficient thought to the significance of the Gods as really existing beings in Plato. This leads her to at least one flagrant misreading, on p. 133, where she claims that Socrates in the Philebus "alternat[es] between referring to 'Aphrodite' on the one hand, and talking more literally or prosaically of the source of pleasure on the other," when this is instead what Philebus himself does, and for which Socrates scolds him, speaking of his own "more-than-human awe in respect to the names of the Gods", and goes on to explain that whereas Aphrodite is unquestionably one, pleasure has various aspects, and its unity may in fact be problematic. Had Desjardins reflected more upon the ontological question posed here, of different modes of unity, she might have been able to present a broader and deeper synthesis of Plato's thought on a theoretical, and not only a practical level.
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