On January 30, 1968 approximately 84,000 North Vietnamese Army and National Liberation Front forces launched nearly simultaneous attacks against over 100 cities and military installations in South Vietnam. The well-coordinated urban attacks came during the most sacred of Vietnamese holidays and caught American commanders by surprise. The results of the Tet Offensive were monumental, tens of thousands were killed and many more wounded. But its importance goes far beyond its military outcome to the powerful political, psychological, and economic impact in the United States.
In this new work, historian David F. Schmitz analyzes what is arguably the most important event in the history of the Vietnam conflict. Schmitz situates the Tet Offensive in the context of American foreign policy and the state of the war up to 1968 while carefully considering the impact of the media on American public opinion. Through his up-to-date analysis of recently available sources, Schmitz works to dispel myths and clarify the central debates surrounding this pivotal event that brought an end to American escalation of the war and led to LBJ's decision to withdraw from the presidential race.
I don't know much about the Vietnam War. It was before my time and not covered much in my schooling, but this book gave me a very good top level overview of the what was happening the the first half of the war. I particularly think the author gave a very good, non biased overview of the political climate and spoke about many of the beliefs and competing forces that revolved around the buildup and result of the Tet Offensive.
I never really understood why the US was in Vietnam, but this read helps me to understand the rationale with containment and the threat of Communism that was palpable in the cold-war era. Perhaps something akin the threat of terrorism in the US in the early 2000's.
In summary, the Tet Offensive was a large scale attack during the Vietnamese Tet holiday (which was an armistice). This offensive action was was more impact than what both the administration and US general public were expecting, and it caused the administration to rethink its position on Vietnam. The position in November, before the attacks was extremely optimistic, perhaps too optimistic, while after the attacks in January, the outlook was defeatist. Although the Tet offensive may not have been militarily effective, it proved that the North Vietnamese had more fight in them than was previously thought. The North Vietnamese were able to recruit from, gain access to, and inflict more damage to South Vietnamese areas more easily than the US/South Vietnamese governments had previously believed.
The book was a nice quick read, and very simple to absorb. I think what resonated with me the most was that in 1966, it cost the United States 6 USD for every 1 USD of damage inflicted on the enemy, while in 1968, that ratio rose to 9:1. Very interesting stuff.