What do you think?
Rate this book
Napoleon 1814: The Defence of France
In 1814, after two successive years of defeat in Russia and central Europe, Napoleon was faced with the ultimate disaster - an Allied invasion of France itself. The conduct of the intense, fast-moving campaign that followed has been widely hailed as one of his greatest feats as a commander, yet it has rarely been described fully and objectively. Andrew Uffindell, in this gripping and original study, reconstructs the campaign, reassesses Napoleon's military leadership and provides a masterly account of a campaign that helped shape modern Europe.
- GenresHistoryMilitary Fiction
336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
49 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
August 28, 2019
Excellent book: well written, well researched and adds in meaningful ways to other accounts.
Uffindel's main point is that we can't understand the actions and outcome of the campaign of France in 1814 if we look at the military in isolation from the physical, political and social conditions in which it took place. That means his account provides less detail on the battles, but offers a wider scope than traditional military
He starts out with several chapters describing the French and allied armies at the start of 1814, the state of France and the campaign area. In the second part we get an operational overview of the campaign (not much detail on the battles). Next, Uffindel analyses the campaign and the most important strategic decisions. The last part provides and overview of the experience of civilians, POWs and the sick and wounded.
Terrain and weather determined operational and tactical movement, but also led to high levels of straggling and disease. The area in which the campaign was fought was very small and could not support the armies operating in it. The allies faced the dilemma of concentrating for battle or spreading out to ease logistics. The weather was exceptionally cold, even for the time of year.
But the most important decision of the campaign was the allies crossing the Rhine in December, thus denying the resources and men of North-Eastern France to Napoleon, diminishing the credibility of his regime by showing its inability to defend the country and by putting Paris in danger, thus constraining the Emperor to the defence of his capital.
For Uffindel, time was running out for Napoleon. If he had managed to pull off a decisive victory early in the campaign, he could have re-established his credibility and gained the time and space to rebuild his army from conscripts. Many of the steps he took in late 1813, like the silencing of internal opposition and overconfident expressions in the press, gave him only a temporary respite with negative long term repercussions.
The most interesting part of the book is the last. It draws its strength from research in local archives, combined with first hand accounts from soldiers and civilians. It shows the effects of the occupation on communities and the administration (and provides a counterpoint to the French behaviour in foreign territory): provision of food and lodgings to allied soldiers, rape and plunder, collaboration and resistance, the movement of refugees and POWs, the care of sick and wounded.
It also shows the reasoning behind and the limits to Napoleon’s decision not to wage popular warfare. The occupation of north eastern France helped rally that part of the country to him as allied occupation broke the apathy of the population. But militia troops like the Garde National were of questionably quality (especially its leadership) and competed for manpower with the regular army, so they were only levied locally. Popular warfare was only possible if the population still believed in victory and guerilla’s could be supported by field armies. But sending out field armies was not a possibility with Paris under threat and by the time Napoleon made the move in late March, it was already too late.
In many places, the book provides pointers to 1815. It explains why a defensive, attritional strategy was not really and option for Napoleon. He couldn’t count on popular support to hold out, and he couldn’t afford to have foreign armies wage war at his expense on French soil.
And from my reading, the success of French aggressive cavalry tactics in 1814 may have given Napoleon and his senior commanders too much confidence in its application at Waterloo.
Of course, there were also important differences: in 1815 the alliance was much closer knit because many outstanding issues had been solved and Napoleon was no longer a realistic option. The monarchs were also not present, intervening in the direction of the campaign and battles. It made life easier for the generals. The military resources of the Low Countries and Germany were now fully available, shifting the balance further in their favour.
Napoleon also held some advantages. There was an intact army waiting for him and he had more time and space to build up his army and now had the choice where to fight. Popular support may even have been stronger for him in 1815 than in 1814, exactly because the French had experienced occupation the year before. On the other hand, he had lost the full backing of the political and military elite and they now had a legitimate alternative.
Uffindel's main point is that we can't understand the actions and outcome of the campaign of France in 1814 if we look at the military in isolation from the physical, political and social conditions in which it took place. That means his account provides less detail on the battles, but offers a wider scope than traditional military
He starts out with several chapters describing the French and allied armies at the start of 1814, the state of France and the campaign area. In the second part we get an operational overview of the campaign (not much detail on the battles). Next, Uffindel analyses the campaign and the most important strategic decisions. The last part provides and overview of the experience of civilians, POWs and the sick and wounded.
Terrain and weather determined operational and tactical movement, but also led to high levels of straggling and disease. The area in which the campaign was fought was very small and could not support the armies operating in it. The allies faced the dilemma of concentrating for battle or spreading out to ease logistics. The weather was exceptionally cold, even for the time of year.
But the most important decision of the campaign was the allies crossing the Rhine in December, thus denying the resources and men of North-Eastern France to Napoleon, diminishing the credibility of his regime by showing its inability to defend the country and by putting Paris in danger, thus constraining the Emperor to the defence of his capital.
For Uffindel, time was running out for Napoleon. If he had managed to pull off a decisive victory early in the campaign, he could have re-established his credibility and gained the time and space to rebuild his army from conscripts. Many of the steps he took in late 1813, like the silencing of internal opposition and overconfident expressions in the press, gave him only a temporary respite with negative long term repercussions.
The most interesting part of the book is the last. It draws its strength from research in local archives, combined with first hand accounts from soldiers and civilians. It shows the effects of the occupation on communities and the administration (and provides a counterpoint to the French behaviour in foreign territory): provision of food and lodgings to allied soldiers, rape and plunder, collaboration and resistance, the movement of refugees and POWs, the care of sick and wounded.
It also shows the reasoning behind and the limits to Napoleon’s decision not to wage popular warfare. The occupation of north eastern France helped rally that part of the country to him as allied occupation broke the apathy of the population. But militia troops like the Garde National were of questionably quality (especially its leadership) and competed for manpower with the regular army, so they were only levied locally. Popular warfare was only possible if the population still believed in victory and guerilla’s could be supported by field armies. But sending out field armies was not a possibility with Paris under threat and by the time Napoleon made the move in late March, it was already too late.
In many places, the book provides pointers to 1815. It explains why a defensive, attritional strategy was not really and option for Napoleon. He couldn’t count on popular support to hold out, and he couldn’t afford to have foreign armies wage war at his expense on French soil.
And from my reading, the success of French aggressive cavalry tactics in 1814 may have given Napoleon and his senior commanders too much confidence in its application at Waterloo.
Of course, there were also important differences: in 1815 the alliance was much closer knit because many outstanding issues had been solved and Napoleon was no longer a realistic option. The monarchs were also not present, intervening in the direction of the campaign and battles. It made life easier for the generals. The military resources of the Low Countries and Germany were now fully available, shifting the balance further in their favour.
Napoleon also held some advantages. There was an intact army waiting for him and he had more time and space to build up his army and now had the choice where to fight. Popular support may even have been stronger for him in 1815 than in 1814, exactly because the French had experienced occupation the year before. On the other hand, he had lost the full backing of the political and military elite and they now had a legitimate alternative.
December 12, 2018
A thorough examination of the 1814 campaign of the Napoleonic Wars.
Driven from Germany in 1813 after his disastrous defeat at the Battle of Leipzig, Napoleon was forced in 1814 to defend France itself from invasion by a superior allied coalition of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and several other Germanic states. The book itself is divided into four sections. The first section is short and serves to set up the political situation of the Great Powers in 1814 as they moved to invade France. The second section covers the ebb and flow of the campaign itself, while the third section provides a retrospective on why the coalition won and how Napoleon himself performed. The fourth section is, in my opinion, the most interesting. Here, Uffindell explore the less-discussed logistical aspects of the war, the treatment of the wounded, how both sides dealt with prisoners, and the effect of the invasion itself on the French civilian population.
Part military history, part social history, Napoleon 1814 is a well written account of Napoleon's last attempt to save the French Empire, and himself, from defeat. Uffindell writes in a clear style, covers the war from the perspective of most of the nations involved, and overall gives a comprehensive narrative of the campaign that is both in-depth enough for the professional historian while still fun to read for the aspiring Napoleon buff. As Uffindell concludes, while Napoleon was quick to blame his subordinates or other assorted "traitors" for his defeat, the blame was generally his alone. By 1814 Napoleon had simply lost his popular support. "What Napoleon saw as treason was the consequence, rather than the cause of his failure to win the campaign, but he needed scapegoats," and in the end it was Napoleon the undefeated defender of France, not the would-be egomaniac which came to dominate the popular culture of the man (pg 201).
Driven from Germany in 1813 after his disastrous defeat at the Battle of Leipzig, Napoleon was forced in 1814 to defend France itself from invasion by a superior allied coalition of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and several other Germanic states. The book itself is divided into four sections. The first section is short and serves to set up the political situation of the Great Powers in 1814 as they moved to invade France. The second section covers the ebb and flow of the campaign itself, while the third section provides a retrospective on why the coalition won and how Napoleon himself performed. The fourth section is, in my opinion, the most interesting. Here, Uffindell explore the less-discussed logistical aspects of the war, the treatment of the wounded, how both sides dealt with prisoners, and the effect of the invasion itself on the French civilian population.
Part military history, part social history, Napoleon 1814 is a well written account of Napoleon's last attempt to save the French Empire, and himself, from defeat. Uffindell writes in a clear style, covers the war from the perspective of most of the nations involved, and overall gives a comprehensive narrative of the campaign that is both in-depth enough for the professional historian while still fun to read for the aspiring Napoleon buff. As Uffindell concludes, while Napoleon was quick to blame his subordinates or other assorted "traitors" for his defeat, the blame was generally his alone. By 1814 Napoleon had simply lost his popular support. "What Napoleon saw as treason was the consequence, rather than the cause of his failure to win the campaign, but he needed scapegoats," and in the end it was Napoleon the undefeated defender of France, not the would-be egomaniac which came to dominate the popular culture of the man (pg 201).
July 1, 2021
A very detailed, meticulously researched account of Napoleon's 1984 campaign. The book was rich in detail and engaging in analysis as well as interpretation. I especially enjoyed the visual aids coming with it, such as maps and charts. The last part of the book was especially interesting where the author documented how the campaign affected civilians' life regarding the birth and death rate, together with the marriage rate. All in all, the book was well worth a read.
June 20, 2020
This is a great book, easy to read and provides a concise analysis of the campaign.
I learned quite a bit from reading it.
I learned quite a bit from reading it.
August 10, 2021
Very good high level stuff, did not dwell in the battles.
The highlight is the chapters which is normally left out of military history books: effect on civilians, logistics, etc.
The highlight is the chapters which is normally left out of military history books: effect on civilians, logistics, etc.
January 19, 2021
truly amazin'
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews