African states range from strong to weak, and weak ones can be grouped into those with valuable extractable resources and those without. This innovative study investigates warlord politics in weak states with rich endowments: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the former Zaire, with Nigeria as a potential candidate. Reno argues that the new post-Cold War environment has forced weak-state rulers to revise their political calculus. Told by creditors to trim bloated bureaucracies and privatize public-sector companies, they dismantle old patronage networks and form new alliances with compliant, often buccaneering foreign firms. In turn, these firms become surrogate providers of bureaucratic services (especially security) in the enclaves where diamonds, cobalt, timber, or other valuable resources are extracted. Politics becomes a simple process of asset-stripping, and less-endowed regions are left to stagnate. Since research on warlord activity is difficult, some of Reno's conclusions rest on shaky evidence. Nevertheless, he makes a serious effort to challenge conventional wisdom about failed states and the virtues of free markets and small government.
A real bear of a read, but offers a fairly complex and nuanced take on what happens when the African big man phenomenon in West African politics mobilizes toward violence. Patronage linkages are utilized not only to exploit the state and local populations, but also to use force to accumulate even more wealth and control over a geographic territory.
I think Reno spends a little too much time on definitional issues (after all, is a warlord really only a non-state entity? Did Charles Taylor cease to be a warlord upon assuming the mantle of the Liberian presidency when he continued to utilize the same practices that previously had made him a warlord?), but in all this is a very good and thorough introduction to one of the most frustrating causes of conflict in West Africa (and elsewhere as well).
A very dry, but wonderful book. Seemingly failing societies still remain connected to our globalised system. Often this globalisation hinders their reconstruction as access to commerce rather than internal consolidation govern the desire of politicians.
Reno's book is attempting to conceptualize the Warlord state. He aggregates warlords and predatory states into a single conceptual structure, operating similar tactics. His interpretation of warlordism is essentially one showing it to be a rational conduct of politic economy in the face of difficulty controlling terrain, and the presence of other actors conducting violent campaigns against both government incumbents and populations. Whereas it is an effective explanation of warlord politics, and the manner in which they attempt to control trade routes, it falls short in its conceptualization of 'warlord states'. It is unclear why the standard definition of a warlord - a substate actor controlling a limited area as opposed to an entire state or sovereign territory - is jettisoned and merged with 'predatory rulers'. A fascinating read, however.
Reno introduces his theory that Cold War politics shifted the distribution of opportunities for African rulers. Patronage strategies became essential to maintaining personal power, as well as providing a link to the global economy.
There are four case studies: Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC and Nigeria. Reno's writing is crisp and linear. The case studies are fascinating.
Overall, this is a great book for academics as well as people wishing to enhance their understanding of the troubled nature of African states.