In this book an eminent psychiatrist integrates data from neuroscience, psychology, biology, artificial intelligence, and psychoanalysis to examine the nature of memory and dreams and to explore the crucial role of emotion in organizing memory. Establishing a correspondence between psychoanalytic and neurobiological principles, Dr. Reiser elaborates a contemporary psychobiological model of the dream process.
A CONSIDERATION OF WHAT DREAMS MAY TELL US ABOUT THE BRAIN, MEMORY, ETC.
Morton Francis Reiser (1919-2007) was an American psychiatrist, and emeritus professor of Psychiatry at Yale University of Medicine.
He wrote in the General Introduction to this 1990 book, “This volume will present the results of a study that developed quite naturally from prior explanations into the more general clinical and empirical issues displayed in mind/brain-body functions. It represents a phase of my broader ongoing inquiry into the question of how the mind works---and how the brain enables it to do what it does… In focusing on dreams and memory as illustrative phenomena, it demonstrates the use of a particular approach … to the study of phenomena that are simultaneously manifest in the separate domains of mind and body… The dream process offers a particularly promising area for inquiry, because it reflects both mind and brain-body mechanisms and is accessible to parallel study by research methods appropriate to each---sometimes separately, sometimes together.” (Pg. 1-2)
In the first chapter, he observes, “those dreams that are recalled in the morning are ordinarily forgotten before the day is over. To remember them often requires special attention or effort, and even then such efforts may not succeed. It doesn’t seem on the face of it that dreams are intended, for the most part, to be remembered. Clearly, most of what we dream (approximately 1½ hour’s worth per night) is soon forgotten.” (Pg. 17)
He acknowledges, “the analyst’s record is not a veridical record of the [psychoanalytic] session, nor can it be regarded as reflecting directly (or only) the analysand’s mental processes… The analyst’s reported account cannot be consensually validated, and therefore its reliability cannot be established. Understandably, this limitation has cast doubt on the scientific credibility of psychoanalytic theory.” (Pg. 56)
He asserts, “the linkage of affect and memory move onto center stage: reciprocal interactions between the memory systems of analyst and analysand appear to be mediated by affect, to be related to empathy, and to play a meaningful role in the analytic process… the mediating role of affect in associatively linking sensory percepts can be hypothesized to play a role in the construction of the dream, by organizing perceptual residue for appearance as images in dream consciousness during REM sleep. This is a bridging concept, pointing to convergence of separately derived functional principles from each of the two domains, principles that would appear to pertain to the same phenomenon… observed in two different ways… The bridging concept … depends for its credibility on whether or not the functional principles derived from the obervational data of the two realms, obtained by different methods, are indeed comparable.” (Pg. 62-63)
He states, “the presence o fragments or part of images in dreams requires no special explanation. They are part of normal perceptual function; one does not have to be asleep for them to be there, available for use in constructing the dream. What is different about dreaming and does warrant special investigation is the reassembly process, which can---and so often does---produce strange and bizarre images. Extraordinary images in dreams are composed of things, and parts of things, originally perceived and experienced in ordinary ways.” (Pg. 103)
He suggests, “The linkage of visual cortex neuronal activity with the eye movements on REM can be interpreted in one of several alternative ways. J. Allen Hobson has suggested … ‘the possibility that the activity in the visual sensory neurons was somehow a response to eye movement commands in the visual motor system.’ Alternatively, the linkage may… indicate that the eyes are reacting to what they are ‘seeing’ in the dream, much as … if the dreamer were watching a movie or television screen.” (Pg. 137)
He explains, “It will not be easy to construct a theoretical model that will conform to the large and heterogeneous body of information available in both realms, but I am going to attempt it…. The basic hypothetical premise… is that affective linkage, the main functional principle governing establishment and maintenance of associative links between sensory percepts in nodal memory networks (MIND), is analogous to the main functional principle by which neural networks govern development of associative links in the BRAIN. The premise has several aspects: 1. The MIND principle of affective linkage is analogous to the BRAIN principle of connection via system-limbic linkage… 2. The MIND principle of nodal memory networks… is analogous to the BRAIN principle of neural networks, which allows for parallel and distributed processing in computational information processing.” (Pg. 167-168)
He proposes, “The plays [in the dream] are ready-made… each poses a problem or problems … and portrays an attempt to solve, resolve, or otherwise deal with them. The director’s choice of play may depend on a variety of economic and artistic considerations, but the basis for the dreamer’s choice is clear… the ‘dream play’ is staged by the dreamer because it is relevant to a current life problem and may portray his or her efforts to find a solution.” (Pg. 176)
He adds, “In summary, the postulate states that the REM state of the brain provides neural mechanisms for stimulating associatively organized memory images, recruited by affect during the day, to ‘light up’ and appear in the dream at night. Condensed in this way, the postulate seems simple, but that appearance is deceptive.” (Pg. 183)
He also asserts, “I have come to be impatient with, and sometimes irritated by, a currently fashionable trend to dismiss peremptorily (and I think prematurely) Freud’s seminal and fundamental contributions to understanding dream phenomena and the dream process.” (Pg. 184-185)
He summarizes, “Dreaming in man can be defined as the subjective experience of vital memory and problem-solving cognitive function, made possible by the special psychophysiological conditions that obtain in mind/brain-body during REM sleep.” (Pg. 200)
He laments in the Epilogue, “Throughout the course of writing this book, I repeatedly experienced the frustration of wanting to develop and suggest practical ideas for experiments that might bring psychoanalysis and cognition neuroscience closer to conceptual convergence. I did think of some but realized that they could not get past the armchair stage without access to interdisciplinary collaborators and facilities that are currently unavailable. Those few who could collaborate are not… free to do so, nor are all of them as ideally prepared for it as might be wished.” (Pg. 203)
This book may interest some who are studying dreams and their origins.