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1 pages, Audio CD
Published March 1, 2021
[I]f love is a cocktail, it has no single, strict recipe. It's better conceived of as a family of cocktails. Consider daiquiris. You'd expect to find a few basic ingredients in a daiquiri: some kind of rum, some sort of citrus juice (usually lime), and some sort of sweetener (usually sugar). But individual daiquiris vary the ratio, and some include other ingredients like strawberries or bananas. Other daiquiris get creative and replace the rum with another spirit.
This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin, and he was a good genealogist who made Iris the daughter of Thaumas.
—Plato, Theaetetus
The romantic mystique, as I see it, has a lot in common with the feminine mystique. The romantic mystique tells us that romantic love is also “mysterious and intuitive and close to the creation and origin of life,” yet special and wonderful (partly for that very reason). The romantic mystique likewise encourages us to accept love’s “nature,” passively and uncomprehendingly, instead of trying to resist or alter it. It is a disempowering ideology that celebrates ignorance and acquiescence.
Isn’t there something intellectually comforting about the idea that science can finally tell us what love really is? Isn’t it reassuring to think we might finally get some answers, through the application of tried and trusted experimental methods, to our deepest and most perplexing questions about love? It is to me.
I propose a new theory of romantic love. At its core is the idea that romantic love has a dual nature: it is ancient biological machinery embodying a modern social role...[Its] social function [is] to take as input the attraction and affection that arises between adults and produce as output something resembling the nucleus of a nuclear family.
The third common strategy is simply to state that love is both biology and society without doing anything to resolve the appearance of contradiction this creates.
Consider, for example, the situation of a lesbian couple in late-nineteenth-century England. Suppose they are in love biologically speaking: the parts of their brains associated with romantic love are active, and they are under the influence of oxytocin, dopamine, and so on. But social norms severely curtail their ability to engage in any of the kinds of bonding associated with romantic love.
In the same way [as homosexuality], society’s insistence on the one-true-love-forever model can’t, and won’t, shut down the neurochemistry of all the people who fall in love with a new person after promising themselves to an existing partner or of all the people who grow bored of long-term monogamous romance with their spouses. We can keep trying to retrain the biological actor by diagnosing these individuals with a medical problem and attempting to “cure” their desire for others or their chronic boredom. Or we can reconsider the failing social norm.
ancient biological machinery embodying a modern social role...[Its] social function [is] to take as input the attraction and affection that arises between adults and produce as output something resembling the nucleus of a nuclear family.
Nozick was also philosophically interested in romantic love, which he thought of as a desire for a certain kind of union with another person...Russell himself doesn’t explicitly say union is the defining characteristic of love, but he certainly thinks it is one of love’s important features: he writes that love “breaks down the hard walls of the ego, producing a new being composed of two in one.” He acknowledges the fear of losing one’s own individuality in the process of becoming part of a “new being,” but he calls this fear “foolish,” since “individuality is not an end in itself,” and the loss of separateness is actually required for a satisfying life. Love, for Russell, is “the best thing that life has to give.”
This sentiment might sound sweet, even cute. But it’s not. A word recently coined by philosopher Elizabeth Brake describes Russell’s attitude here: amatonormativity. Amatonormativity says that romantic love is the normal or ideal condition for a human life, so lives that don’t include it are imperfect or abnormal. Russell’s amatonormative attitude becomes especially pronounced when he says that those who haven’t experienced mutual sexual love “cannot attain their full stature, and cannot feel towards the rest of the world that kind of generous warmth without which their social activities are pretty sure to be harmful.” He says, “The resulting disappointment inclines them towards envy, oppression and cruelty.” This is a horrible—and untrue—thing to say.
Romantic love has always been intimately connected with the idea that people—especially women—are a kind of private property. It has been a powerful tool in the enforcement of class structures, racist segregation, and homophobic oppression. Are we sure we want to keep it around?
I think we are capable of striking the necessary balance [of change vs caution]: changing what needs to change without destroying romantic love entirely. Here’s how. Romantic love, at the social level, could have the function of taking as input attraction and affection between adults (not necessarily a particular number or of particular genders) and outputting intimate bonds and relationships that are special and significant in people’s lives. Optional add-ons can then include sex, kids, home building, family building, agreeing not to enter into other relationships, caring for a dog together, writing love poems … whatever floats the boat of the people in the boat. These optional extras would work like a buffet: people would be free to decide on the features they wanted in their own relationships without facing stigma for what they did or didn’t choose. And they would be free to switch it up over time, going back to the buffet to add something new to their plates or remove something they didn’t like.
This will not be a story in which the death of the husband or wife becomes what amounts to the credit sequence for a new life, a catalyst for the discovery that (a point typically introduced in such accounts by the precocious child of the bereaved) “you can love more than one person.” Of course you can, but marriage is something different. Marriage is memory, marriage is time.
But, on pain of sounding like a broken record, they aren’t. Love, sex, and people are not property or resources that we get to manage and distribute in the name of “equity.” Men are not entitled to demand a “fair share” of love, sex, or women.
Most important, though, is the suggestion that we view the ethics of love and sex through the lens of equitable distribution, or justice. We need to remember that we are talking about people and their most intimate relationships with other people. Is the idea that the unattractive women will voluntarily choose to take drugs in order to become available to the unsuccessful men (and vice versa)? Or will they be forced to take such drugs? The first option sounds bizarre, but the second is disturbing. Anyhow, who decides who counts as unattractive or unsuccessful in the first place? In such subjective assessments, whose standards are we to take as definitive?