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The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party
The story of contemporary Ireland is inseparable from the story of the official republican movement, a story told here for the first time - from the clash between Catholic nationalist and socialist republicanism in the 1960s and '70s through the Workers' Party's eventual rejection of irredentism. A roll-call of influential personalities in the fields of politics, trade unionism and media - many still operating at the highest levels of Irish public life - passed though the ranks of this secretive movement, which never achieved its objectives but had a lasting influence on the landscape of Irish politics.
688 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
July 31, 2010
A fascinating read, full of frankly jaw-dropping stories about some of the major figures of left-wing politics in Ireland today. I really didn't know much about the history of Sinn Fein and the IRA, so a lot of this book was revelatory. The turn to Marxism, the rejection of nationalism, the Provo split, Charles Haughey's role in that split, and the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the major points in the development of The Workers Party are detailed here. I definitely recommend this book for anyone interested in the history of left-wing politics in Ireland, but my one criticism is that the book is a fairly straight forward, maybe slightly old-fashioned history. There's not very much analysis. The authors are clearly more interested in "presenting the facts" than in "making an argument," but that's fine, because the story they tell is so gripping that the book is never boring.
October 28, 2025
Took me well over a year to get through this after abandoning it 2 or 3 times. It wasn't for want of a more interesting subject (the history here is fascinating at times), but more the book is so damn long. There's barely a hint of any narrative structure throughout the book. This meant you just had to plough through ~40 years of hard left Irish politics - with stories about obscure meetings amongst a handful of activists in Waterford getting equal weighting to the major political developments of the day making it hard to contextualize the story at times.
I did learn a lot however and think it was worth the effort in the end.
I did learn a lot however and think it was worth the effort in the end.
December 4, 2023
Detailing the move of the Official IRA/Sinn Fein (later the Workers’ Party) from a left republican organization to a proper Marxist party alongside its abandonment of the armed struggle in Northern Ireland, The Lost Revolution is a deeply frustrating but illuminating read. Brian Hanley and Scott Millar guide the reader through the turmoil following the failure of the late 1950s Border Campaign which led to the reorganization of Sinn Fein as a predominantly Left Republican organization to the end of abstentionism in the south in the 1970s, the conflict with Provisional Sinn Fein, and the split with the Democratic Left in the early 1990s. The history of the Officials provides a salient look not only into the complexity of the Irish national question, but how an inability to deal with the national question in a satisfactory manner can lead to the total disintegration of a Marxist movement.
This history of the OIRA begins over a decade before the split with the Provos, introducing Cathal Goulding and the meagre existence of the Irish left by 1953, largely decimated by the Spanish Civil War from which it never recovered (6). Although leading IRA figures like Goulding and Sean Murphy took inspiration from Tito and the Yugoslavian partisans, ideological focus remained on a militarist Catholic nationalism untempered by a Marxist analysis (8-9). The main ideological focus remained on the military tactics of national liberation movements like the Algerian FLN as well as the right-wing EOKA in Cyprus (12-13). It was only upon the failure of Operation Harvest, better known as the IRA Border Campaign of 1956-1962, that the IRA began to reconsider its ideological direction from an unguided, vulgar militarism (14-20).
Hanley and Millar, similar to the argument of Pat Walsh regarding socialism and Irish republicanism, argue that Vatican II allowed for ideological maneuvering to the left for the IRA (23). Regardless, Goulding began to consult with England’s Connolly Association, Ireland’s Wolfe Tone Society, and Anglo-Irish Marxist theorists Roy Johnston and Anthony Coughlan (36). Alongside this ideological realignment came a greater willingness to dialogue with the Protestant proletariat, which had a miniscule base in the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (32, 37). This constant willingness to capitulate to the Protestant working class even when pressured on sectarian grounds would be a key strategic weakness of the Officials going forward, even though it led to a tiny amount of Protestant support and even smaller membership (68). Left IRA leaders like Goulding and Seamus Costello pushed for the left realignment and a focus upon social agitation in the south alongside a policy of defense of the Catholic minority in the north. (39, 57).
Involvement in the Civil Rights campaign in the north throughout the 1960s would be a great political boon for Sinn Fein and the northern “Republican Clubs”. This would be the first failure of the conciliatory policy towards the Protestants, as Protestant opinion hardened against Catholic civil rights and began attacks upon Catholic communities (105). The IRA’s involvement in social agitation saw campaigns against evictions and foreign-owned property, while alliances within the left saw the election of Bernadette Devlinm, then affiliated with the pseudo-Trotskyist “People’s Democracy” grouping, as MP for Mid-Ulster in 1969 (109-114). The Civil Rights campaign found a backlash among the rise of right-wing populism internationally, as the Catholic NI left organized into the Irish National Liberation Movement and the IRA found itself unprepared for the bloody Battle of Belfast (109-136). As the IRA’s military faltered, ideological divisions were perpetuated by elements in the Fianna Fail Lynch government, particularly Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey, who made aid to the IRA conditional upon the expulsion of leftists like Goulding, Costello, and Sean Garland (137-140). The split initially remained amicable, although younger membership which didn’t go with the Provos aligned with Seamus Costello’s anti-abstentionist position (144).
Leaving ideological differences aside, the main tactical difference between the Officials and the Provisionals were that the Officials did not believe a “revolutionary situation yet existed” in NI and limited themselves to defense of Catholic communities, whilst the Provisionals went on the offensive against Protestant militias and the RUC. This won the Provos key support from the Catholic community, whilst the Officials were forced by RUC-Protestant attacks to enter a conflict they refused to recognize (149-178). Amidst this, the Soviet authorized a small amount of weapons to the OIRA (196). The Irish left continued in ideological mire—the Provos, although adopting anti-communist rhetoric against the Officials, adopted the 1966 Eire Nua programme drawn up by Johnston as their political programme, the PD came to the conclusion that the Protestants were settlers, and the OIRA had a small Maoist influence in calls for a “Gaelic Cultural Revolution” to reeducate reactionary Protestants (202-207). One cannot help but wonder how, if it was admitted Protestants were largely reactionary, the Officials kept up their cognitive dissonance of the mysterious revolutionary bloc among them. Keeping up their anti-Marxist rhetoric, the Provos condemned the “Free Derry” municipal governing committees as “communism” whilst the Officials praised them (209-210). One again wonders how the Officials failed to embrace a vulgar anti-“sectarianism” despite the revolutionary positions of the Catholic working class. The anti-sectarian position within the IRA began to precipitate the second split, of the IRA-INLA, as Goulding embraced a stageist view of Catholic civil rights before revolution whilst Seamus Costello (correctly) emphasized a dual-pronged approach advocating both (220-221).
As it abandoned abstentionism, there was a boom of political activity for Sinn Fein in the Free State (234). This was coupled with intense ideological strife within the party. Although he left in 1972 over the violent (defensive) activities of the OIRA, Roy Johnston (supposedly a revolutionary Marxist!) was considered a “positive force” by British intelligence for his commitment to anti-“militarism,” really a concession to the Provisionals and reactionary Protestant paramilitaries (246). The anti-“sectarian” wing began to coalesce in opposition to Costello, who had the support of Sean Garland in wanting to recommit to military struggle alongside social agitation. Although they won the initial internal debate, Costello maintained positions against a stricter democratic centralism and was court martialed and expelled (252-281). Although he held the correct position in regards to the North, Costello’s personal opportunism was revealed in moves he had already made against the party before his departure, and the formation of the Irish Socialist Republican Party and INLA created a bloody and unnecessary feud similar to that of the Official-Provo split. Conflict with the Provisional ramped up in a night of an explicitly anti-communist “pogrom” against the Officials (315-321). Despite this, the Officials continued to scale back the OIRA, reorganized as “Group B,” and was increasingly dominated by the “Industrial Department,” an often-elitist middle-class intellectual division which embraced Marxism-Leninism but often held class reductionist stances in regards to women’s rights (329-333).
The Officials’ embrace of Marxism-Leninism was solidified in the change to “Sinn Fein—The Workers’ Party” and the publication of the controversial The Irish Industrial Revolution, an influential document which outlined a commitment to Marxism-Leninism but also hinted towards two-nationism, an abandonment of republicanism, and minimized the historical role of British imperialism and the national liberation struggle (336-342). Amidst this, Costello was assassinated by the OIRA (347). Although essentially abandoning the armed struggle despite the continued existence of the OIRA as a fund-raising and defense group, the Officials expanded their connections to national liberation movements of the Global South (352-353).
The late 1970s and early 1980s held much promise but also much to be desired from the Workers’ Party. As Gerry Adams rose to Provisional leadership and moved the Provos in a left-wing direction, the Officials rejected overtures and friendly ties on the basis of Provo sectarianism and baselessly and ridiculously accused them of fascist leanings (380-394). This was coupled by a disastrous anti-prisoner policy which refused to back the H-Block hunger strikes or any political activity regarding prisoners’ rights, directly aligning themselves with the RUC and the British state (397-399, 422-430). This pushed the Provisionals ahead of the Officials, while it sapped much Official support. Alongside this, the OIRA cultivated ties as “Group B” with the UDF, UVF, and even the RUC (418-420).
In the south, the WP was finally running into electoral success with an increased rivalry with Labour, a complete shift to electorialism, and ties with the DPRK and USSR (450-464). Although Goulding maintained the necessity of violent revolution as late as 1984, the party’s practice was simply counter to this. Even Gorbachev’s CPSU considered the Workers’ Party half social-democratic and half Marxist (483). Concurrent with this was Proinsias De Rossa’s move to the right and an embracing of “market socialism” coupled with the party’s greatest electoral success, 7 TDs in the 1989 elections (491-493).
The story of the WP in the north remained the same, with an emphasis on non-“sectarianism,” conflict with the Provos, and ties to UDA and UFF alienating the party from Catholic voters with no apparent gains with the Protestant population. The 1986 abandonment of abstentionism by Gerry Adams spelled the long term death knell for the Workers’ Party as Sinn Fein began to take votes and platforms (494-515). The OIRA continued to exist as “Group B” post-1982, mostly as a fundraising institution for the southern party and a vehicle for unnecessary conflict with the Provos (519-545).
The collapse of socialism in the Eastern Bloc spelled the death of the Workers’ Party. Former ardent “Stalinists” like Eoghan Harris and those in the Industrial Department demanded a complete turn to social democracy as the “completion” of Marxism, whilst trade unionist factions pushed for a socialism without democratic centralism, Garland maintained the head of the Marxist-Leninist faction, and De Rossa advocating a middle democratic socialism centered around nationalization, anti-nationalism, and Europeanism (547-556). After an internal battle over the OIRA and the party’s finances, De Rossa split into the Democratic Left with 6 of the party’s 7 TDs (promptly losing 2 in the next election), and eventually folded into Labour (581-589). In protest of the dissolution of the OIRA, nationalists who had remained with the WP in the movement split to form the Official Republican Movement (595). Today, the Workers’ Party maintains that it took all the positions the Provisionals eventually took as part of the peace process, whilst maintaining a proper Marxism (598-599). This is somewhat true, but unlike the WP, Sinn Fein never abandoned republicanism and never cultivated any of the ties to the reactionary Protestant organizations or police like the WP did, and it did not have Marxist ideology guiding it as the Workers’ Party should have.
The Lost Revolution is a deeply frustrating but fascinating read. The heirs of Connolly seem to have squandered his legacy, but his legacy remains nonetheless, and the fight for a United Ireland will continue until the 32 county socialist republic is achieved.
This history of the OIRA begins over a decade before the split with the Provos, introducing Cathal Goulding and the meagre existence of the Irish left by 1953, largely decimated by the Spanish Civil War from which it never recovered (6). Although leading IRA figures like Goulding and Sean Murphy took inspiration from Tito and the Yugoslavian partisans, ideological focus remained on a militarist Catholic nationalism untempered by a Marxist analysis (8-9). The main ideological focus remained on the military tactics of national liberation movements like the Algerian FLN as well as the right-wing EOKA in Cyprus (12-13). It was only upon the failure of Operation Harvest, better known as the IRA Border Campaign of 1956-1962, that the IRA began to reconsider its ideological direction from an unguided, vulgar militarism (14-20).
Hanley and Millar, similar to the argument of Pat Walsh regarding socialism and Irish republicanism, argue that Vatican II allowed for ideological maneuvering to the left for the IRA (23). Regardless, Goulding began to consult with England’s Connolly Association, Ireland’s Wolfe Tone Society, and Anglo-Irish Marxist theorists Roy Johnston and Anthony Coughlan (36). Alongside this ideological realignment came a greater willingness to dialogue with the Protestant proletariat, which had a miniscule base in the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (32, 37). This constant willingness to capitulate to the Protestant working class even when pressured on sectarian grounds would be a key strategic weakness of the Officials going forward, even though it led to a tiny amount of Protestant support and even smaller membership (68). Left IRA leaders like Goulding and Seamus Costello pushed for the left realignment and a focus upon social agitation in the south alongside a policy of defense of the Catholic minority in the north. (39, 57).
Involvement in the Civil Rights campaign in the north throughout the 1960s would be a great political boon for Sinn Fein and the northern “Republican Clubs”. This would be the first failure of the conciliatory policy towards the Protestants, as Protestant opinion hardened against Catholic civil rights and began attacks upon Catholic communities (105). The IRA’s involvement in social agitation saw campaigns against evictions and foreign-owned property, while alliances within the left saw the election of Bernadette Devlinm, then affiliated with the pseudo-Trotskyist “People’s Democracy” grouping, as MP for Mid-Ulster in 1969 (109-114). The Civil Rights campaign found a backlash among the rise of right-wing populism internationally, as the Catholic NI left organized into the Irish National Liberation Movement and the IRA found itself unprepared for the bloody Battle of Belfast (109-136). As the IRA’s military faltered, ideological divisions were perpetuated by elements in the Fianna Fail Lynch government, particularly Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey, who made aid to the IRA conditional upon the expulsion of leftists like Goulding, Costello, and Sean Garland (137-140). The split initially remained amicable, although younger membership which didn’t go with the Provos aligned with Seamus Costello’s anti-abstentionist position (144).
Leaving ideological differences aside, the main tactical difference between the Officials and the Provisionals were that the Officials did not believe a “revolutionary situation yet existed” in NI and limited themselves to defense of Catholic communities, whilst the Provisionals went on the offensive against Protestant militias and the RUC. This won the Provos key support from the Catholic community, whilst the Officials were forced by RUC-Protestant attacks to enter a conflict they refused to recognize (149-178). Amidst this, the Soviet authorized a small amount of weapons to the OIRA (196). The Irish left continued in ideological mire—the Provos, although adopting anti-communist rhetoric against the Officials, adopted the 1966 Eire Nua programme drawn up by Johnston as their political programme, the PD came to the conclusion that the Protestants were settlers, and the OIRA had a small Maoist influence in calls for a “Gaelic Cultural Revolution” to reeducate reactionary Protestants (202-207). One cannot help but wonder how, if it was admitted Protestants were largely reactionary, the Officials kept up their cognitive dissonance of the mysterious revolutionary bloc among them. Keeping up their anti-Marxist rhetoric, the Provos condemned the “Free Derry” municipal governing committees as “communism” whilst the Officials praised them (209-210). One again wonders how the Officials failed to embrace a vulgar anti-“sectarianism” despite the revolutionary positions of the Catholic working class. The anti-sectarian position within the IRA began to precipitate the second split, of the IRA-INLA, as Goulding embraced a stageist view of Catholic civil rights before revolution whilst Seamus Costello (correctly) emphasized a dual-pronged approach advocating both (220-221).
As it abandoned abstentionism, there was a boom of political activity for Sinn Fein in the Free State (234). This was coupled with intense ideological strife within the party. Although he left in 1972 over the violent (defensive) activities of the OIRA, Roy Johnston (supposedly a revolutionary Marxist!) was considered a “positive force” by British intelligence for his commitment to anti-“militarism,” really a concession to the Provisionals and reactionary Protestant paramilitaries (246). The anti-“sectarian” wing began to coalesce in opposition to Costello, who had the support of Sean Garland in wanting to recommit to military struggle alongside social agitation. Although they won the initial internal debate, Costello maintained positions against a stricter democratic centralism and was court martialed and expelled (252-281). Although he held the correct position in regards to the North, Costello’s personal opportunism was revealed in moves he had already made against the party before his departure, and the formation of the Irish Socialist Republican Party and INLA created a bloody and unnecessary feud similar to that of the Official-Provo split. Conflict with the Provisional ramped up in a night of an explicitly anti-communist “pogrom” against the Officials (315-321). Despite this, the Officials continued to scale back the OIRA, reorganized as “Group B,” and was increasingly dominated by the “Industrial Department,” an often-elitist middle-class intellectual division which embraced Marxism-Leninism but often held class reductionist stances in regards to women’s rights (329-333).
The Officials’ embrace of Marxism-Leninism was solidified in the change to “Sinn Fein—The Workers’ Party” and the publication of the controversial The Irish Industrial Revolution, an influential document which outlined a commitment to Marxism-Leninism but also hinted towards two-nationism, an abandonment of republicanism, and minimized the historical role of British imperialism and the national liberation struggle (336-342). Amidst this, Costello was assassinated by the OIRA (347). Although essentially abandoning the armed struggle despite the continued existence of the OIRA as a fund-raising and defense group, the Officials expanded their connections to national liberation movements of the Global South (352-353).
The late 1970s and early 1980s held much promise but also much to be desired from the Workers’ Party. As Gerry Adams rose to Provisional leadership and moved the Provos in a left-wing direction, the Officials rejected overtures and friendly ties on the basis of Provo sectarianism and baselessly and ridiculously accused them of fascist leanings (380-394). This was coupled by a disastrous anti-prisoner policy which refused to back the H-Block hunger strikes or any political activity regarding prisoners’ rights, directly aligning themselves with the RUC and the British state (397-399, 422-430). This pushed the Provisionals ahead of the Officials, while it sapped much Official support. Alongside this, the OIRA cultivated ties as “Group B” with the UDF, UVF, and even the RUC (418-420).
In the south, the WP was finally running into electoral success with an increased rivalry with Labour, a complete shift to electorialism, and ties with the DPRK and USSR (450-464). Although Goulding maintained the necessity of violent revolution as late as 1984, the party’s practice was simply counter to this. Even Gorbachev’s CPSU considered the Workers’ Party half social-democratic and half Marxist (483). Concurrent with this was Proinsias De Rossa’s move to the right and an embracing of “market socialism” coupled with the party’s greatest electoral success, 7 TDs in the 1989 elections (491-493).
The story of the WP in the north remained the same, with an emphasis on non-“sectarianism,” conflict with the Provos, and ties to UDA and UFF alienating the party from Catholic voters with no apparent gains with the Protestant population. The 1986 abandonment of abstentionism by Gerry Adams spelled the long term death knell for the Workers’ Party as Sinn Fein began to take votes and platforms (494-515). The OIRA continued to exist as “Group B” post-1982, mostly as a fundraising institution for the southern party and a vehicle for unnecessary conflict with the Provos (519-545).
The collapse of socialism in the Eastern Bloc spelled the death of the Workers’ Party. Former ardent “Stalinists” like Eoghan Harris and those in the Industrial Department demanded a complete turn to social democracy as the “completion” of Marxism, whilst trade unionist factions pushed for a socialism without democratic centralism, Garland maintained the head of the Marxist-Leninist faction, and De Rossa advocating a middle democratic socialism centered around nationalization, anti-nationalism, and Europeanism (547-556). After an internal battle over the OIRA and the party’s finances, De Rossa split into the Democratic Left with 6 of the party’s 7 TDs (promptly losing 2 in the next election), and eventually folded into Labour (581-589). In protest of the dissolution of the OIRA, nationalists who had remained with the WP in the movement split to form the Official Republican Movement (595). Today, the Workers’ Party maintains that it took all the positions the Provisionals eventually took as part of the peace process, whilst maintaining a proper Marxism (598-599). This is somewhat true, but unlike the WP, Sinn Fein never abandoned republicanism and never cultivated any of the ties to the reactionary Protestant organizations or police like the WP did, and it did not have Marxist ideology guiding it as the Workers’ Party should have.
The Lost Revolution is a deeply frustrating but fascinating read. The heirs of Connolly seem to have squandered his legacy, but his legacy remains nonetheless, and the fight for a United Ireland will continue until the 32 county socialist republic is achieved.
March 19, 2022
I'm very glad that I got around to reading this eventually. While quite the commitment because of its length, this book was well worth the three months it took me to read it. It's a must for anyone involved in socialist politics and party building as there is much to learn from both the success and failures of the Workers party. While sad and slightly pessimistic towards the end, the experiences of the socialist and republican activists of the 20th century can be inspiring and have allowed me to have a clear view of the path ahead
December 16, 2022
A history of the party formerly known as Sinn Féin (and after that Sinn Féin /The Workers Party) but that we now know as the workers party. This is a very interesting read for those interested in intra-republican politics of the troubles.
Admittedly it is quite sympathetic to the Workers Party, but despite that it is very interesting and does mention some of their controversies too. The Ned Stapleton Cumann infiltrating RTÉ being one of the most unusual, as well as their going into power with Charles Haughey, and the assassination of Seamus Costello.
A very good read, but maybe just a tad too sympathetic.
Admittedly it is quite sympathetic to the Workers Party, but despite that it is very interesting and does mention some of their controversies too. The Ned Stapleton Cumann infiltrating RTÉ being one of the most unusual, as well as their going into power with Charles Haughey, and the assassination of Seamus Costello.
A very good read, but maybe just a tad too sympathetic.
December 28, 2025
Thorough analysis of the development of the Official IRA from the border campaign, through the splits of 1969 and 1974, and eventually the collapse of the organisation into the Eurocommunist Democratic Left.
Full of first hand accounts and interviews, the writers clearly undertook a substantial piece of work in putting the book together.
The first half of the book, on the developments of the Officials in the 60s and the eventual split with the Provos and then the IRSP goes into a lot of depth, and clearly shows how the failure of the Border Campaign, the leftward shift of the younger members of the IRA, and then the collapse of the civil rights movement under sustained violent pressure in 1969 developed into an all out split.
Costello and the IRSP remain one of histories heart breaking "what-if's", maintaining the socialist politics without collapsing into the frequently bizarre somersaults of the Official's "anti-sectarianism".
One key takeaway is the repeated failure of the Officials to accurately understand the situation in front of them, whether that be the Provos (esp. after the rise of Adams), the IRSP, or most disastrously the UDA, the RUC, and the British Army. At the end older members console themselves that the Officials were "right too early"; famously there is often little difference in practice between being right early and being wrong.
One limitation of the book is its focus often on the "what" and "how" of the history of the Officials, and less on the "why". This is especially notable in two areas: the chapters on developments in the North, and; the discussion of the mainstreaming of the WP and eventual rise of the Democratic Left. At its worst points the book collapses into a journalistic list of things that happened (attacks, deaths, robberies, meetings, protests) lacking an argument about why the Officials developed in the way they did.
Regarding the Officials in the Six Counties, this book raises many questions, but provides few answers. Why did the "Neither Orange nor Green" approach of the Officials fail? Why were the Provos able to become the dominant force of republicanism in the Six Counties, despite the Officials starting off with more members and better organisation? The authors discuss these developments in great detail, but why these things happened is often missed out.
Likewise the emergence of the politics that would become Democratic Left appear as if from nowhere in 1989 in this otherwise orthodox semi-Official Communist/ML party. Having read about the PCF and PCI and their development as Eurocommunists in some detail, the apparent damascene conversion of the WP comes as a surprise.
Despite these shortcomings, the meticulous research that Hanley and Millar conducted bears real fruit with fascinating interviews and discussion of the vibrant life of the Officials and the WP. At its best this book is a clear example of excellent social history that takes the reader inside the dimly lit bars of the Republican Club in Newry, along for the ride on countless robberies and gun battles, and into secretive meetings of the Worker's Party Industrial Department in RTE. For anyone interested in an introduction to the Officials you could do a lot worse than this book.
Also robbing a post office was apparently much easier in the 70s judging by the fact every group that split from the Officials, no matter how small, carried out at least one!
Full of first hand accounts and interviews, the writers clearly undertook a substantial piece of work in putting the book together.
The first half of the book, on the developments of the Officials in the 60s and the eventual split with the Provos and then the IRSP goes into a lot of depth, and clearly shows how the failure of the Border Campaign, the leftward shift of the younger members of the IRA, and then the collapse of the civil rights movement under sustained violent pressure in 1969 developed into an all out split.
Costello and the IRSP remain one of histories heart breaking "what-if's", maintaining the socialist politics without collapsing into the frequently bizarre somersaults of the Official's "anti-sectarianism".
One key takeaway is the repeated failure of the Officials to accurately understand the situation in front of them, whether that be the Provos (esp. after the rise of Adams), the IRSP, or most disastrously the UDA, the RUC, and the British Army. At the end older members console themselves that the Officials were "right too early"; famously there is often little difference in practice between being right early and being wrong.
One limitation of the book is its focus often on the "what" and "how" of the history of the Officials, and less on the "why". This is especially notable in two areas: the chapters on developments in the North, and; the discussion of the mainstreaming of the WP and eventual rise of the Democratic Left. At its worst points the book collapses into a journalistic list of things that happened (attacks, deaths, robberies, meetings, protests) lacking an argument about why the Officials developed in the way they did.
Regarding the Officials in the Six Counties, this book raises many questions, but provides few answers. Why did the "Neither Orange nor Green" approach of the Officials fail? Why were the Provos able to become the dominant force of republicanism in the Six Counties, despite the Officials starting off with more members and better organisation? The authors discuss these developments in great detail, but why these things happened is often missed out.
Likewise the emergence of the politics that would become Democratic Left appear as if from nowhere in 1989 in this otherwise orthodox semi-Official Communist/ML party. Having read about the PCF and PCI and their development as Eurocommunists in some detail, the apparent damascene conversion of the WP comes as a surprise.
Despite these shortcomings, the meticulous research that Hanley and Millar conducted bears real fruit with fascinating interviews and discussion of the vibrant life of the Officials and the WP. At its best this book is a clear example of excellent social history that takes the reader inside the dimly lit bars of the Republican Club in Newry, along for the ride on countless robberies and gun battles, and into secretive meetings of the Worker's Party Industrial Department in RTE. For anyone interested in an introduction to the Officials you could do a lot worse than this book.
Also robbing a post office was apparently much easier in the 70s judging by the fact every group that split from the Officials, no matter how small, carried out at least one!
July 14, 2023
A great antidote to the PIRA/SF narrative on the troubles and the IRA split that is somewhat pervasive on the left. The phrase that stuck with me the most from the whole book was Cathal Goulding's ‘We were right, but too soon, Gerry Adams is right, but too late – and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh will never be fucking right.’ referring to the party's brave but tragically futile opposition to sectarianism throughout the onslaught of The Troubles. It does serve however as a cautionary tale, as to how secret organisations and indeed secret armies can warp the normal democratic functions of a political party.
Whilst the WP clearly grasped the impossibility of winning a United Ireland militarily one does also wonder if they were almost blinded by their dislike for their former comrades in the PIRA, in their latter years seemingly cosying up to the RUC.
Whilst the WP clearly grasped the impossibility of winning a United Ireland militarily one does also wonder if they were almost blinded by their dislike for their former comrades in the PIRA, in their latter years seemingly cosying up to the RUC.
November 2, 2024
Great book but a long read. Hanley and Millar do an excellent job in documenting the history of the official IRA and workers party. The names mentioned in this book are mind-blowing, and it shines a light on murky underbelly of contemporary Irish left wing politics. This book also explains to some extent how woke culture has corrupted modern Irish republicanism through its Marxist influence. You will come to learn how many of Ireland's media and political darlings have backgrounds steeped in subversion and skullduggery.
A must-read for anyone interested in Irish politics and nationalism.
A must-read for anyone interested in Irish politics and nationalism.
May 31, 2024
Excellent book, full of information, interviews and anecdotes about an unlikely but pretty incredible evolution of an almost defeated 1940s IRA to a serious revolutionary party on the brink of making a breakthrough, to its disastrous break up. At times quite sad in a way. This quote from nearing the end, from a former OIRA Chief of Staff I think sums it up: "We were right but too early, Gerry Adams was right but too late, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh will never be fucking right"
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May 26, 2019I love all history on the IRA and revolutionary struggle in Ireland against British Imperialism. However this book could (and should) have been shorter. The author and editors seem to have no clue how to present information in a concise/clear manner. It honestly reads like a college student trying desperately to make their essay long enough.
February 21, 2019
As far as I can tell - thorough and balanced.
May 12, 2020
Eye-opening.
A bit densely written.
But a valuable history.
A bit densely written.
But a valuable history.
September 1, 2021
Gets too bogged-down in small details.
October 20, 2014
In 1975, the Official IRA and Sinn Féin had a bright future. They had broken with reactionary Catholic nationalism and Provisional terrorism, declared a ceasefire with the British state, and launched themselves on a course to build a revolutionary party that sought to lead the struggle of a working class united across sectarian lines for the abolition of capitalism and a secular socialist republic in Ireland. Today, the Workers' Party, the organizational descendent of the Official IRA, survives as a tiny, blinkered Stalinoid sect with most of its talented cadre having deserted socialism decades ago.
But the line to today was not straight and narrow. Hanley and Millar's detailed, accesible and exhaustively documented history shows the present importance of the attempted revolution that the Official IRA/Sinn Féin/The Workers' Party launched in the early 1970s. The leadership and members of the group were, despite serious ideological and practical faults, engaged in a process that could have, were the conditions right, averted the violence of the Troubles and placed Irish society on a road to the future. There were serious attempts by the official IRA to distance itself from the gangsterist and terrorist methods of its Republican past. There were likewise serious attempts, despite Stalinist coloring, to reach out to the working class, Catholic and Protestant, on economic issues that could unite them. These parts of the book remain a challenging and inspiring piece of Irish history.
If I have one complaint about the book, it's that a sincere dedication to providing the history in a narrative form often leads the authors away from the most basic demands for an analysis. As we get deeper into the book there are chapters which separate out the Party's northern and southern wings, and the activity of 'Group B,' but shocking developments such as the Officials' covert collaboration with the British state and Unionist paramilitaries against the Provos get little explanation from either the authors' frame of reference or party activists. The death knell of the party as a force in Irish politics in 1990 when Proisinas de Rossa left with five other TDs and the majority of the party's rank and file, eventually to merge with the Labour Party, got little buildup or analysis in retrospect.
On a final note, I particularly enjoyed the verdict of Cathal Goulding, the first leader of Official Sinn Féin on the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process: "We were right, but too early, Gerry Adams is right, but too late, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh will never be fucking right."
But the line to today was not straight and narrow. Hanley and Millar's detailed, accesible and exhaustively documented history shows the present importance of the attempted revolution that the Official IRA/Sinn Féin/The Workers' Party launched in the early 1970s. The leadership and members of the group were, despite serious ideological and practical faults, engaged in a process that could have, were the conditions right, averted the violence of the Troubles and placed Irish society on a road to the future. There were serious attempts by the official IRA to distance itself from the gangsterist and terrorist methods of its Republican past. There were likewise serious attempts, despite Stalinist coloring, to reach out to the working class, Catholic and Protestant, on economic issues that could unite them. These parts of the book remain a challenging and inspiring piece of Irish history.
If I have one complaint about the book, it's that a sincere dedication to providing the history in a narrative form often leads the authors away from the most basic demands for an analysis. As we get deeper into the book there are chapters which separate out the Party's northern and southern wings, and the activity of 'Group B,' but shocking developments such as the Officials' covert collaboration with the British state and Unionist paramilitaries against the Provos get little explanation from either the authors' frame of reference or party activists. The death knell of the party as a force in Irish politics in 1990 when Proisinas de Rossa left with five other TDs and the majority of the party's rank and file, eventually to merge with the Labour Party, got little buildup or analysis in retrospect.
On a final note, I particularly enjoyed the verdict of Cathal Goulding, the first leader of Official Sinn Féin on the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process: "We were right, but too early, Gerry Adams is right, but too late, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh will never be fucking right."
April 1, 2014
Absolutely fascinating read that describes an Ireland that is almost totally unrecognisable now - one where a republican group associated with the IRA (well one of the IRAs) could become a staunchly marxist, anti republican, even anti-nationalist movement, filled with some of the most senior personnel in today's Ireland. The authors describe a genuine belief in all the activists that Ireland could and would be transformed into a socialist workers' republic, in the image of the USSR. The book focused far more on the early days of the movement in the 1960's and 70's, and especially north of the border, most of which was very new to me and very interesting - The genesis of the mental and cultural division between north and south that is now cemented by the legacy of the troubles is all laid out, and even more interestingly the reader can see a time when it didn't exist before 1969.
The end of the book feels a little rushed, with a strong majority of the now more influential personnel splitting to form Democratic Left and then eventually merge into Labour (which in the context of the early part of the books, seems totally impossible), but then the process itself was rearkably short. It seems that as soon as the Berlin wall fell, social democrats throughout the party had all their secret doubts exonerated, and ready to be printed as new manifestoes!
The book was fascinating as an investigation of the infighting and numerical insignificance of the Irish left, but also as a demonstration of how their ideas can become mainstream by attracting the attention (and in some cases supplanting) media elites and opinion formers. The party failed, but many of their seemingly oddest and most idiosyncratic ideas won out in the end, on the north at least, if not in the political economy of Ireland.
One strange thing I noticed in the notes was that the authors seemingly had not talked to Eamon Gilmore, Pat Rabitte or Liz McManus, three people very important by the end of the book, who's point of view was notable in its absence.
All in all, a great, gossipy, compulsive and well-researched read.
The end of the book feels a little rushed, with a strong majority of the now more influential personnel splitting to form Democratic Left and then eventually merge into Labour (which in the context of the early part of the books, seems totally impossible), but then the process itself was rearkably short. It seems that as soon as the Berlin wall fell, social democrats throughout the party had all their secret doubts exonerated, and ready to be printed as new manifestoes!
The book was fascinating as an investigation of the infighting and numerical insignificance of the Irish left, but also as a demonstration of how their ideas can become mainstream by attracting the attention (and in some cases supplanting) media elites and opinion formers. The party failed, but many of their seemingly oddest and most idiosyncratic ideas won out in the end, on the north at least, if not in the political economy of Ireland.
One strange thing I noticed in the notes was that the authors seemingly had not talked to Eamon Gilmore, Pat Rabitte or Liz McManus, three people very important by the end of the book, who's point of view was notable in its absence.
All in all, a great, gossipy, compulsive and well-researched read.
July 14, 2015
This one taught me a lot. My knowledge of the Officials was very limited when I started reading, other than they ended up splitting in the early 90s, and a few other little snippets. The book was an interesting rundown of all that the movement did, how their positions changed, and so on. In places, it was a bit on the sparse side, and the narrative being so strongly divided between North and South was a little disorienting. Nonetheless, a good read. And, of course, it's always fun to see names you recognize from today (like, say, Gilmore, Rabitte, De Rossa, and so on) being so stridently socialist...
2015 Reread: Still very interesting. Lots of parallels between then and now, interestingly.
2015 Reread: Still very interesting. Lots of parallels between then and now, interestingly.
April 11, 2025
‘The Lost Revolution’ is a very detailed and well constructed extensive history of the Official IRA and the Workers Party. No element of the narrative is left without attention, nor any aspect of the various personal histories untouched. You cannot adequately understand the post-independence history of Ireland without grasping these concerns, nor the complex internecine struggles that characterised the 6 counties ever since.
The authors are particularly skilled at explaining all of this with reference to the intricacies of Irish history and politics, which is often missing from these historical accounts.
A must read for anyone intrigued by this fascinating time in the bloody history of Ireland.
4/5
The authors are particularly skilled at explaining all of this with reference to the intricacies of Irish history and politics, which is often missing from these historical accounts.
A must read for anyone intrigued by this fascinating time in the bloody history of Ireland.
4/5
May 30, 2016
extremely interesting, and absorbing in places. The story of how the Official IRA managed to transform itself from a nationalist paramilitary into a communist party. In the process, subverts quite a few myths about Ireland. It only really covers the time span until the split between Democratic Left and Workers' Party though, so there is nothing on the period between 1991 and the rpesent. Also, the notes at the back were quite unhelpful
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