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A imaginação
This new translation includes a helpful historical and philosophical introduction by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf. Also included is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's important review of L'Imagination upon its publication in French in 1936. Translated by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf.
Paperback
First published January 1, 1936
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About the author
Jean Paul Friedrich Richter
1,669 books83 followersHumorous and sentimental novels of German writer Jean Paul Friedrich Richter under pen name Jean Paul include
Titan
(1800-1803) and
Years of Indiscretion
(1804-1805).
In the Fichtelgebirge mountains of Bavaria, his father worked as an organist. This fathre served in 1765 as a pastor at Joditz near Hof and in 1767 at Schwarzenbach but died on 25 April 1779, leaving the family in great poverty. After attending the gymnasium at Hof, Jean Paul went in 1781 to the University of Leipzig. His original intention was to enter his father's profession, but theology did not interest him, and he soon devoted himself wholly to the study of literature. Unable to maintain himself at Leipzig, he returned in 1784 to Hof, where he lived with his mother. From 1787 to 1789 he served as a tutor at Töpen, a village near Hof; and from 1790 to 1794 he taught the children of several families in a school he had founded in nearby Schwarzenbach.
Jean Paul began his career as a man of letters with Grönländische Prozesse ("Greenland Lawsuits", published anonymously in Berlin) and Auswahl aus des Teufels Papieren ("Selections from the Devil's Papers", signed J. P. F. Hasus), the former of which was issued in 1783-84, the latter in 1789. These works were not received with much favour, and in later life Richter himself had little sympathy for their satirical tone. A spiritual crisis he suffered on 15 November 1790, in which he had a vision of his own death, altered his outlook profoundly. His next book, Die unsichtbare Loge ("The Invisible Lodge"), a romance published in 1793 under the pen-name Jean Paul (in honour of Jean Jacques Rousseau), had all the qualities that were soon to make him famous, and its power was immediately recognized by some of the best critics of the day.
Encouraged by the reception of Die unsichtbare Loge, Richter composed a number of books in rapid succession: Hesperus (1795), Biographische Belustigungen unter der Gehirnschale einer Riesin (1796), Leben des Quintus Fixlein (1796), Der Jubelsenior (1797), and Das Kampaner Tal (1797). Also among these was the novel Blumen- Frucht- und Dornenstücke, oder Ehestand, Tod und Hochzeit des Armenadvokaten Siebenkäs in 1796-97. The book's slightly supernatural theme, involving a Doppelgänger and pseudocide, stirred some controversy over its interpretation of the Resurrection, but these criticisms served only to draw awareness to the author. This series of writings assured Richter a place in German literature, and during the rest of his life every work he produced was welcomed by a wide circle of admirers.
After his mother's death in 1797, Richter went to Leipzig, and in the following year to Weimar, where he started work on his most ambitious novel, Titan, published between 1801-02. Richter became friends with such Weimar notables as Herder, by whom he was warmly appreciated, but despite their close proximity, Richter never become close to Goethe and Schiller, both of whom found his literary methods repugnant; but in Weimar, as elsewhere, his remarkable conversational powers and his genial manners made him a favorite in general society. In 1801 he married Caroline Meyer, whom he had met in Berlin the year before. They lived first at Meiningen, then at Coburg; and finally, in 1804, they settled at Bayreuth.
Here Richter spent a quiet, simple and happy life, constantly occupied with his work as a writer. In 1808 he was fortunately delivered from anxiety about outward necessities by Prince Primate Karl Theodor von Dalberg, who gave him a pension. Titan was followed by Flegeljahre (1804-5), two works which he himself regarded as his masterpieces. His later imaginative works were Dr Katzenbergers Badereise (1809), Des Feldpredigers Schmelzle Reise nach Flätz (1809), Leben Fibels (1812), and Der Komet, oder Nikolaus Marggraf (1820-22). In Vorschule der Aesthetik (1804) he expounded his ideas on art; he discussed the principles of education i
In the Fichtelgebirge mountains of Bavaria, his father worked as an organist. This fathre served in 1765 as a pastor at Joditz near Hof and in 1767 at Schwarzenbach but died on 25 April 1779, leaving the family in great poverty. After attending the gymnasium at Hof, Jean Paul went in 1781 to the University of Leipzig. His original intention was to enter his father's profession, but theology did not interest him, and he soon devoted himself wholly to the study of literature. Unable to maintain himself at Leipzig, he returned in 1784 to Hof, where he lived with his mother. From 1787 to 1789 he served as a tutor at Töpen, a village near Hof; and from 1790 to 1794 he taught the children of several families in a school he had founded in nearby Schwarzenbach.
Jean Paul began his career as a man of letters with Grönländische Prozesse ("Greenland Lawsuits", published anonymously in Berlin) and Auswahl aus des Teufels Papieren ("Selections from the Devil's Papers", signed J. P. F. Hasus), the former of which was issued in 1783-84, the latter in 1789. These works were not received with much favour, and in later life Richter himself had little sympathy for their satirical tone. A spiritual crisis he suffered on 15 November 1790, in which he had a vision of his own death, altered his outlook profoundly. His next book, Die unsichtbare Loge ("The Invisible Lodge"), a romance published in 1793 under the pen-name Jean Paul (in honour of Jean Jacques Rousseau), had all the qualities that were soon to make him famous, and its power was immediately recognized by some of the best critics of the day.
Encouraged by the reception of Die unsichtbare Loge, Richter composed a number of books in rapid succession: Hesperus (1795), Biographische Belustigungen unter der Gehirnschale einer Riesin (1796), Leben des Quintus Fixlein (1796), Der Jubelsenior (1797), and Das Kampaner Tal (1797). Also among these was the novel Blumen- Frucht- und Dornenstücke, oder Ehestand, Tod und Hochzeit des Armenadvokaten Siebenkäs in 1796-97. The book's slightly supernatural theme, involving a Doppelgänger and pseudocide, stirred some controversy over its interpretation of the Resurrection, but these criticisms served only to draw awareness to the author. This series of writings assured Richter a place in German literature, and during the rest of his life every work he produced was welcomed by a wide circle of admirers.
After his mother's death in 1797, Richter went to Leipzig, and in the following year to Weimar, where he started work on his most ambitious novel, Titan, published between 1801-02. Richter became friends with such Weimar notables as Herder, by whom he was warmly appreciated, but despite their close proximity, Richter never become close to Goethe and Schiller, both of whom found his literary methods repugnant; but in Weimar, as elsewhere, his remarkable conversational powers and his genial manners made him a favorite in general society. In 1801 he married Caroline Meyer, whom he had met in Berlin the year before. They lived first at Meiningen, then at Coburg; and finally, in 1804, they settled at Bayreuth.
Here Richter spent a quiet, simple and happy life, constantly occupied with his work as a writer. In 1808 he was fortunately delivered from anxiety about outward necessities by Prince Primate Karl Theodor von Dalberg, who gave him a pension. Titan was followed by Flegeljahre (1804-5), two works which he himself regarded as his masterpieces. His later imaginative works were Dr Katzenbergers Badereise (1809), Des Feldpredigers Schmelzle Reise nach Flätz (1809), Leben Fibels (1812), and Der Komet, oder Nikolaus Marggraf (1820-22). In Vorschule der Aesthetik (1804) he expounded his ideas on art; he discussed the principles of education i
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
March 17, 2024
Imagination or the production of images poses a problem in philosophy: what is an image, what is its nature, how does it differ from reality - and if reality is only one image, how to distinguish between imagination and reality, between false and true - and if the image is different from reality, what is it, how is it produced, how is it stored, how is it remembered, etc.
Philosophers have all broken their teeth on this thorny problem. For Descartes, reality and image do not make a difference; understanding makes the selection. This point of view is not very satisfactory because experience makes us live every day in that we immediately make the difference between a voice "in our head" and the neighbor next door who speaks, without "thinking" or "reason" to achieve this result. For empiricists, it's all about sensations since consciousness does not exist - the image only reproduces the real sensations, but less powerfully. Not very convincing either: when I think of an injury, I remember being in pain, but I don't know the pain. For psychologists, it is not better; the world is reconstituted in each of us so that the objectivity of the matter is denied. For everyone, or almost, the image is an image of reality - but why is it always more blurry, less clear, and less specific than accurate perception?
Of course, Husserl and the Würzburg Philosophers offer an exciting option by eliminating the image question and differentiating its fixation from its production. This living process is renewed each time through perception or precertification. But where is the image stored? By what operation will we look for it? Once again, how can we differentiate the process of precertification (recalled memory) from accurate perception? Where is the information? It remains for JPS to write a book on the subject. It will be called "The Imaginary". And perhaps neurology has brought some exciting experiments to submit to philosophy since then.
Philosophers have all broken their teeth on this thorny problem. For Descartes, reality and image do not make a difference; understanding makes the selection. This point of view is not very satisfactory because experience makes us live every day in that we immediately make the difference between a voice "in our head" and the neighbor next door who speaks, without "thinking" or "reason" to achieve this result. For empiricists, it's all about sensations since consciousness does not exist - the image only reproduces the real sensations, but less powerfully. Not very convincing either: when I think of an injury, I remember being in pain, but I don't know the pain. For psychologists, it is not better; the world is reconstituted in each of us so that the objectivity of the matter is denied. For everyone, or almost, the image is an image of reality - but why is it always more blurry, less clear, and less specific than accurate perception?
Of course, Husserl and the Würzburg Philosophers offer an exciting option by eliminating the image question and differentiating its fixation from its production. This living process is renewed each time through perception or precertification. But where is the image stored? By what operation will we look for it? Once again, how can we differentiate the process of precertification (recalled memory) from accurate perception? Where is the information? It remains for JPS to write a book on the subject. It will be called "The Imaginary". And perhaps neurology has brought some exciting experiments to submit to philosophy since then.
March 21, 2024
Sartre has such profound ideas! I only wish they were uptaken by more philosophers and given the debate and development they deserve. Sartre might be partly responsible for this lack of uptake, given his presentation; he doesn’t foreground his ideas, and instead keeps them hidden within his very general summing up and riffing on other philosophers’ views.
Here’s the key idea. We have assumed a vocabulary for thinking about the mind that implicitly makes the contents of what we experience out to be akin to physical things, which are concrete, determinate, and subject to mechanical processes. Sartre uses the term “the image” to talk about this content of experience.
Hume, for example, believes that perception consists in mental images of a sort (sensations), and that beliefs and ideas are fainter replications of these images, and amount to images in their own right. While Sartre doesn’t discuss Kant, we can also see this in his work. Kant talks about the sensory manifold, schemata, concepts, and ideas in such a way that implies that these are like mental images, or things with determinate form which can undergo deterministic processes.
Sartre points out that once the mind is conceived of as consisting in such mental images, it is only natural to think about them as “atomistic” and as combined or joined with others by “association.” Association can refer to a range of mental operations. For Kant, the understanding and imagination working in conjunction to get the sensory manifold to become a coherent experience might be understandable in terms of association perhaps. The sensory manifold gets associated with a schema, which gets associated with certain concepts, and these processes yield our experience.
Sartre doesn’t provide much of a positive alternative to this picture of mental images and mental association. Instead, he spends the majority of this work showing how this picture is implicit in many philosophers and psychologists, and even in those thinkers who believe they have broken free of this spell.
It seems that Sartre’s positive alternative is found in Being and Nothingness, out of those works I’ve read by him at least. Our agency is behind the very formation of any “mental image.” It is not a pre-formed thing, which we can then use our agency upon by associating it with other images. But to my memory, Sartre doesn’t develop this picture of exactly how agency forms mental content. It’s only suggested that, given Sartre’s opposition to this idea of mental association, there would have to be some sort of chaotic or messy growth, which is irreducible to the interaction between atomic units.
Would highly recommend this little read. It supplements Sartre's Part II on the imagination, The imaginary: a phenomenological psychology of the imagination, and contains ideas not found in that more popular work.
March 24, 2021
O examinare extinsă a conceptelor de neant și libertate, ambele derivând din capacitatea conștiinței de a imagina obiecte atât așa cum sunt, cât și cum nu sunt.
Sartre critică teoriile filosofice despre imaginație, în special pe cele ale lui Descartes, Leibniz și Hume, apoi revizuiește teoriile psihologice despre imaginație susținand că „concepția clasică” este fundamental defectuoasă deoarece începe prin conceperea imaginației ca fiind percepție și apoi caută, în zadar, să restabilească diferența dintre cele două. Incheie cu un capitol despre teoria lui Husserl, care, în ciuda faptului că împărtășește defectele abordărilor anterioare, semnalează o nouă cale de înțelegere a imaginației.
Sartre critică teoriile filosofice despre imaginație, în special pe cele ale lui Descartes, Leibniz și Hume, apoi revizuiește teoriile psihologice despre imaginație susținand că „concepția clasică” este fundamental defectuoasă deoarece începe prin conceperea imaginației ca fiind percepție și apoi caută, în zadar, să restabilească diferența dintre cele două. Incheie cu un capitol despre teoria lui Husserl, care, în ciuda faptului că împărtășește defectele abordărilor anterioare, semnalează o nouă cale de înțelegere a imaginației.
July 29, 2013
I have some problems with this book, and I wish to have more clarifications on the matter. I find the content of the book overwhelming, that is, excessive; and it entails some parts that I deem unnecessary to the development of Sartre's postulate or arguments. Some of the problems I can only recall are:
1. Shouldn't the title be changed to "Image"? "Imagination" was nonetheless discussed, but very flatly. Sartre seemed to have shifted his focus towards Image and Perception more than what "imagination" has to do with them.
2. He discussed the viewpoints of whether thoughts exist without images [the problem of which persists until the very last chapter], and at first I really thought that was impossible for us to think without creating the images in our head. But then I thought of numbers - or more clearly, calculations - I found that we usually think with conscience [because we calculate] with numbers - but many of us do not picture numbers in our head when we do the maths, especially for quick calculations. Of course there are many exceptions [like cases in psychology where people link numbers to certain colors/sounds, etc.]
3. I was quite surprised that Sartre hardly mentioned the link between image and "memory", despite the fact that he took an in-depth investigation on image and perception, and actually invested in analyzing the psychological aspect of it.
Anyway, some thoughts struck me.
1. Shouldn't the title be changed to "Image"? "Imagination" was nonetheless discussed, but very flatly. Sartre seemed to have shifted his focus towards Image and Perception more than what "imagination" has to do with them.
2. He discussed the viewpoints of whether thoughts exist without images [the problem of which persists until the very last chapter], and at first I really thought that was impossible for us to think without creating the images in our head. But then I thought of numbers - or more clearly, calculations - I found that we usually think with conscience [because we calculate] with numbers - but many of us do not picture numbers in our head when we do the maths, especially for quick calculations. Of course there are many exceptions [like cases in psychology where people link numbers to certain colors/sounds, etc.]
3. I was quite surprised that Sartre hardly mentioned the link between image and "memory", despite the fact that he took an in-depth investigation on image and perception, and actually invested in analyzing the psychological aspect of it.
Anyway, some thoughts struck me.
September 5, 2023
Sartre faz uma retomada histórica do desenvolvimento da teoria da imagem desde Descartes, passando por Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, Bergson, produzindo uma crítica à separação da imagem em relação ao pensamento/percepção/ideia, assim como ao associacionismo (doutrina que compreende a imagem enquanto coisa, que estão em relação a outras). É na fenomenologia de Husserl que Sartre começa a esborçar uma teoria da imagem que possa defini-la a partir da concepção de intencionalidade, isto é, a partir da ideia de que uma imagem é sempre uma consciência ~de alguma coisa. O texto é denso e as diferenças entre as teorias problematizadas por Sartre parecem, por vezes, ser sutis (pelo menos p aqueles não iniciados no tema). Leitura relativamente difícil.
April 25, 2024
É bacana observar como Sartre aborda a imaginação como um ato consciente, destacando a liberdade e a responsabilidade do sujeito na construção de significados e também na formação da própria identidade. Sartre nos desafia a questionar não apenas o que imaginamos, mas também como nossas imaginações moldam nossas formas de perceber o mundo e influenciam as nossas escolhas e ações. Ele mergulha na complexa teia de significados e nuances que as imagens desempenham na constituição da subjetividade. Através de uma análise penetrante, o livro explora muito como as imagens moldam não apenas a percepção individual, mas também como influenciam as relações sociais e políticas.
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August 8, 2023"De modo nenhum minha consciência poderia ser uma coisa, porque seu modo de ser em si é precisamente um SER para SI. Existir, para ela, é ter consciência de sua existência." - Sartre (1936)
March 24, 2025
Volveré a este libro en algún momento.
February 28, 2021
4.25/5
This is Sartre’s first full philosophical work. This work acts as a great precursor to most philosophical essays by Sartre. Sartre develops his phenomenology and you can find ideas in here that are later found and expounded in works such as The Imaginary, and Being and nothingness, as examples.
Sartre discusses a bit of the history of how images have been defined. He discusses consciousness, perceptions, sensations, reflection, objects, imagination, etc. Psychology and ontology are topics that are discussed, especially in regards to the works of Henri Bergson.
As an early work, this helps establish the groundwork for Sartre’s ideas, his system, and it serves as a basis for his existentialism and for his phenomenology, in my opinion. This work in the greater scheme of things shows how we are ontology free if we can imagine.
This work may seem overwhelming for those new to Sartre or to philosophy in general, although the work is not too long, so it is very feasible to read.
I can see anyone being interested in this work if they are into psychology.
This is Sartre’s first full philosophical work. This work acts as a great precursor to most philosophical essays by Sartre. Sartre develops his phenomenology and you can find ideas in here that are later found and expounded in works such as The Imaginary, and Being and nothingness, as examples.
Sartre discusses a bit of the history of how images have been defined. He discusses consciousness, perceptions, sensations, reflection, objects, imagination, etc. Psychology and ontology are topics that are discussed, especially in regards to the works of Henri Bergson.
As an early work, this helps establish the groundwork for Sartre’s ideas, his system, and it serves as a basis for his existentialism and for his phenomenology, in my opinion. This work in the greater scheme of things shows how we are ontology free if we can imagine.
This work may seem overwhelming for those new to Sartre or to philosophy in general, although the work is not too long, so it is very feasible to read.
I can see anyone being interested in this work if they are into psychology.
November 21, 2017
Um bom livro. Aqui, quando Sartre investe na conceituação da imaginação ele não fala essencialmente naquele mecanismo que usamos para criar coisas nas nossas mentes, mas, principalmente, nossa relação com as imagens. Ele aborda como as adquirimos, sejam pictóricas ou audiovisuais, como as processamos na forma de imagens mentais e como elas passam a ser utilizadas pro nós em nosso processo de representação da realidade me nossas relações conosco mesmo e com o alheio. O filósofo francês também utiliza teorias de filósofos anteriores a si como Hume e Husserl para explicar a fenomenologia das imagens. Mas, o mais importante para mim, foi a aproximação do imagético com a teoria da memória de Bergson, onde Jean-Paul Sartre diz que a memória é parte essencial de nossa aquisição e processamento de imagens, bem como auxilia nos processos de representação do mundo enquanto percepção e imagens mentais.
July 29, 2025
Mais complicado do que pensei que seria. Sartre traz muitos conceitos, de muitos autores com visões semelhantes e divergentes. É difícil lembrar se conceitos recém citados foram elaborados por Ribot, Husserl, Spaier, Hume ou pelo próprio Sartre.
A parte inicial, que traz uma recapitulação da produção de conhecimento sobre os conceitos de imagem e ideia, pensamento, objeto, coisa e afins, foi difícil de compreender (muito por não conhecer os autores citados), mas ao final do livro a análise fica mais clara.
Gostei do que li e com certeza lerei novamente mais pra frente.
“Não há, não poderia haver imagens NA consciência. Mas a imagem é um certo tipo de consciência. A imagem é um ato e não uma coisa. A imagem é consciência DE alguma coisa.”
A parte inicial, que traz uma recapitulação da produção de conhecimento sobre os conceitos de imagem e ideia, pensamento, objeto, coisa e afins, foi difícil de compreender (muito por não conhecer os autores citados), mas ao final do livro a análise fica mais clara.
Gostei do que li e com certeza lerei novamente mais pra frente.
“Não há, não poderia haver imagens NA consciência. Mas a imagem é um certo tipo de consciência. A imagem é um ato e não uma coisa. A imagem é consciência DE alguma coisa.”
March 18, 2025
Un texto más crítico que constructivo. No está mal, pero quien no esté tan interesado en la obra de Sartre en sí seguramente haga mejor tomando un libro de Husserl o pasando directamente a L'être et le néant.
June 4, 2017
Reflexões filosóficas sobre a imagem. Perceber, conceber, imaginar... Deslizar rumo ao irreal, porque o ato de imaginar é um ato de liberdade.
July 7, 2020
Não recomendo... Muito elitizado e pouco prático. Pouco democrático. O tema explorado é ótimo mas a maneira que foi expressado... Nossa aliviado de terminar esse livro.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 21, 2020
I believe this is his first book, and it is amazing how many examples he takes from this and places into Being and Nothingness.
July 8, 2023
Infumable - non é para min.
July 22, 2024
Desisti.
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September 26, 2024Muito bom. Sartre nos leva por essa estruturação do que é uma imagem, bem somo suas possibilidades dentro da filosofia existencialista.
October 18, 2025
L’Imagination, not to be confused with L’Imaginaire, is Sartre’s first of two works exploring the topic of the imagination. In this first book the reader is taken along a walkthrough of the State of the Art at the time regarding the imagination, mental images, perception, and thought. We go through Classical and Romantic philosophers, and finally, contemporaries to Sartre: Bergson, Taine, Spaier, et al.
It is not until the second book on this topic that we get Sartre’s own philosophy of the (mental) image. Finding in Husserl important clues, the book ends with Sartre being set on forming a complete phenomenological theory of the image. For now, what is the problem being explored? I can see an object, if I look away or close my eyes, I can evoke that very same object “in my mind”. Yet, it is impossible for me to mistake this appeared object for the real one. What is going on here?
This object is inert. It can be constituted but it cannot be produced. It is a being in itself; it escapes the scope of my consciousness. Now, within my imagination it can still be “seen” with its exact same properties (color, form, position). It is “the same thing”. What appears to me is an identity of its essence without the identity of its existence. I do not truly see it, it is not imposed on my perception. It is not external nor inert, and most importantly, it is not confused as being present. I know it is a mental image.
It is easy to understand this distinction, intuitively. However, it is quite difficult to form thoughts and true propositions about the nature of these mental images. What is this existence as an image? It seems like throughout time everyone has arrived at either image and perception being different in nature or the image being a sort of reborn perception. Where does Sartre fall?
Parting from a Husserlian ontological law of consciousness—objects exist either as things out there or as things being conscious of—Sartre believes the image to be also an image of something. There is an intentional relationship to a certain something, but it is not psychic content, it is consciousness of something as an image.
If you are on a road to Being and Nothingness (like me), here you will find a sample of some of the core ideas of his existentialism that will be polished later. A centaur is posited. What in the case of fictions? What is the something that consciousness is pointing to as an image? Well, as they are objects of consciousness, they are outside of it, pointing towards a Nothingness (néant). The image becomes a way in which intentionality animates Hyletic content (the quasi-qualities of the things out there that posses the real qualities, before any raw subjective impression).
I feel like this has to be read with L'Imaginaire right afterwards, because after all of that, it feels like it just ends with Sartre being like "Like, subscribe and stay tuned for part 2 where we'll get to the bottom of this!"
It is not until the second book on this topic that we get Sartre’s own philosophy of the (mental) image. Finding in Husserl important clues, the book ends with Sartre being set on forming a complete phenomenological theory of the image. For now, what is the problem being explored? I can see an object, if I look away or close my eyes, I can evoke that very same object “in my mind”. Yet, it is impossible for me to mistake this appeared object for the real one. What is going on here?
This object is inert. It can be constituted but it cannot be produced. It is a being in itself; it escapes the scope of my consciousness. Now, within my imagination it can still be “seen” with its exact same properties (color, form, position). It is “the same thing”. What appears to me is an identity of its essence without the identity of its existence. I do not truly see it, it is not imposed on my perception. It is not external nor inert, and most importantly, it is not confused as being present. I know it is a mental image.
It is easy to understand this distinction, intuitively. However, it is quite difficult to form thoughts and true propositions about the nature of these mental images. What is this existence as an image? It seems like throughout time everyone has arrived at either image and perception being different in nature or the image being a sort of reborn perception. Where does Sartre fall?
Parting from a Husserlian ontological law of consciousness—objects exist either as things out there or as things being conscious of—Sartre believes the image to be also an image of something. There is an intentional relationship to a certain something, but it is not psychic content, it is consciousness of something as an image.
If you are on a road to Being and Nothingness (like me), here you will find a sample of some of the core ideas of his existentialism that will be polished later. A centaur is posited. What in the case of fictions? What is the something that consciousness is pointing to as an image? Well, as they are objects of consciousness, they are outside of it, pointing towards a Nothingness (néant). The image becomes a way in which intentionality animates Hyletic content (the quasi-qualities of the things out there that posses the real qualities, before any raw subjective impression).
I feel like this has to be read with L'Imaginaire right afterwards, because after all of that, it feels like it just ends with Sartre being like "Like, subscribe and stay tuned for part 2 where we'll get to the bottom of this!"
November 12, 2012
Una discusión acerca del valor ontológico de la imagen, de su relación con la percepción, el pensamiento, con la conciencia y con el objeto, así como el de su implicación en la teoría de la realidad a través de la filosofía moderna, previa a Husserl: Deescartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Taine, Binet.
A través de ella, Sartre critica y rechaza los planteamientos filosóficos que confunden la entidad metafísica de la imagen y que llevan al asociacionismo como a una síntesis que no logra separar la imagen de la cociencia, y ve en la fenomología de la imagen de Husserl y en la consideración de la imagen como algo separado del objeto y de la conciencia una posibilidad para encauzar el estudio de la imagen y permitir, entre otras cosas, el estudio de la relación entre la "imagen mental" y las imágenes materiales (cuadros, fotografías, etc.)
Este artículo largo y temprano en la carrera de Sartre irá seguido por su reflexión acerca de Lo imaginario y los datos acerca de la conciencia y percepción del otro de El ser y la nada.
A través de ella, Sartre critica y rechaza los planteamientos filosóficos que confunden la entidad metafísica de la imagen y que llevan al asociacionismo como a una síntesis que no logra separar la imagen de la cociencia, y ve en la fenomología de la imagen de Husserl y en la consideración de la imagen como algo separado del objeto y de la conciencia una posibilidad para encauzar el estudio de la imagen y permitir, entre otras cosas, el estudio de la relación entre la "imagen mental" y las imágenes materiales (cuadros, fotografías, etc.)
Este artículo largo y temprano en la carrera de Sartre irá seguido por su reflexión acerca de Lo imaginario y los datos acerca de la conciencia y percepción del otro de El ser y la nada.
June 3, 2016
Sartre explica a teoria da imaginação e mostra como a observação e a ideia a projetam. Gostei do inicio, não fui muito afundo pois não tenho saco ou sofisticação teórica para prosseguir mas para quem tem interesse em saber sobre a imaginação e ir afundo em análise de imagem é diversão garantida.
O livro começa assim:
"Olho esta folha em branco colocada sobre minha mesa; percebo sua forma, sua cor, sua posição. Essas diferentes qualidades têm características comuns: em primeiro lugar, elas se oferecem ao meu olhar como existências que posso apenas constatar e cujo ser não depende de modo algum do meu capricho. Elas são para mim, não são eu. (…) De nada serve discutir se essa folha se reduz a um conjunto de representações ou se ela é e deve ser algo mais. O certo é que o branco que constato não é minha espontaneidade que pode produzi-lo. Essa forma inerte, que está aquém de todas as espontaneidades conscientes, que deve ser observada, aprendida aos poucos, é o que chamamos uma coisa..."
O livro começa assim:
"Olho esta folha em branco colocada sobre minha mesa; percebo sua forma, sua cor, sua posição. Essas diferentes qualidades têm características comuns: em primeiro lugar, elas se oferecem ao meu olhar como existências que posso apenas constatar e cujo ser não depende de modo algum do meu capricho. Elas são para mim, não são eu. (…) De nada serve discutir se essa folha se reduz a um conjunto de representações ou se ela é e deve ser algo mais. O certo é que o branco que constato não é minha espontaneidade que pode produzi-lo. Essa forma inerte, que está aquém de todas as espontaneidades conscientes, que deve ser observada, aprendida aos poucos, é o que chamamos uma coisa..."
November 12, 2012
Uma ótima discussão filosófica sobre imagem. Certamente um livro obrigatório para aqueles que usam a imagem como instrumento de trabalho.
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