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The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War
The Law of Armed International Humanitarian Law introduces law students and undergraduates to the law of war in an age of terrorism. What law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law applies to particular armed conflicts? Does that law apply to terrorists as well? What is the status of participants in an armed conflict? What constitutes a war crime? What is a lawful target and how are targeting decisions made? What are rules of engagement? What weapons are lawful and unlawful, and why? This text takes the reader through these essential questions of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law to an awareness of finer points of battlefield law. The U.S.-weighted text incorporates lessons from many nations and includes hundreds of cases from jurisdictions worldwide.
- GenresLawNonfictionWar
692 pages, Hardcover
First published March 30, 2006
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August 6, 2022
In his comprehensive book, Gary D. Solis covers everything an interested lay reader might want to know about the laws of armed conflict.
As a longtime Bulgarian Red Cross Youth volunteer, I have harbored a healthy doze of interest in international humanitarian law for some time. My enthusiasm to educate myself on this topic was significantly tampered after I attended a lecture on international humanitarian law conducted by partners of the Bulgarian Red Cross. All I remember is that this was one of the most boring hours of my life, as the lecturer droned on in a monotone voice. To my delight, Solis's work turned out to be nothing like that sleeping pill of a lecture that I had to sit through. He introduces and develops the topic in an engaging, informative manner.
As the author notes, no person concerned with rational decision-making and aware of the threat posed to our continued existence by modern weapons of mass destruction combined can doubt the desirability of eliminating armed conflict as an instrument of national policy. However, as long as states engage in armed conflicts, international laws must be followed to allow the efficient use of military force while trying to preserve humanitarian values and making these two irreconcilable goals as mutually consistent as possible. This difficult task requires profound insight into the operations of the international juridical process, a basic understanding of the technological aspects of contemporary armed conflict, and a firm commitment to humanitarian values.
As Solis narrates, the need to provide protection for non-combatants in armed conflict situations has resulted in many historical attempts to legally limit governmental coercion and violence, which the combatants frequently engage in by destroying without the military necessity to destroy. Civilians who need protection in international conflict include those who are living under belligerent occupation and those who are living in territory that, while not under the control of the enemy, is subject to enemy attack. Civilians who need protection in a widespread internal conflict or a civil war comprise a third distinct category.
During the Second World War, the author narrates, even the limited provisions of Hague Convention IV and its Annexed Regulations, were violated by the practices of both the Nazis and the Japanese militarists. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 met in the shadow of those grim events and aimed at preventing the repetition of the horror that characterized that war. The resulting four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims are the current effective agreements with essentially the same countries as the United Nations Charter.
Article 2, which is a common article in all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, indicates that the Convention must not only be applied in declared wars, but in any other armed conflict" as well. Furthermore, the Civilians Convention provides: the Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation . . . even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. As Solis explains, this sentence is important because it lifts the previous requirement that there has to be a militarily effective occupation for the legal protections for civilians to apply. There is no longer a distinction between the invasion phase and the occupation regime. The authoritative I.C.R.C. Commentary on the Civilians Convention states: even a patrol which penetrates into enemy territory without any intention of staying there must respect the Convention in its dealings with the civilians it meets.
As a testament to the brutalities of the Second World War, the international law of armed conflict also states that each of the parties "is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies . . . to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation." Reprisals against protected individuals and their property are likewise prohibited. The permissible extent of and the limitations upon the use of reprisals against civilians was a major issue in the Nuremberg and other war crimes trials.
What armed conflicts in the post-WWII period have shown, though, is that it is almost naive of us to believe that such prohibitions have any effect on the conduct of wars. As Solis observes in the many instances that he presents, from Korea to Vietnam and beyond, the practice of not following the international humanitarian law continues. To his credit, Solis emphasizes the importance of considering the success of the enforcement of the humanitarian law of armed conflict. Since this law has been created and agreed to by states, it seems reasonable to expect states to comply with it, but such compliance, the author acknowledges, is not the invariable rule. However, unlike me, he entertains the hope that this can be improved in the future.
Regardless of our diverging views, I found Solis's work extraordinarily informative. One of my favorite stories from it is that of the Breisach Trial. When someone speaks of war crime trials, Nuremberg is usually the first thing that comes to mind, but the first international war crimes tribunal actually happened almost five centuries earlier. It was the 1474 trial of Peter von Hagenbach, the Governor of the fortified Austrain town of Breisach.
At the time, Duke Charles of Burgundy had risen to international power through fierce armed conflicts with other territorial sovereigns. Although his friends called him Charles the Bold, his enemies had nicknamed him Charles the Terrible, and his massacre of the inhabitants of Nesle surely entitles him to the latter title. When, in 1469, financial struggles forced the Archduke of Austria to give his possessions on the Upper Rhine, including Breisach, to Charles, Charles appointed Peter von Hagenbach as governor. In forcing the citizens of Breisach to submit to Charles’s rule, Governor von Hagenbach said he merely carried out his master’s directions, but he committed unspeakable atrocities that had little to do with Burgundian policy. His regime was one of terror, extending to murder, rape, illegal taxation, and the confiscation of private property. The victims of his depredations included the inhabitants of neighboring territories, as well as Swiss merchants on their way to and from the Frankfurt fair. His outrages, remarkable even by the standards of the fifteenth century, contributed to forging "what had previously been considered impossible": alliances against Burgundy by her Holy Roman Empire neighbors, Austria, Berne, France, and the towns and knights of the Upper Rhine. The allies authorized the Archduke of Austria to repay his debt to Charles, but Charles refused under unconvincing pretexts, which led to the Breisach citizens' revolting. The revolt allowed the allies to capture Hagenbach and put him on trial. Hagenbach attempted to cite obedience to orders as justification for his conduct, but it did not work. He was found guilty, stripped of his knighthood, and executed.
According to the author, this was the first known interposition of the defense of obedience to orders. From Hagenbach to Liutenant Calley, this is a defense that is mostly unsuccessful and still remains the most frequently used.
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT is a treasure trove of knowledge on the international law of armed conflict. Solis has written a work that is graspable, engaging, and informative. This book is not to be missed by students of the humanitarian law. I highly recommend it.
As a longtime Bulgarian Red Cross Youth volunteer, I have harbored a healthy doze of interest in international humanitarian law for some time. My enthusiasm to educate myself on this topic was significantly tampered after I attended a lecture on international humanitarian law conducted by partners of the Bulgarian Red Cross. All I remember is that this was one of the most boring hours of my life, as the lecturer droned on in a monotone voice. To my delight, Solis's work turned out to be nothing like that sleeping pill of a lecture that I had to sit through. He introduces and develops the topic in an engaging, informative manner.
As the author notes, no person concerned with rational decision-making and aware of the threat posed to our continued existence by modern weapons of mass destruction combined can doubt the desirability of eliminating armed conflict as an instrument of national policy. However, as long as states engage in armed conflicts, international laws must be followed to allow the efficient use of military force while trying to preserve humanitarian values and making these two irreconcilable goals as mutually consistent as possible. This difficult task requires profound insight into the operations of the international juridical process, a basic understanding of the technological aspects of contemporary armed conflict, and a firm commitment to humanitarian values.
As Solis narrates, the need to provide protection for non-combatants in armed conflict situations has resulted in many historical attempts to legally limit governmental coercion and violence, which the combatants frequently engage in by destroying without the military necessity to destroy. Civilians who need protection in international conflict include those who are living under belligerent occupation and those who are living in territory that, while not under the control of the enemy, is subject to enemy attack. Civilians who need protection in a widespread internal conflict or a civil war comprise a third distinct category.
During the Second World War, the author narrates, even the limited provisions of Hague Convention IV and its Annexed Regulations, were violated by the practices of both the Nazis and the Japanese militarists. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 met in the shadow of those grim events and aimed at preventing the repetition of the horror that characterized that war. The resulting four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims are the current effective agreements with essentially the same countries as the United Nations Charter.
Article 2, which is a common article in all four of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, indicates that the Convention must not only be applied in declared wars, but in any other armed conflict" as well. Furthermore, the Civilians Convention provides: the Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation . . . even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. As Solis explains, this sentence is important because it lifts the previous requirement that there has to be a militarily effective occupation for the legal protections for civilians to apply. There is no longer a distinction between the invasion phase and the occupation regime. The authoritative I.C.R.C. Commentary on the Civilians Convention states: even a patrol which penetrates into enemy territory without any intention of staying there must respect the Convention in its dealings with the civilians it meets.
As a testament to the brutalities of the Second World War, the international law of armed conflict also states that each of the parties "is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies . . . to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation." Reprisals against protected individuals and their property are likewise prohibited. The permissible extent of and the limitations upon the use of reprisals against civilians was a major issue in the Nuremberg and other war crimes trials.
What armed conflicts in the post-WWII period have shown, though, is that it is almost naive of us to believe that such prohibitions have any effect on the conduct of wars. As Solis observes in the many instances that he presents, from Korea to Vietnam and beyond, the practice of not following the international humanitarian law continues. To his credit, Solis emphasizes the importance of considering the success of the enforcement of the humanitarian law of armed conflict. Since this law has been created and agreed to by states, it seems reasonable to expect states to comply with it, but such compliance, the author acknowledges, is not the invariable rule. However, unlike me, he entertains the hope that this can be improved in the future.
Regardless of our diverging views, I found Solis's work extraordinarily informative. One of my favorite stories from it is that of the Breisach Trial. When someone speaks of war crime trials, Nuremberg is usually the first thing that comes to mind, but the first international war crimes tribunal actually happened almost five centuries earlier. It was the 1474 trial of Peter von Hagenbach, the Governor of the fortified Austrain town of Breisach.
At the time, Duke Charles of Burgundy had risen to international power through fierce armed conflicts with other territorial sovereigns. Although his friends called him Charles the Bold, his enemies had nicknamed him Charles the Terrible, and his massacre of the inhabitants of Nesle surely entitles him to the latter title. When, in 1469, financial struggles forced the Archduke of Austria to give his possessions on the Upper Rhine, including Breisach, to Charles, Charles appointed Peter von Hagenbach as governor. In forcing the citizens of Breisach to submit to Charles’s rule, Governor von Hagenbach said he merely carried out his master’s directions, but he committed unspeakable atrocities that had little to do with Burgundian policy. His regime was one of terror, extending to murder, rape, illegal taxation, and the confiscation of private property. The victims of his depredations included the inhabitants of neighboring territories, as well as Swiss merchants on their way to and from the Frankfurt fair. His outrages, remarkable even by the standards of the fifteenth century, contributed to forging "what had previously been considered impossible": alliances against Burgundy by her Holy Roman Empire neighbors, Austria, Berne, France, and the towns and knights of the Upper Rhine. The allies authorized the Archduke of Austria to repay his debt to Charles, but Charles refused under unconvincing pretexts, which led to the Breisach citizens' revolting. The revolt allowed the allies to capture Hagenbach and put him on trial. Hagenbach attempted to cite obedience to orders as justification for his conduct, but it did not work. He was found guilty, stripped of his knighthood, and executed.
According to the author, this was the first known interposition of the defense of obedience to orders. From Hagenbach to Liutenant Calley, this is a defense that is mostly unsuccessful and still remains the most frequently used.
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT is a treasure trove of knowledge on the international law of armed conflict. Solis has written a work that is graspable, engaging, and informative. This book is not to be missed by students of the humanitarian law. I highly recommend it.
February 26, 2012
It took me good eight months to read this book from cover to cover, but it was absolutely worth the time and effort. I say effort because this is a text that requires some focus, or even active reading. Don't let that discourage you, though.
The author presents complex matters in a very accessible way, comprehensible to people that don't have a military or legal background (such as myself). The prose is well organized, clear, and enriched with interesting real-life examples of battlefield dilemmas--both past and present, and those that may yet arise as conflicts and warfare continue to change in the 21st century. The cases and materials with the author's commentary that are supplied at the end of each chapter help demonstrate to the reader how the law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law is applied in practice.
Each chapter covers a particular topic/area of LOAC/IHL, and they are arranged in a logical order so I would recommend not to jump between chapters. However, most chapters can be read separately. Of all the important and intersting principles and issues in LOAC/IHL, I found the chapter on torture the most compelling. Without being preachy, it is such a coherent and unambiguous analysis of the torture "debate", and of the associated legal framework, that it leaves no doubt about the inherent evil and irrationality of the practice of torture.
In sum, The Law of Armed Conflict is surely useful as a textbook for law students and military personnel, but it is also a great book for anyone who is genuinely interested in military matters, armed conflicts, and/or international law.
The author presents complex matters in a very accessible way, comprehensible to people that don't have a military or legal background (such as myself). The prose is well organized, clear, and enriched with interesting real-life examples of battlefield dilemmas--both past and present, and those that may yet arise as conflicts and warfare continue to change in the 21st century. The cases and materials with the author's commentary that are supplied at the end of each chapter help demonstrate to the reader how the law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law is applied in practice.
Each chapter covers a particular topic/area of LOAC/IHL, and they are arranged in a logical order so I would recommend not to jump between chapters. However, most chapters can be read separately. Of all the important and intersting principles and issues in LOAC/IHL, I found the chapter on torture the most compelling. Without being preachy, it is such a coherent and unambiguous analysis of the torture "debate", and of the associated legal framework, that it leaves no doubt about the inherent evil and irrationality of the practice of torture.
In sum, The Law of Armed Conflict is surely useful as a textbook for law students and military personnel, but it is also a great book for anyone who is genuinely interested in military matters, armed conflicts, and/or international law.
May 25, 2013
The first text book that I actually enjoyed reading!
It gives interesting examples of the application of the law of armed conflict in practice. So you can (more or less) get the understanding what actually happens in the field and how the parties involved try to mould the law to secure their own interests.
Although Solis is clearly very-US-biased, I think this book is worth reading.
It gives interesting examples of the application of the law of armed conflict in practice. So you can (more or less) get the understanding what actually happens in the field and how the parties involved try to mould the law to secure their own interests.
Although Solis is clearly very-US-biased, I think this book is worth reading.
December 27, 2013
This was the text for my 'Law of War' class. It is a rather exhaustive textbook on LOAC/LoW/IHL. Some of the sections are better than others. This type of information is especially important as we continue in the time of 'terror' and begin the 'drone' age. Overall, a good place to start with LOAC.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews