In 1972 a North Vietnamese offensive of more than 30,000 men and one hundred tanks smashed into South Vietnam and raced to capture Saigon. All that stood in their way was a small band of 6,800 South Vietnamese (ARVN) soldiers and militiamen, and a handful of American advisors with U.S. air support, guarding An Loc, a town sixty miles north of Saigon and on the main highway to it. This depleted army, outnumbered and outgunned, stood its ground and fought to the end and succeeded. Against all expectations, the ARVN beat back furious assaults from three North Vietnamese divisions, supported by artillery and armored regiments, during three months of savage fighting.
This book has a rather misleading title. While Lam Quang Thi does chronicle the battle for An Loc, he provides little information about the Easter Offensive of 1972 in general, leaving the reader without helpful context.
For the title of his work, the author drew inspiration from the name Bernard Fall gave the battle of Dien Bien Phu – "Hell in a Very Small Place". Much like the French eighteen years earlier, the Americans' war effort in Vietnam reached its culmination in a small patch of ground surrounded by enemy artillery and harassed by infantry attacks. The significance of An Loc, a town of fewer than 15,000 people located in the middle of an underpopulated province, was greatly exaggerated by the government and the media. Its mainly symbolic importance it owed to the fact that it was only fifty miles northwest of Saigon and that its capture would greatly harm the prestige of the ARVN. Aside from that, the Communists' motives for attacking it were not clear because even if they had managed to take the town, American B-52s would have made them relinquish it soon after. As one Air Force officer observed, "They'd have to sleep under a B-52 blanket, and that can be scratchy." It did not come to that, though. Unlike the French, who suffered a decisive loss at Dien Bien Phu, the ARVN units, with the help of American air support, fought fiercely and managed to turn back the Communists' attack in III corps and win the battle.
The author structures his narrative chronologically, going over the most important hours and moments of the battle, which lasted an impressive sixty-six days. His account is by no means in-depth – it did not make me much wiser about the tactical aspects. I learned that the 5th ARVN division was vital for the eventual victory, but not that the division's senior adviser, Colonel William Miller, stayed in the city with his fellow advisers as the Communists threw themselves against the defenses, offering his colleagues sound advice on troop placement and making sure that the air strikes were on time and on target. Without him, the first month would have been way rougher for the ARVN defenders.
One of the author's goals in writing this work seems to have been to underscore that the ARVN soldiers were brave and determined, and that their efforts contributed more to the battle for An Loc than the Americans gave them credit for. This is correct, of course. The ARVN soldiers, contrary to the beliefs of the American soldiers, who regarded them with contempt, were not lazy and useless. They defended the town with all they were worth, and their good performance during the largest siege of the war should not be denied.
However, it was still American air support that turned the tide in favor of the South Vietnamese army. Together with the American advisers' expertise, it made the difference between winning and losing. Liuetenant General Nguyen Van Minh of the ARVN was way out of his league as a corps commander. He was an effective political administrator, not a fighter, so when he had to take on the responsibility for handling both the situation in An Loc and the political games in Saigon, he became too overwhelmed to make good decisions and would have probably led the battle to a disastrous end for the ARVN if not for the American advisers. For instance, in the battle of Loc Ninh, which preceded An Loc and emboldened the Communists to attack the provincial capital, Minh ordered a B-52 strike within two miles of Loc Ninh without first checking the tactical situation. Although B-52s were usually a useful weapon, they could not bomb close enough to friendly positions to affect the course of a close-range battle, so only one helicopter made it to Loc Ninh, and the enemy tanks thundered in unopposed. A town that Miller had called "reasonably defendable" was lost.
Another thing that surprised me is that in the chapter Assessing the Battle of An Loc, the author argues that casualties cannot be used to measure the success or failure of a siege. Knowing how obsessed the MACV was with kill ratios and body counts, I understand why Lam Quang Thi might have been wary of casualty statistics. However, the number of dead soldiers, both fellow and enemy ones, does matter in every battle. If the siege has been lifted at the cost of all his men, can the commander say that he won? I do not think so. To make his argument stronger, the author should have written that casualties are not the only metric that matters when measuring progress and victory, instead of dismissing them altogether. It is true, as he points out, that which side accomplished its objective determines who won, but one cannot disregard the cost at which that objective was achieved and how much damage was inflicted on the enemy. A victory with ten percent casualties is not the same as a victory with fifty percent casualties.
HELL IN AN LOC could have been an interesting and valuable account of a notable battle from the perspective of the ARVN. However, it falls short of its potential. This book will be of interest to those readers who want to know the South Vietnamese perspective, but not to those who want to learn about the battle.
I might be a little bias since my father wrote this book but for vietnam war officionados it's a valuable contribution, least of which for the fact that it's written by a south vietnamese general who knew the inside out of the on goings of the war. and it's a decisive battle that kept south vietnam safe for 2 extra years, even when americans have withdrawn, by and large.
A book that is long overdue. Finally one from the South Vietnamese perspective. Would have liked to have seen more pictures, better pictures, and better maps. I had a difficult time managing the flow of the situation with the maps provided. The author provides some interesting insights into both the tactical and the operational art of war as well as some great individual war stories. Seeing how the ARVN fought so tenaciously during the Easter Offensive in 1972 for An Loc it seems hard to believe the country could have fallen three years later. But that is explained too. Some real heros and warriors living now among us in the USA and we are completely oblivious of their accomplishments because they are Vietnamese and not American. But perhaps it's better to be forgotten than to be disrespected like so many of our American veterans were. If you are going to read about Vietnam you need to read this book to round out your perspective. Many of the heroes of An Loc endured over a decade of "re-education" in the new Vietnam before being released in the late 1980's.
The Battle of An Loc is a symbol of South Vietnamese determination. The author, a South Vietnamese general, provides a lot of details about this battle on strategies and troops. Other events of the Vietnam War are also described. If you're researching on the Vietnam War, I would recommend reading this because it provides a South Vietnamese perspective, which is uncommon. But also, reading this book can help make your perspective on the War more well-rounded.