Proclus: On the Existence of Evils

Trois études sur la Providence #3

by Proclus, Carlos Steel (Translator), Jan Opsomer (Translator)

Proclus' On the Existence of Evils is not a commentary, but helps to compensate for the dearth of Neoplatonist ethical commentaries. The central question addressed in the work how can there be evil in a providential world? Neoplatonists agree that it cannot be caused by higher and worthier beings. Plotinus had said that evil is matter, which, unlike Aristotle, he collapsed into mere privation or lack, thus reducing its reality. He also protected higher causes from responsibility by saying that evil may result from a combination of goods. Proclus evil is real, and not a privation. Rather, it is a parasite feeding off good. Parasites have no proper cause, and higher beings are thus vindicated as being the causes only of the good off which evil feeds.

Genres: Philosophy

170 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2003

About the author

Proclus Lycaeus (/ˈprɒkləs ˌlaɪˈsiːəs/; 8 February 412 – 17 April 485 AD), called the Successor (Greek Πρόκλος ὁ Διάδοχος, Próklos ho Diádokhos), was a Greek Neoplatonist philosopher, one of the last major Classical philosophers (see Damascius). He set forth one of the most elaborate and fully developed systems of Neoplatonism. He stands near the end of the classical development of philosophy, and was very influential on Western medieval philosophy (Greek and Latin).

Reviews

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found this slim volume languishing in some dusty corner of a local used book store. Having written my bachelor's thesis on the problem of evil many moons ago, I foolishly thought maybe reading some Proclus would rekindle my love of philosophy. In this treatise Proclus makes many maneuvers that we would today recognize as belonging to the time-honored tradition of the privation theory of evil. For instance, he denies that evil can subsist independently of the good that serves as its substrate (i.e. parupostasis or parasitic existence). This denial is so thoroughgoing that causation, efficient or otherwise, do not even apply to evil phenomena (their origin is "uncaused, unintended in a way and indefinite ). Nor can we, according to Proclus, speak of evil as existing in nature as a whole over and above particular (and particularized) natures. Lastly, the later analytic distinction between "natural evil" and "moral evil" is formulated in terms of a "deficiency" in the intellect, in soul and in nature or body. Proclus somehow makes himself sound even more dogmatically optimistic than later monotheistic philosophers who operated within the ambit of the privation theory of evil. For him, no particular soul can ever knowingly will evil (or willingly know evil, formlessness cannot be known). In many ways, Proclus is led to theorize evil as an inevitable by-product of the procession of the Good. But for me, what stands out in this treatise more than anything else is Proclus' energetic defense of matter. In his words, matter is neither good nor evil but necessary. Even more daringly, he floats the proposition that "evil existed in the soul prior to its descent into matter" [33]. This line alone would have no doubt inspired the likes of Schelling, who in his Freedom Essay, famously argued for a kind of "moral pre-destination" that occurs to individual souls in the bosom of godhood.