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The Works Of Jacobus Arminius #3
The Works of James Arminius, Volume 3
This volume is subtitled A Friendly Discussion Between James Arminius & Francis Junius, Concerning Predestination, Conducted By Means Of Letters, the origin of which was a discussion on the subject of Predestination, where Junius endeavoured to defend the opinion of Calvin, by rendering it a little more palatable. The letter of Arminius was divided by Junius into twenty-seven propositions in answering it, and each of them is here presented, with the answer of Junius, and the reply of Arminius, corresponding to it. "God, who is good, does not hate that which is good. All things, at their creation, were good, therefore at their creation, God did not hate any one of all created things: He hates that which is alien from Himself, but not that which is His own: He is angry with our fall and sin, not with His own creation. "-- Francis Junius, Answer of Junius to the Sixth Proposition. Jacobus Arminius (aka Jacob Arminius, James Arminius, and his Dutch name Jacob Harmenszoon), was a Dutch theologian, best known as the founder of the anti-Calvinistic school in Reformed Protestant theology, thereby lending his name to a movement which resisted some of the tenets of Calvinism-known popularly as Arminianism. Lamp Post is proud to present some of the finest Christian literary works of all time-writings that have affected the Church, touched the hearts of its leaders, and helped shape Christianity for two thousand years; timeless books that have endured and are deserving to be included among the Christian Classics.
- GenresTheology
392 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 2006
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About the author
Jacobus Arminius
54 books6 followersDutch theologian Jacobus Arminius, originally Jakob Harmenszoon founded Arminianism.
In the theology, followers of Jacobus Arminius rejected the Calvinist doctrines of predestination and election and believed in compatible human free will with sovereignty of God.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobus...
In the theology, followers of Jacobus Arminius rejected the Calvinist doctrines of predestination and election and believed in compatible human free will with sovereignty of God.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacobus...
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June 28, 2024
THE THIRD AND FINAL VOLUME OF THE WRITINGS OF THE FAMED DEFENDER OF "FREE WILL"
James [Jacobus] Arminius (1560-1609; actually was named "Jakob Harmenszoon") was a Christian theologian who became famous for his opposition to Calvinism. (Interestingly, most of his works were published posthumously.) The other volumes in the series are The Works Of James Arminius V1 and The Works of James Arminius V2). [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 3-volume hardcover set, of which Volume 3 has 658 pages.]
In the “Friendly Conference with Dr. F. Junius,” he states, “The opinion according to which God is made to be necessarily the author of sin, ought to be repudiated by all Christians, nay, and by all men: for no mortal thinks Him to be bad whom He esteems as God: But according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza God is made to be necessarily the author of sin: Therefore it is to be repudiated.” (Pg. 74)
He observes, “the question is not this: Whether God occupied Himself about this decree of His respecting men without consideration of sin as a cause---the cause, I mean, why He should elect these, pass by those… But this is the question; Whether be the condition required in the object about which God will be occupied in electing and passing by, or not. As is apparent from the arguments adduced by me; which do not prove that sin in the cause of that decree, but that it is the condition required in the object.” (Pg. 92)
In his “Modest Examination of Dr. Perkins’s Pamphlet,” he notes, “Of what you say respecting the ultimate end of predestination I approve, when rightly understood; that is, if the declaration of the glory of God by mercy and justice be attributed to predestination, as it is the preordination to life eternal of those sinners who shall believe in Christ, and, on the other hand, the precondemnation to eternal death of those sinners who shall persevere in their sins. Of those who shall believe, I say, from the gracious gift of God; and of those who shall persevere in their sins, from their own wickedness and the just desertion of God. But if you thus understand it---that god from eternity, without any pre-existence of sin in His own prescience, determined to display His glory by mercy and by punitive justice, and, in order to carry that purpose into effect, decreed to create man good, but mutable; ordained also that he should fall, that in this way there might be room for that decree---I say that this opinion cannot, in my judgment at least, be established by any word of God.” (Pg. 276)
He points out, “Christ prayed also for the non-elect. For He prayed for those who crucified Him, for His enemies, among whom there were also non-elect. For ‘the princes of the world’ crucified Him, but to most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, was not revealed. Secondly, the prayer of Christ, which is set forth in John 17, was instituted peculiarly for believers and those who should believe, and, indeed, to obtain and apply to them the benefits merited for them by the sacrifice of His death. He asks for them that they may be one with the Father and the Son, as the Father and the Son are one; which He could not ask unless the reconciliation had actually been accomplished, or was considered by God as accomplished.” (Pg. 326)
He argues, “Neither is this universally true, that ‘whatever is just, is so because God wills it,’ since there are many things which God wills because they are just. It is just that God alone be acknowledged by the creature as the true God. God will this because it is just; and it is not just because God wills it. An act of simple obedience is just, not because God wills it to be offered to Him by the creature, but because it is such in itself, and God cannot but require it from the creature; though it may belong to His free will to prescribe in what respect He will have obedience to be offered Him by man.” (Pg. 357)
In his “Analysis of the Ninth Chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans,” he says, “To begin with the scope: that is the same as of the whole Epistle: That the Gospel, not the law, is the power of God to salvation, not to him that worketh, but to him that believeth; because in the Gospel is made manifest the righteousness of God, by which salvation is obtained through faith exercised on Christ. This chapter, however, does its part in confirmation of that proposition, and in a peculiar way. For it defends that against the objections of the Jews…” (Pg. 485-486)
He suggests, “Hence it appears what is the true sense of those things which are here advanced by the Apostle; namely, that God has the power of making men out of shapeless matter, and of enacting a decree about them, by the mere judgment and pleasure of His will, ratified by certain conditions, according to which He makes some men vessels to dishonor, other vessels to honor; and that therefore man has no jut ground of expostulation with God because He has made him to be hardened by His irresistible will; since obstinacy in sins intervenes between the determination and His will and the hardening itself; on account of which God wills, according to the same pleasure of His will, to harden man by his irresistible will. If any one simply say that God has the power of making man a vessel to dishonor and wrath, he will do the greatest injustice to God, and will contradict clear Scripture. Wherefore Beza himself does not dare to say that SIMPLY, but that those things are to be understood of the decree, which He does not execute till after man, having become a sinner, has made himself deserving of wrath.” (Pg. 514)
He explains, “We shall… propound the answer more briefly, if we fit it to the several parts of the objective syllogism. The syllogism was like this: ‘He who hardens by His irresistible will, can [not] rightfully be angry with the hardened: but God hardens by his irresistible will: Therefore He cannot rightfully be angry with the hardened.’ The Apostle replies to the proposition by negation: as well because it is simply false—for those whom God hardens have deserved that hardening, and God is free to inflict it on those who have deserved it, in whatever mode He may think best---as because the hardening is falsely alleged as the cause of God’s wrath, when they are already ready vessel of wrath before they are hardened, and the wrath is the cause of the hardening. Let then the proposition be corrected in this way: ‘He who by His irresistible will hardens those who, because they are vessels of wrath, have deserved that hardening---He can moreover be rightfully angry with those who are hardened.’ … And thus I think I have shown that this passage of the Apostle does not serve to confirm that opinion which many suppose to rest on the foundation of this Chapter.” (Pg. 518-519)
In his “Examination of the Theses of Dr. F. Gomasus Respecting Predestination,” he asserts, “God wisely ordains all His actions, wisely carries them through: He decreed to make rational creatures, and made them most wisely, to the glory of His wisdom, goodness of power; which end He attained by creation itself. For by that very action which grace decrees as of a certain end, it attains that end itself: otherwise the action would be in vain, and appointed in vain. If any one say that salvation and damnation are the ends wherefore rational creatures were made, I shall deny it, and shall with good reason require proof, since God’s end cannot exist outside of Himself.” (Pg. 540-541)
He argues, “Prescience (or foreknowledge) is not rightly distributed into definite and indefinite: for the particle ‘pre’ (or ‘fore’) denotes reference to an object, as it is about to follow on and to be after knowledge. But indefinite SCIENCE (or KNOWLEDGE) is of things possible, not of things future. That foreknowledge is not of things possible, is evident;; because they are as much from eternity as foreknowledge, nor does foreknowledge precede the possibility, but only the futurition of a thing. But let this be granted… let us look at the thing itself. Knowledge in God is prior to volition, and depends on His infinite essence, by which God knows all things by one immediate act. No volition, then, in God can be the cause of any knowledge of cognizance in God. God’s volition can, indeed, put before it any object which would not exist unless the will should destine it to be done, and therefore God would not know that it would be: for what is not about to be, God cannot foreknow as about to be without error. But it does not hence follow that that predestination is the cause of knowledge or prescience. For it only produces the effect, or appoints its production: but that very thing cannot NOT be foreknown by God on account of the infinity of His knowledge and essence; the volition not causing it, but only by producing the effect, which is the object of knowledge and foreknowledge.” (Pg. 572-573)
He states, “For the cause of non-inscription in the book of life is the same as that of inscription in the earth and in the book of death: the same names which are inscribed in the book of death are not inscribed in the book of life, the same and no other, neither more nor fewer: the same is the end of [non-]death: wherefore it is also called blotting out from God’s book, from the book of life and of the living. Nor is any mention made in the Scriptures of a volition of God whereby He wills non-life to man, or by which He non-wills eternal life to man, except that volition whose cause is man’s sin; object, man a sinner; end, the declaration of God’s wrath and power.” (Pg. 596)
He notes, “The passages of Scripture set forth the end of the reprobation of the impenitent and unbelieving sinners, as we have already seen. But that the illustration of [God]s] wrath and dominion is subordinate to the illustration of [His] glorious grace towards the elect, is not proved by that passage in Romans 9:23. For this is not the sense… so that the clay cannot complain; God also has the right, and indeed much more justly, at length to cut off the vessels of wrath, framed for destruction, long borne with by His patience, in order to declare his wrath and dominion; and to prepare the vessels of mercy for glory, in order to display the riches of His glory towards them. We do not, however, deny … that the glory of God’s grace towards the elect shines out more brightly from comparison with the reprobate: but we thoroughly deny that reprobation was instituted to this end.” (Pg. 632-633)
Arminius is one of the most important Christian theologians, and his works belong in every serious theological library.
James [Jacobus] Arminius (1560-1609; actually was named "Jakob Harmenszoon") was a Christian theologian who became famous for his opposition to Calvinism. (Interestingly, most of his works were published posthumously.) The other volumes in the series are The Works Of James Arminius V1 and The Works of James Arminius V2). [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 3-volume hardcover set, of which Volume 3 has 658 pages.]
In the “Friendly Conference with Dr. F. Junius,” he states, “The opinion according to which God is made to be necessarily the author of sin, ought to be repudiated by all Christians, nay, and by all men: for no mortal thinks Him to be bad whom He esteems as God: But according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza God is made to be necessarily the author of sin: Therefore it is to be repudiated.” (Pg. 74)
He observes, “the question is not this: Whether God occupied Himself about this decree of His respecting men without consideration of sin as a cause---the cause, I mean, why He should elect these, pass by those… But this is the question; Whether be the condition required in the object about which God will be occupied in electing and passing by, or not. As is apparent from the arguments adduced by me; which do not prove that sin in the cause of that decree, but that it is the condition required in the object.” (Pg. 92)
In his “Modest Examination of Dr. Perkins’s Pamphlet,” he notes, “Of what you say respecting the ultimate end of predestination I approve, when rightly understood; that is, if the declaration of the glory of God by mercy and justice be attributed to predestination, as it is the preordination to life eternal of those sinners who shall believe in Christ, and, on the other hand, the precondemnation to eternal death of those sinners who shall persevere in their sins. Of those who shall believe, I say, from the gracious gift of God; and of those who shall persevere in their sins, from their own wickedness and the just desertion of God. But if you thus understand it---that god from eternity, without any pre-existence of sin in His own prescience, determined to display His glory by mercy and by punitive justice, and, in order to carry that purpose into effect, decreed to create man good, but mutable; ordained also that he should fall, that in this way there might be room for that decree---I say that this opinion cannot, in my judgment at least, be established by any word of God.” (Pg. 276)
He points out, “Christ prayed also for the non-elect. For He prayed for those who crucified Him, for His enemies, among whom there were also non-elect. For ‘the princes of the world’ crucified Him, but to most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, was not revealed. Secondly, the prayer of Christ, which is set forth in John 17, was instituted peculiarly for believers and those who should believe, and, indeed, to obtain and apply to them the benefits merited for them by the sacrifice of His death. He asks for them that they may be one with the Father and the Son, as the Father and the Son are one; which He could not ask unless the reconciliation had actually been accomplished, or was considered by God as accomplished.” (Pg. 326)
He argues, “Neither is this universally true, that ‘whatever is just, is so because God wills it,’ since there are many things which God wills because they are just. It is just that God alone be acknowledged by the creature as the true God. God will this because it is just; and it is not just because God wills it. An act of simple obedience is just, not because God wills it to be offered to Him by the creature, but because it is such in itself, and God cannot but require it from the creature; though it may belong to His free will to prescribe in what respect He will have obedience to be offered Him by man.” (Pg. 357)
In his “Analysis of the Ninth Chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans,” he says, “To begin with the scope: that is the same as of the whole Epistle: That the Gospel, not the law, is the power of God to salvation, not to him that worketh, but to him that believeth; because in the Gospel is made manifest the righteousness of God, by which salvation is obtained through faith exercised on Christ. This chapter, however, does its part in confirmation of that proposition, and in a peculiar way. For it defends that against the objections of the Jews…” (Pg. 485-486)
He suggests, “Hence it appears what is the true sense of those things which are here advanced by the Apostle; namely, that God has the power of making men out of shapeless matter, and of enacting a decree about them, by the mere judgment and pleasure of His will, ratified by certain conditions, according to which He makes some men vessels to dishonor, other vessels to honor; and that therefore man has no jut ground of expostulation with God because He has made him to be hardened by His irresistible will; since obstinacy in sins intervenes between the determination and His will and the hardening itself; on account of which God wills, according to the same pleasure of His will, to harden man by his irresistible will. If any one simply say that God has the power of making man a vessel to dishonor and wrath, he will do the greatest injustice to God, and will contradict clear Scripture. Wherefore Beza himself does not dare to say that SIMPLY, but that those things are to be understood of the decree, which He does not execute till after man, having become a sinner, has made himself deserving of wrath.” (Pg. 514)
He explains, “We shall… propound the answer more briefly, if we fit it to the several parts of the objective syllogism. The syllogism was like this: ‘He who hardens by His irresistible will, can [not] rightfully be angry with the hardened: but God hardens by his irresistible will: Therefore He cannot rightfully be angry with the hardened.’ The Apostle replies to the proposition by negation: as well because it is simply false—for those whom God hardens have deserved that hardening, and God is free to inflict it on those who have deserved it, in whatever mode He may think best---as because the hardening is falsely alleged as the cause of God’s wrath, when they are already ready vessel of wrath before they are hardened, and the wrath is the cause of the hardening. Let then the proposition be corrected in this way: ‘He who by His irresistible will hardens those who, because they are vessels of wrath, have deserved that hardening---He can moreover be rightfully angry with those who are hardened.’ … And thus I think I have shown that this passage of the Apostle does not serve to confirm that opinion which many suppose to rest on the foundation of this Chapter.” (Pg. 518-519)
In his “Examination of the Theses of Dr. F. Gomasus Respecting Predestination,” he asserts, “God wisely ordains all His actions, wisely carries them through: He decreed to make rational creatures, and made them most wisely, to the glory of His wisdom, goodness of power; which end He attained by creation itself. For by that very action which grace decrees as of a certain end, it attains that end itself: otherwise the action would be in vain, and appointed in vain. If any one say that salvation and damnation are the ends wherefore rational creatures were made, I shall deny it, and shall with good reason require proof, since God’s end cannot exist outside of Himself.” (Pg. 540-541)
He argues, “Prescience (or foreknowledge) is not rightly distributed into definite and indefinite: for the particle ‘pre’ (or ‘fore’) denotes reference to an object, as it is about to follow on and to be after knowledge. But indefinite SCIENCE (or KNOWLEDGE) is of things possible, not of things future. That foreknowledge is not of things possible, is evident;; because they are as much from eternity as foreknowledge, nor does foreknowledge precede the possibility, but only the futurition of a thing. But let this be granted… let us look at the thing itself. Knowledge in God is prior to volition, and depends on His infinite essence, by which God knows all things by one immediate act. No volition, then, in God can be the cause of any knowledge of cognizance in God. God’s volition can, indeed, put before it any object which would not exist unless the will should destine it to be done, and therefore God would not know that it would be: for what is not about to be, God cannot foreknow as about to be without error. But it does not hence follow that that predestination is the cause of knowledge or prescience. For it only produces the effect, or appoints its production: but that very thing cannot NOT be foreknown by God on account of the infinity of His knowledge and essence; the volition not causing it, but only by producing the effect, which is the object of knowledge and foreknowledge.” (Pg. 572-573)
He states, “For the cause of non-inscription in the book of life is the same as that of inscription in the earth and in the book of death: the same names which are inscribed in the book of death are not inscribed in the book of life, the same and no other, neither more nor fewer: the same is the end of [non-]death: wherefore it is also called blotting out from God’s book, from the book of life and of the living. Nor is any mention made in the Scriptures of a volition of God whereby He wills non-life to man, or by which He non-wills eternal life to man, except that volition whose cause is man’s sin; object, man a sinner; end, the declaration of God’s wrath and power.” (Pg. 596)
He notes, “The passages of Scripture set forth the end of the reprobation of the impenitent and unbelieving sinners, as we have already seen. But that the illustration of [God]s] wrath and dominion is subordinate to the illustration of [His] glorious grace towards the elect, is not proved by that passage in Romans 9:23. For this is not the sense… so that the clay cannot complain; God also has the right, and indeed much more justly, at length to cut off the vessels of wrath, framed for destruction, long borne with by His patience, in order to declare his wrath and dominion; and to prepare the vessels of mercy for glory, in order to display the riches of His glory towards them. We do not, however, deny … that the glory of God’s grace towards the elect shines out more brightly from comparison with the reprobate: but we thoroughly deny that reprobation was instituted to this end.” (Pg. 632-633)
Arminius is one of the most important Christian theologians, and his works belong in every serious theological library.
August 18, 2024
Long. Difficult to understand, especially the epistolary. Confirmative insights, especially in response to Perkins and in the Romans 9 analysis.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews