The Great War Generals On The Western Front 1914-1918

by Robin Neilland

In this controversial and expertly researched book, Robin Neillands seeks to explode the prevailing myth that the Allied Generals in the Great War were responsible, through their callous and incompetent military leadership, for the catastrophic loss of life on the Western Front. The widespread opinion that the British soldiers were 'lions led by donkeys' has led generations to believe that Generals such as Haig, French, Plumer and Gough were solely to blame for all that went wrong during the conflict. Whilst not seeking to exonerate the Generals completely, in his meticulous account of the conflict, Robin Neillands shows that a host of other, more decisive factors played a part.

Genres: History, Military History, World War I, War

549 pages, Paperback

First published October 15, 1998

Reviews

[Dimitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

Neillands was my first. My first de-mythologizer during the thesis years.
Reading this again in glorious HC in 2019 is a reminder of just how far WWI consensus has evolved since the scarce voices of reason by John Terraine couldn't be heard over the dark laughter of Blackadder goes Forth .

[Alex Helling · Rating 4 out of 5]

‘Lions led by donkeys’ is the popular view of the British soldiers of World War I. Since they are the donkeys this is not a positive view of the Generals; they sat behind the lines in beautiful french Chateau not sharing the risks with their men; they were inept, relentlessly doing the same thing over and over again; and they were callous, sending soldiers needlessly to their deaths. Robin Neillands in his book The Great War Generals seeks to skewer these myths and as such serves as a compelling corrective to what many (including me) believe about British forces on the Western Front in WWI.

Pros:
Cogently argued
Light touch narrative
Cons:
Doth protest too much!
Maps could be better

This book is therefore all about demonstrating that the British generals were better than their reputation. This Neillands accomplishes successfully. After reading this book it would be difficult to contend that most of the British generals did not learn or were not considerate of their troops welfare. It is clear that WWI was a completely new kind of warfare and a steep learning curve but the generals evolved their methods throughout the war. Some of the blame is passed to others; particularly the politicians who failed to prepare for war and then deprived Haig of reserves in 1918, and also to the French who insisted Britain attack. The arguments Neillands uses are well thought out and excellently argued with the actions from the narrative being taken as the examples as the book progresses through the narrative of the western front throughout the war.

That said I am not totally convinced that the Generals could not have done better. Attacks are nearly always carried on for too many days. And Neillands is sometimes too forgiving, for example Haig seems to consistently be over-optimistic and buy into a dream that with a little more hard fighting there will be a breakthrough and the cavalry into open country (p388). But it is never analysed what this would mean. Cavalry are slower than railways so surely the line would simply be reformed just a bit further back. So long as defensive infantry weapons so far overpower cavalry the idea that there might be an opportunity to break out or roll up the line would likely have been delusional.

To call the narrative ‘light touch’ is perhaps a double edged sword. The narrative here is light. It makes no attempt to be a gripping story of the war. But since the focus of the book is on the analysis this is a good thing. The narrative provides the basic facts the reader needs for the analytical side without encumbering it.

While the focus of the book is on the myths around the generals Neillands seems determined to slay myths wherever he can find them. Thus he several times swings into action in defence of British units unjustly demeaned by Canadian, Australian and New Zealand critics that argue the lion's share of the fighting fell on the Dominion contingents. While this is clearly an adjacent myth to those the book is mostly focused on, it does not feel compelling that it needs to be addressed at the same time, and there is not really enough space devoted to it to do it justice.

Given there are quite a lot of maps, and they have a decent number of place names on them I am perhaps griping too much by suggesting this might be a con. But they could be better; given the analysis regularly talks about the value of small rises, contours would help considerably. Marking armies and movements rather than just being a plain map would also be an improvement - though at the cost of clutter.

I am usually immensely annoyed by history books not giving references but here oddly it does not matter. We are told right at the beginning that the British official history is used for the narrative/facts. The rest is argumentation so does not need references.

The negatives here are pretty minor. For those who engage with WWI, or those whose only encounters have been through the popular viewpoints (or something like Blackadder goes forth!) then this book is a useful corrective. Because the whole book is based around setting out a case it won't be for everyone.

[Addickmick · Rating 4 out of 5]

An epic roll of honour and dishonour - but Kindle version is a pig’s ear

Good, bad and indifferent characters march through this brilliantly detailed and thought-provoking analysis of how we won the war, either because of or in spite of the generals who were in charge. It’s hard not to pity Douglas Haig and his fellow top brass who weren’t just fighting the Germans, but also devious rats like Lloyd George and, at times, criminally uncooperative French allies. Neillands does not spare the incompetents like Gough and Sir John French, but he provides a convincing rebuttal of the ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ narrative and puts the post-war colonial Pommie bashers back in their box. In a nutshell, Britain was unprepared for a continental war and it took more than three years of trial and terror - and unimaginable slaughter - to produce an army and a leadership that achieved spectacular results and eventual victory over 100 days in 1918, a success too often buried amid the mire and murderous memory of the Somme and Passchendaele.
BUT … the proof-reading and editing of this Kindle edition is shamefully inept. Typos litter the text - the number of Ludendorffs instead of Ludendorff’s (singular possessive) had me screaming at my poor defenceless iPad. Verdum instead of Verdun. Hindeburg instead of Hindenburg. St Orne instead of St Omer. And there are obvious howlers among casualty figures that anyone with half a brain should have spotted. For example, where the contradictory numbers are even in the same paragraph: “Casualties had been high, the British having lost 163,00 men killed, wounded, missing and captured, the French 77,000, and the Germans something in excess of 70,000. German losses were in the region of 250,000, with especially heavy casualties among the stormtroops.” Then there’s this shocker, relating to 3rd Ypres: “Casualties of all types by the end of August totalled 68,000, which can be compared to the 7,000 racked up on the first day of the Somme.” That’ll be the first day of the Somme, July 1, 1916, when British losses totalled 57,470, with 19,240 men killed. The horrors go on …. “the village of La Boisselle, attacked on 1 July, did not finally fall until 6 July” is followed a few lines later by: “La Boisselle was finally captured on 4 July…”
Such mistakes undermine a fine study, deserving of five stars for want of an editor worthy of the name.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing a focused history of Great Britain’s World War 1 Generals. The author, noted military historian Robin Neillands, sets out to re-orient the popular and academic image of the United Kingdom’s Western Front Generals. The author’s emphasis is on Douglas Haig, the British Army’s senior Western Front commander for much of World War I. Neillands argues that Haig, and his subordinate senior Generals, faced not just the “normal” challenges of poor alliance structures, resource constrained decisions, and confrontation with their political masters, but also the inherent lopsided issue of having to assume an offensive strategy in a defensive dominated military environment. Neillands argues that these Generals, as a whole, made the best decisions they could given their situation. The book shifts the heavy costs of the Western Front from the Generals to the dilemma of defensive dominance. Neillands is, of course, a committed “Westerner,” carrying forward Haig’s argument that the plains of Northern France were the best place to defeat the Germans, because they were already there. He pointedly ignores the idea that good Generalship should also consider strategic options to reorient the fight towards more favorable geography or circumstances. The book is well researched and well written, but the basic argument remains “it was what it was.” Not the best response for professionals entrusted with the manpower and resources of a nation. A great book for understanding the multiple dynamics confronting senior military leaders in complex strategic dilemmas.

[Gareth · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting read this one. Was on the kindle, so had no maps to support it unfortunately which made it a little harder to follow. The introduction does suggest that readers should have read other general books on the war, which I hadn't, so did skip over some detail that I would have found interesting, but the book would have blown out in size if it had that much detail. Dry reading in parts, but I think captured well the battles, and the thinking that went behind them, as well as giving us a good view of the generals and their personalities. The book is answering a charge that I didn't necessarily follow - at least, I didn't think the British generals were any worse than generals from the other countries in this war, as otherwise the casualties would have been one sided which wasn't the case. However, I did have some false ideas of the callousness, which this book well shows were wrong - some might have been, but certainly not most. All round an interesting and informative read.

[Matthew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Putting popular history right

A good book marred slightly by the author's political opinions. He sets out the case for the defence drawing on academic scholarship, the accounts of the time and realistic assessments of the performance of British generals.
Neillands chooses to side with the Westerners' conventional claim that Germany was the main target and all resources should have been targeted there, aside from being wrong this detracts from the rest of the book and like his political views should have been edited out. An expanded survey of diaries and memoirs of Great War soldiers would have been useful.

[Dr Kelvin Duncan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book should be compulsory reading for all interested in World War 1, and especially be studied closely by those who criticize the generals, British, who won the war. However, I disagree respectively about the low value the author places on the various Mediterranean campaigns, especially the

Sonia campaign which knocked out Bulgaria, Austria, thus breaking the trade links with Germany exacerbating German'ys food and mineral situation, and exposed the southern border of Germany proper with only 5 weak divisions to defend it. This is further than the Western forces got and they had the immense Rhine barrier to conquer.

[Carey H Bryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Truth takes time

The main goal of the author is to attempt to give a balanced view of the performance or lack thereof of the top British generals of the Great War. Having read some other authors on the subject of WWI, I now appreciate the analysis provided in this book. The discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the commanders cuts sufficiently close to home that I become very thankful that I was not called upon to fight or send men into harm’s way in that conflict.

[Seth Acerni · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great insight on the troubles faced by nations fighting ww1. The author focuses on the big name generals and doesn't excuse what happened but offers some reasons and thoughts as to why they did what they did, and why things happened the way they did. Really shaped my perspective on the wider lens of the war. Would recommend to all avid history readers.

[Nick Morton · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent read for any military historian with an interest in WW1. It can be a bit heavy in places for those not already reasonably informed. The insight into the relationship between the general staff was fascinating but the real insight was to the pattern of warfare beyond the trench attrition which is the normal depiction of this era.
As ever the politicians do not come out of this well ....

[Peter · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting analysis of the performance of British generals on the Western front during the Kaiser’s War. Generally not as bad as they are sometimes claimed to have been.

[wally walter · Rating 5 out of 5]

A VERY THOROUGH account

[bkwurm · Rating 2 out of 5]

It is a widely held belief that the generals of WW1 were blundering incompetents, indifferent to the suffering of their men or the casualties that resulted from the attacks they ordered their men into against the fixed defences.

The author seeks to show that this was untrue and that the British generals, in fact, did take every effort to try and minimise casualties, trying new innovative tactics and that the horrendous casualty figures were largely the result of offensive technology not having caught up with defensive ones.

While he does largely succeed, he is unable to explain away the fact that the generals did, on many occasions, persevere with attacks that had failed and which resulted in many unnecessary deaths and is forced to brush this away with the excuse that such perseverance was innate to the character of the generals.

Curiously, a great deal of blame is placed on the French generals who are portrayed as unreliable and treacherous allies, who repeatedly failed to provide the promised support for offensive attacks or help defend against German attacks.

[Mick Maye · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book, which in itself is saying something. I found the book easy to read and thoughtful. I understood his arguments and reasoning about the various Generals and the actions involved, however I don't quite agree with his conclusion. Whilst I understand that we are in a different time and common thought now struggles with the reasoning before and during WWI I cannot countenance the lack of alternatives to the accepted practices during the war. With that said Neillands arguments and conclusions are well thought out and reasoned I just don't agree with them. That is why I would recommend this book to anyone.

[Alayne · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found this book quite hard to read on the Kindle. The hard copy apparently had maps, which would have made understanding the descriptions of the various battles on the Western Front easier, but the Kindle version did not have any. I found the descriptions of the battles without maps to refer to, quite tedious and hard to follow. However I enjoyed his descriptions of the generals and the decisions they had to make, and the context they made them in, to be quite interesting.

[Jack Deighton · Rating 4 out of 5]

The common perception of British generalship in the Great War – as put forth in many depictions of the conflict from at least Oh, What a Lovely War! through “lions led by donkeys” to Blackadder Goes Fourth and beyond - is of cavalry officers with little knowledge of infantry tactics in charge, of widespread incompetence and callousness, of throwing men rather than competence at the enemy, of safely staying well behind the lines. In this book Neillands sets out the evidence for and against these assertions and as a result comes down in favour of the generals. In many respects for me he was pushing against an open door. It has always struck me that if the British generals were so incompetent and useless how come we didn’t lose the war? Add to that the fact that the British (and Empire) force was the only major Allied combatant (setting aside the short - but still bloody - sojourn of the US Expeditionary forces) that did not suffer a large mutiny or rout and the questions ought to be why, if their leaders were so useless, were British soldiers so steadfast? Why were they so willing to follow orders - and keep doing so?

Despite its all-encompassing sub-title the book is chiefly focused on the British generals on the Western Front, though French and German generals are of course dealt with as necessary. Overall, however, it is more of a complete history of the British sectors of the Western Front rather than a summary of the doings of the generals who directed the efforts there.

Neillands states that it is only British generals that have been subjected to such criticisms as a group. No such opprobrium has been heaped on the French or German generals as a whole despite similar propensities to life squandering, particularly the Germans at Langemarck and the French in Nivelle’s offensive. Plus there’s always Verdun.

For all sides this was a new kind of war (though slightly prefigured by aspects of the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War.) None of the European agonists had been subjected to industrial war of this kind before, though in terms of numbers the French and Germans were prepared for it, the latter also in terms of artillery. All expected a war of movement - and a quick resolution. As it was the trench system came about by accident; in the attempts of both sides to outflank each other in the “Race to the Sea.” And throughout defence held the upper hand.

Like all British armies at the start of a war the BEF was inadequate to the coming task in numbers and equipment; lacking in machine guns and especially artillery. Its astonishing proficiency in rifle fire could not make up for this. It would take time - years - to provide enough artillery ammunition, to recruit, to equip and to train not only the soldiers but also the staff officers necessary for the army to function efficiently (and of these the staff officers take much longer to train.) Until that came about the generals, like the soldiers, had to do the best with what they had, and to learn the techniques and tactics required to succeed. Plus they were fighting Germans; dogged professional soldiers who never gave in easily, the best army in the field - certainly until the end of 1916 (when the British perhaps took over the mantle.)

Among other beliefs Neillands describes as myths is that all British troops on the first day of the Battle of the Somme moved forward in line and at walking pace. There was in fact a large variation in tactics, the generals on the ground being largely responsible for their own formations’ procedures. The sentence attributed to Lieutenant-General Kiggell, after Passchendaele, “Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?” has no provenance and is likely to be apocryphal. Neillands finds it incredible that any general faced with all the reports from the front, aerial photos, requisitions etc could have been unaware of the conditions. Quite why Third Ypres was nevertheless persisted with is a question harder to avoid.

Some criticisms are easily dispatched. Much fewer than half of the British generals were originally from cavalry regiments while an average of one general a week was lost to enemy action, hardly indicative of distance from the front. They were not hidebound tactically but learned from earlier reverses. However, in response to British innovations in attack the Germans continually adopted new defensive tactics and provided new problems to solve.

Neillands contends that the difficulties of prosecuting such a war have not been sufficiently acknowledged by the critics. The generals were from the outset instructed by the British Government to co-operate closely with their French allies. This in many respects tied the hands of both British Commanders-in-Chief, Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig. Sometimes this necessary support, as at Loos, led to attacks the British generals did not favour. At the Somme and Third Ypres the necessity to divert German resources to relieve pressure on the French (from Verdun and the consequences of the French mutiny respectively) more or less demanded action.

The static nature of the trench system, the opportunities it gave the Germans to develop defence in depth (from Second Ypres in 1914 till their spring offensive in 1918 the Germans did not launch a major attack on the British Army anywhere along the line,) was a large factor in preventing a breakthrough. Allenby was not a notable success on the Western Front but in a war of movement in Palestine was able to show his capabilities more readily.


The main problem affecting the war’s conduct, though, was communications; which could not be relied on. Amid the smoke of battle, lines of sight were obscured; wireless technology was neither robust nor portable; telephone lines - even buried metres deep – were prone to severance by shellfire; carrier pigeons inadequate. The problem was never properly solved even by the war’s end.

Nor are any alternative strategies entirely obvious. Short of abandoning the war (so allowing Germany to keep its gains) - a course which the Allied Governments never contemplated - there was little option but to carry on.

Another factor affecting the generals was that Prime Minister Lloyd George never trusted them, Haig in particular. Neillands holds Lloyd George partly responsible for the British being forced to retreat by the German “Michael” offensive of March 1918 as he had held troops back in Britain rather than reinforcing the front. The overwhelming force of their initial attack would have caused problems in any case but even in its unstrengthened form the army, though it retreated, nevertheless did not break; the Germans were held.

In passing Neillands decries the “Pommie bashing” of latter day Australian and Canadian historians who variously claim the British “establishment” was biased against their own commanders and treated colonial troops as cannon fodder. While acknowledging the quality of these troops and the abilities of the Canadian General Currie and the Australian General Monash in particular, he shows most British divisions - and not a few generals - were equally effective.

Some criticisms are harder to defray. Typically there was a failure to exploit initial success quickly (in the case of Cambrai a disbelief in the extent of that success and a lack of preparedness for it) and an all too prevalent tendency to keep bashing away when an attack slowed down, in the belief that the Germans were weakening and “one more push” would prevail.

Yet the final victories - and they were victories, the Hindenburg line was breached, the British Army ended up as far advanced from the trench lines as Mons (where its participation in the war had started) – are not given nearly as much attention as the earlier “failures”. That is an indictment of those who give more weight to the generals’ shortcomings than to the achievements of the men under their direction. It was the war, and its continuation, plus the inability of the technology of attack to overcome that of defence that was the problem.

This is a book that, while not ignoring their faults, attests to the good faith of the British generals of the Great War, men doing their best amidst adverse circumstances.