When southern Civil War vets pondered how they lost their war, they sifted their records and recollections, looking for the mistake that gave victory to their enemy. But General George Pickett cut through all that nonsense by saying, "I think the Yankees had something to do with it."
Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg take Pickett's approach and apply to their study of the enemy in the Vietnam War, entitled "Inside the VC and NVA--The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces." Lanning and Cragg deftly take apart the NVA and VC, showing the component parts of training, logistics, doctrine, tactics and discipline, then putting it all together again to show how it all worked together.
The authors are not armchair generals or Monday morning quarterbacks, trying to explain how the U.S. lost. They focus instead on how North Vietnam built its army to win on its own terms, playing to its own strengths in ways we did not try to understand. North Vietnam was always a poor country, rich in peasants and hardship. Couple this with a thick, Confucian culture that stressed the good of the group over the well being of the individual. Stir this in the village, where that social structure enforces itself. Bring in Communism, which stirs this mix into a stew, following its own recipe of substituting the Party for the Village.
But the real steel that runs through this country is its dogged history of all-out opposition to foreign occupation. Vietnam fought Chinese occupation--for one thousand years. No invader was ever welcomed with open arms--just open hostility.
Lanning and Cragg show the reader how North Vietnam built its army on these foundations. Vietnamese communists knew how to enforce Confucian discipline through the party, and reproduce the village through the army. Soldiers were grouped in three-man cells, where they shared all benefits and hardships, and looked out for each other. Self-criticism helped with discipline, focusing troops on doing a better job the next time it had to be done. Operations were planned meticulously, sometimes taking as long as six months, and well practiced before execution. And no attack was every undertaken unless the NVA had three-to-one superiority.
The average NVA or VC "grunt" only fought two or three times a year, unlike his American or ARVN counterpart, who was always seeking to destroy them. Laning and Craig takes pains to point out that this was a disciplined army designed to survive and persist, and in doing so, eventually win.
Lanning and Cragg served in Vietnam and based their work on reviewing thousands of RAND corp. interviews with NVA and VC PoWs, running these accounts through the prism of their experience. Their perspective provides a measure of illumination that more one-sided accounts of the war sadly skip. We know what the U.S. did in Vietnam, but those one-sided accounts suffer for the lack of context, falling back on cliches instead of providing explanations.
The authors are cognizant of this context, and save the last two chapters for comments about the enemy by American generals and grunts. "Know your enemy" is an old saying in warfare. Some of these guys just didn't, with one general leaning on the old "stabbed in the back by politicians, media and hippies" as the reason why the U.S. lost the war. Those were the symptoms of defeat, but not the true cause of it. North Vietnam was willing to fight a long war, regardless of the cost. Were we?
Lanning and Cragg are not blind to the downside of Communist victory. Long after the war, unified Vietnam remained warlike under the dictatorship of the Communist regime in Hanoi. Military operations against the Khmer Rouge in Camdodia and the Communist Chinese along the northern border. One of the 10 poorest countries in the world, Vietnam maintained one of the largest armies in the world. The nation knows how to fight, but forgot how to prosper.
"Hopefully, this book has made the individual soldiers of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army a little easier to understand and perhaps more human--or a little less superhuman, depending on preconceptions," Lanning and Craig write in summation. "What we can say is this: ...to all the VC/NVA who did their duty as they saw fit and kept their hands clean, many of whom we faced with no formal introductions on the battlegrounds nearly two decades ago, if we should ever meet (hopefully not all at once), the first drinks are on us."