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Beyond Repair: The Decline And Fall Of The Cia
Charles Faddis, co-author of Operation Hotel California, offers gritty, hair-raising stories about the CIA, which has devolved into a giant bureaucracy of ass-coverers and careerists – not the kind of people you want in charge of preventing another 9/11.
192 pages, Hardcover
First published October 8, 2009
30 people are currently reading
185 people want to read
About the author
Charles S. Faddis
6 books24 followersA retired CIA officer and author. Spent twenty years undercover in the Near East, South Asia and Southern Europe. Took the first CIA team into Iraq in advance of the 2003 invasion. Retired as head of CIA's WMD terrorism unit.
Author of six books, three works of non-fiction and three novels.
Lives near Annapolis, Maryland. Spends his free time writing, sailing, traveling and reading.
Still consults for the Intelligence Community.
Author of six books, three works of non-fiction and three novels.
Lives near Annapolis, Maryland. Spends his free time writing, sailing, traveling and reading.
Still consults for the Intelligence Community.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
April 7, 2019
Very well organized and thought out book. If this is a true reflection of the current state, then we are truly in some scary times. The book starts out with a brief history and then brings to light the difficult situations that we would expect of this agency. It is disappointing that we have gotten to the point where there is no political skin in the game or stomach for the protection of American. Thank you for sharing your insights into an issue that will hopefully right itself soon.
December 14, 2018
A worthwhile conversation to have, but this felt like only the opening of what should have been a much more in-depth book.
There were some obvious flaws in what Faddis had to say here, though. Nobody is as great as case officers. The rest of the CIA is borderline worthless. But no way should non-CIA people be involved in ops. It is kind of like, "my little brother is an idiot. but only I can pick on him."
It also seems like his focus on terrorism may have put on blinders to seeing there is a big world out there that the bravery and heroism of the military archetype he seems so impressed by is not necessarily well-suited for.
It would seem like some easy fixes for the current organization would be to make it easier to remove or fire full performers. If you won't incentivize intelligent risk-taking, at least punish those who are actively holding things back.
There were some obvious flaws in what Faddis had to say here, though. Nobody is as great as case officers. The rest of the CIA is borderline worthless. But no way should non-CIA people be involved in ops. It is kind of like, "my little brother is an idiot. but only I can pick on him."
It also seems like his focus on terrorism may have put on blinders to seeing there is a big world out there that the bravery and heroism of the military archetype he seems so impressed by is not necessarily well-suited for.
It would seem like some easy fixes for the current organization would be to make it easier to remove or fire full performers. If you won't incentivize intelligent risk-taking, at least punish those who are actively holding things back.
March 18, 2019
Faddis attempts the difficult task of exposing the weaknesses in our clandestine services without appearing to be a disgruntled former employee. It is a solid effort which exposes our vulnerability to another attack on the scale of 9/11. Unfortunately, no one in Washington is paying attention.
February 2, 2024
A very complete review of the state of the CIA. A good read with some disturbing conclusions. Perhaps this book will be the framework for an overhauled CIA/OSS.
April 4, 2010
I really enjoyed reading Faddis' account of the devolution of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, now known by the term National Clandestine Service (NCS). His writing is not great, and a few items grated (toeing the line, not towing the line, dumbass) but it's the content, not the style, for which this book should read.
His comments that there should be intensive leadership development training at each echelon of command and that people ought to be promoted after proving themselves in the field is completely correct. This glaring organizational weakness affects not only CIA, but several organizations in the Intelligence Community, not least the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Security Agency (NSA).
I found that some of his comments confused cause and effect. He complains bitterly that case officers are no longer treated as the elite of the intelligence community, and (gasp) sometimes are not allowed to be in charge just because they think they should be. He then provides a couple hundred pages of evidence that they should not be. While there are some real studs out there the sad truth is that you don't have to be particularly good to enjoy a career in the Agency. To be treated the way he demands, you need to earn the respect and deference of your peers in the community. I have worked with a cross-section of the IC for many years, and frankly I have met quite a few inept case officers. The one thing they all have in common is that they think their own sh** doesn't stink, and are frequently unjustifiably arrogant. (I am all for arrogance when you back it up - but nobody deserves it without individually proving himself or herself.) He also somehow fails to mention that that for all the value HUMINT provides when it's right, it is often wrong. Stupidly, spectacularly wrong. But because of the mystique that the DO has fostered over the years, it is often believed over hard evidence gleaned from technical sources. When given a choice of believing what someone tells me, especially someone who may have a reason to lie, or what I can see with my own eyes on imagery for example, I will choose the objective source. He did mention intel failures, but generally from a failure to provide warning, as opposed to publishing BOGINT.
His complaint that leadership by non-DO officers is infeasible is crap. The best, most capable leader should be in charge. At the tactical/operational level that means specialization is required - just as an infantry officer should lead a rifle platoon...but there is no reason a general who was an artilleryman cannot manage a large multi-arm Army task force, or that a Navy admiral cannot manage a multi-service joint operation. DO officers should run DO stations. For operations bigger than pure HUMINT, let the best man or woman win, regardless of background. (The key is that it needs to be the best candidate, not someone chosen to advance a politically correct agenda.) I am not at all convinced that the HUMINT agency automatically should be preeminent, or the COS should be automatically be the IC focal point in any given country. Faddis is incapable of thinking beyond his parochial interest. Ultimately, the DO officer will probably end up in charge based on experience anyway, but that should not be a hard-coded given.
His call for a smaller, more elite service that is less bureaucratic and totally results-oriented is spot-on, as is his call for foreign language mastery. His plea to abandon official cover as a way of life and to adopt whatever cover furthers the objective is long overdue. I also support his idea that there are way too many levels of staff bureaucracy in the broader IC, and the ODNI has only added another layer of ass-pain and bureaucratic inertia to the mix.
Overall, this book will be of interest to members of the IC, and those who care about its mission (which in my opinion should be every thinking American citizen). I am very glad he wrote it. While I disagreed with the few items mentioned above, I mainly found myself nodding along in agreement throughout. I hope it will cause some serious thought at senior levels of the CIA, ODNI, and Congress. Sister services (especially the large DoD agencies) should ask themselves if this shoe fits as well.
His comments that there should be intensive leadership development training at each echelon of command and that people ought to be promoted after proving themselves in the field is completely correct. This glaring organizational weakness affects not only CIA, but several organizations in the Intelligence Community, not least the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Security Agency (NSA).
I found that some of his comments confused cause and effect. He complains bitterly that case officers are no longer treated as the elite of the intelligence community, and (gasp) sometimes are not allowed to be in charge just because they think they should be. He then provides a couple hundred pages of evidence that they should not be. While there are some real studs out there the sad truth is that you don't have to be particularly good to enjoy a career in the Agency. To be treated the way he demands, you need to earn the respect and deference of your peers in the community. I have worked with a cross-section of the IC for many years, and frankly I have met quite a few inept case officers. The one thing they all have in common is that they think their own sh** doesn't stink, and are frequently unjustifiably arrogant. (I am all for arrogance when you back it up - but nobody deserves it without individually proving himself or herself.) He also somehow fails to mention that that for all the value HUMINT provides when it's right, it is often wrong. Stupidly, spectacularly wrong. But because of the mystique that the DO has fostered over the years, it is often believed over hard evidence gleaned from technical sources. When given a choice of believing what someone tells me, especially someone who may have a reason to lie, or what I can see with my own eyes on imagery for example, I will choose the objective source. He did mention intel failures, but generally from a failure to provide warning, as opposed to publishing BOGINT.
His complaint that leadership by non-DO officers is infeasible is crap. The best, most capable leader should be in charge. At the tactical/operational level that means specialization is required - just as an infantry officer should lead a rifle platoon...but there is no reason a general who was an artilleryman cannot manage a large multi-arm Army task force, or that a Navy admiral cannot manage a multi-service joint operation. DO officers should run DO stations. For operations bigger than pure HUMINT, let the best man or woman win, regardless of background. (The key is that it needs to be the best candidate, not someone chosen to advance a politically correct agenda.) I am not at all convinced that the HUMINT agency automatically should be preeminent, or the COS should be automatically be the IC focal point in any given country. Faddis is incapable of thinking beyond his parochial interest. Ultimately, the DO officer will probably end up in charge based on experience anyway, but that should not be a hard-coded given.
His call for a smaller, more elite service that is less bureaucratic and totally results-oriented is spot-on, as is his call for foreign language mastery. His plea to abandon official cover as a way of life and to adopt whatever cover furthers the objective is long overdue. I also support his idea that there are way too many levels of staff bureaucracy in the broader IC, and the ODNI has only added another layer of ass-pain and bureaucratic inertia to the mix.
Overall, this book will be of interest to members of the IC, and those who care about its mission (which in my opinion should be every thinking American citizen). I am very glad he wrote it. While I disagreed with the few items mentioned above, I mainly found myself nodding along in agreement throughout. I hope it will cause some serious thought at senior levels of the CIA, ODNI, and Congress. Sister services (especially the large DoD agencies) should ask themselves if this shoe fits as well.
October 12, 2013
As shown in the title, the author, a CIA veteran, doesn't believe that the Agency needs fixing or "tweaking." He strongly believes that it needs to be torn down and totally rebuilt.
During World War II, in the days of the OSS, a person or group was given a mission, which usually involved being dropped behind enemy lines, and was told to make it happen. They treated intelligence work as some sort of holy calling. Today, the CIA is filled with bureaucrats and buck-passers who consider it as merely another federal job. It is thought of as a cardinal sin to make waves, even if it will save American lives. The solution to intelligence failures, like 9/11, seems to be to add layers of bureaucracy and "coordination" instead of reducing it.
The US Army's ROTC program trains and continually evaluates potential officers. If a person doesn't measure up to Army standards, they are asked to leave the program. The CIA has no such training program. A person could be a wonderful case officer, but be totally incompetent in a position of leadership. Despite the CIA's rigid bureaucracy, they still know how to put together a covert operation in days, or even hours, when an intelligence opportunity presents itself. Other agencies, like the military and FBI, need months and months of briefings, re-briefings, evaluations and approval from several different people before there can be a final approval. That is why the author strongly feels that the CIA should be the only foreign intelligence agency, and that other agencies should stop their foreign intelligence operations.
In a US embassy overseas, the ambassador is the boss. No covert operation happens without his (or her) approval. The ambassador works for the State Department, whose top rule seems to be "Don't upset the host country", even if that covert operation will save lives. Occasionally, there will be visits from Washington bureaucrats, who would not know a covert operation if they tripped over it. They usually have this wonderful intelligence idea, which sounds great in a Langley conference room, but on the ground, is an amazingly stupid idea.
Physical training for covert agents used to be very rigorous, because an agent had to be able to deal with almost anything. Over the years, standards have been reduced to almost zero. What was "very rigorous" training is now something like mildly stressful. The CIA is in strong need of people on the ground, so physical standards have been reduced to the point where people from other divisions have been let in to the program. It doesn't matter if they have asthma, diabetes or some other major ailment. If they complete the course (there are no repercussions if they don't), they suddenly think they are qualified to go overseas and work on real covert operations, right next to someone with 20 years experience.
This is a very scathing book, but it is much needed. Regardless of your opinions about recent CIA actions, America needs some sort of foreign intelligence agency. This book is an excellent place to start putting together such an agency the right way.
During World War II, in the days of the OSS, a person or group was given a mission, which usually involved being dropped behind enemy lines, and was told to make it happen. They treated intelligence work as some sort of holy calling. Today, the CIA is filled with bureaucrats and buck-passers who consider it as merely another federal job. It is thought of as a cardinal sin to make waves, even if it will save American lives. The solution to intelligence failures, like 9/11, seems to be to add layers of bureaucracy and "coordination" instead of reducing it.
The US Army's ROTC program trains and continually evaluates potential officers. If a person doesn't measure up to Army standards, they are asked to leave the program. The CIA has no such training program. A person could be a wonderful case officer, but be totally incompetent in a position of leadership. Despite the CIA's rigid bureaucracy, they still know how to put together a covert operation in days, or even hours, when an intelligence opportunity presents itself. Other agencies, like the military and FBI, need months and months of briefings, re-briefings, evaluations and approval from several different people before there can be a final approval. That is why the author strongly feels that the CIA should be the only foreign intelligence agency, and that other agencies should stop their foreign intelligence operations.
In a US embassy overseas, the ambassador is the boss. No covert operation happens without his (or her) approval. The ambassador works for the State Department, whose top rule seems to be "Don't upset the host country", even if that covert operation will save lives. Occasionally, there will be visits from Washington bureaucrats, who would not know a covert operation if they tripped over it. They usually have this wonderful intelligence idea, which sounds great in a Langley conference room, but on the ground, is an amazingly stupid idea.
Physical training for covert agents used to be very rigorous, because an agent had to be able to deal with almost anything. Over the years, standards have been reduced to almost zero. What was "very rigorous" training is now something like mildly stressful. The CIA is in strong need of people on the ground, so physical standards have been reduced to the point where people from other divisions have been let in to the program. It doesn't matter if they have asthma, diabetes or some other major ailment. If they complete the course (there are no repercussions if they don't), they suddenly think they are qualified to go overseas and work on real covert operations, right next to someone with 20 years experience.
This is a very scathing book, but it is much needed. Regardless of your opinions about recent CIA actions, America needs some sort of foreign intelligence agency. This book is an excellent place to start putting together such an agency the right way.
April 8, 2011
Not great for gack, but really wonderful stories about the glory days of the OSS. Some nice examples of VO's that encapsulate the mentality and life-style of an intelligence agent. It really helps you understand the frame of mind of a case officer that has to struggle with threats to their life as well as the insurmountable inertia of a constantly growing bureaucracy. I really enjoyed it, but it's important to note that this book is less "what it's like to be part of the intelligence community" and more "what's wrong with the intelligence community." I'll have the notes typed up soon to post on the "Did you know" board.
January 3, 2012
Although I appreciated the conclusions and recommendations Charles Faddis provided in Beyond Repair, I could barely get past the somewhat whining and complaining tone of the book. Surely there are other ways to communicate the failures of the CIA without constantly reminding the reader that you are perfect and the CIA was perfect back in the good old days. I'll keep looking for a book that examines the CIA with a bit less bias.
January 12, 2010
First hand account of former station chief about why the CIA used to work and the current-day obstacles that impede its effectiveness.
July 31, 2012
Disgruntled officer with a chip on his shoulder...but has some very good points about bureaucracy and Washington culture that could just as well be written about State.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews