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The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806
The compelling story of the military campaign that changed how we think about war
Responding to the enemy's innovation in war presents problems to soldiers and societies of all times. This book traces Napoleon's victory over Prussia in 1806 and Prussia's effort to recover from defeat to show how in one particular historical episode operational analyses together with institutional and political decisions eventually turned defeat to victory.
The author moves from a comparative study of French and Prussian forces to campaign narrative and strategic analysis. He examines processes of change in institutions and doctrine, as well as their dependence on social and political developments, and interprets works of art and literature as indicators of popular and elite attitudes toward war, which influence the conduct of war and the kind and extent of military innovation. In the concluding chapter he addresses the impact of 1806 on two men who fought on opposing sides in the campaign and sought a new theoretical understanding of war―Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.
Fields of history that are often kept separate are brought together in this book, which seeks to replicate the links between different areas of thought and action as they exist in reality and shape events.
Responding to the enemy's innovation in war presents problems to soldiers and societies of all times. This book traces Napoleon's victory over Prussia in 1806 and Prussia's effort to recover from defeat to show how in one particular historical episode operational analyses together with institutional and political decisions eventually turned defeat to victory.
The author moves from a comparative study of French and Prussian forces to campaign narrative and strategic analysis. He examines processes of change in institutions and doctrine, as well as their dependence on social and political developments, and interprets works of art and literature as indicators of popular and elite attitudes toward war, which influence the conduct of war and the kind and extent of military innovation. In the concluding chapter he addresses the impact of 1806 on two men who fought on opposing sides in the campaign and sought a new theoretical understanding of war―Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.
Fields of history that are often kept separate are brought together in this book, which seeks to replicate the links between different areas of thought and action as they exist in reality and shape events.
176 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
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126 people want to read
About the author
Peter Paret
55 books22 followersAmerican historian who has specialised in German military history in the Napoleonic era and German artists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
December 1, 2020
Excellent premise, poor delivery. Paret asserts that we as humans have a huge problem “recognizing and coming to terms” with that which is new because we are “never free of preconceptions and indeed, prejudice.” (Pg 32)
This problem of adaptation is precisely what plagued Prussia at the beginning of the 19th Century leading to their disastrous defeat at Jena and Auerstedt. He goes on further to show that it was primarily social and cultural conditions and attitudes that caused this defeat as opposed to simply inadequate military or civil institutions.
At the end of the day, Prussia “regarded the French as an imperfect copy of itself,” an assumption that sealed their defeat and a lesson that any modern military or business organization could learn from.
This problem of adaptation is precisely what plagued Prussia at the beginning of the 19th Century leading to their disastrous defeat at Jena and Auerstedt. He goes on further to show that it was primarily social and cultural conditions and attitudes that caused this defeat as opposed to simply inadequate military or civil institutions.
At the end of the day, Prussia “regarded the French as an imperfect copy of itself,” an assumption that sealed their defeat and a lesson that any modern military or business organization could learn from.
April 28, 2024
Chapters on the interplay between art and the response to the Prussian defeat in 1806-07 are the best. Imaginative, descriptive, and thoughtful, they show a burgeoning national consciousness and introspection after a colossal reverse. The chapter on Clausewitz's "On War" is repetitive, less approachable, and seems sort of obvious in my opinion.
April 21, 2011
"The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806" by Peter Paret is an expansion of a lecture given by Paret on how a society responds to a military disaster. The Prussians were decisively defeated by the Napoleon in 1806-7. Their country was dismembered, placed under heavy debt and became a strictly limited dependent of the French.
The book discusses some of the responses by Prussia and elements of it's society to the disaster. There is a short summary of the military campaigns of 1806 and 1807. Then there is a discussion of the response by various sectors including artists, intellectuals, the middle class, as well as the military and the ruling king and nobility.
The book's strength is in how it thinks outside the box. It deals not only with military responses to a military disaster, but in national responses to a national disaster. How a society responds to disaster and the transformation of society from the personal property of a king to a true national society are fascinating issues and issues we are still dealing with today.
The book does have some shortcomings. It's language is somewhat labored. It is also, I believe, too short to cover all the material it attempts to address. Finally, as a military historian, Paret tends to return over and over again to military history. All this gives the book a feeling of disjointedness. That is, a feeling that it tried to cover to much and in the end the author retreated back to what was familiar. Not that I think that any of the topics is problematic, just that expectations were raised far too high.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in Prussian/German history, the Napoleonic wars, military history and sociology. I found Paret's approach fascinating and well worth the read.
The book discusses some of the responses by Prussia and elements of it's society to the disaster. There is a short summary of the military campaigns of 1806 and 1807. Then there is a discussion of the response by various sectors including artists, intellectuals, the middle class, as well as the military and the ruling king and nobility.
The book's strength is in how it thinks outside the box. It deals not only with military responses to a military disaster, but in national responses to a national disaster. How a society responds to disaster and the transformation of society from the personal property of a king to a true national society are fascinating issues and issues we are still dealing with today.
The book does have some shortcomings. It's language is somewhat labored. It is also, I believe, too short to cover all the material it attempts to address. Finally, as a military historian, Paret tends to return over and over again to military history. All this gives the book a feeling of disjointedness. That is, a feeling that it tried to cover to much and in the end the author retreated back to what was familiar. Not that I think that any of the topics is problematic, just that expectations were raised far too high.
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in Prussian/German history, the Napoleonic wars, military history and sociology. I found Paret's approach fascinating and well worth the read.
April 8, 2018
BLUF: This book is a historical account of the challenge of recognizing the need for military reform and then instituting change following the Prussian defeat at Jena-Auerstedt.
Following the battles of Jena-Auerstedt (1806), the Prussians, specifically Gerhard Scharnhorst, recognizes the need to reform the Prussian military organizational structure, recruiting/conscription, officer selection, doctrine, and training. He is relatively successful in accomplishing the military reforms, but is challenged obtaining the civil reform necessary to change recruiting/conscription and officer selection. [Furthermore, following the defeat of Napoleon, with the lack of an existential threat, the Prussian Army largely reverts to its 1806 status quo.]
Chapter 2 focuses on the role of fine art (paintings, theater, and writing) in informing the public on the need for reform and as a medium to influence change.
Chapter 4 looks at the legacy of Jena-Auerstedt in a comparative analysis of how Jomini and Clausewitz interpreted Napoleonic warfare. It has a brief introduction to Clausewitz's ideas on the trinity, total and limited wars/means/ends, and attack/defense. While, Jomini sought to present didactic/principled lessons, Clausewitz thought that theory should enable study, but that each circumstance was contextually unique enough that theory should not attempt to suggest universal, dogmatic actions/doctrine.
Following the battles of Jena-Auerstedt (1806), the Prussians, specifically Gerhard Scharnhorst, recognizes the need to reform the Prussian military organizational structure, recruiting/conscription, officer selection, doctrine, and training. He is relatively successful in accomplishing the military reforms, but is challenged obtaining the civil reform necessary to change recruiting/conscription and officer selection. [Furthermore, following the defeat of Napoleon, with the lack of an existential threat, the Prussian Army largely reverts to its 1806 status quo.]
Chapter 2 focuses on the role of fine art (paintings, theater, and writing) in informing the public on the need for reform and as a medium to influence change.
Chapter 4 looks at the legacy of Jena-Auerstedt in a comparative analysis of how Jomini and Clausewitz interpreted Napoleonic warfare. It has a brief introduction to Clausewitz's ideas on the trinity, total and limited wars/means/ends, and attack/defense. While, Jomini sought to present didactic/principled lessons, Clausewitz thought that theory should enable study, but that each circumstance was contextually unique enough that theory should not attempt to suggest universal, dogmatic actions/doctrine.
February 4, 2015
I'll admit, I took this one quickly but the unifying component of the book eluded me. This seemed like four essays related mostly because they addressed the Prussian military in the 1795-1914 time period. Paret's treatment of Jena and Auerstadt is fair enough but too sparse for any detailed level of analysis. The second section humanizes the characters of the day through an exposition of the arts - perhaps it gives a slightly fuller impression of Clausewitz and others. The true benefit of this book is in the final section on the development and application of theories of war. Pages 127-128 are clutch.
August 28, 2019
Excellent combination of military, art, social and intellectual history of the Prussian defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, and how it affected Prussian (and German) society, army and politics. Finally Paret distills this in an discussion of Clausewitz' theories on warfare, which he shows were influenced by much more than just military events.
I love how Paret weaves books like Kleist's The Prince of Homburg and paintings like The Chasseur in the Woods into his argument. Fascinating in their own right, especially in their relevance at the time they were made, they also have a wider significance.
One of the bravest books by a military historian.
I love how Paret weaves books like Kleist's The Prince of Homburg and paintings like The Chasseur in the Woods into his argument. Fascinating in their own right, especially in their relevance at the time they were made, they also have a wider significance.
One of the bravest books by a military historian.
August 6, 2013
Excellent, quick read. I particularly enjoyed the bits on Schiller's Wallenstein trilogy and how it provided a cognitive frame for Clausewitz and his contemporaries.
January 31, 2017
I can't really place the necessity of this book. I suppose it is to better understand what influenced Clausewitz. It is an interesting, quick read but I don't know that I gained much by reading it.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews