In a groundbreaking, comprehensive history of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat from Gettysburg in July 1863, Kent Masterson Brown draws on previously untapped sources to chronicle the massive effort of General Robert E. Lee and his command as they sought to move people, equipment, and scavenged supplies through hostile territory and plan the army's next moves. Brown reveals that even though the battle of Gettysburg was a defeat for the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's successful retreat maintained the balance of power in the eastern theater and left his army with enough forage, stores, and fresh meat to ensure its continued existence as an effective force.
Kent Masterson Brown's "Retreat from Gettysburg" (2005) has been justly praised as the first full-length study of the Army of Northern Virginia as it withdrew from Gettysburg following the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3, 1863, crossed South Mountain, and succeeded in crossing the Potomac River on July 14, 1863. Most histories of the battle devote only a few anti-climactic pages to the retreat and tell the story from the standpoint of General Meade and the Army of the Potomac. These books then either praise or criticize Meade to varying degrees for not being more aggressive in attacking Lee's army. As is well known, President Lincoln was highly critical of Meade and believed that a further attack could have severely crippled the Army of Northern Virginia and perhaps ended the War.
Brown's study not only tells a detailed story of the retreat, it offers as well a somewhat different account of Lee's Pennsylvania campaign than that offered in recent studies. The books on the Battle of Gettysburg by Sears and Trudeau, for example, explain the Pennsylvania campaign as an attempt by Lee to win a major victory, to fight a battle for the annihilation of the Army of the Potomac, and thus to bring the war to an end. Brown describes the campaign as a large-scale raid in which the Army of Northern Virginia invaded Northern soil to secure food for the troops, forage for the horses and mules, and essential supplies for the Army. Southern soil had been decimated by two years of heavy fighting, and the Confederacy lacked an adequate supply system to keep the army moving. Thus Lee wanted to tap the rich, untouched soil of Pennsylvania for supplies to keep his Army a fighting force.
And forage Lee's army did. Brown has unearthed and utilized a vast array of documentary evidence showing the extent of southern foraging. The foraging of food, supplies, and clothing began when the vanguard of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac and proceeded with great force during the two weeks portions of Lee's Army spent unopposed in Pennsylvania before the Battle of Gettysburg. The foraging and gathering continued during the battle and, indeed, during the long retreat. The retreat was difficult in part because the Army of Northern Virginia had thousands of wagons which formed a train extending for 50 miles as it crossed the mountains. These wagons had to be protected, no less than the troops, to keep the army together. There were some losses to Union cavalry but on the whole Lee and his army managed to get the goods they took in Pennsylvania across the Potomac and to make use of them to alleviate pressure on Southern soil and transportation systems.
For Brown, the Battle of Gettysburg was a serious tactical loss for the Confederacy, resulting in a defeat and in the loss of men that could not be replaced. But he argues that the Pennsylvania campaign had a strategically more ambiguous result because Lee achieved many of his objectives. His army spent much of the summer in Pennsylvania and took the food, the beef, the horses, and the supplies that were a prime objective of the campaign. Brown concludes that "Gettysburg cannot be viewed as the turning point of the Civil War or even a turning point of the eastern theater of war after Lee's remarkable retreat." (p. 390, citing the work of Gary Gallagher who has taken a similar view of the aftermath of the battle.)
The story of the retreat itself is told with remarkable detail and clarity. Brown gives the reader a full picture of Lee, Stuart, Imboden, Pettigrew, and many lesser-known leaders in the Army of Northern Virginia that played essential roles in the long, difficult retreat through the mud and the mountains, most of it in driving rain. There are closely-drawn pictures of the many ill and wounded soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia and of the African-Americans, slave and some free, who accompanied and provided essential services to Lee's army. The maps in the book are well-chosen, clear, and illuminating. The book is also graced with many rare photographs and drawings.
Brown gives the reader the retreat almost exclusively from the Southern standpoint -- by following the Southern army -- but this hasn't been done before for the retreat. It deepens the reader's understanding of the campaign and of the army. I understood better after reading this account why General Meade had to hesitate in his pursuit -- he was unsure of Lee's intentions and the condition of his own army and supply system demanded attention -- and why Meade was probably correct in not attacking the strong southern defenses at Williamsport. Still, the Army of Northern Virginia was highly vulnerable to attack during the evening of July 13 early on July 14 while it was crossing the Potomac. The Union cavalry mounted a strong late attack at this point, resulting in the death of Southern General Pettigrew. Possibly a more effective reconnaissance and a stronger Union infantry presence during the crossing could have inflicted greater damage.
Brown has written a thoughtful and well-documented history of the retreat from Gettysburg and of the Pennsylvania campaign that has much to teach the serious student of the battle and of the Civil War.
I thought this book was okay, but a bit of a slow read. I ended up not finishing it and moving on to other books.
For what I was looking for I think I should have picked up One Continuous Fight instead. Both of those books cover the same period: the Gettysburg campaign from July 4 through July 14. However, Brown focuses more on the logistics and the Confederate side whereas Wittenberg focuses more on maneuvers, combat, and the Union side.
EDIT: A decade later I want to reread this book as I think I would have more appreciation for it now.
After three days of heavy fighting at Gettysburg, one of the questions became how did Lee extricate himself from the battle. Kent Masterson Brown answers that question in this book. Brown takes a very systematic approach - tracking the movements of Lee's forces into a more compact defense following the battle, the route of trains and troops withdrawing, the extensive foraging operations that continued all the way to the Potomac, how the sick and wounded were handled, and so on. An important part of the book is Brown's analysis. He uses the frame of Clausewitz's theory to outline Lee's approach and objectives, one of which was to restore the equilibrium of the army. It also shows the options, limits, and challenges Lee faced in his decision making. As part of this, he also looks at Meade's actions, and the constraints and challenges Meade faced in pursuing and attempting to disrupt the retreat. There are a number of skirmishes and battles to cover that occurred - Union cavalry efforts to disrupt the retreat and capture wagons and the battle of Falling Waters. In Brown's view, Lee successfully extricated his army, restored its equilibrium, and brought back sufficient food and fodder to keep his army supplied into the 2nd half of the year. An interesting book that provides clarity to an important element of the Gettysburg campaign.
This is a fascinating book detailing the Army of Northern Virginia’s retreat after the battle of Gettysburg. I had never read much about this part of the campaign.
This book is well researched and well written. The prose is clear and precise.
In telling as many of the details as possible Mr. Brown keeps the narrative flow of the events moving forward even as immense numbers of details are being imparted to the reader.
He relates the reasons for the whole campaign by Lee, the vast amounts of booty being carried back to Virginia, the serpentine wagon trains of the wounded stretching over mile after mile of road, the reasons for the short delay in Meade’s pursuit, and the final crossing of the Potomac River after the rains with its probable disastrous battle (disastrous for the Union Army).
It is an intense read (at least for me) since there are so many new facts, figures and insights filling its pages.
If you are fascinated by the American Civil War, as I am, then I believe this is a book you ought to read.
A great book if you’re interested in the last stage of the Gettysburg Campaign and more specifically Civil War logistics. Kent Masterson Brown isn’t the most eloquent writer, but his research is so thorough that it’s invaluable to any serious student of Gettysburg. There’s that old adage that goes something like: “Amateurs study tactics and strategy, but professionals study logistics.” You really feel that while reading this book.
Battles are fun to read about and all, but one can’t understand the military aspect of the any war without knowing how the army’s kept themselves supplied. The logistical aspect of the Gettysburg Campaign is key to understanding why Lee invaded Pennsylvania and why Meade’s pursuit after the battle unfolded as it did.
My one qualm is that Brown has an annoying habit of using too many brackets in the quotes from firsthand accounts that are meant to provide clarity to the reader. This might be helpful to someone unfamiliar with the subject, but for someone well versed in the Civil War and Gettysburg I just found it to be unnecessary and clunky.
Should the Civil War have ended at Gettysburg? Did Meade blunder by not pursuing Lee afterwards and finishing the job? One would think this would be the central discussion of “Retreat from Gettysburg”. Nah. This is a deeply researched, all trees-no forest, review of Lee’s escape across the Potomac (and Meade’s delayed response). Step by step, unit by unit, mile by mile. I enjoyed reading of history happening in little towns where I grew up and played Little League baseball - also, sure this is great fodder for those deeply interested in Civil War logistics, but I was sorely disappointed that in the end the author simply concludes that maybe Gettysburg wasn’t so bad for the South because of all the successful foraging they’d done in Pennsylvania.
This was a good description of Lee’s retreat. I thought it organized the events from Lee’s retreat better than One Continuous Fight. (But perhaps being familiar with those events from the latter book made it easier in this book. I would say the two books complement each other.) It did have some flaws; its excessive details (such as long lists of names of wounded) for example was tedious. However, other details are useful since they are seldom presented in other places. The most prominent of these included the amount of supplies the army needed and seized.
Kent Masterson Brown’s exhaustive research leads to a reassessment of the outcome of Lee’s Pennsylvania campaign, including its impact on the Confederacy’s subsequent war fighting capability. Although there has been much Monday morning quarterbacking of the performances of both Union General Meade and Confederate General Lee, the reader will find considerably less fault with either of them after reading this comprehensive account of the conditions they both faced in the days following Gettysburg.
Until I read this book, I'd been under the erroneous impression that the Gettysburg battled ended on July 3, 1863. I couldn't have been more wrong.
It took about 10 days for the Army of Northern Virginia to get back to safety in Old Dominion. The trip back was absolute torture! Not only was the weather horrendous, but the Army of the Potomac, contrary to what I'd believed, was in constant pursuit. There were several more "minor" battles between the Confederates and the Yankees before the retreat was completed. Hundreds more Rebs and Yanks died.
The line of wagons in retreat stretched for 57 miles. Included in the retreat were not only soldiers, but thousands upon thousands of animals.
The Confederates lost the battle at Gettysburg but achieved a victory of sorts by drawing the Union Army north and by obtaining, via foraging, enough meat and other supplies to keep the Army of Northern Virginia well-stocked for several months. Prior to the invasion of the north, Robert E. Lee's army was so short on supplies that its future was in doubt.
An incredible account of the extent to which human beings can be tested.