The Great Courses: Great Philosophical Debates : Free Will and Determinism

by Shaun Nichols

The Great Great Philosophical Debates : Free Will and Determinism (The Great Courses)

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Audiobook, Psychology, Social Science, Science

Unknown Binding

Reviews

[Mohamed al-Jamri · Rating 5 out of 5]

الإرادة الحرة والحتمية

في عالم يحكمه قانون السببية، هل خياراتنا حرة حقًا؟ هل يمكن لنا أن نختار ما نختار، أي أن نختار رغباتنا، أم أننا ننفذ الرغبات التي تتولد في عقولنا دون علمنا بالأسباب ولا يعدو دور الوعي سوى التبرير؟ ألن تمتد هذه السلسلة من الأسباب إلى ما قبل ولادتنا؟ فمن أين تأتي إذًا إرادتنا الحرة إن وجدت؟ وهل يمكن ألا يعدو هذا الشعور بالحرية في الاختيار الوهم الجميل الذي يخلقه العقل؟ ألا يمكن التوفيق بين الحتمية والإرادة الحرة؟ ما هي التبعات الأخلاقية المتربة على كل هذا؟

في هذه السلسلة من المحاضرات يقوم بروفيسور الفلسفة شون نيكولس من جامعة أريزونا بتقديم هذا الموضوع بدءًا بتعريف المواقف الثلاثة منه، وهي:

1. نفي الحتمية المطلقة وتأكيد وجود الإرادة مهما كانت محدودة
2. التوفيق بين الحتمية والإرادة الحرة
3. التشكيك في وجود الإرادة الحرة ونفيها

ثم يستعرض البروفيسور بشكل مختصر التاريخ الطويل لهذا الموضوع في مختلف الحضارات والديانات التي فكرت فيه وبعد ذلك ينتقل للحجج التي تؤيد وتعارض على كل موقف.

ما يميز هذه المحاضرات هو تقديمها بصورة محايدة، فلا يتم الانحياز لأي وجهة نظر، بل الهدف هو التعليم، لا الاقناع. ويقوم البروفيسور بطرح بعض المواضيع العلمية المرتبطة بالموضوع مثل البيولوجيا وعلم الأعصاب وميكانيكا الكم. ويتم استعراض التبعات الأخلاقية والعملية، خاصة تلك المترتبة على نفي الإرادة الحرة، وفيما يتعلق بأصحاب الشخصية السايكوباثية.

من بين جميع ما قرأت واستمعت له هذا العام، فإن هذه السلسلة من المحاضرات كان لها التأثير الأكبر علي، فقد ساهمت في توضيح بعض مواقفي وتنقية بعض أفكاري والتي كانت ضبابية بعض الشيء، ولم أشعر بأي لحظة من الملل أثناء استماعي للمحاضرات. أنصح به كل من تراوده الأسئلة حول موضوع الإرادة.

[for-much-deliberation ... · Rating 5 out of 5]

Professor of philosophy Shaun Nichols thoroughly investigates varied views and theories surrounding the issues of free will and determinism. This is successfully achieved via his references to various philosophical views both modern and historical, definitions and opinions...

[Tim · Rating 4 out of 5]

First, some definitions courtesy of the Oxford Dictionary:

Free will: The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion.

Determinism: The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

A series of 24 lectures that are broad in scope if not minute in detail - a sketch more than a portrait, if you will. The tension between free will and determinism has been vexing our tiny human minds for a long, long time: mythology, theology, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, physics and criminal law are all represented here. He breaks his investigation down into three types of questioning:

Descriptive questions: What is free will? What is required for us to be morally responsible?
Substantive questions: Do we have free will? Are we morally responsible?
Prescriptive questions: How do we change our actions in response to our knowledge of free will?

One of the things I really appreciated about the lecturer was the complete lack of polemics on his part. His stated goal is 'to give a balanced presentation of the most important philosophical arguments and scientific evidence to put you in a position to draw your own conclusions.' There may be a certain level of irony in that statement: you can only make a choice between free will and determinism if there actually is such a thing as free will (that is to say, you are capable of freely choosing between alternatives). If you find the evidence for determinism convincing, a moment of reflection should suffice to see that you need to take the horse out from behind the cart and place it in front of it. You aren't a determinist because the evidence convinced you it is correct, rather, the evidence appears convincing to you because that was determined. Which is to say, evidence and arguments are inconsequential (indeed, everything is). A determinist does not draw conclusions because it is the determinist system that makes the evidence and argument appear convincing to one group of people and unconvincing to another group of people, not the evidence and argument itself.

This was an interesting series but it didn't change my mind about anything. Which is to say, I still believe I have the option to do just that. And, of course, if you are a determinist, there is no sense in arguing with me.... after all, you believe I have no choice but to think I have a choice. Just like you have no choice but to think otherwise.

But maybe you have no choice but to argue about it. Which is fine. There's a fifty/fifty chance I might freely choose to ignore you.

As you can see, this can all get a little silly.

I didn't say too much about the lecture series, did I? That's all right. You are either going to listen to it or you are not going to listen to it. Perhaps you've got a good idea by now which it is going to be. Or not. Que sera sera.

[Timo · Rating 3 out of 5]

The first two thirds of this lecture series were well done. But the section that got into Ethics seemed to go off the rails in significant ways.

For example...much of this section can be summarized by this statement beginning lecture 23:

"What kinds of moral thoughts 'should' we have about punishment and if we don't have free will is there a way to justify punishment..."

The lecturer veered into a discussion of moral ethics but seemed to forget, frequently, why he'd veered into this discussion. He'd give lengthy descriptions of various ethical systems and theories of justice and then almost as an afterthought try to tie it back to the discussion of Free Will and Determinism.

Several times he'd say things like "this moral system is not affected by a view of determinism..." which I found wholly unbelievable.

To argue that a person is causally determined in their behavior, that they 'couldn't' have 'chosen' to do other than they did, but then that we 'should' 'choose' to treat people in certain ways is simply glossing over the serious troubles with this conflict.

As I said, the first 2/3rds of the series was pretty good. I do think the lecturer could have spent more time explaining how determinism escapes fatalism. Again, I think he rushed past this critically important discussions and then simply referred back to it as though it had been covered in detail.

Finally, I wish those interested in this topic would lose the term "free" in this discussion. It's simply unproductive to argue that any agent is "free" in the Universe, and that becomes a straw man that is simply unable to fight back. Knocking down "free" teaches us nothing of import.

The fundamental question is whether we have the ability to uniquely influence our choices. Can we shape our own subconscious in meaningful ways? Can we navigate the forces that influence us? Of course we are acted upon by genetics and environmental forces beyond our control. Anyone who doesn't recognize this as a starting point in the discussion is simply not worth debating.

The arrogance, it seems to me, of the Free Will skeptics to simply claim victory long before we adequately understand brain science is a mistake that was skewered by Hume: just because we recognize causal determination in the Universe doesn't mean that complex brain activity will behave in the same way that Newtonian physics says objects act. The science is radically still out on this point.

Anyway...overall the lecture series was helpful to my thinking about Will and Determination. But I just wish it hadn't gone off the rails at the end.

[John Martindale · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really liked these lectures. I do not recall Nichols, however, ever bringing up what I consider some of the biggest problems with determinism. Most of these lectures were exploring the points of view of those who believe determinism is true and then wrestle with the consequences. I wish he spent a little more time sharing perspectives in opposition to determinism.

Imagine someone claimed that words and concepts don’t exist and he uses lots of words to try and convince you of this; his entire argument would be a refutation of his argument. There would be absolutely no way to try and convince you of this absurdity, without engaging in a blatant contradiction. That is the sense I get with determinists; everything they say just digs themselves further into a hole.

Determinists believe that nothing could have happened otherwise, meaning if we could rewind the clock to the beginning of time, every human choice would play out precisely like it had. Yet just about everything a determinist does and says seems to contradict this notion.

They work so hard to convince us through argumentation, thus acting as if we have a choice and may or may not be persuaded. For example, some are hell-bent on trying to get the justice system overhauled, since no one is morally responsible, and no one could have done otherwise. Which means they are working extremely HARD to alter the most likely future. See, if they stopped and thought about it, they’d know that future A (most people thinking determinism is absurd) IS FAR MORE LIKELY than possible future B (people largely embracing determinism). Since determinism is overwhelmingly contrary to human experience and common sense and seems manifestly irrational to many, they have a largely uphill battle. They continue to act as if their choices can alter the future. They act as if the future is OPEN, every argument assumes this, and to argue that it is instead determined is to engage in a contradiction.

There are so many of those convinced that determinism is true who then wrestle with what is best, what is moral, and what is fair, all this deliberation presupposes we can come to the truth, we have a choice in the matter. All this “SHOULD” talk to, suggests that we have an obligation to agree with what is true, that we are morally responsible to make adjustments to be aligned with reality, and yet if everything is determined and we have no choice, that is just utter nonsense! Why do they bother? It’s absurd as using words and concepts to try and argue that words and concepts don’t exist.

Every determinist, when they engage in argumentation for why determinism is true, is assuming there is Truth and thinks I should align my errant beliefs with the reality of determinism. But since what they think is true, was determined, why think it is true? The "truth" they embrace is they had no choice in what they believe, rather irrational and unconscious factors, social conditioning, genetics, and for the Calvinists--God's meticulous control made them think this is true and is making them try and convince me. But why should we suppose these deterministic forces care about truth?! I mean seriously, if they are right, it would be the same forces that determined that I think determinism is the most absurd notion conceivable. So, yes, why think determinism cares about truth since it determines us to believe things that are so diametrically opposed?

I guess these philosophers feel that they are predetermined to provide arguments that will determine other people’s beliefs and actions. Their genes and conditioning are making them present a supposed knockout argument that free will is an illusion, those determined to agree with them, have no choice but to be persuaded and experience the horrible life consequences that will follow this deluded belief. Now, it is true the subject will have the illusion they were persuaded by the argument, but another part of the brain will determine this and give them a meaningless residue of having made a choice to believe after the belief had already occurred, and also delude them into thinking they believed it BECAUSE it was true, as if they determining factor making people believed in determinism had any concern with truth.

After writing this review, I found a philosopher who expressed my points far more eloquently. And again, I don't think Nichols ever even mentioned these points in this series.

"If physical determinism is true then the person arguing for it has no choice as to whether he believes in physical determinism or not, nor whether he argues for determinism or not. He is in the grip of physical forces beyond his control. It is as though someone pushed the cosmic “play” button and the arguer starts arguing for something he never had any choice but to believe and to argue for. He is the victim of circumstance. Why should any attention be paid to such a victim – to such a mindless and compulsive machine – to such an idiot? He has an unfortunately not so rare form of Tourette’s syndrome and should be pitied.

It is a farce. The farce gets worse when the person being blasted with this nonsense is considered. According to determinism, the interlocutor too has no choice whether he listens to the sounds the other madman makes, for he too is mad. He listens or does not listen compulsively. He agrees or does not agree with the determinist’s argument through no free will of his own. While the arguer is a cosmic tape machine playing its predetermined recording, the interlocutor is affected by blind physical forces himself. The outcome of this travesty masquerading as “reasoning” has been predetermined since the beginning of time and the exercise is pointless.

The image of two tape machines alone in a room together playing their scripted comments and responses comes to mind. Nobody and nothing is really asserting anything nor really responding. Determinism is consciousness denying. No meaningful “thinking” is occurring if the determinist is right." -Richard Cocks (from The Illogicality of Determinism)

[Angie Boyter · Rating 3 out of 5]

A well-presented lecture series. Perhaps more than I really wanted to know about the subject, but I listened to it with friends and followed each lecture with an enjoyable discussion. MUCH better than a live course I took on the same subject!

[Scott · Rating 4 out of 5]

Generally good, but the latter lectures on punishment and ethics, while interesting, move too far off topic.

[Chris Bowley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great Philosophical Debates: Free Will and Determinism provides a robust commentary of the history of the free will versus determinism debate. At the start of the course, important ideas on the topic are strongly defined such as determinism, fatalism, compatibilism, libertarian free will. These ideas are consistently referred to in the following lectures, ensuring both that this earlier knowledge compounded and that the listener is able to much more readily understand later topics.

Arguments from either side are presented with minimal bias, allowing the listener to determine which side of the argument they sit on (no suggestion intended), based on the evidence provided. Arguments from both sides are presented in such a way that they become convincing; especially the more recent arguments.

The lecture series includes elements of normative ethics (i.e. what we should do) especially in the context of the debate, which are perhaps the most interesting part: what implications would free will being false and determinism being true have on say utilitarianism? What about duty? Expanding upon this is the theme of punishment, not only in a limited or small scale context but in the context of society: if determinism is true and criminals are not responsible, is it morally right to punish? Is there still a reason to punish? What other options do we have?

There’s even a quite brilliant lecture on ‘The Power of Punishment’ which outlines how punishment can be used to motivate people, drawing on scientific evidence. Outcomes are then fed back into the debate.

Prof. Shaun Nicols should be commended on the course structure and delivery. For anyone with a thirst for knowledge and an interest in philosophy, psychology, sociology or ethics, this offering from the Great Courses is not to be missed.

[Abdulla · Rating 2 out of 5]

This course was disappointing on multiple levels, but particularly in its scope and approach to this question.

First of all, the question of free will in the religious sense was only given one lecture. That one lecture considered religious questions of free will only as a historical phenomenon in the context of Calvinism, following the previous lecture on Greek "Fate" and Stoic "necessity." The implication is that religious concerns are just a 'superstition' on par with the latter two. Once the superstitions have been mentioned, the course can move on to discussing the "real" questions while never again referencing God.

I say this is a major flaw because according to Gallup 87% of Americans believe in God. The percentage across the world is even higher. So 87% of Americans would find a crucial element missing from this discussion. On numerous occasions the professor references surveys of people's attitudes about free will and responsibility, many of which would be deeply influenced by their religious persuasions. And yet religion is not mentioned at all. It seems to me that religion is highly relevant to this topic regardless of whether one believes, as the professor seems to, that it's simply a superstition.

But the professor isn't a theologian, he has a scientific and philosophical background. So fine, perhaps this course was meant to be much narrower in scope, only addressing scientific and philosophical questions. Judging it by that standard, it's still a poor course.

First of all, the professor spends far too much time discussing esoteric questions of hard determinism (Are our decisions predetermined?), which he himself acknowledges can never actually be proven one way or another. And because he comes to no conclusions about what the "self" is or the nature of consciousness, the question is deeply confused: how can one conclude that we have no control over our actions when one can't even define what "we" is? What is the nature of our existence? If there's no agreement on *that* question, then it seems to me we can't even begin to discuss determinism in that sense.

His discussions of the consequences of determinism for morality also suffer from similar problems. He talks about morality in the context of modern theories: utilitarianism, deontology, Hume, etc. It's not clear that anybody thinks of morality in those terms except philosophers. Again, religious conceptions of morality (relevant to the vast majority) are conspicuously absent. But aside from this, I would like to have seen some discussion of Nietzschean morality.

The course was best at the few times when it stopped being concerned with absolutist questions of free will vs. hard determinism, and instead addressed the fact that free will is more limited than we often think. The neurological research about random decision making was really fascinating, and I liked his discussions of psychopathy and mental illness. I wanted to hear more about the role of genetics and upbringing in limiting our choices. There's a lot of interesting research on this, especially twin studies, but for some reason this was almost entirely omitted. Also perhaps a discussion of how we might want to rethink the distribution of resources in society if the qualities society prizes are largely accidental and not the result of deliberate effort. But again, none of this was there.

This course was in many ways a microcosm of all that I find wrong with most contemporary philosophy: Ivory tower elitist academics, full of appeals to authority, discussing esoteric questions by speculating wildly with no basis in either objective fact, or in what average people think.

This is probably not the course you're looking for.

[Nilesh Jasani · Rating 5 out of 5]

Free Will and Determinism is an exceptional course that is highly focussed, well structured, and with countless insights to stimulate thinking. The best tribute is to write one's conclusions to append the Professor's closing remarks about his intentions in the course of not to conclude but to make others think. So, this reviewer's views from hereon on the course's main topics.

The simple reality of a philosophical mind is that it struggles to accept a world that could be running only on specific mathematical, logical, or similar rules. It gets worse: these rational fields in which the world rules are set are not the most natural to a homo Sapien. Humanity has discovered the underlying rule-based structure of the world lately.

Contrasting with this is our philosophers' strong inclination to retain the traditional feeling/experience/intuition-based language concepts passed down to them through the mouths of the most well-known and respected thinkers of our kind. The efforts to reconcile the latest knowledge with historic concepts and queries invariably lead to unresolvable debates on definitions and meanings of the terms that are impossible to pin. More importantly, even after millennia-spanning debates, philosophers never settle debates on pet topics unless comprehensively refuted by later-day scientific studies.

Given this, it could be more productive to approach philosophical questions by starting with what is already known and working backward rather than trying again based on queries posed in the past. There is not enough space in a book review to scratch the surface of these ideas, but it is worth putting them here as notes.

Given the evidence of the weight, let us presume that the world runs on a set of rules. Let's call it a big axiom A. We will show that axiom A is at the root of countless philosophical debates, including free will and determinism: believers and disbelievers of many philosophical concepts effectively differ here.

The rule set of the world may or may not be fully comprehendible now or forever. Thankfully, we do not need assumptions about a sentient's complete comprehensibility for our purpose. One must still note that the whole of the rule set could be just slightly longer than what we know currently in our sciences, or it could be billions of times more complex with the number of parameters, interrelations, forces, fields, constants, etc. so large that no system on a rock like earth could encompass it fully with all the resources at disposal.

When a human language produces concepts like soul, consciousness, free will, determinism, or even God, there is a required assumption of something - like a field or a force - that works outside any rule system governing the material world. We are different from inanimate objects and other life forms. Our ancestors found it necessary to believe additional mystic sources were working on us to account for our higher-order existence.

Given that the rules uncovered so far are, at best, an approximation of the full set, it is impossible to rule out mystery concepts as comprehensively as geocentric theories. Proponents need consciousness and the likes to be outside the rule-based frameworks to give importance and agency to our race, not unlike the importance accorded to earth in geocentric theories. This inherently contradicts the axiom mentioned above. The contradictions lead one group to refute the starting assumption, another to rue the gaps in our knowledge, and the most to debate endlessly on finer points without conclusions. A disagreement on the axiom cannot simply be resolved through rational arguments based on them.

Here is one example from the book that falls into this category. In the chapters on neurosciences, we learn about the struggles of different philosophical schools in finding the space for consciousness and free will in what we are learning about the brain's processing of signals and actions. Some see a potential for consciousness to exert itself in the current measurement gaps between our awareness neurons becoming aware of something and another set acting. The others want to use the gap for free will to guide the action before its neurons are activated. It actually gets this silly!

There are more straightforward, obvious answers that require an overthrowing of historically-cherished concepts (the reviewer realizes practical difficulties but let's leave that aside, given the space constraints).

Let's start with an example from traditional physics - say, fluidity. One needs to know everything about individual liquid molecules and their interrelations when present in an enormous number to understand the behavior of droplets or onwards to fluid down a capillary. The reality is that not only do we not know all at a molecular level, but we cannot understand the complete interplay of even three of them, let alone billions.

Still, fluidity is an emergent concept that can be studied approximately using other types of equations. No scientific person thinks there is something non-scientific in between, like free will or consciousness, that suddenly causes molecules to behave like waves of one type versus the other.

Our minds and bodies are tiny instances of the large world equation set. We cannot work on how our body changes from one moment to the next without any external influence, let alone its dynamic evolution over time, given all the environmental variables. A soul, consciousness, free will, etc., are good functional ways to describe many emergent behaviors like viscosity in fluid mechanics (notwithstanding their utility in reconciling historic, spiritual, or religious beliefs). Yet, searching for their causes in scientific or rational realms is futile.

The last statement is important. A typical philosopher begins with questions like whether there is free will with the promise not to provide an answer through axiomatic authority but with didactic, reasoned discourses. The process of answering first tangles her in describing the term's meaning. The more she parses, the worse it becomes to ignore the gaps in scientific knowledge. Depending on her proclivity, she might feel tempted to use the knowledge gaps to provide the basis for her conclusions on the topic. Unfortunately, the closer she comes to asserting a non-rational concept, the more random and arbitrary it appears if she continues to pursue her logical exercise to find causality or reason. This point will have her recoil and leave the query without a definitive conclusion. Amid such tensions, she would also anguish whether a complete rule-based system will be deterministic, regardless of the possibility of the equation being unsolvable by any system smaller than the universe itself.

The simple reality is that for those who want to believe in concepts like soul, consciousness, or free will, it is imperative to abandon rationality or science somewhere. Efforts to reconcile are doomed to fail, given the starting point in the hypothesis. It is precisely for the same reason that people with different assumptions on the limits of rationality are unlikely to ever agree on the answers to these questions, given the gaps in our knowledge. Those who believe in a rule-based world can still have practical answers to moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas, as shown in the course toward the final chapters.

A small section on the determinism debate, which is slightly different. On the arrow of time, the observed world hurls in only one direction. To call this direction fated or not is a linguist's prerogative. Whether the equation is solvable using anything smaller than the universe is unimportant for our purposes. Like a three-body problem, even the most defined rule-based system may still not yield conclusions on where things are headed without waiting for the actuality to unfold. The defined rule-based system may have probabilistic parts. However, it is still an axiomatic assumption if we want to believe that there is no more profound, hidden theory behind any probabilistic fallout we observe. In the end, without mystic forces, a rule-based system is definitionally just rule-based, which is almost synonymous with the word deterministic. Some may use probabilistic parameters to dispute this, but that's an issue with the word's definition; it does not create any room for concepts like free will.

Back to the course: it is worth going through because it will make many come up with ideas, like for this reviewer.

[Jacob O'connor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very, very interesting. A definite recommendation for anyone who likes to think.

[Nikola Jankovic · Rating 5 out of 5]

Veliki sam obožavalac The Great Courses Plus, nekakvog Netflixa za obrazovanje. Nakon što su dve godine pokušavali da flertuju sa hobistima, pa se fokusirali na šivenje, slikanje i crtanje, vratili su se na kurseve koje često drže univerzitetski profesori. Fiksna mesečna pretplata, pa izvoli, nahrani radoznalost...

Naravno, uvek ih je bolje gledati, ali neka od tih predavanja mogu se i slušati kao Audible "knjiga". 24 lekcije, pre kojih sam imao prilično čvrsto mišljenje o slobodnoj volji. Svaki čovek bira svoj put, u svakom trenutku smo slobodni da odlučujemo, tj. svaka pojedinačna odluka je samo naša i potpuno je slobodna. Jasno mi je bilo da mnogi faktori utiču na to do kojih odluka možemo da dođemo, naravno, ali jednom kad dođeš do te odluke, ona je tvoja...

Ovaj kurs me je malo poremetio. Ne, nisam prestao da verujem u postojanje slobodne volje, ali sad mogu da poslušam zagovornike determinizma i da ne mislim da je to što pričaju potpuno van pameti. Osim toga, još sam više počeo da razmišljam o faktorima koji utiču na naš život, a koji su izvan naše slobodne volje. I dalje sam na Sartrovoj strani, smatram da je njegov koncept "loše vere" odličan i da ga treba pratiti ("Čovek je osuđen na slobodu; jer, jednom bačen u svet, on je odgovoran za sve što učini"), ali ne možemo jednostavno prećutati činjenicu da veći uticaj na našu sreću i uspeh u životu (najverovatnije) imaju oni faktori koji su izvan naše kontrole i izvan naših svakodnevnih (slobodnih?) odluka.

Najpre, šta je slobodna volja? Prvi uslov za slobodnu volju je otprilike to da, kad osoba donese neku odluku, u tom trenutku ima mogućnost i priliku da donese i drugačiju. Potrebni su alternativni izbori, izbor između različitih opcija. Drugi ključni element je autonomija, tj. osećaj da izbor dolazi od nas, a ne pod prisilom ili manipulacijom. Treći uslov je odgovornost – lična i moralna. Možeš da budeš odgovoran za svoje odluke (na kraju krajeva, i za svoja dela) samo ako si imao mogućnost slobodne volje, i tada treba da odgovaraš za posledice svojih odluka ili dela.

S druge strane, determinizam se objašnjava kao mišljenje da su događaji "determinisani" (predodređeni), i to tako da svaka naša odluka sledi nečemu što se desilo pre toga. Deterministi objašnjavaju da u tom trenutku imamo samo privid izbora, a da je ustvari svaka odluka ujedno i jedina moguća posledica svega što se desilo pre tog trenutka. Najčvršći deterministi čak tvrde da bismo to mogli da dovedemo do početka vremena. Kažu, na primer, kad bismo vreme vratili na 1. januar 1900, pa ga ponovo pustili, da bi se sve stvari nakon toga desile potpuno isto. Nisam postao determinista, ali mi je jasna logika tog "uzročnog determinizma", prema kojoj svaka stvar ima nekakav uzrok i da se desila zbog nečega. Ako je izbio požar u kuhinji, jednostavno pokušavamo da nađemo razlog zašto je do njega došlo i da ga objasnimo – tako funkcionišu i nauka i razumsko razmišljanje. Ne kažemo jednostavno "požar se desio, slučajno".

Ozbiljan, racionalni determinizam ne treba videti kao nekakvu sudbinu, predodređenost čitavih naših života i svega što se dešava, već svakog prvog sledećeg događaja, tj. naše prve sledeće odluke. (Uzgred, stari Grci su imali to verovanje u sudbinu, setimo se samo Edipa, ali ni ta sudbina nije određivala svaki naš trenutak i sve što nam se desi, već samo velike i važne događaje u našim životima). Neki deterministi čak tvrde da su slobodna volja i determinizam kompatibilni (zato ih zovemo kompatibilisti). Tvrde da tvoj "karakter", ono što ti jesi, pravi svaki sledeći izbor. U tom trenutku ti zapravo nemaš izbora, pošto taj izbor temelji na tvom razmišljanju, istoriji, karakteru i emocijama – ali, na kraju krajeva, izbor jeste tvoj, jeste posledica svega što ti jesi.

Ima ovde mnogo interesantnih pitanja. Šta znači slobodna volja za hrišćanstvo? Ako imamo slobodnu volju, Bog zna za to, ustvari zna svaku našu odluku i trenutnu i buduću. Ako je tako, čemu onda molitve? I zašto je poslao svog sina na Zemlju – deluje da je na taj način reagovao na dešavanja na njoj? Ako je znao sve što se dešava pre i nakon toga, zbog čega je reagovao?

Interesantno je razmišljanje i o pravu. Da li ljudima treba suditi i osuditi ih za njihove odluke i dela ukoliko prava slobodna volja ne postoji? Ako je za neki zločin krivo sve što se tom zločincu desilo do tog trenutka, i ako taj pojedinac u tom trenutku nije imao mogućnost izbora, kako možemo da ga osudimo? Ovaj koncept se delimično već i koristi – predavač koristi primer poznatog suđenja na kojem je advokat, uz pomoć argumenta nepostojanja slobodne volje, uspeo svoja dva klijenta da spase smrtne kazne. Zar nisu suđenja na kojima se pozivaju na mentalno stanje optuženog upravo to? Mentalno stanje krivca uticalo je na to da nije imao slobodnu volju, ali koliko daleko ide to mentalno stanje? Da li bismo tako trebali da gledamo na svaku odluku?

Tu su i neki deterministi (Smolensky), koji veruju da ljudima "ne treba reći da slobodna volja ne postoji, jer bi posledice bile katastrofalne". Bez obzira na to što slobodna volja ne postoji, Smolensky kaže da naša verovanja i naše misli utiču na naša dela, pa bi se vremenom brojne odluke promenile. Takođe, ako prestanemo da verujemo u slobodnu volju, prestaćemo da preuzimamo odgovornost za naše uspehe, a još više za naše neuspehe. "Nisam ja kriv" bi išlo toliko daleko da bismo stigli do toga da izgubimo prirodan osećaj krivice, kao i vrednost svojih života. Uspeh u školi, na poslu, u privatnim odnosima – ni za šta od toga nisam zaslužan, uspeh je bio neizbežan, čemu se onda truditi dalje? Ako nas neko voli (ili mi volimo nekoga), da li ta ljubav vredi isto, ako se jednostavno desila kao posledica nekih prethodnih dešavanja, našeg vaspitanja, okoline, naših roditelja, sveta koji nas okružuje? Da li je zbog toga manje vredna? Dakle, ako živimo pod iluzijom slobodne volje, da li treba to da skrivamo od svih nas? (I, ako je tako, zašto Smolensky o tome priča javno?)

Ima i determinista (Pareboom) koji tvrdi da se neće ništa promeniti. Slobodna volja ne postoji, tvrde, ali to ne znači da ćemo prestati da preuzimamo odgovornost ili osećaj vrednosti za naše uspehe. Kažu: "Hvalimo vrhunske košarkaše uprkos tome što nisu sami zaslužni za svoju visinu. Isto tako hvalimo Ajnštajna, iako nije sam kriv za svoju genijalnost i intelekt."

Jako je zanimljivo i pitanje "moralne sreće", pa imam osećaj da bih mogao pročitati nekoliko knjiga samo na tu temu. Na primer, zbog čega su kazne za pokušaj ubistva manje nego za ubistvo, ako je samo (ne)sreća uticala na to da se to ubistvo nije zaista i desilo? Ako vozim pijan i zaustavi me policija, platiću kaznu, možda mi oduzmu dozvolu na neko vreme – ali zbog čega idem u zatvor ako u identičnom slučaju udarim pešaka?

Slobodna volja je jedno od onih toliko važnih filozofskih pitanja, koja mogu pokrenuti i hraniti naš interes za filozofiju. A opet, na njega nemamo odgovor. Možemo imati mišljenje, možemo doneti svoj sud, čak ga i potkrepiti racionalnim objašnjenjima – ali na kraju krajeva, ne možemo biti sigurni da je naš odgovor tačan. Ali tako je to sa filozofijom – pokreće teška, ali veoma bitna pitanja, na koja ćemo pokušati da odgovorimo i o njima nećemo prestati da razmišljamo, pa čak i kad znamo da konačnog odgovora na ta pitanja nema.

[Jon Stout · Rating 4 out of 5]

More tapes I listen to while driving, these lectures thoroughly cover the bases of the Free Will versus Determinism debate. They start off with a survey of intellectual history, finding elements of the debate in each of the major religious traditions, for example Karma in Hinduism and predestination in Calvinism. They go on to trace the debate through Enlightenment science, into the influence of clinical psychology and current legal thinking.

Nichols specializes in experimental philosophy, a relatively new wrinkle in philosophy, which is interested in polls and experiments as they might bear on philosophical problems. Though I am often skeptical, it is an interesting fact, established experimentally, that if one does not believe in free will, one will act differently, more fatalistically I suppose.

As a result of working through these lectures, I have come to the conclusion that both sides of the debate have holes so big you could drive a truck through them, and thus the debate loses a lot of its point. I have always been a compatibilist, believing that the two sides can be reconciled, and I am now confirmed in this view.

On the side of determinism, quantum level indeterminacy and chaos theory indicate that there is a considerable element of randomness in the world, so that no determinism can be absolute. On the side of free will, unconscious factors in our thinking (going back to Freud and even Aristotle) make it clear that there are often determinants of our actions of which we are not aware, and from which we are not free. Nonetheless free will is so central to ethics and determinism is so central to science that we need to try to understand the role of these concepts as best we can.

My own view (which I may write up some time) is that free will is not achieved in spite of determinism, but rather accomplishes a measure of determinism. If I act freely, I put my actions into some context that makes sense to me, that is, a series of reasons that determines the result. I have refrained from allowing my actions to be random or irrational, and have established a causal nexus into which they fit. I am speaking somewhat glibly at the moment, but these are issues that one returns to again and again.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was the second great courses audiobook I've done, so I had a decent idea of what to expect on the style and depth of the material. In that respect, it was deep enough to get a good understanding of the topic, but probably not deep enough for someone whose done dedicated research into it before. For me, coming from some philosophy courses at university, I had a decent understanding of the concepts already, but I never delved into it much. Based on that, I really enjoyed this course.

The lectures all had clear points and were well connected to each other and the main topic. The philosophies of each argument seemed well summarised and nicely explained in each case. The narrator/lecturer spoke in a natural and expressive manner which gave me the impression that he was just as excited to be teaching this course as I was about learning the concepts. There were a couple of instances where I lost the train of thought a bit, but those were more from my internal diversions on thinking about the topics and not paying enough attention to what was being said.

I particularly enjoyed how the lectures were structured by going mostly chronologically on when the different concepts were developed. Some of the later lectures weren't quite as interesting since they went more into the legal and moral implications of some of the arguments of each side, but that's not to say they weren't still quite enjoyable and interesting to think about.

Based on the course, I've definitely been swayed to the determinist side. I actually came to that conclusion quite early on and it was fun to have internal arguments with myself based on arguments both against determinism and also interpretations and justifications for determinism that were not in line with my view on it. I honestly can't think of any noteworthy issues regarding the course and therefore I'd highly recommend this course for anyone even mildly curious on the topic.

[Skip (David) Everling · Rating 4 out of 5]

A 12 hour series of 24 lectures. The first half focuses on the core free will debate, laying out the history of philosophy on the topic, weighing in arguments from the major perspectives (libertarian, compatibilist, determinist), and looking at how more recent science, particularly discoveries in neuroscience, might factor in with supporting evidence.

The second half proceeds into norms for Ethics and Punishment, which, as the common argument would hold, are rendered meaningless in a deterministic view (i.e. if all is fated who's to blame). I liked the way the professor Shaun Nichols presented reasons for why it doesn't make sense to jump to an extreme normative conclusion as policy, even if you believe in Hard Determinism, the view to which I found myself inclined toward throughout the lecture series.

I found the first half with its philosophizing on free will directly a bit more engaging than the later lectures on morality and policy, but every lecture was always interesting on its own and I enjoyed the course overall.

The Philosophy of Mind: Brains, Consciousness and Thinking Machines course by Patrick Grim covers very similar philosophical ground, and in comparison I might consider it slightly better than this course because of the added breadth.

[Josh Shelton · Rating 3 out of 5]

This did what I wanted it too. I'm satisfied. But my interest is much more specific and in depth.

[Behrooz Parhami · Rating 5 out of 5]

[I wrote this review on June 4, 2016, and uploaded it to GoodReads on June 4, 2021.]

In this 24-lecture course, Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science) outlines the history of efforts to answer the important question: Do we have a precharted destiny or do we make our own life choices? Our answer to this question, whose roots go back to more than 2500 years ago, affects every detail of our daily lives individually and how we view social structures and criminal justice laws/punishments at the collective level. This age-old riddle, viz. free will vs. determinism, has occupied not just philosophers, but also scientists and other great minds for centuries.

Determinism means that because nothing happens without a cause, everything is predetermined. For example, if we could roll back the universe to its exact state at the beginning of January 1, 1900, everything that has happened since then will happen again, and in exactly the same manner. The notions of fate and karma are in line with this way of thinking. Proponents of free will, or libertarians (not to be confused with a political philosophy that goes by the same name), contend that humans, and to some extent lower life forms, are capable of making decisions which can lead to choosing one path over another, thus potentially resulting in vastly different outcomes in the long run.

Most versions of the argument for free will postulate that it is incompatible with determinism. In other words, they take the conditional statement “If determinism is true then there is no free will” to be true. However, determinism being false does not automatically imply the existence of free will. One can point to probabilistic events (a la quantum mechanics) which lead to nondeterministic or unpredictable outcomes, even in the absence of free will. Of course, there is also the argument that some things appear to be random only because our knowledge is not yet deep enough to understand them.

One of the main arguments for the existence of free will is that humans seem to be wired for the concept. Children as young as 2 or 3 understand what it means to decide between alternatives. We humans are also wired for moral responsibility, which is nonsensical in the absence of free will. Determinism is supported by predictability in nature based on scientific laws. Given precisely known initial condition, natural laws predict what happens next, and there is no reason to think that our mind and the deliberation processes therein are exempt from such laws. Compatibilism is the view that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. This is sometimes viewed as the chicken’s way out of a serious debate.

Harry G. Frankfurt, an effective proponent of the free-will theory, is, unfortunately, better-known for his semiserious book, On Bullshit, which got him a gig on Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show,” an indication that philosophical topics aren’t all that interesting to the general public! Frankfurt argued that the principle of alternate possibilities (someone can be said to have acted on free will only if he could have done otherwise) is not necessary for free will. He then advanced the concept of second-order desire (the desire to have a certain desire), which is unique to humans, as a hallmark of free will, in the process removing some of the prior objections to compatibilism. But problems remain nevertheless.

https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/...

In the 24 lectures of this highly enjoyable and informative course (listed at the end of my review), Professor Nichols tackles the problem from every possible angle, as he tries to shed light on why the problem is indeed very profound and how both psychology and neuroscience are playing key roles in advancing our understanding of the main issues. Hearing about these ideas from an award-winning professor is much more effective that reading a book. I recommend the course highly.

1. Free Will and Determinism
2. Fate and Karma
3. Devine Predestination and Foreknowledge
4. Causal Determinism
5. Ancient and Medieval Indeterminism
6. Agent Causation
7. Ancient and Classical Compatibilism
8. Contemporary Campatibilism
9. Hard Determinism
10. Free Will Impossibilism
11. The Belief in Free Will
12. Physics and Free Will
13. Neuroscience and Determinism
14. Neuroscience of Conscious Choice
15. Psychology and Free Will
16. Deontological Ethics and Free Will
17. Utilitarianism and Free Will
18. Responsibility and the Emotions
19. Pessimism and Illusionism
20. Optimism and Skepticism
21. The Ethics of Punishment
22. The Power of Punishment
23. Moral Responsibility and Psychopathy
24. The Future of Responsibility

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was meant to like this course...

Of course I wasn't meant to like this course. I enjoyed these lectures because they were well-prepared and presented by an interesting and knowledgeable Professor Nichols. I'm a novice when discussing these nearly unanswerable philosophical questions, but here goes:

Within the human realm, there is both freewill and deterministic events and processes. The determined 'things' are like: if you are born, you will die. If you live, you will breathe, eat, drink (being merry is a freewill thing); our biology is determined through eons of evolution and cannot be (easily) changed. The freewill aspects in humans can be boiled down to individual and societal. For example the societal aspects might include the broad definition of 'morality', which has been defined by societies throughout history, changing as the needs require. As individuals, we may chose (freely) what aspects of the societal morality we wish to follow. As an example, in past centuries slavery was not considered to be amoral, yet many would disagree (especially the slaves), based on their own views and reflecting their experiences.

Within the non human realm, animals have a more direct relationship between animal freewill (quite different from human freewill in this discussion) and determinism. The donkey, when faced with two separate, but equal, piles of hay, will eat from both, most probably...all to help stay alive and procreate. I suppose the donkey's freewill choice is which pile he/she chooses first.

In the realm of physics, almost (?) everything is deterministic. A radioactive atom will decay in a prescribed manner, releasing the same amount and type energy every single time. The aspects of quantum physics that 'seem' to behave in a more 'freewill' manner, are (most probably) a result of their not being fully understood by the human observer.

All in all, I enjoyed the lectures because it made me think...possibly in a prescribed manner...possibly in my own, unique way. I freely acquired these lectures during a sale that was purposely proposed by the Great Courses...my use of a coupon was divinely ordained.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

I listened to this to see if there were any good arguments for free will which I had missed out on after concluding that either determinism or indeterminism were true. But yeah, they dont exist. So this was mostly a review. I did learn a few things, but they were mostly having to do with history or with neuroscience. Tertiary things of little bearing to the core of this issue. I am more convinced now that free will is obviously false, that this was obvious a thousand or more years ago, and that discerning this easily is a good test of someone's basic critical thinking ability.

[Yilmaz Aksoy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bir dizi dersteň oluşan bu kitap hoşuma gitti. Sesli kitaptan dinleyip takip etmesi de kolay geldi bana. Kitapta tarih boyunca değişik perspektiflerden bu iki konunun nasıl düşünüldüğünü anlatıyor.
Tabii ki bu soruların cevabı verilmiyor ama bu yolda sunulmuş bir sürü çözüm önerisini çok güzel ele alıyor. Filozofların ifadeleri kafa karıştırıcı karmaşıklığa ulaşınca basit örneklerle yardımımıza koşuyor hoca. Ders sonlarında da çok kısa ve öz bir özet geçiyor. Soruları fizik, psikoloji ve hukuk açısından da ele alıyor. Felsefeye ilgi duyanlara tavsiye ederim.

[Max Mitchell]

Spoiler alert: Free will is an illusion. We are the ever evolving conclusion of an eternal equation and everything we have ever thought/felt/acted is the result of everything that has ever happened. We have no control in this. If you were to intentionally scald yourself with freshly boiled water for the sake of free will you would be foolish in that your action is only a reaction.

[Emma · Rating 3 out of 5]

A mixed bag.

Too many lectures spent on ethics/justice/law instead of the core free will vs determinism content I was looking for.

Wish it would have explored concepts highly relevant to the question of free will such as the Self, mind vs brain stuff etc.

[Subjuntivo Subjuntivo · Rating 3 out of 5]

I felt it went unnecessary places, that the focus was rather lost talking about physics and more; the focus I expected was philosophical.

[Joseph L. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Watch a detailed review along with my favorite ideas and takeaways at:
https://youtu.be/3YGUGQqUEkc

[Aaron Neath · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Listened to the audiobook at work, not sure about completed date!)

Interesting, casual listening.

[Leonardo]

Sapolsky cita a Nichols en Compórtate.

[Toni · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have no idea what I read/listen to but it was interesting and I will have to go over the material again.

too smart for me

[Ansha · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5

[Edward · Rating 4 out of 5]

Free will vs Determinism is one of those questions that I've always struggled to wrap my head around. How to reconcile what is clearly a universe whose parts are governed by well understood and well described forces and laws with human behavior that, at least for most of us, appears to entail acts of free will?

First off - this series of lectures from the Great Courses series doesn't settle the argument. Not only I, but philosophers in general are still struggling over it. However, what this course does and does well is introduce the various thoughts and concepts, both historical and current, on the nature of free will.

Cases are made from different approaches for both sides - that Free Will is true or that Free Will is false. These lectures cover the first half of the course and give me a lot of what I was expecting to find.

The later lectures that make up the second half of the course build on this and go in directions I didn't expect. Offering more abstract discussions on what free will really means. In addition, there are lectures bringing in the results and observations of neuroscience and speculations about what they mean to the free will consideration. Finally, there's discussion about morality, crime and punishment considered both from the notion that free will is true as well as the implications of determinism being true.

I found the lecturer easily listenable - neither put to sleep monotone, nor excessively dramatic. Overall I found the course interesting and challenging. It's helped me better understand my own beliefs and given me some new things to consider. I rate it a high success. This is my first exposure to one of The Great Courses products since they became available on Audible and I look forward to exploring other titles.

[J.D. Steens · Rating 2 out of 5]

Nichols starts this Teaching Company course with a common sense proposition about free will that sets up the debate: we are free to choose, yet we acknowledge that events have causes. From this basic bifurcation, he adds that the brain is a physical object, yet its mental operations have the capacity to operate in a transcendent world. From this solid foundation, Nichols moves through the history of the free will debate in all of its iterations but does not develop fully this connection between the physical brain and non-physical mind. From an evolutionary viewpoint, mental activity develops from primal life forms where freedom to vary action is extremely limited to humans where such freedom is relatively unlimited. From this perspective, the end of action remains invariant throughout evolution (survival, well-being), but the means by which these overarching ends are obtained are progressively variable, reaching their culmination in humans where there is choice (free will) about how to survive and achieve well-being (and also the freedom to deviate from what is best for us). This line of thought might provide an underlying unity to the many either/or schools of thought that characterize the free will debate. It would not only pull together the connection between the brain and mind and, thus, man's essential continuity with all life forms, but would also help to explain why presumed objectivity is so often pervaded with subjectivity (needs of the body).