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My Year in Iraq
""Baghdad was burning." With these words, Ambassador L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer begins his memoir of fourteen danger-filled months as America's proconsul in Iraq. My Year in Iraq is the only senior insider's perspective on the crucial period following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. In dramatic detail, Bremer reveals the previously hidden struggles among Iraqi politicians and America's leaders, taking us from the ancient lanes in the holy city of Najaf to the White House Situation Room and the Pentagon E-Ring." "His memoir carries the reader behind closed doors in Baghdad during hammer-and-tongs negotiations with emerging Iraqi leaders as they struggle to forge the democratic institutions vital to Iraq's future of hope. He describes his private meetings with President Bush and his admiration for the president's firm wartime leadership. And we witness heated sessions among members of America's National Security Council - George Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice - as Bremer labors to realize the vision he and President Bush share of a free and democratic New Iraq." Bremer faced daunting problems working with Iraq's traumatized and divided population to find a path to a responsible and representative government. The Shia Arabs, the country's long-repressed majority, deeply distrusted the Sunni Arab minority who had held power for centuries and had controlled the detested Baath Party. Iraq's non-Arab Kurds teetered on the brink of secession when Bremer arrived. He had to find Sunnis willing to participate in the new political order. He takes the reader inside marathon negotiations as he and his team shepherded Iraq's new leaders to write an interim constitution with guarantees for individual and minority rights unprecedented in the region.
417 pages, Hardcover
First published November 21, 1387
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 46 reviews
April 22, 2012
Poor Paul Bremer, so incompetent, he couldn't even write his own book, much less manage the Iraq mess. His story is of a country-club diplomat and Bush crony thrust into a situation miles above his head who spends 400 pages on finger-pointing, ducking responsibility, doing nothing and causing countless problems through his ignorance and hubris. Most famous was his pointless disbanding of the Iraqi army which bred chaotic violence and gang rule for a decade.
I made it about 3/4 of the way through before throwing it against the bookcase and dismissing it as BS.
I made it about 3/4 of the way through before throwing it against the bookcase and dismissing it as BS.
October 25, 2015
أثار هذا الكتاب كم كبير من الأسئلة فبعد 12 سنة من احتلال العراق لم يوجد سوى قوى سياسية ضعيفة و فاسدة و إدار غير كفوءة للبلد و مقدراته و إنقسام مستفحل و عميق بين مكوناته و بيئة خصبة لتيارات التكفيرية
July 23, 2023
Felt somewhat conflicted about this one: it is self-propagandizing in a number of ways, highly selective, and a bit treacly. But on the other hand, it's a very valuable resource for historians for understanding what happened in Iraq during the first year of the US presence there. Moreover, at times I had to sympathize with Bremer for the impossible situation he faced in Iraq, and while he made some critical mistakes he also got some things right.
Bremer was a long-time diplomat, Republican foreign policy expert, and consultant who was tapped in a rush to head the Coalition Provisional Authority, which essentially governed Iraq from early 2003 to June 2004. The CPA has been widely and justifiably criticized for not being able to produce resources and decisions, although the Iraqi Governing Council that co-ruled with the CPA deserves a lot of this blame too. Where people really come down hard on the CPA is its first 2 orders, which de-Baathified the Iraqi state and disbanded the army and police. Bremer's defense of the former act is more...defensible. He argues that this de-Baathification only covered the top slices of the Iraqi Baath Party, although there is evidence that a lot of ordinary people were purged. Either way, this decision was probably less consequential than the disbanding of the military and police. Almost all analysts of the war contend that this act poured fuel on the embers of insurgency by putting tens of thousands of armed young men out of work and dishonoring them in the process. Bremer in the book contends that the Iraqi army had disbanded itself by melting away or going home after the US invasion, but this is a weak excuse. Dozens of testimonies by people like Pete Mansoor show that some Iraqi commanders were trying to reconstitute their units, which could have been used for a variety of security tasks: securing the border, combatting looting, locking down arms depots, etc. Instead, the sudden, blanket disbanding of the army became a self-inflicted wound that haunted the occupation. Bremer doesn't mention that the process for this decision was incredibly haphazard; he apparently cleared it with Rumsfeld and Bush but not Rice and Powell, and it wasn't decided upon or even really considered before the US invaded Iraq.
A lot of this book is about Bremer's dealings with the top Iraqi political players and the effort to create a transitional government and constitution. Bremer worked alongside the fractious and incompetent Iraqi Governing Council, which the CPA appointed in a way designed to represent the major ethnic/sectarian groups of Iraq. The Shia, now the majority, were more Islamist in character and were now in the catbird seat, although they still wanted a federalized govt that would prevent the return of an oppressive central state. The Kurds just wanted a more secular govt and autonomy for their region. The Sunni were a major problem: they had dominated Iraq for decades and feared revenge from the Shia and Kurds, and they were secular nationalist centralizers. The consensus that emerged was a federalized state with a fairly weak central govt, which was probably inevitable considering IRaq's recent history.
Much of the difficulty Bremer faced was trying to wrangle these fractious and persnickety groups, and no one threw a bigger wrench in the process than the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. This Shia spiritual leader didn't participate directly in the political process but rather sniped from the sideline with unreasonable demands. His major demand was to have immediate elections for a transitional government and constitutional convention. THis was great in theory, except that there was zero electoral infrastructure in IRaq: no voter rolls, no electoral law or personnel, nothing. The CPA and the UN agreed that it would take a year to be able to hold national elections, and it took forever to get Sistani to realize this. He still criticized and undermined the transitional constitution (TAL), which was written by the CPA and IGC together. Of course, democratic legitimacy was a huge problem for the interim period, but overall I think BRemer did a decent job guiding this process.
He was also dealing at the same time with the "sovereignty now" crowd in the US (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney) who wanted to just appoint an interim gov't and phase out the US presence. Bremer pushed back and kind of won this policy battle, committing the US to a longer transitional process that would have more room eventually for IRaqi input through elections and referenda. Bremer understood that the US presence, for all its flaws, was the key to keeping the security situation intact as Shia and Sunni insurgencies escalated. Here was where I had more sympathy for him: he was dealing with an incredibly complex set of political actors, not a ton of resources, and a country whose infrastructure was highly degraded and was in a sense psychologically damaged from decades of brutal Baathist rule. While he made crucial mistakes, I don't think anyone could have excelled in this situation (which is a good reason not to invade).
I think the frustrating thing about Bremer is that he really isn't willing to look at things from another angle or to reassess decisions. He really believes that this war was justified and necessary, that the example of Iraq will spread democracy in the MIddle East, and that the insurgency during the first year was almost all "dead-enders," or regime personnel trying to retake power or get revenge. He seems incapable of viewing US power as having negative or unpredictable effects. He never bothers taking the perspective of, for example, an Iraqi who might have had a family member killed by stray US fire, or one who might have had his/her home raided in the middle of the night and had a family member taken away after guns were shoved in their faces. These dynamics also drove the insurgency, but Bremer never discusses them. It's disconcerting to have people thrust into such immense positions of power who seem to lack these critical thinking skills.
There was a major cognitive dissonance at the end of the book, for example, when he's trying to leave the country and transfer sovereignty without the insurgency stopping the process (or shooting down his plane). He's trying to get out of the country physically in a surprise way so insurgents don't literally shoot down his plane. At the same time, he's talking about what a huge success the CPA has been, how Iraq is on the road to democracy, prosperity, and stability. It has the "everything is fine" flaming room meme written all over it.
There's definitely a great book to be written about BRemer, who embodies many tendencies of both the national security establishment and the consulting world. He is an incredibly energetic and resourceful person with a lot of hubris, not too much self-reflection, and major blind spots. Still, this is a good book for understanding the challenges and processes of the first year of the US war in Iraq; just don't make it the only book you read on the subject.
Bremer was a long-time diplomat, Republican foreign policy expert, and consultant who was tapped in a rush to head the Coalition Provisional Authority, which essentially governed Iraq from early 2003 to June 2004. The CPA has been widely and justifiably criticized for not being able to produce resources and decisions, although the Iraqi Governing Council that co-ruled with the CPA deserves a lot of this blame too. Where people really come down hard on the CPA is its first 2 orders, which de-Baathified the Iraqi state and disbanded the army and police. Bremer's defense of the former act is more...defensible. He argues that this de-Baathification only covered the top slices of the Iraqi Baath Party, although there is evidence that a lot of ordinary people were purged. Either way, this decision was probably less consequential than the disbanding of the military and police. Almost all analysts of the war contend that this act poured fuel on the embers of insurgency by putting tens of thousands of armed young men out of work and dishonoring them in the process. Bremer in the book contends that the Iraqi army had disbanded itself by melting away or going home after the US invasion, but this is a weak excuse. Dozens of testimonies by people like Pete Mansoor show that some Iraqi commanders were trying to reconstitute their units, which could have been used for a variety of security tasks: securing the border, combatting looting, locking down arms depots, etc. Instead, the sudden, blanket disbanding of the army became a self-inflicted wound that haunted the occupation. Bremer doesn't mention that the process for this decision was incredibly haphazard; he apparently cleared it with Rumsfeld and Bush but not Rice and Powell, and it wasn't decided upon or even really considered before the US invaded Iraq.
A lot of this book is about Bremer's dealings with the top Iraqi political players and the effort to create a transitional government and constitution. Bremer worked alongside the fractious and incompetent Iraqi Governing Council, which the CPA appointed in a way designed to represent the major ethnic/sectarian groups of Iraq. The Shia, now the majority, were more Islamist in character and were now in the catbird seat, although they still wanted a federalized govt that would prevent the return of an oppressive central state. The Kurds just wanted a more secular govt and autonomy for their region. The Sunni were a major problem: they had dominated Iraq for decades and feared revenge from the Shia and Kurds, and they were secular nationalist centralizers. The consensus that emerged was a federalized state with a fairly weak central govt, which was probably inevitable considering IRaq's recent history.
Much of the difficulty Bremer faced was trying to wrangle these fractious and persnickety groups, and no one threw a bigger wrench in the process than the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. This Shia spiritual leader didn't participate directly in the political process but rather sniped from the sideline with unreasonable demands. His major demand was to have immediate elections for a transitional government and constitutional convention. THis was great in theory, except that there was zero electoral infrastructure in IRaq: no voter rolls, no electoral law or personnel, nothing. The CPA and the UN agreed that it would take a year to be able to hold national elections, and it took forever to get Sistani to realize this. He still criticized and undermined the transitional constitution (TAL), which was written by the CPA and IGC together. Of course, democratic legitimacy was a huge problem for the interim period, but overall I think BRemer did a decent job guiding this process.
He was also dealing at the same time with the "sovereignty now" crowd in the US (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney) who wanted to just appoint an interim gov't and phase out the US presence. Bremer pushed back and kind of won this policy battle, committing the US to a longer transitional process that would have more room eventually for IRaqi input through elections and referenda. Bremer understood that the US presence, for all its flaws, was the key to keeping the security situation intact as Shia and Sunni insurgencies escalated. Here was where I had more sympathy for him: he was dealing with an incredibly complex set of political actors, not a ton of resources, and a country whose infrastructure was highly degraded and was in a sense psychologically damaged from decades of brutal Baathist rule. While he made crucial mistakes, I don't think anyone could have excelled in this situation (which is a good reason not to invade).
I think the frustrating thing about Bremer is that he really isn't willing to look at things from another angle or to reassess decisions. He really believes that this war was justified and necessary, that the example of Iraq will spread democracy in the MIddle East, and that the insurgency during the first year was almost all "dead-enders," or regime personnel trying to retake power or get revenge. He seems incapable of viewing US power as having negative or unpredictable effects. He never bothers taking the perspective of, for example, an Iraqi who might have had a family member killed by stray US fire, or one who might have had his/her home raided in the middle of the night and had a family member taken away after guns were shoved in their faces. These dynamics also drove the insurgency, but Bremer never discusses them. It's disconcerting to have people thrust into such immense positions of power who seem to lack these critical thinking skills.
There was a major cognitive dissonance at the end of the book, for example, when he's trying to leave the country and transfer sovereignty without the insurgency stopping the process (or shooting down his plane). He's trying to get out of the country physically in a surprise way so insurgents don't literally shoot down his plane. At the same time, he's talking about what a huge success the CPA has been, how Iraq is on the road to democracy, prosperity, and stability. It has the "everything is fine" flaming room meme written all over it.
There's definitely a great book to be written about BRemer, who embodies many tendencies of both the national security establishment and the consulting world. He is an incredibly energetic and resourceful person with a lot of hubris, not too much self-reflection, and major blind spots. Still, this is a good book for understanding the challenges and processes of the first year of the US war in Iraq; just don't make it the only book you read on the subject.
January 16, 2012
Paul Bremer provides a clear and concise look at the state of affairs in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) during his tenure as the head of Iraq. There are many lessons to be learned from what happened in Iraq and the understanding that this was to be the largest reconstruction project since Germany and Japan is often lost on many people who study this area. It is amazing to see the state that Saddam had driven the country to during his tenure. A moderate middle class was completely destroyed, technocrats were virtually eliminated and the prized Saddam army vanished into almost thin air soon after the occupation began. What is also clear from Bremer's account is that the United States and its allies had no plan whatsoever for how they were going to shape postwar Iraq. From bureaucratic struggles to the confusion on command and control structures (CPA was transferred from Defense to NSC midway through his tenure) the situation in Iraq was a mess even before the CPA got started.
Now the main problem with this book is simply a lack of sources. We have someone who reports on a lot of private meetings but we have no way to verify what actually occurred. There are no corroborating documents available from either intelligence, military or domestic source to help compare this account. This book can only serve as a firsthand account from Paul Bremer's point of view and while that should not be dismissed out of hand just because of lack of supporting evidence it does need to be taken with caution. For those who are looking at what happened in Iraq from someone who was on the ground this is an interesting book to read but more reading to understand the whole story is in order.
Now the main problem with this book is simply a lack of sources. We have someone who reports on a lot of private meetings but we have no way to verify what actually occurred. There are no corroborating documents available from either intelligence, military or domestic source to help compare this account. This book can only serve as a firsthand account from Paul Bremer's point of view and while that should not be dismissed out of hand just because of lack of supporting evidence it does need to be taken with caution. For those who are looking at what happened in Iraq from someone who was on the ground this is an interesting book to read but more reading to understand the whole story is in order.
Read
July 18, 2007this is a lot of useless talk
May 24, 2019
بول بريمير يظهر نفسه على أنه أكبر داعم للديمقراطيات في الوطن العربي و العراق تحديداً و أكبر معادي للدكتاتورية .. الكتاب يحمل من الكذب و الدجل الشيء الكثير .. لكن قراءته كانت مفيده بالنسبة لي .
April 6, 2011
I found this book very interesting. First, let me say that if you read it and bring in your emotions about the Iraq War, then I think you will miss the essence of it. It is Paul Bremmer's story of his year in Iraq; the duties he had and the work he did. Like him or not, his accounting from his eyes was quite a story. I recall most of this stuff, but always as separate pieces. To read this all together gave me a whole new perspective. First of all, I think I would have packed my bags and gone home after the first week, and if the man did not end up an alcoholic after one year, I don't know why. He had to deal with the Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, the U.N., the DOD, the president, the army, the pentagon, etc. - all with their own agendas, and his job was to make it mesh. It reminded me of the game, Whack-A-Mole. You get one down and another pops up. In some ways, it was a comedy. There were a few times that I thought he propagandized a bit. My only other criticism would be that there were places where he repeated nearly word for word. Other than that, if you can put aside emotions and preconceived ideas, I think you might find it fascinating.
December 21, 2014
Whether you agreed or disagreed with the US decision in 2003 to lead a coalition to Iraq in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein, this book will provide an enlightening view of the politics and turmoil that went on in the country in the year following the collapse of the Ba'athist regime.
As the book was written in 2006, it's perspective is current rather than historical. It was written by the head of the US occupation force and so, of course, portrays that administration in a favorable light. However, it does not excuse events such as the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal and the mistakes that went into putting together the interim government and initial constitution.
The book is certainly relevant to today (2014) when we see the old problems that Bremer encountered resurfacing. Sectarian violence, divided politics and corruption still plague Iraq and sadly show that democracies are more difficult to create and maintain than the average person would guess.
A good read for anyone interested in digging into the weeds of a very complicated issue.
As the book was written in 2006, it's perspective is current rather than historical. It was written by the head of the US occupation force and so, of course, portrays that administration in a favorable light. However, it does not excuse events such as the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal and the mistakes that went into putting together the interim government and initial constitution.
The book is certainly relevant to today (2014) when we see the old problems that Bremer encountered resurfacing. Sectarian violence, divided politics and corruption still plague Iraq and sadly show that democracies are more difficult to create and maintain than the average person would guess.
A good read for anyone interested in digging into the weeds of a very complicated issue.
December 18, 2017
Bremer was fully aware of the two salient facts, the first being that this is the largest reconstruction since Japan and Germany WWII and the second being that the disbanding of the Iraqi is a bad decision forced on by Rumsfeld.
Bremer did convince me of his best intentions, and he did shed light on the difficulties of the situation on the ground. He probably deserves more credit for the job on the ground made harder by the Neocons stateside.
Bremer did convince me of his best intentions, and he did shed light on the difficulties of the situation on the ground. He probably deserves more credit for the job on the ground made harder by the Neocons stateside.
Read
March 24, 2023سيرة ذاتية للص آخر من عصابة العم سام .. لا أكثر
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تتمة مراجعة الكتاب على مدونتي:
((( همى الغيث )))
https://www.hma-algaith.com/%d8%b9%d8...
July 31, 2015
لماذا أضيع وقتي بقراءة كتاب سيء مثل هذا
بينما انا عراقي وعاش الاحداث التي كتبها وزاد عليها
بينما انا عراقي وعاش الاحداث التي كتبها وزاد عليها
March 13, 2021
Full of lies
May 25, 2025
یک منبع خوب برای بازخوانی عراق پس از صدام و وضعیت آشفتهای که در آن کشور ایجاد شد. مشخص است که برمر به صورت روزانه یادداشتبرداری میکرده که توانسته با جزئیات و به خوبی اتفاقات مدت اقامت خود را در عراق بازگو کند. نکات مهمی که میشود اشاره کرد این است که برمر از خطاها و اشتباهات آمریکا به صورت سریع و گذرا رد میشود مثلا موضوع زندان ابوغریب در حد چند خطی کفته میشود و تاکید زیادی روی آن نمیشود و یا تلفات غیر نظامی که به عراق تحمیل میکنند با لفظ اینکه در همه حنگها این تلفات وجود دارد و غیر قابل پیشگیری است رد میشود اما به تلفات نیروهای آمریکایی که میرسد با دقت تعداد را اعلام میکند.
در اوایل کتاب نیز بحث تحریمها را به کلی نادیده کرفته و بر فساد رژیم صدام در بهرهبرداری از این تحریمها به سود منافع خود سخنرانی میکند و از خود نمیپرسد چه کسی و چرا این تحریمها را وضع کرده و اگر موفق نبود چرا رفع نمیشد. در مورد علت اصلی حمله به عراق به بهانه سلاحهای کشتارجمعی و عدم یافته شدن آنها نیز کمترین توجهی نداشته و معتقد است که اهمیتی ندارد چون ما صدام را سرنگون کردیم!!!
در جاهای مختلفی به کشتار کردها و شیعیان بعد از جنگ خلیج فارس اشاره میشود و از حمایت آمریکا از کردها در این مقطع داد سخن میده ولی نمیگه چرا از شیعهها حمایت نکرده و باعث کشتار آنها شدند. البته این رویه در صحبتهای خود برمر مشخص میشود که در جایجای کتاب شیعیان نظاممند به قول خودش یا حزاب شیعی را با حزب بعث در یک راستا قرار میدهد و از هر تلاشی برای به قدرت نرسیدن آنها فروگذار نیست.
مسائل مربوط به رابطه با آیتالله سیستانی و مقتدی صدر نیز از نکات جالب و خواندنی این کتاب است.
درباره ترجمه کتاب هم من در ابتدا کتاب با ترجمه شاکر کسرانی را خواندم که در آن مترجم اشاره کرده بود که قسمتهایی از کتاب را بنا به صلاحدید خود حذف کرده!! که این صلاحدید مترجم حدود ۲۰۰ صفحه میشد. پس از خواندن ۱۰۰ صفحه از آن ترجمه که به شکل عجیبی فضاحتبار بود، ترجمه حسن رئیسزاده از نشر آبی را خواندم که ترجمه بسیار بهتری از قبلی بود و حذفیات نیز نداشت. البته مشخصا مترجم از اسمهای عربی و شاید فضای عربی-عراقی اطلاعی نداشته که در بسیاری از موارد اسمها را اشتباه نوشته و نقل کرده است.
August 8, 2025
Paul Bremer has been made a scapegoat for the failures in Iraq by the press and armchair warriors. In reality, he had an impossible job dealing with the Kurs, Sunnis, and Shais as well as the policy makers in Washington who never understood the history, culture, and society. I spent a year in Iraq and am familiar with austere living conditions, the blazing heat, and the religious divisions within the country. We went to Iraq without a clear and concise plan for the occupation. That is not Paul Bremer's fault. He did a remarkable job in the worst of conditions. He should be remembered as an American patriot who did his best for Iraq and the United States.
November 9, 2024
I’m giving this one star because it’s a useful record of the ignorance and arrogance that defined the U.S. occupation and destruction of Iraq. Bremer’s attempts to whitewash the disastrous decisions made by Americans make him sound like a child at times (“it wasn’t me!”) but not even the author could hide his and his government’s utter incompetence when it comes to dealing with the aftermath of the war and governance of Iraq.
August 23, 2018
تحديات كبيرة كانت تواجه المبعوث الامريكي للعراق بول بريمر لإنتاج عراق ديموقراطي سياسة واقتصاداً وامناً ، اعتقد بريمر انه نجح في تشكيل حكومة تكنوقراط ائتلافية من السنة والشيعة والكرد والتركمان ولكن هذه لم تكن الا فقاعة حتى يقال ان امريكا نجحت
ولكن نشاهد اليوم لازال العراق غارقاً في الحروب الطائفية ولازال يبحث عن ضالته ( الديموقراطية ) .
ولكن نشاهد اليوم لازال العراق غارقاً في الحروب الطائفية ولازال يبحث عن ضالته ( الديموقراطية ) .
May 19, 2019
Great insight of the first year after the liberation of Iraq in 2003
I've bene following politics in Iraq for a long time, but it's been a new eye opener to read this book about the first year after the liberation of Iraq. This books and the issues it tells of Iraqi politics is still the case now.
I've bene following politics in Iraq for a long time, but it's been a new eye opener to read this book about the first year after the liberation of Iraq. This books and the issues it tells of Iraqi politics is still the case now.
October 8, 2021
عام قضيته في العراق / بول بريمر / ترجمة عمر الايوبي /500 صفحة .
يتكلم بريمر عن الوضع العراقي بعد سقوط النظام السابق واسناد مسؤولية العراق إليه وأهم المشكلات التي واجهته من أجل تثبيت دعائم الديمقراطية المزعمة، في هذا الكتاب نجد جذور العملية السياسية المنتشرة الان وكيف استحوذت بعض الشخصيات على مقاليد الحكم من تلك الفترة وحتى الآن .
علي غضبان مُشكل .
يتكلم بريمر عن الوضع العراقي بعد سقوط النظام السابق واسناد مسؤولية العراق إليه وأهم المشكلات التي واجهته من أجل تثبيت دعائم الديمقراطية المزعمة، في هذا الكتاب نجد جذور العملية السياسية المنتشرة الان وكيف استحوذت بعض الشخصيات على مقاليد الحكم من تلك الفترة وحتى الآن .
علي غضبان مُشكل .
March 12, 2020
Read this years ago and recall enjoying it.
April 1, 2020
Very informative book.
Great read
Great read
April 17, 2020
ملخص الكتاب:
١- بول بريمر حاكم غير فعال و غير حازم
٢- غياب للسلطات
٣- دور النجف و علي السيستاني في انشاء دولة ظل تحكم العراق
١- بول بريمر حاكم غير فعال و غير حازم
٢- غياب للسلطات
٣- دور النجف و علي السيستاني في انشاء دولة ظل تحكم العراق
March 27, 2021
I am interested, but how can I get the book cause any link page that I want to read it it’s not free , so how can I get free And how to read
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 27, 2024
Not them acting like the good guys . Not them killing one million iraqis in the process.
September 5, 2025
من اهم الكتب التي يجب على الشعب قرائتها لكي نعرف عراق اليوم يجب ان نعرف عراق الماضي
August 10, 2023
Read it in 2018 Its interesting but can be very biased sometimes and thats understandable.
good bird-eye view on iraqi political and economic and social system
good bird-eye view on iraqi political and economic and social system
March 5, 2017
For someone familiar with the events in Iraq, this book doesn't add much. The most interesting things that were new to me were the personal anecdotes about the various figures involved, and the conversation with Saddam. For someone who doesn't know any more than the least common denominator of the mainstream news stories, this book would presumably be very eye opening. It only covers the CPA year, though, not the time after.
April 24, 2025
Enjoyed listening to this as an audiobook. Great story. Interesting to hear from this perspective despite the obvious fallacies to thinking such as this. Horrible outcomes…
October 15, 2007
L. Paul Bremer, or "Jerry" as he is called by his friends and coworkers (it's never revealed why, though... why do they call him Jerry?), spent 14 months in Iraq. Not the happiest time in his life he is very quick to point out. Bremer is given an almost impossible task: prepare war-torn and recently tyrant-less Iraq to be a democratic nation.
Throughout the book we witness events unfolding "firsthand" (I use quotations there, because we can never truly know what was said in private meetings or how decisions were made, we can only trust that Bremer is giving an undedited version of what truly happened).
It is clear from the beginning that Bremer has a task ahead of him. The plan for Iraq did not include much reconstruction. For some reason, everyone in Washington is constantly pushing Bremer to "speed up" the transfer of power to Iraqis. We get to see the discourse among Iraqi sects as well as the riffs between Iraqis and the Coalition.
The book travels at a fast pace, sometimes skipping some details that I would have liked to hear more about. A lot of time is focussed on Moqtada al-Sadr (Bremer wanted to arrest and/or kill him from the beginning, but the military wouldn't do it), but in the end there is only a brief mention that suddenly Moqtada is fighting the terrorists. That was a bit confusing.
Also, the book ends on a very optimistic note, which is nice for a fictional book, but since this is an historical novel and since the final timeline of the book (June 2004), things have not been all rosy in Iraq.
Bremer's book gives the reader a very interesting look at his year in Iraq, but sometimes makes himself seem a bit like a transplanted Ayn Rand figure single-handedly fighting with the incompetence around him (both Iraqi and American). Donald Rumsfeld is definitely not painted as a very competent Secretary of Defense, so no wonder he got asked to resign if even uber-Conservative Bremer doesn't like him.
Overall, this is a well-written novel and helped me to grasp the enormity of the rebuilding of Iraq. Bremer avoids many "if only" statements, but it is clear that a well-planned reconstruction effort would have greatly aided his time in Iraq, and shortened the occupation a great deal.
Throughout the book we witness events unfolding "firsthand" (I use quotations there, because we can never truly know what was said in private meetings or how decisions were made, we can only trust that Bremer is giving an undedited version of what truly happened).
It is clear from the beginning that Bremer has a task ahead of him. The plan for Iraq did not include much reconstruction. For some reason, everyone in Washington is constantly pushing Bremer to "speed up" the transfer of power to Iraqis. We get to see the discourse among Iraqi sects as well as the riffs between Iraqis and the Coalition.
The book travels at a fast pace, sometimes skipping some details that I would have liked to hear more about. A lot of time is focussed on Moqtada al-Sadr (Bremer wanted to arrest and/or kill him from the beginning, but the military wouldn't do it), but in the end there is only a brief mention that suddenly Moqtada is fighting the terrorists. That was a bit confusing.
Also, the book ends on a very optimistic note, which is nice for a fictional book, but since this is an historical novel and since the final timeline of the book (June 2004), things have not been all rosy in Iraq.
Bremer's book gives the reader a very interesting look at his year in Iraq, but sometimes makes himself seem a bit like a transplanted Ayn Rand figure single-handedly fighting with the incompetence around him (both Iraqi and American). Donald Rumsfeld is definitely not painted as a very competent Secretary of Defense, so no wonder he got asked to resign if even uber-Conservative Bremer doesn't like him.
Overall, this is a well-written novel and helped me to grasp the enormity of the rebuilding of Iraq. Bremer avoids many "if only" statements, but it is clear that a well-planned reconstruction effort would have greatly aided his time in Iraq, and shortened the occupation a great deal.
February 4, 2012
Paul Bremer provides a clear and concise look at the state of affairs in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) during his tenure as the head of Iraq. There are many lessons to be learned from what happened in Iraq and the understanding that this was to be the largest reconstruction project since Germany and Japan is often lost on many people who study this area. It is amazing to see the state that Saddam had driven the country to during his tenure. A moderate middle class was completely destroyed, technocrats were virtually eliminated and the prized Saddam army vanished into almost thin air soon after the occupation began. What is also clear from Bremer's account is that the United States and its allies had no plan whatsoever for how they were going to shape postwar Iraq. From bureaucratic struggles to the confusion on command and control structures (CPA was transferred from Defense to NSC midway through his tenure) the situation in Iraq was a mess even before the CPA got started.
Now the main problem with this book is simply a lack of sources. We have someone who reports on a lot of private meetings but we have no way to verify what actually occurred. There are no corroborating documents available from either intelligence, military or domestic source to help compare this account. This book can only serve as a firsthand account from Paul Bremer's point of view and while that should not be dismissed out of hand just because of lack of supporting evidence it does need to be taken with caution. For those who are looking at what happened in Iraq from someone who was on the ground this is an interesting book to read but more reading to understand the whole story is in order.
Now the main problem with this book is simply a lack of sources. We have someone who reports on a lot of private meetings but we have no way to verify what actually occurred. There are no corroborating documents available from either intelligence, military or domestic source to help compare this account. This book can only serve as a firsthand account from Paul Bremer's point of view and while that should not be dismissed out of hand just because of lack of supporting evidence it does need to be taken with caution. For those who are looking at what happened in Iraq from someone who was on the ground this is an interesting book to read but more reading to understand the whole story is in order.
December 15, 2019
If I were judging the CPA and L. Paul Bremer on Iraq performance, it'd be a negative number of stars. As a book, it's exactly what you'd expect from him -- largely CPA CYA and focusing on the wrong things. There's very little actual information here; other primary and secondary sources are better. I don't really care that he was wracked by distress while running a country into the ground through incompetence and had to rely on his wife and faith in God. Just get the job done.
(I was against the Iraq war and expansion of Afghanistan from 2002 onward, and worked in the AOR 2003-2010. I saw firsthand what utter inanity and incompetence CPA and many other entities were. CPA was an outlier as among the worst of a bad lot.)
Iraq was never going to be "winnable" as a great outcome given feasible resources, and we certainly didn't net-benefit from the adventure, but we didn't need to make the invasion/occupation/egress as bad as it was. We had many obvious-at-the-time better choices available for the entire decade and actively chose not to make most of them, and the ultimate reason was the mix of boomer holdovers at the top, inexperienced post-cold-war civil service at State, and True Believer political hacks imposed on all new entities. Combine that with a relatively non-agile military with a fucktard at the top of DOD, being sold out by our "allies" in Turkey, and you end up with trillions of dollars and many lives down the drain for negative benefit compared to pre-invasion. Incidentally GWB was probably the least-bad person in leadership.
I'd probably assign max culpability to Chalabi, Bremer, and Rumsfeld, although it's hard to rate within that set.
(I was against the Iraq war and expansion of Afghanistan from 2002 onward, and worked in the AOR 2003-2010. I saw firsthand what utter inanity and incompetence CPA and many other entities were. CPA was an outlier as among the worst of a bad lot.)
Iraq was never going to be "winnable" as a great outcome given feasible resources, and we certainly didn't net-benefit from the adventure, but we didn't need to make the invasion/occupation/egress as bad as it was. We had many obvious-at-the-time better choices available for the entire decade and actively chose not to make most of them, and the ultimate reason was the mix of boomer holdovers at the top, inexperienced post-cold-war civil service at State, and True Believer political hacks imposed on all new entities. Combine that with a relatively non-agile military with a fucktard at the top of DOD, being sold out by our "allies" in Turkey, and you end up with trillions of dollars and many lives down the drain for negative benefit compared to pre-invasion. Incidentally GWB was probably the least-bad person in leadership.
I'd probably assign max culpability to Chalabi, Bremer, and Rumsfeld, although it's hard to rate within that set.
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