Through careful analysis of phenomenological texts by Husserl and Heidegger, Marion argues for the necessity of a third phenomenological reduction that concerns what is fully implied but left largely unthought by the phenomenologies of both Husserl and the unconditional "givenness" of the phenomenon. At once historically grounded and radically new, this phenomenology of givenness has revitalized phenomenological debate in Europe and the U.S.
This is my first time fully engaging not only Marion, but also someone's phenomenological system/method. Had I previously studied Husserl, Heidegger, or both, it's likely I would've gotten much more out of this work. This text traces the historical development of phenomenological principles through Husserl and Heidegger as the two most prominent phenomenologists, and weighs them against each other. In the midst of such a task, he also shows how both systems fall short in truly actualizing the immense possibility that they opened up. Marion concludes in offering his own phenomenological understanding and reduction which both incorporates and exceeds those of Husserl and Heidegger. While the writing at times was borderline indecipherable (due to the peculiarly phenomenological vocabulary; untranslated words/phrases in German, Greek, French, Latin; parenthetical clauses interrupting already massive sentences; and numerous tmetic words), this was truly an enjoyable read. If it weren't, I don't know if I could've stayed up until 2am these past few nights tackling the concepts contained therein. Diving head first into a contemporary and innovative phenomenological work was simultaneously challenging and enriching. This text is the first of Marion's phenomenological "trilogy," and I'm enthusiastic to move onto the next.
I'm being a little hard on this book, but it really disappointed me, starting with a bang and ending with a whimper. While the overall structure of a succession of increasingly radical reductions has some merit, especially for the project of integrating phenomenology into the preceding history of metaphysics, Marion's elucidation of this structure just becomes progressively less and less convincing, with his account of Husserl coming off the best, his account of Heidegger serving as much to remind one of Heidegger's weaknesses relative to Husserl as to advance the inquiry, while the final part of the book, which argues for a third reduction to a structure of the call, consists almost entirely of the most shameless special pleading, and would require a great deal of reconstruction in order to live up to whatever promise it has.