Amazone
For me: a mite disappointing
I'll admit, in here we find a wealth of information; along with the games played by the spy agencies there is a good amount, and I’d venture too much, history of the past century’s political manoeuverings, subterfuge and gambits. We read a great deal about the thoughts, ideas, plans of government ministers, presidents and supreme leaders on both sides of the divide, with lengthy preamble of the intelligence agencies efforts that did, or may well have, worked in tandem with the political schemes. We are even told of what certain ministers did say, or may well have said, in those times.
884 pages that describe, I believe, in far too long a fashion, how the information gathered on other nations, by fair means or foul, is reacted to by the spy agency’s customer [their government].
A theme I take from this work is that the author is asking us to believe that for many years, from before The Revolution in Russia up until post the Second War, intelligence agencies in the west were playing catch-up with their adversaries in the east. As a broad and general statement that can be argued, but not to the extent portrayed here.
Early in this we are told, "MI6’s archives reveal that it had little intelligence from inside Russia in the first chaotic months of Bolshevik rule." It seems to me, the author paints British Intelligence during the early part of the last century as floundering around with no idea of what was happening in Russia post The Revolution.
The author further states: "The Cheka was far ahead of Western intelligence services in recognising the importance of recruiting well-placed agents with access to code books. In May 1921, at the height of the Red Terror, Lenin established an independent SIGINT body run jointly by the Cheka and the Soviet Red Army (military) intelligence."
As the beginnings of The Revolution began to smoulder, Captain Sir Mansfield George Smith-Cumming (who is mentioned by the author), the first chief of SIS (MI6) personally dispatched agents into the field with instructions to work unsupported and gather information, some of whom were in Russia during the 'first chaotic months of Bolshevik rule'. A decision made by 'C', putting British Intelligence on the front foot, as he was aware the government were desperate to have reliable, up-to-date, information fed back to Britain.
In this account of history, Bruce Lockhart (British Consul General in Moscow (1915-1917) - Head of the Unofficial British Mission in Moscow (1917-1918)) is dismissed as a hard drinking Scotsman. In my reading of this, the author sees fit to allude to the fact that Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart was in some way involved in the plot to kill Lenin: from all that I've previously read, the accusation was politically motivated, and Lockhart was used by the Bolsheviks as a pawn in exchange for a London based Russian diplomat arrested for engaging in propaganda activities. Lockhart was tried and found guilty in absentia. I’ve read much from these times, including Lockhart’s memoirs and I’d suggest most saw Lockhart as a brave, resourceful, 'accidental intelligence agent' who did his very best in the most trying of circumstances.
Sidney Reilly is here accused of being a womaniser and philanderer: that to some extent may well be true, but in my understanding it is far from 'nothing but the truth'. He was an incredibly brave individual and able to use his intellect to find favour with many connected adversaries. He used woman as part of his many covers thus socialising grandly, which allowed him to be so readily accepted; and, from my readings, he provided the British with a great deal of reliable information.
I note, with some surprise, there is no mention of the momentous work [information couriered back to Britain] done by Paul Dukes and Captain George Hill: two agents (intelligence officers) personally dispatched by Captain Sir Mansfield George Smith-Cumming.
From my readings, neither Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart, Sir Paul Dukes or Captain George Alexander Hill cast Sidney Reilly as simply a womaniser and philanderer; and neither Sir Paul Dukes or Captain George Alexander Hill looked upon Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart as a little more than a drunkard. In his account of matters, Captain George Hill (a man who lived by his wits and achieved incredibly) saw Sidney Reilly as a fearless, determined individual who could be relied upon in a tight corner.
During and after the 'first chaotic months of Bolshevik rule' both Paul Dukes or Captain George Alexander Hill ran extensive networks with informants providing masses of up to date information that was used by London to create large quantities of useful intelligence. Codes, invisible inks, disguises, forged identities, all manner of tradecraft was employed. Paul Dukes became the Cheka's 'Most Wanted Man' He was known as the 'Man of a Hundred Faces': he was at one time carrying with him Cheka identification papers and frequently passed himself off as a Cheka officer. Both of these men were British agents, in the field, handling informants, managing and keeping intact networks: they ran circles around the Cheka. The Cheka, it is said by those who faced them day-in and day-out, during the Cheka’s early days, were little more than illiterate thugs: easily duped and open to all manner of bribery.
Upon his return to Britain, Paul Dukes. was cited as a distinguished hero. In 1920, he was knighted by King George V, who called Paul Dukes 'the greatest of all soldiers' Sir Paul Dukes remains the only person to be knighted based upon his espionage activities alone; and to this day remains a standard-bearer of great acclaim within the house at Vauxhall Cross.
The author assures us this book is based upon five-years of exhaustive research; I wonder if in those five-years the author was looking for a novel line of approach to what are already well documented events. It's said, by many a good barrister, that you should only ever put before the Court the evidence that supports your argument.
Iain
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Great book until chapter 18
I don't usually read spy books but the WSJ review convinced me to order and read a copy. It was a very interesting book all the way until chapter 18 (First star downgraded) where is came off the rails for me.
Chapter 18 is full mostly of guesswork such as stating that China will become the #1 economy in ten years when facts from the time period this book was written demonstrate that China has peaked and will only decline especially with its return to extreme totalitarian government.
I find books written by members of academia are out of touch with the real world with the tiresome vitriol against the former President but yet has no concern whatsoever for the current administration. Too funny and for this I took a second star off.
Joe
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Uneven and Too Long, But Interesting
My read: very good, revealing, and convincing first third on intelligence history and techique; wandering, slow and repetitive second third, burdened with detail and U.S. secrecy foolishness; unwelcome politically leaning uninformative, overly long last third.
Author defends and romanticises the CIA without collecting in one summary space, as it should, the list of mentioned (and no doubt many ommitted and unmentioned) colassal CIA failures over the years.
Overall, important as the book persuades us intelligence gathering and covert action is, our top intelligence apparatus after the OSS years does not merit a top grade. It seems too undermanned and under-resourced, to say nothing of too often unimaginative and passive in its leadership, to do better.
Given our values, other demands on the public purse, and the vagaries necessarily introduced by regular changes in presidential leadership, the discomforting state of our intelligence affairs seems likely to remain as it is.
Three and a half stars would be my real grade for the book.
Andrew M. Klein
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Villains on all sides
The world of espionage and counter-espionage is fascinating, and this book gives a useful run through the battles between East and West in that secret world over the last hundred years. It covers everything from Russia’s “Cheka” in the 1920s, through Kim Philby and the Cold War spies, right up to the present day.
So, why am I only giving it three stars? Well, the author rightly insists that the undercover battles he describes have to be seen in the context of broader geopolitics. And it is Walton’s view of those geopolitics that weakens his book.
Walton admits that Western intelligence agencies have made mistakes and done some immoral things, but his overall view suggests that Western “liberal democracies” are the “goodies” and the Eastern regimes of Russia and China are the “baddies”. I consider this to be naïve.
Stalin’s USSR, Putin’s Russia, and the Chinese regime are/were blatantly tyrannical: that is obviously true. But our "democracy" in the West is totally distorted by the economic power of the ruling class and their control of the media and the state machine. The control exercised by our rulers in the West is more subtle than that of the rulers of Russia and China, but it is control nevertheless.
The West is "traditional" (oligarchic) capitalism; Putin's Russia is gangster-capitalism; and China is a bureaucratic state capitalist tyranny of the Stalinist model. The secret services of all three serve the interests of their rulers, not of the mass of the population.
Walton also fails to distinguish between Marx and Lenin on the one hand, and Stalin’s tyranny on the other. He refers to “communist dictatorship, which Marx described, and Lenin created.” In fact, Marx said that socialism was "the self-emancipation of the working class", and his model for a workers' state was the Paris Commune, where all officials were elected, subject to recall at any time, and paid the average worker's wage.
And the Bolshevik Revolution was not a “coup”, as Walton claims. Rather, it was based on a mass movement, and it only took place when the Bolsheviks had won the majority on the Soviets (highly democratic workers’ councils). Sadly, that initial democracy was destroyed by 14 foreign armies and the Russian White Army, and then by Stalin's bureaucratic counter-revolution in the 1920s. The tragedy of the Cheka resorting to ruthless methods was the result of the Civil War, during which the White armies far outdid the Bolsheviks in brutality. The fact that the USSR ended up as a one-party state was a sign of the failure of the revolution, not its success.
Stalin and Putin’s secret services (and China’s) were and are certainly villains. But so are those of the Western powers – as shown, just to give one example, by the CIA-backed coup against the democratically elected government of Allende in Chile.
I'm reminded of what someone said at the height of the Cold War: "The Free World isn't really free; and the Communist World isn't really communist."
During the Cold War genuine Marxists (who defined the USSR as a bureaucratic state capitalist tyranny) came up with the slogan of "Neither Washington nor Moscow but International Socialism". Today we need to say: "Neither Washington nor Moscow nor Beijing etc..."
There are no “goodies” in the secret war.
Phil Webster
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