Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush

by Peter W. Rodman, Henry Kissinger (Introduction)

An official in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and both Bush administrations, Peter W. Rodman draws on his firsthand knowledge of the Oval Office to explore the foreign-policy leadership of every president from Nixon to George W. Bush. This riveting and informative book about the inner workings of our government is rich with anecdotes and fly-on-the-wall portraits of presidents and their closest advisors. It is essential reading for historians, political junkies, and for anyone in charge of managing a large organization.

Genres: Politics, History, American History, Nonfiction, Leadership, Government

368 pages, Paperback

First published January 24, 2009

Reviews

[Lobstergirl · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rodman was mentored by Henry Kissinger and worked in the State Department or Defense Department or in the White House for several Republican presidents before ending up at the liberal-ish Brookings Institution. He examines how presidents lead in foreign policy: how they choose what kind of person they want to head State or Defense (or as national security adviser) and what this says about their leadership abilities or failures; how they encourage or discourage consensus or disagreement; and how their personalities and interests affect foreign policy decision-making. Carter specifically wanted different types to head up his foreign policy apparatus (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance) so that he would be presented with a variety of options (a lack of consensus, really) and could choose what he considered the best. He was haunted by how powerful Kissinger had been in the cabinets of Nixon and Ford and wanted to make sure he, the president, always made policy. Reagan had foreign policy successes in areas where he had a lot of interest (the Soviet Union) but had failures in areas which bored him (Lebanon). Clinton had very little interest in foreign policy and picked a weak head of State (Warren Christopher), and his decision-making meandered. George W. Bush put too much emphasis on getting bureaucratic consensus and, as a graduate of Harvard Business School, was too wedded to the president-as-CEO management model. Rodman argues that it is always a mistake for a president to pick a weak cabinet head or national security adviser. There are risks in picking strong personalities for a cabinet, but if a president has some foreign policy expertise or at least interest, or has a commanding management style, the risks that accompany being surrounded by other strong advisers are lessened.

This was an interesting read. I will probably come back to it at some point after reading other contemporary points of view. Rodman has a clear Republican bias (Clinton and Carter come off worst), but his insights are valuable.

[Edgar Raines · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author was the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the first several years of the George W. Bush administration. This book is by far the fairest, most even handed explanation of what went on in the Bush administration in international affairs among those insider accounts that I have read. It is, however, much more than that. Rodman began his public service as an aide to Henry Kissinger. He analyzes the ways in which the modern presidents (Richard Nixon through George W. Bush) have organized their administrations and conducted themselves so that their decisions in foreign policy are carried out in the way that they intend them to be. It requires a president who is constantly engaged in the process and strong secretary of state. The president wants a secretary of state who will present options but when a decision is made act as his representative to the department rather than the department's representative to the president. Rodman devotes one chapter to each president and his administration. He finds the elder George Bush the most skilled at bending the bureaucracy to his purposes, although because he lacked "the vision thing" the public and possibly historians will never quite give him his due. He argues that Bill Clinton was fundamentally uninterested in foreign affairs during his first term and fumbled many things as a consequence but grew into the job in his second term.

Sadly, the author died before the book appeared. He left, however, a legacy of even-handed commentary on a very important issue.

[Bill Manzi · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit of an older one but a very good read anyway. Rodman, who has passed away, was an assistant to Henry Kissinger in the Nixon Administration, who wrote the foreword. I saw a positive reference to this in the last HR McMaster book and it looked worthwhile.

Rodman worked in several Republican administrations after Nixon, in the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Defense Department. This book looks at the foreign policy decisions of Presidents from Nixon through George W. Bush with an emphasis on how those decisions got made and what type of infrastructure each President set up to handle the process. This is where the strength of the book is, and though it was written more than a few years ago the recent decision of President Trump to dramatically downsize the staff at the National Security Council makes this book topical today.

Rodman is an advocate of strong Presidential power, but as he acknowledges in the opening this book centers on the exercise of that power within the executive branch itself, not vis a vis Congress or the courts. In light of the preference of President Trump for near total control of the executive branch this book, by looking at some of the past Presidents and their use of executive power, is relevant to events happening now.

I believe, likely a bit more than some others in the Democratic Party, that the President should be able to, for better or worse, exercise the authority of the office. The book started with a President Lincoln story that is both funny and on point:

“There is a famous story of President Abraham Lincoln, taking a vote in a cabinet meeting on whether to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. All his cabinet secretaries vote nay, whereupon Lincoln raises his right hand and declares ‘The ayes have it.’ “

Rodman, Peter Presidential Command pg. 3

Rodman gets us started with Nixon and Kissinger, looking beyond the policies to see what Nixon wanted, and how he pulled the levers of power within the Administration. It is a many times told story of Nixon, and Kissinger, undercutting and marginalizing Secretary of State William Rodgers. Rogers, despite being a very old and close associate of Nixon, was shut out because Nixon was determined to go around the career staff at the State Department, who he distrusted (and hated) This baseline is used throughout the book, as Presidents are shown to use differing methodologies to try to bring the bureaucracy to heel. Rodman quotes McGeorge Bundy on that ever present battle:

“The unending between the Presidency and much of the bureaucracy is as real today as ever, and there has been no significant weakening in the network of triangular alliances which unite all sorts of interest groups with their agents in the Congress and their agents in the Executive Branch…. [T]he Executive Branch remains woefully short of first-class executive agents of the President….The Cabinet role which I am trying to describe….in its relation to the White House….must be at once highly autonomous and deeply responsive. It is political, but only in the Presidents interest. It is managerial, but only on the President’s terms….At a test-unless he means to resign-the Secretary should always be the President’s agent in dealing with the bureaucracy, not the other way around.”

Rodman, Peter Presidential Command pg. 11

This tug of war is a central feature in the book. As Rodman looks at the Presidents from Nixon to Bush 43 a critical distinction in evaluating key personnel, like a Secretary of State, gets back to the Bundy points above. Will a person posted to the State Department become “captured” by them or will he or she be willing to buck the bureaucracy and continue to represent the President.

In this context Rodman goes through the covered Presidencies, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of the decision making, and of the process by which decisions got made. Rodman worked for Republican Presidents, and I detect a slight bent towards the GOP Presidents, but nothing that makes his observations unfair.

I had some level of disagreement with the Rodman observations on Bush 43 and Iraq. Rodman worked for Doug Feith in that administration, and on that basis alone I went from five stars to four. I share General Tommy Frank’s assessment of Feith, and I believe that Rodman, while acknowledging error, did not emphasize that error enough. (He failed to mention the Franks assessment of Feith) He manages to repeat some of the flat out nonsense that propelled the U.S. into the war, and even gives a mulligan to Don Rumsfeld on the “size of force” question for the U.S. invasion. It was Rumsfeld who demanded that we go in light, with the generals giving way to their boss.

Despite the Iraq portion there is still some great observations on how Bush 43 conducted policy and dealt with some of the large personalities in his Administration.

Each President covered brings us great insights into how power is spread, and used, in the executive branch, with each President’s differing approaches critiqued. For folks interested in national security, and with some of the past giants involved in that field, this book comes highly recommended.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Measured and wise analysis of how national security policy was executed by presidents from Nixon to George W. Bush by someone who was a high-level Zelig in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush 41 and Bush 43 administrations. Fascinating stuff, especially relating to how the sausage was made in the run-up to the Iraq war and the occupation. Interestingly, one thing that Rodman did not attribute much importance to was ideology.

[Emily · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read for class, Richard Nixon being Richard Nixon

[timnc15 · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is a fairly routine examination of presidential command structures within foreign policy, especially in the NSC (often shaped by the particular events and decisions that they had to make at that point in history). This greatly reminded me of a book I read for a class last year about American foreign policy between presidential transitions and the process by which a president installs his new Cabinet and NSC apparatus. I found the differences between presidents like Eisenhower (regimented, military-like hierarchy) and Kennedy (collegial, informal) interesting, especially just how much variation is permitted by the 1948 NSC law and its amendments/additions. Rodman ultimately argues for an engaged, authoritative (but not authoritarian!) presidency to decisively handle foreign policy and impose its will on the various mechanisms and parties that exist within the U.S. foreign policy landscape. It's also evident that Rodman (and his mentor Kissinger) and the decisions of the Nixon and Bush administrations are treated with some rather unwarranted grace, which explains away some of the key errors in Iraq and Vietnam made by these presidencies.

Ultimately, an interesting read but an incomplete story.

[Zach B · Rating 4 out of 5]

An informative read that is certainly less repetitive than a book such as Honest Broker. Rodman’s experiences shape the book, and thus should shape any readers interpretation of his writing. I think he is generally fair, as his experiences are the basis of his authority on this subject. It is rather dense, but worth reading.

[Dale · Rating 3 out of 5]

Recommended to me when I was at the Army War College studying national security. Pretty good snap shot history of the National security council from Nixon to the second Bush. Some real gems here about staff interaction and leadership.

[Alex · Rating 5 out of 5]

Riveting account of the inner workings of several presidencies. Really emphasizes how personalities, principles, and bureaucratic forces shape policy. Would recommend to anyone that seeks a career in government

[David N Fetter · Rating 4 out of 5]

Must read for an incoming administration

Well documented review of presidential power and how to be more effective. If we could just implement the wise reform he recommends.

[Carol_Reads2u]

for grad school

[Walter Mack · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Seminal Work

If American foreign policy and presidential behaviour is an interest, this detailed and informed book is a great place to begin your journey.

[Urey Patrick]

A very interesting insider's look at Presidential management styles and designs, largely through the lens of the National Security Council and the federal bureaucracy - State and Defense, most particularly. Rodman looks at administrations in some depth from Nixon through Bush 43 (and briefly but fascinatingly dealing with Truman through LBJ), their organizational strengths and weaknesses, personalities, Presidential characteristics and individual strengths and weaknesses to explain and illustrate successes and failures. All Presidents have difficulty compelling the standing bureaucracies to take guidance from the White House, follow White House policies, much less implement them. Rodman deftly points out reasons why, and sometimes why not. An interesting inside politics narrative from the viewpoint of one who was inside during four administrations, and had a pretty keen eye into the others.

[Sai Rao · Rating 5 out of 5]

Must read for understanding U.S. foreign policy decision-making works. It comes from a clearly biased place, however. Five stars for the window into this world, not as an endorsement of the recommendations.