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Delusions in Context
Chapter 1. Delusional Beliefs in the Clinical Context; Rachel Upthegrove and S. AChapter 2. Delusions and Prediction Error;Philip CorlettChapter 3. Delusions and other Beliefs; Richard P. BentallChapter 4. Delusions and Three Myths of Irrational Belief; Lisa Bortolotti
136 pages, Paperback
Published October 10, 2018
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94 people want to read
About the author
Lisa Bortolotti
14 books13 followers I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham.
My main research area is the philosophy of cognitive science, and in my work I have mostly focused on the limitations of human cognition and human agency including faulty reasoning, delusions, confabulations, irrational beliefs, poor knowledge of the self, distorted memories, unreliable self narratives, self deception, implicit bias, inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour, unrealistic optimism and positive illusions.
I am also interested in the relationship between science and society and in the ethical issues emerging from biomedical research, psychiatry, reproduction, parenting, and the treatment of nonhuman animals.
I currently lead a 5-year project on Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (PERFECT), funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (2014-2019).
My latest book is Irrationality (Polity Press, 2014). I am currently writing a new research monograph provisionally entitled The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions.
My main research area is the philosophy of cognitive science, and in my work I have mostly focused on the limitations of human cognition and human agency including faulty reasoning, delusions, confabulations, irrational beliefs, poor knowledge of the self, distorted memories, unreliable self narratives, self deception, implicit bias, inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour, unrealistic optimism and positive illusions.
I am also interested in the relationship between science and society and in the ethical issues emerging from biomedical research, psychiatry, reproduction, parenting, and the treatment of nonhuman animals.
I currently lead a 5-year project on Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (PERFECT), funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (2014-2019).
My latest book is Irrationality (Polity Press, 2014). I am currently writing a new research monograph provisionally entitled The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
July 28, 2020
The rise in the prevalence of what seem to be delusional beliefs (flat earthers, anti-vaccers etc) prompted me to look for some academic writings on the subject to see if they could shed any light on why this is happening, and what might be done about it.
This is a short book, comprising four chapters by different authors with different specialisms. The first deals exclusively with delusions in a clinical setting. Delusions as identified by DSM-5, in which a person holds beliefs that are not only irrational (plenty of us have those) but also unique to them, and resistant to contrary evidence. While interesting in itself, that wasn't really what I was trying to find out about.
The second chapter (by Philip Corlett) began more promisingly, claiming that delusions of all kinds are caused by faulty functioning of the prediction error cognitive network. This sounded reasonably plausible and I thought we might be getting somewhere, as his claims were backed up by numerous studies. He argues strongly in favour of a reductionist explanation of delusions (it's dodgy neural networks), however he argues his position so obscurely that I found it hard to follow. He uses much technical vocabulary from the field of cognitive neuroscience, and I fear that if you aren't a specialist in that area, you might have trouble following it too. However, it is packed with references for further reading, so you might just be inspired to find out what all those words mean.
The third chapter (by Richard Bentall) was my favourite, because it dealt with exactly the subject I was trying to find out about. Well, perhaps not exactly - he doesn't specifically deal with the current upsurge in irrational beliefs, but he does draw a distinction between clinical delusions of the sort that might be experienced by a paranoid schizophrenic, and the kinds of false beliefs that entire populations might hold. He suggests that each of us develops a 'master interpretive system' (similar, I think to the idea of schema). New information is either assimilated into this system, or, if the new idea is a bad fit, it will be rejected. Bentall's chapter is highly readable, and he makes some interesting observations which a little reflection reveals are certainly true eg: that ideas which threaten our political orientation can often create visceral distress. The question of why is left up in the air, but he does comment that there is very little literature on the psychology of belief. If true, I find that very surprising, but so far I haven't done a proper search.
The final chapter is by the editor, Lisa Bortolloti, and is again highly readable. She is coming at the issue from the perspective of Philosophy, or more specifically, epistemology. I liked her methodical approach to structuring and presenting her thoughts and conclusions, which essentially boil down to three points: 1. We can use a person's irrational beliefs to explain their behaviour; 2. Irrational beliefs aren't always bad for us; 3. Irrational beliefs are common.
To illustrate point three, she uses the well-known example from mainstream psychology of attribution error and self-serving bias. These are indeed examples of bias that are not only common, but perhaps ubiquitous and inescapable. Curiously, there is no mention of the kinds of irrational belief I was particularly interested in - flat earth, anti-vacc, fake moon landings etc.
Also, it is very striking that none of the contributors to this volume mentioned religion - not once in the entire book. Yet, what could be less rational than believing (for example) that wine and wafer can be transformed into human flesh and blood by the recitation of certain words by a certain kind of person?
This is a short book, comprising four chapters by different authors with different specialisms. The first deals exclusively with delusions in a clinical setting. Delusions as identified by DSM-5, in which a person holds beliefs that are not only irrational (plenty of us have those) but also unique to them, and resistant to contrary evidence. While interesting in itself, that wasn't really what I was trying to find out about.
The second chapter (by Philip Corlett) began more promisingly, claiming that delusions of all kinds are caused by faulty functioning of the prediction error cognitive network. This sounded reasonably plausible and I thought we might be getting somewhere, as his claims were backed up by numerous studies. He argues strongly in favour of a reductionist explanation of delusions (it's dodgy neural networks), however he argues his position so obscurely that I found it hard to follow. He uses much technical vocabulary from the field of cognitive neuroscience, and I fear that if you aren't a specialist in that area, you might have trouble following it too. However, it is packed with references for further reading, so you might just be inspired to find out what all those words mean.
The third chapter (by Richard Bentall) was my favourite, because it dealt with exactly the subject I was trying to find out about. Well, perhaps not exactly - he doesn't specifically deal with the current upsurge in irrational beliefs, but he does draw a distinction between clinical delusions of the sort that might be experienced by a paranoid schizophrenic, and the kinds of false beliefs that entire populations might hold. He suggests that each of us develops a 'master interpretive system' (similar, I think to the idea of schema). New information is either assimilated into this system, or, if the new idea is a bad fit, it will be rejected. Bentall's chapter is highly readable, and he makes some interesting observations which a little reflection reveals are certainly true eg: that ideas which threaten our political orientation can often create visceral distress. The question of why is left up in the air, but he does comment that there is very little literature on the psychology of belief. If true, I find that very surprising, but so far I haven't done a proper search.
The final chapter is by the editor, Lisa Bortolloti, and is again highly readable. She is coming at the issue from the perspective of Philosophy, or more specifically, epistemology. I liked her methodical approach to structuring and presenting her thoughts and conclusions, which essentially boil down to three points: 1. We can use a person's irrational beliefs to explain their behaviour; 2. Irrational beliefs aren't always bad for us; 3. Irrational beliefs are common.
To illustrate point three, she uses the well-known example from mainstream psychology of attribution error and self-serving bias. These are indeed examples of bias that are not only common, but perhaps ubiquitous and inescapable. Curiously, there is no mention of the kinds of irrational belief I was particularly interested in - flat earth, anti-vacc, fake moon landings etc.
Also, it is very striking that none of the contributors to this volume mentioned religion - not once in the entire book. Yet, what could be less rational than believing (for example) that wine and wafer can be transformed into human flesh and blood by the recitation of certain words by a certain kind of person?
July 14, 2022
A surprising and fascinating book. Why do some people maintain a view of reality - held with conviction - that is delusional? How are feelings of loss managed without adaptive fitness?
This books explores delusions beyond the clinical setting, and investigates the contextual markers and frames that configure delusions. There is attention to extreme political and religious beliefs, and the writers and researchers work hard to explain the rationality in irrationality.
This books explores delusions beyond the clinical setting, and investigates the contextual markers and frames that configure delusions. There is attention to extreme political and religious beliefs, and the writers and researchers work hard to explain the rationality in irrationality.
March 25, 2020
During this Covid 19 shelter in place, I've taken to reading some open access books online in an effort to prevent my dwindling stockpile of TBR books from being consumed too quickly. So, I'm downloading and reading books on my tablet that seem somewhat interesting (and they are, and this is!) but that dryish scholarly tone that characterizes most of the offerings makes them far more informative than enjoyable. Obviously the casual reader is not the intended audience for these works (and maybe I have no business reading and commenting on them) but I'm gleaning some knowledge from them, and this one was no exception. Divided into 4 main sections (Delusional Beliefs in the Clinical Context, Delusions and Prediction Error, Delusions and Other Beliefs, and Delusions ad Three Myths of Irrational Belief) the authors examine delusional beliefs from different perspectives (clinical, psychological, philosophical, cultural, etc.). In spite of the said scholarly tone, the content is comprehensible for non-specialists, there are plenty of references, and not too much jargon. Thank you authors, for making your books open access, I feel a bit like a student again!
July 1, 2020
Fine, not great. Full of embarrassing typos.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews