Operating in the vast trans-Appalachian west, the Army of Tennessee was crucially important to the military fate of the Confederacy. But under the principal leadership of generals such as Braxton Bragg, Joseph E. Johnston, and John Bell Hood, it won few major battles, and many regard its inability to halt steady Union advances into the Confederate heartland as a failure at the top. Here, military historian Larry J. Daniel offers a far richer interpretation. Surpassing previous work that has focused on questions of command structure and the force's fate on the fields of battle, Daniel provides the clearest view to date of the army's inner workings, from top-level command and unit cohesion to the varied experiences of common soldiers and their connections to the home front. Drawing from his mastery of the key sources, Daniel's book is a thought-provoking reassessment of an army's fate, with important implications for Civil War history and military history writ large.
Probably the best single volume work I've come across focused solely on the Army of Tennessee. The author makes the argument that many factors contributed to the army's downfall. These included poor leadership decisions as well as supply and morale issues. Although the case can be made that R.E. Lee would have provided the better leadership sought by this western army, removing him from the Army of Northern Virginia may have caused more problems than it would potentially have solved.
This is an interesting analysis of the failure of the Army of Tennessee over time. It experienced few victories in the West during the Civil War. Why?
Among the key causes was dysfunctional leadership. Often, there was animosity between and among generals. Most apparent with the acerbic Braxton Bragg. He had feuds with, inter alia, Generals, Polk, Longstreet, Hill (DH--not AP), Hardee, et al. Sometimes, as before and at Chickamauga, his generals didn't obey orders or were intolerably slow to act on these.
A good read. Not necessarily earth shaking results, but a sensibly presented argument.
A very good study—part campaign narrative, part topical—of the Army of Tennessee from its origins as a state military force at the beginning of the Civil War to its destruction in Hood’s assaults at Franklin and Nashville in late 1864.
The book concentrates most heavily on the years between Shiloh and the fall of Atlanta, which particularly good chapters on Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and Johnston’s defense of Atlanta. Daniel pays close attention to the personalities of the army’s leadership, whether the revolving door of commanders (AS Johnston, Bragg, Joe Johnston, Hood, et al) or the corps and brigade commanders, which included many famous names—only a few of them famous for the right reasons. Politics, personal rivalries, and bitterly held resentments played a huge role in the command of the army, to such an extent that I marveled that anything ever got done.
The meat of the book is the topical chapters, covering the army from multiple minutely observed angles—logistics and supply, food, medicine and sickness, the camaraderie of the troops, the dynamics of the officer corps, the home front, state rivalries, recruitment and conscription, and even Gen Cleburne’s famous and controversial proposal to liberate and arm slaves to help make up the army’s manpower shortage. While a few chapters—especially that on logistics, an important and often neglected topic—included overwhelming lists of numbers, the mass of data and written testimony from letters, diaries, newspapers, and official communiques impart a very clear picture of that most difficult to achieve part of historical study: conveying what it was like. Daniel’s book is densely researched and all the more rewarding for it.
My only complaints are that I do wish the campaign narratives had been a bit longer and more detailed, especially toward the end, and that the book had better maps. The few scattered throughout are pretty spare and don’t include many locations—especially fords, crucial geographic features in so many campaigns in the west—mentioned in the text. Also, while Daniel adjudicates a number of scholarly disputes regarding specific points of the army’s histories, particularly those among historians of the western theater and biographers of the generals involved, and Daniel shows sensible and open minded judgement in all of these disputes, the narrative does occasionally bog down in them. But just occasionally.
Overall a well researched, measured, and detailed study. Worth your while if you’re interested in learning more about this particular part of the Civil War, though I recommend it to those who already have at least a little familiarity with some of the campaigns, personalities involved.
My great grandfather and two great great grandfathers were in this Army, with a host of their kin. Most physically survived but others had wounds of another kind. This book gave me much better insight into the travails they endured at Stones River, Hoover’s Gap, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and for one the surrender at Durham. This is a good macro-history of men, their battles, and their rationale for being there in the first place.
The author set out to match Joseph Glatthaar's General Lee's Army using that author's innovative meticulously assembled database of some 5,000 who served therein, the only problem is Daniel omitted that crucial first step of assembling the data. The contribution of this study, in my opinion, lies in the author's treatment of the impact of regionalism (other Souths vs. Upper South). There is a book's worth of research and writing on that vital and emerging thesis. Unfortunately Daniel is so busy churning out yet another Civil War book (regurgitating previous content) that the good points are few and far between (such as Ohio yielding more volunteers than five Southern states is a nice point). Daniel pledges to avoid chewing the cud on the major battles but one either avoids doing that or just wades in. He waded in. Maps are minimal and my favorite, his railroad map (page 7) shows the Memphis and Charleston Railroad terminating at Corinth, well east of one of its namesake terminal points. As a currently mad editor of my own long-delayed work I was astounded to find the verbatim paragraph on both pages 71 and 115. Even a little tweaking would have remedied that. I feel that a topical approach, each with its own chronology would have minimized the feeling that this is a pamphlet transformed into a book. As for the comparable statistics and findings promised, I don't of course find them or at least enough to equate this tome with General Lee's Army. What the author does offer is a volley of first-person observations that certainly define trends, this reader developed the feeling that what was needed was more comprehensive context. Just one final example, the chapter on Manpower abruptly concludes in September 1864. Okay, done with that.
First book I've encountered that covers Tennessee during the Civil War. I was drawn to the book as I have only recently discovered I had ancestors living in the state during that time period and wanted to read about what they may have experienced. It is a very dry, academic read, but I am sure Civil War buffs and history buffs in general will likely find it's highly researched and detailed writing fascinating. I'll continue to browse it for a long time to come. I received a Kindle arc from Netgalley in exchange for a fair review.
I very much enjoyed this book. Civil War literature tends to focus a lot on the Army of Northern Virginia, so it was nice to dive into this work on the lesser known Army of Tennessee. There was a lot of drama, finger pointing and accusing, and not a whole lot of winning for this beleaguered army. I found the author's writing style to be engaging and the narrative to be interesting and quick paced. I am glad I read this book as I feel it gives me a greater perspective and context when studying the Western Theatre of the Civil War.
A well documented account of the trials and tribulations of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. Beginning with Braxton Bragg’s assumption of command, and documenting the army thru it’s demise in front of Nashville, this thorough study addresses perceptions of other well known historians in many debatable interpretations of the army’s hard luck history. Very well thought out and interesting in its interpretations of the many factors facing this army.
Very good book on how the army of Tennessee was defeated on the battlefield and by itself. A detailed look at the political back stabbing and interpersonal relations between the officers of the army and the government. A fun aside is the fact civil war soldiers engaged in live fire( using blanks with cartridges filled with black powder and no ball.) Haven't seen that in any other book I have read on the war. Good read and a must read of you are interested in the western theater.
Interesting, detailed and well-researched, showing how the South bungled the war for the "West." The author's conclusion is that, while not completely Bragg's fault, he played a major role in the overall mess, leading to the final defeat.
easy to follow explanations of the battles and great chapters about the troops in the field and how they were feeling PLUS all the backstabbing you would expect on a book about the Real Confederates of the Tennesse Army.
With a large operating theater covering multiple states, the Army of Tennessee played an often neglected but vitally important role in the fate of the Confederacy. It’s failure, as compared to the Army of Northern Virginia, is often blamed solely on the poor leadership of generals Braxton Bragg, Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood. Under them it won few battles and failed to halt the advance of the Union armies in the west. But the reason for its failures go beyond the performance of its top commanders. While the Army of Tennessee had some excellent division and brigade commanders, it suffered largely from the infighting and poor performance of its corps commanders like Polk and Hardee. Military historian Larry J. Daniel’s analysis goes beyond previous works that have focused on questions of command structure and the battlefield, he provides a clearer view of the army's flawed command structure, from President Jefferson Davis to the army’s top-level command and unit cohesion to the varied experiences of common soldiers and their connections to the home front. Daniel takes full account of work by previous historians, but he is not shy about pronouncing his own fresh judgments of the army’s generals, troops, campaigns, successes, and failures. As Daniel persuasively argues, there is no simple answer to the question of why the army was conquered, but he provides us an informed range of suggestions that enrich our understanding of Confederate military operations and the war as a whole.
One of the driest books I have ever read. It is interesting to look into the details of how various Confederat units were successful while others were not. The details and facts presented are not in question but the writing style of Daniel leaves much to be desired.