Like Merleau-Ponty, but gay.
Despite Bersani's reputation as the founder of the "anti-social turn" in queer theory, every essay here attempts to express a conception of love as an ethical commitment to overcoming the ontological difference between subject and object .
What if the indiscernability between activity and passivity in ___perceiving/fucking___ revealed, beneath the social antagonisms that undergird the projects of Freudian psychoanalysis & identitarian political projects, a more primordial correspondence between body and world, where inside & outside, past & present, and self & other are not mutually opposed, but intertwined variants of Being's never-ending process of self-relation?
Bersani follows Freud further than Freud was willing to go in his claim that gay love is, at its core, narcissistic, since the lover sees the beloved as similar to themselves. Mature object-love, by contrast, is for Freud premised upon sexual difference between self and other. But rather than object, as many queer theorists do, that Freud's conceptualization of homosexuality is pathological, Bersani celebrates it for proposing an expansive concept of narcissism which offers a way out of the political deadlocks of psychoanalytic conflict theory, in which self and other are pitted in an endless war against each other.
Drawing upon Heideggerian ontology and analyses of Proust, Genet, and Godard, Bersani proposes, beneath the narcissism of an imaginary ego that constructs itself in an accordance with the ideological demands of the Symbolic in an attempt to achieve a false sense of mastery and avoid the pain of object-loss, a more primordial relation to the world which he calls "homo-narcissism." Like the primary narcissism which Freud associates with oceanic feeling, homo-narcissism is pre-personal, anonymous, ontological rather than phenomenological, passively constituted by the world rather than actively constituting it, and at home in the world rather than alienated from it, ; but unlike Freud's conception of primary narcissism, in which differences between self and other are collapsed into a monism, homo-narcissism maintains that Being is composed of self-dispersing, self-differentiating replications. Homo-narcissism, then, by aiming at the destruction of the ego in order to return to a transindividual field of being, ultimately aims for the expansion of the self through worldly others. Otherness is no longer seen as threatening to the self, but is instead its necessary complement. Beneath a lacking, alienated ego attempting (and failing) to master a world of hostile objects, we find a surplus of more-than-human Being overflowing with a voracious desire for itself.
Psychoanalysis, as an ethical practice, ought not to aim at building up egos, but at dissolving them. The ego, as Lacan said, is the symptom par excellence. It is composed of libidinal drive energy that has become organized in accordance with prevailing social norms, which is to say that it is composed of the same (previously) disorganized libido that it now deems "other" from itself and feels itself threatened by. To practice of psychoanalysis consists in a painful coming to terms with the otherness that inheres in oneself, the otherness that oneself is and has mistakenly believed oneself to not be--an otherness that at once motivates and undoes the ego's attempt at self-identity. If we admit, with Freud, that "the ego is not the master in its own house," then it is a small step to admit that it is not the master in the house of Being, either--that the irreducible opposition between self and other, which for Freud produces the discontent within civilization, is in fact premised upon an originary forgetting of their sameness. What follows, then, is a way of relating to others that neither denies them their fundamental alterity, nor reifies it into an unbridgeable chasm that separates isolated subjectivities. We create others and the world from our own fantasies, from our own flesh, it's true, but the flesh of our fantasies, our flesh, is equally drawn from others and from the world. What we love in others reveals to us something fundamental about ourselves , but the self here is an impersonal, worldly self ("no one," to quote Merleau-Ponty), a self outside of our conscious sense of who we are, a self beyond the restricted narcissism of the ego and its others. This is a self that rides the crest of Being--not in a mystical oneness with Being that would erase all difference and conflict, but a self that echoes and expresses Being's many forms.
Bersani: "External reality may at first present itself as an affective menace, but psychoanalysis--like art, although in a more discursive mode--might train us to see our prior presence in the world, to se, as bizarre as this may sound, that, ontologically, the world cares for us. Finally...it is part of the complexity of a human destiny that we may fail to find that care sufficiently satisfying, and so we will undoubtedly never stop insisting--if only intermittently--that the jouissance of an illusion of suppressing otherness can surpass the pleasure of finding ourselves harbored within it" (153).
"Ideally conducted, analysis can lead to the dissolution of the self--that is, to the loss of the very grounds of self-knowledge...Seen in this way, psychoanalytic treatment would not be primarily a subject-object relation in which the analyst helps the analysand to excavate and to know the secrets or drives that have brought him or her to treatment. Rather, it would be an exercise in the depersonalization of both analyst and analysand, in the creation of a new, third subjectivitiy to which no individual name can be attached, a subjectivity in which the two find themselves corresponding--co-responding--in the transindividual being which, they have discovered, 'belongs' to neither of them, but which they share...We call such an exchange an experience of impersonal intimacy...Love is perhaps always--as both Plato and Freud suggest--a phenomenon of memory, but what is rememebered in the expansive narcissism of an impersonal intimacy is not some truth we know about the self, but rather, as [Adam] Phillips says in Intimacies , 'a process of becoming,' or, in other terms, evolving affinities of being. The subject's need to know the other, rather than being valued as our highest relational aspiration, should be seen, as Phillips writes of the relationship between mother and child, as 'a defence against what is unknowningly evolving, as potential, between them.' This potentiality is originally initiated by the mother's 'aesthetic of handling' and repeated but also modified and recategorized in the splintered, nonassignable subjectivity between analyst and analysand" (161-2).