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Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship
..". cuts squarely across the accepted tradition... Fuller examines these two great soldiers from a fresh viewpoint and refuses to let himself be bound by tradition." --New York Times Book Review
..". readable, instructive, stimulating, and... controversial as when first published." --Military Review
First published fifty years ago, Fuller's study of Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee remains one of his most brilliant and durable works, Grant and Lee is a compelling study not only of the two men, but also of the nature of leadership and command in wartime.
..". readable, instructive, stimulating, and... controversial as when first published." --Military Review
First published fifty years ago, Fuller's study of Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee remains one of his most brilliant and durable works, Grant and Lee is a compelling study not only of the two men, but also of the nature of leadership and command in wartime.
336 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1933
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About the author
J.F.C. Fuller
119 books71 followersMajor-General John Frederick Charles Fuller, CB, CBE, DSO was a British Army officer (1899–1933), military historian and strategist, notable as an early theorist of modern armoured warfare, including categorising principles of warfare.
Fuller was also an early disciple of English poet and magician Aleister Crowley and was very familiar with his, and other forms of, magick and mysticism.
Fuller was also an early disciple of English poet and magician Aleister Crowley and was very familiar with his, and other forms of, magick and mysticism.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 40 reviews
August 21, 2007
Iconoclastic as always, Fuller picks Grant over the historian's darling (and mine), Robert E. Lee as the better general. Strong argument, extensive research, and convincing logic. Don't read Fuller unless you're ready for someone to mess with your preconceptions.
February 14, 2010
Fuller's campaign narratives are often colorless, his introduction to antebellum America is a weird collage of Lost Cause tropes and Stephen Vincent Benet stanzas (!), but his brilliant analysis of the capabilities and peculiarities of Grant and Lee, as well as of the fearful political muddle on each side, excuses the book's dated mannerisms. One instructive point: if you're planning to launch a rebellion against political authority possessed of greater resources, you had better get your shit together first. Scrappy fighting and trust in God ("the moral offensive") won't cut it. To gain its independence, the South needed Lee and President Davis to be statesmen-strategists of the highest order. They weren't. The best military minds of their generation happened to belong to their opponents.
October 25, 2025
John Frederick Charles Fuller was a British Army officer who gained a reputation as one of the foremost strategic thinkers of the 20th century. Even before his retirement as a major general in 1933 he had embarked upon what proved a prolific career as an author of works on military theory and history, which were influenced by both his military service and his extensive reading. Both of these elements are on display in this book, which compares and contrasts the personalities of Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee to show how they shaped their commands during the American Civil War.
Fuller’s grasp of military operations is the strength of the book, and nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the first chapter, in which Fuller sets out his interpretation of the context of the war. It’s an analysis which is heavily influenced by outdated interpretations that were then current and it suffers from the author’s unfamiliarity with American geography and antebellum politics. Not only does he buy into the pseudohistorical Lost Cause mythos that distorts understandings of the focus of the war, but his criticism of the Confederates’ strategy ignores important factors in their decision-making process. His claim that the Confederacy would have been better off had they exploited their size and drawn Union forces into their interior rather than fighting them in Virginia and Tennessee misses the fact both that those states possessed the bulk of the Confederates already limited industrial resources, and that the Southern population was hardly as united behind secession as such a strategy assumes. Add to that the Confederacy’s need to demonstrate their viability as a nation if they were to have any hope of support from the European powers, and Fuller’s strategy is less a prescription for success than a recipe for failure thanks to his ignorance of the ingredients involved.
Fuller’s book improves once he moves on to the more familiar ground of analyzing his subjects’ respective leadership styles as generals. These chapters embody Fuller’s Carlylean approach to history to a fault, though, which is far from their only flaw. The nature of his approach to the two men is blatantly revisionist, as he challenges directly the contemporary view of Lee as a great general and Grant as little more than a butcher of men. This he does with a detailed comparison that criticizes Lee for his excessive deference to both his president and his men, his blinding devotion to Virginia, and his surrender of the direction of battles to his subordinates once the fighting began. Many of his criticisms are valid ones, and they are contrasted throughout with Grant’s superior qualities: his strategic vision, the clarity with which he grasped the problems before him, and the clear directions he gave to his officers during engagements with the enemy.
There is a didactic goal in this, as Fuller sees in Grant’s generalship a harbinger of his own ideas about the conduct of war. This is of a piece with his view that the American Civil War presaged the First World War in which Fuller himself served, which influences his interpretation of the evidence. The best example of this is in his focus on the impact of the rifle in Civil War battles, where they demonstrated a lethality with which Fuller’s contemporaries would become well familiar in 1914. Only the rifle was far from the ubiquitous firearm during the Civil War that his analysis assumes they were, as smoothbores were far more common at the start of the conflict and equipped many units right up to the end of the fighting.
Flaws such as these diminish its value as a comparative study of the generalship of the two men. Yet Fuller’s study remains a stimulating read even with these deficiencies. A fluent writer, his arguments are stated clearly and are never less than engaging. While this book should not be anyone’s introduction to either of these figures, those with a familiarity with Grant, Lee, or the Civil War more generally are likely to find something of interest within its pages.
Fuller’s grasp of military operations is the strength of the book, and nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the first chapter, in which Fuller sets out his interpretation of the context of the war. It’s an analysis which is heavily influenced by outdated interpretations that were then current and it suffers from the author’s unfamiliarity with American geography and antebellum politics. Not only does he buy into the pseudohistorical Lost Cause mythos that distorts understandings of the focus of the war, but his criticism of the Confederates’ strategy ignores important factors in their decision-making process. His claim that the Confederacy would have been better off had they exploited their size and drawn Union forces into their interior rather than fighting them in Virginia and Tennessee misses the fact both that those states possessed the bulk of the Confederates already limited industrial resources, and that the Southern population was hardly as united behind secession as such a strategy assumes. Add to that the Confederacy’s need to demonstrate their viability as a nation if they were to have any hope of support from the European powers, and Fuller’s strategy is less a prescription for success than a recipe for failure thanks to his ignorance of the ingredients involved.
Fuller’s book improves once he moves on to the more familiar ground of analyzing his subjects’ respective leadership styles as generals. These chapters embody Fuller’s Carlylean approach to history to a fault, though, which is far from their only flaw. The nature of his approach to the two men is blatantly revisionist, as he challenges directly the contemporary view of Lee as a great general and Grant as little more than a butcher of men. This he does with a detailed comparison that criticizes Lee for his excessive deference to both his president and his men, his blinding devotion to Virginia, and his surrender of the direction of battles to his subordinates once the fighting began. Many of his criticisms are valid ones, and they are contrasted throughout with Grant’s superior qualities: his strategic vision, the clarity with which he grasped the problems before him, and the clear directions he gave to his officers during engagements with the enemy.
There is a didactic goal in this, as Fuller sees in Grant’s generalship a harbinger of his own ideas about the conduct of war. This is of a piece with his view that the American Civil War presaged the First World War in which Fuller himself served, which influences his interpretation of the evidence. The best example of this is in his focus on the impact of the rifle in Civil War battles, where they demonstrated a lethality with which Fuller’s contemporaries would become well familiar in 1914. Only the rifle was far from the ubiquitous firearm during the Civil War that his analysis assumes they were, as smoothbores were far more common at the start of the conflict and equipped many units right up to the end of the fighting.
Flaws such as these diminish its value as a comparative study of the generalship of the two men. Yet Fuller’s study remains a stimulating read even with these deficiencies. A fluent writer, his arguments are stated clearly and are never less than engaging. While this book should not be anyone’s introduction to either of these figures, those with a familiarity with Grant, Lee, or the Civil War more generally are likely to find something of interest within its pages.
December 26, 2020
“The final dictum of history must be that whatever excellence Lee possessed as a strategist or tactician, he was the worst Quartermaster-General in history...his strategy had no foundations and his tactics never once resulted in overwhelming and decisive victory.”
A superb examination of two of the greatest American military titans of the 19th century this book was. The author was a famed British general himself and his analysis at the time of writing was without peer.
The above quote perfectly sums up the overall conclusions of the author, and the more I read about the Civil War the more I agree. Lee was a brilliant battlefield commander, but as a general he failed utterly. Perhaps his greatest flaw was an over reliance on Providence to provide a victory miraculously instead of seizing victory himself. Linked to this shortcoming, Lee was so convinced of God’s blessing on the Confederacy that he drastically and consistently underestimated his enemies. While this was a tenable error while the Union’s commanders were mired in incompetency, it proved fatal once a military savant like Grant came to the East.
Furthermore, Lee never sufficiently disciplined his troops, nor did he exercise any real command over his subordinate officers. In his first command of the war, a brigadier general under Lee had to literally beg him to issue orders. Added to this, Lee never acted as the General-in-Chief that, for all intents and purposes, he was following 1862. He never pushed back on President Jefferson Davis’ unwise decisions, and any decision of his he left totally up to the whim of the politicians Richmond.
Finally, he wasn’t worth a damn when it came to supplying his army. Even as late as 1865, Richmond was teeming with 5 million bread and meat rations while his army starved, and the city held a surplus of shoes while Lee’s soldiers went barefoot. He rarely asked for more supplies and when inquired about supplies he seemed to care little.
Grant, as we see, was the far superior general and perhaps the greatest American General in 80 years both prior to and following the Civil War. Having been a Quartermaster himself, he understood perfectly not only HOW to supply his armies but WHY steady supplies were vital. He made excellent maneuvers in his campaigns both East and West, and best of all he never became flustered.
I think the best summation of Grant, and indeed a high complement for a general, can be found in his contemporary, General William T. Sherman, who said, “I’m a damned sight smarter than Grant, and I think a better fighter, but I’ll tell you where he licks me and licks the whole world: he doesn’t give a damn what the enemy does out of his sight though it scares me like hell.”
Simply put, Grant didn’t worry about what Lee was doing so much as he worried what he himself was going to do. Early in the war he learned a vital lesson, namely that his enemy was just as afraid of him as he was of them, and so he resolved always to focus only on his own forces and make the enemy react to THEIR fear.
An excellent read for any lover of history, and a vital first step in peeling away the myth of Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant. It is in my opinion that Lee ought never to have been promoted higher than Colonel, an able tactician but a dreadful general, whereas Grant does not get nearly the level of respect that he deserves. Though over time his reputation has improved and I hope to continue seeing it improve as time wears on.
A superb examination of two of the greatest American military titans of the 19th century this book was. The author was a famed British general himself and his analysis at the time of writing was without peer.
The above quote perfectly sums up the overall conclusions of the author, and the more I read about the Civil War the more I agree. Lee was a brilliant battlefield commander, but as a general he failed utterly. Perhaps his greatest flaw was an over reliance on Providence to provide a victory miraculously instead of seizing victory himself. Linked to this shortcoming, Lee was so convinced of God’s blessing on the Confederacy that he drastically and consistently underestimated his enemies. While this was a tenable error while the Union’s commanders were mired in incompetency, it proved fatal once a military savant like Grant came to the East.
Furthermore, Lee never sufficiently disciplined his troops, nor did he exercise any real command over his subordinate officers. In his first command of the war, a brigadier general under Lee had to literally beg him to issue orders. Added to this, Lee never acted as the General-in-Chief that, for all intents and purposes, he was following 1862. He never pushed back on President Jefferson Davis’ unwise decisions, and any decision of his he left totally up to the whim of the politicians Richmond.
Finally, he wasn’t worth a damn when it came to supplying his army. Even as late as 1865, Richmond was teeming with 5 million bread and meat rations while his army starved, and the city held a surplus of shoes while Lee’s soldiers went barefoot. He rarely asked for more supplies and when inquired about supplies he seemed to care little.
Grant, as we see, was the far superior general and perhaps the greatest American General in 80 years both prior to and following the Civil War. Having been a Quartermaster himself, he understood perfectly not only HOW to supply his armies but WHY steady supplies were vital. He made excellent maneuvers in his campaigns both East and West, and best of all he never became flustered.
I think the best summation of Grant, and indeed a high complement for a general, can be found in his contemporary, General William T. Sherman, who said, “I’m a damned sight smarter than Grant, and I think a better fighter, but I’ll tell you where he licks me and licks the whole world: he doesn’t give a damn what the enemy does out of his sight though it scares me like hell.”
Simply put, Grant didn’t worry about what Lee was doing so much as he worried what he himself was going to do. Early in the war he learned a vital lesson, namely that his enemy was just as afraid of him as he was of them, and so he resolved always to focus only on his own forces and make the enemy react to THEIR fear.
An excellent read for any lover of history, and a vital first step in peeling away the myth of Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant. It is in my opinion that Lee ought never to have been promoted higher than Colonel, an able tactician but a dreadful general, whereas Grant does not get nearly the level of respect that he deserves. Though over time his reputation has improved and I hope to continue seeing it improve as time wears on.
April 22, 2021
After years of idolization amongst a certain class of Southern traditionalists, the character of General Robert E. Lee has plummeted in contemporary America, though for reasons having more to do with politics than his abilities as military commander. His adversary U. S. Grant traditionally was regarded as a crude but persistent batterer, whose materiel superiority insured final victory. Now however, Grant’s gifts as a general have become more appreciated; in The Mask of Command John Keegan presented Grant as the paradigm commander of the army of a democracy.
For military history buffs, J. F. C Fuller figures alongside B. H. Liddle-Hart as one of the ‘military prophets’, men who learned from the slaughter in the trenches of the First World War that there were better, less costly, more intelligent ways to fight. Their publications (along with those of a certain French Col. De Gaulle) were ignored by their own high commands, though eagerly read by members of the German General Staff like Heinz Guderian, who made them the basis of Panzer tactics. Though the date for Grant and Lee looks like 1947, on internal evidence it appears to have been written in the 1930s. Fuller saw in the American Civil War the supremacy of the defence that marked the end of the mass bayonet attack as an offensive tactic, the decisive move in Napoleonic warfare. Already rifle fire was supreme, and by 1914 the machine gun and the rapid firing artillery piece had made the infantry charge even more suicidal.
What I learned from this book by a master tactician was that Lee in many respects was not a very good general, and even at manoeuvre Grant in some ways was better, especially at Vicksburg and Petersburg. Interestingly in the light of those who scorn Lee as a traitor, one of his faults was excessive respect for the doctrine of civilian control of the military, deferring to Jefferson Davis in matters of strategy. Which was hopeless because Davis took the doctrine of State’s rights so seriously that he couldn’t order any of his governors to send troops or supplies to the front when they wanted to keep them at home, leaving the Confederates chronically short of men, ammunition and even boots. Worse for the Confederates, though not for civilisation, they had no strategy for winning the war. Persuading Britain and France to intervene was Davis’ only card and once the European powers saw the North was winning, the Confederacy was finished. In Fuller’s opinion, what Lee needed to do was abandon Richmond and take his army west to fight Grant in Tennessee; there was where the war was really decided. I find it fascinating that the two times Lee took his army north, to Maryland and Pennsylvania, he was beaten, and it would have been much worse had the Union forces vigorously pursued, as I suspect under Grant they surely would.
It was an unexpected surprise to find a reprint of this book in B&N, and a delight to find that so long ago that a major military prophet had appreciated Grant’s generalship.
For military history buffs, J. F. C Fuller figures alongside B. H. Liddle-Hart as one of the ‘military prophets’, men who learned from the slaughter in the trenches of the First World War that there were better, less costly, more intelligent ways to fight. Their publications (along with those of a certain French Col. De Gaulle) were ignored by their own high commands, though eagerly read by members of the German General Staff like Heinz Guderian, who made them the basis of Panzer tactics. Though the date for Grant and Lee looks like 1947, on internal evidence it appears to have been written in the 1930s. Fuller saw in the American Civil War the supremacy of the defence that marked the end of the mass bayonet attack as an offensive tactic, the decisive move in Napoleonic warfare. Already rifle fire was supreme, and by 1914 the machine gun and the rapid firing artillery piece had made the infantry charge even more suicidal.
What I learned from this book by a master tactician was that Lee in many respects was not a very good general, and even at manoeuvre Grant in some ways was better, especially at Vicksburg and Petersburg. Interestingly in the light of those who scorn Lee as a traitor, one of his faults was excessive respect for the doctrine of civilian control of the military, deferring to Jefferson Davis in matters of strategy. Which was hopeless because Davis took the doctrine of State’s rights so seriously that he couldn’t order any of his governors to send troops or supplies to the front when they wanted to keep them at home, leaving the Confederates chronically short of men, ammunition and even boots. Worse for the Confederates, though not for civilisation, they had no strategy for winning the war. Persuading Britain and France to intervene was Davis’ only card and once the European powers saw the North was winning, the Confederacy was finished. In Fuller’s opinion, what Lee needed to do was abandon Richmond and take his army west to fight Grant in Tennessee; there was where the war was really decided. I find it fascinating that the two times Lee took his army north, to Maryland and Pennsylvania, he was beaten, and it would have been much worse had the Union forces vigorously pursued, as I suspect under Grant they surely would.
It was an unexpected surprise to find a reprint of this book in B&N, and a delight to find that so long ago that a major military prophet had appreciated Grant’s generalship.
June 16, 2018
J.F.C. Fuller’s analysis and comparison of the generalship of Grant and Lee is remarkable for its conclusion: that Grant was the superior general. This conclusion would not be in the least bit controversial were it not for the cult of Lee-worshipers that emerged after the Civil War and have largely dominated the historiography ever since. Faulty analysis, lazy research, barely concealed bias, and outright fabrication have elevated Lee to sainthood and, until recent years, relegated Grant to the role of slow, plodding battlefield butcher who gained victory only through superior resources. Nothing could be farther from the truth, and Fuller illuminates this reality.
However, even in arriving at the correct conclusion (many years before such historical reinterpretation had gained any semblance of general tolerance), Fuller still falls victim to the propaganda of the “Lost Cause.” In particular, he lionizes Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson to the point of hagiography and completely ignores Lee’s other excellent corps commander, James Longstreet. In this oversight, we see that the post-war Lee Cult continues their triumph of character assassination against Longstreet — after all, if Lee was a Christ-like figure, he must have a Judas. Read Jeffrey Wert’s excellent biography of James Longstreet to see the facts more clearly. It was Longstreet, not Jackson, that Lee elevated to 2nd in command of the Army of Northern Virginia.
So, Fuller does not completely escape the clutches of the Lost Cause myth, even as he challenges that myth’s most cherished pillar.
When this book was first written in the 1950s, it was hardly fashionable to declare Grant’s superiority. The strength of the Lee Cult and the Lost Cause myth was supreme. However, Fuller’s book contributed greatly to the chipping away of that myth and opening the door for a much needed historical reinterpretation that would not pick up momentum until decades later. For that, Fuller deserves our thanks!
However, even in arriving at the correct conclusion (many years before such historical reinterpretation had gained any semblance of general tolerance), Fuller still falls victim to the propaganda of the “Lost Cause.” In particular, he lionizes Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson to the point of hagiography and completely ignores Lee’s other excellent corps commander, James Longstreet. In this oversight, we see that the post-war Lee Cult continues their triumph of character assassination against Longstreet — after all, if Lee was a Christ-like figure, he must have a Judas. Read Jeffrey Wert’s excellent biography of James Longstreet to see the facts more clearly. It was Longstreet, not Jackson, that Lee elevated to 2nd in command of the Army of Northern Virginia.
So, Fuller does not completely escape the clutches of the Lost Cause myth, even as he challenges that myth’s most cherished pillar.
When this book was first written in the 1950s, it was hardly fashionable to declare Grant’s superiority. The strength of the Lee Cult and the Lost Cause myth was supreme. However, Fuller’s book contributed greatly to the chipping away of that myth and opening the door for a much needed historical reinterpretation that would not pick up momentum until decades later. For that, Fuller deserves our thanks!
November 19, 2022
Boy did I enjoy this book. Not only did it investigate the generals, it gave a strategic synopsis of the primary civil war battles and strategy. It brought out what I have gleaned from the 40 odd books that I had read into something that I could grasp and agree logically. This book does not promote either general as the best, but rather the best at what they could do for their situations and the limitations of their personalities and knowledge. It points out flawed behaviors as well as charismatic action. It quantifies action and inaction. The fella who put this book together was a truly learned man who was a historian as well as a warrior. I know I said it, but I’ll say it again- I really enjoyed this book. Now to find other volumes General Fuller has authored.
June 15, 2021
There is a reason that nearly 90 years later, this is still in publication. One of the foremost opinion pieces on the American Civil War and its tactics, Fuller takes on the historically accepted concept that Lee was the better general despite Grant's larger numbers. A wonderfully insightful defense of the military genius of general Grant as well as a daunting warning for the future of world military affairs. Fuller does tend to repeat himself often, but aside from that, this is a fantastic read.
February 13, 2024
Got lost in the weeds of battlefield tactics a fair bit, but appreciate the praise of Grant as someone who understood grand strategy, simple solutions, and effective management.
November 30, 2019
Very interesting and convincingly argued study of the two most prominent generals of the American Civil War. I definitely learned a lot, and enjoyed the contrasting styles and personalities of Grant and Lee. Fuller does a great job of contextualizing the conflict in which these two men fought. It was indeed a new era of warfare, both generals being forced to learn as they went along. Though a casual observer might consider Grant and Lee to be rather incompetent in their many errors and blunders, Fuller shows us that they were confronted with myriad challenges that new inventions such as rifled guns introduced to warfare at the time. The difference was how they handled these challenges- both adapted as well as you could expect anyone to, but Grant was able to learn from his mistakes and evolve into arguably the finest general of his age (which Fuller believes him to be). I gained a new appreciation for Grant, who is undoubtedly one of the finest generals in American military history.
Fuller's prose is a bit dated, and his battle sequences are hard to follow at times, probably because he assumed everyone would understand tactics like he did, so he kind of spits them out. These can really be a slog to get through; he likes to spend a lot of time on them, including those that didn't directly involve Grant and Lee. But once you get a grip on what's going on you can see Fuller's points.
Definitely an eye-opening study that challenged and overturned much of the prominent thinking of the day in which it was written.
Fuller's prose is a bit dated, and his battle sequences are hard to follow at times, probably because he assumed everyone would understand tactics like he did, so he kind of spits them out. These can really be a slog to get through; he likes to spend a lot of time on them, including those that didn't directly involve Grant and Lee. But once you get a grip on what's going on you can see Fuller's points.
Definitely an eye-opening study that challenged and overturned much of the prominent thinking of the day in which it was written.
January 8, 2022
This year being the Grant Bicentennial I thought it fitting to make effort to finish this book off first. I have at least three other Grant books on my TBR list I intend to finish this year. This is an older volume (published by a British military historian in 1933) but it clearly anticipates the direction of scholarship on Grant and the Civil War now emerging. Fuller argues in this book that Grant was a far superior general to Lee--being capable of seeing the big picture, coordinating events, thinking like his enemy and using his advantages in a way Lee could not. In Fuller's telling Lee's mind was full of a moralistic defense of Virginia as the only battle worth fighting so he refused to put his efforts into other fronts and remained mired in his own issues without being of value to anyone else. Written in the heyday of The Lost Cause mythology, Fuller has some of his contemporaries' views in that he downplays slavery as THE cause of the war and is uninterested in examining how it affected the way the two men waged war. However, in his assessment of Grant as a superior tactician he was far ahead of his time (or behind it, as people who actually experienced the Civil War were well aware of Grant's skill). While its extremely detailed examination of all the different strategic aspects of war is a bit tedious at times, it is readable and well written. Highly recommended!
March 20, 2012
Pretty interesting book. Flips on your head what you think about Lee and Grant. Though it gets into some specific details, it has a lot to cover in about 175 pages, so it feels like more could've been included. An amazing writer though.
January 16, 2012
A good study of contrasts of these two supreme generals. It has spurred me to want to read more about both men . If you are a Civil War buff , then you may want to read this book.
June 11, 2024
Review title: Rethinking military genius
Robert E. Lee has widely been considered the greatest general of the American Civil War, with Ulysses S. Grant the victor because of the overpowering resources he could direct with his blunt and bloody strategy. Fuller, a veteran general and military strategist who has written many books about military history, offers a pretty thorough debunking of this popular consensus in this brief study written in 1932 with a 25th anniversary second edition in 1957.
While you might expect a writer with a military background who has worn the same uniform as these men might base his theory on tactical prowess or strategic genius, but he actually starts with lengthy chapters on the personality of each general. Grant was known for his stolid personality, which Fuller illustrates with the account of Grant, born Hiram Ulysses Grant but preferring Ulysses as his first name to avoid the nickname "Hug", arriving at West Point to find his name on the register as Ulysses Simpson. "To Grant the problem was simplicity itself; he dropped the name Hiram and assumed that of Simpson in its stead. Throughout life he never failed to look at every problem from the simplest point of view, and to answer it in the simplest manner possible." (p. 66). A colonel serving under him said of Grant "He habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall, and was about to do it." (p. 83)
Lee, on the other hand, was the heir of American royalty, related by birth to Revolutionary heroe Lighthouse Harry Lee and by marriage to George Washington. "He stood so apart from his men, that in their eyes he became the cause for which they were fighting." (p. 104). As a devout Christian he did not question the outcome of battles but left them in God's hands, an approach that Fuller considers a "fatalist" (p. 110) strategy that left his army "in a state of semi-starvation and were the causes of much of its straggling and ill-discipline." (p. 125). Fuller pins Lee's ultimate failure in the war against Grant on these personality traits: because of them he preferred to rely on verbal orders to subordinates, not written ones, leading to confusion within his command, and he disliked interfering with both subordinates once a battle started (p. 162) and with his political leader Jefferson Davis even when asked a direct question. "The expediency of the measure you can judge better than I can, " (p. 211) Lee responded to Davis; Fuller condemns this as "not the voice of a great general but of a submissive clerk."
Grant did rely on clearly written orders and occasionally showed anger, such as when he snapped at his staff that he was tired of hearing "about what what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves." (p. 77). And Grant, finally, though no heir to American royalty, learned how to fight, as Lincoln said of him, and to Fuller "It was because Grant could learn such lessons as this . . . and not because he possessed a genius for war, that he commands our admiration." (p. 86)
The second half of the book is Fuller's thumbnail sketches of the key strategies and battles of the war as they reflected the personalities and skills of these generals-in-chief. He uses maps at the back of the book and small, somewhat crude drawings of battlefield placements (remember the original publication was in early-1930s printing technology) to illustrate the narrative. His quotes and descriptions of both generals and battles are footnoted, so while Fuller is unequivocal in his opinions, they are persuasively based on factual outcomes and well-documented sources.
Robert E. Lee has widely been considered the greatest general of the American Civil War, with Ulysses S. Grant the victor because of the overpowering resources he could direct with his blunt and bloody strategy. Fuller, a veteran general and military strategist who has written many books about military history, offers a pretty thorough debunking of this popular consensus in this brief study written in 1932 with a 25th anniversary second edition in 1957.
While you might expect a writer with a military background who has worn the same uniform as these men might base his theory on tactical prowess or strategic genius, but he actually starts with lengthy chapters on the personality of each general. Grant was known for his stolid personality, which Fuller illustrates with the account of Grant, born Hiram Ulysses Grant but preferring Ulysses as his first name to avoid the nickname "Hug", arriving at West Point to find his name on the register as Ulysses Simpson. "To Grant the problem was simplicity itself; he dropped the name Hiram and assumed that of Simpson in its stead. Throughout life he never failed to look at every problem from the simplest point of view, and to answer it in the simplest manner possible." (p. 66). A colonel serving under him said of Grant "He habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall, and was about to do it." (p. 83)
Lee, on the other hand, was the heir of American royalty, related by birth to Revolutionary heroe Lighthouse Harry Lee and by marriage to George Washington. "He stood so apart from his men, that in their eyes he became the cause for which they were fighting." (p. 104). As a devout Christian he did not question the outcome of battles but left them in God's hands, an approach that Fuller considers a "fatalist" (p. 110) strategy that left his army "in a state of semi-starvation and were the causes of much of its straggling and ill-discipline." (p. 125). Fuller pins Lee's ultimate failure in the war against Grant on these personality traits: because of them he preferred to rely on verbal orders to subordinates, not written ones, leading to confusion within his command, and he disliked interfering with both subordinates once a battle started (p. 162) and with his political leader Jefferson Davis even when asked a direct question. "The expediency of the measure you can judge better than I can, " (p. 211) Lee responded to Davis; Fuller condemns this as "not the voice of a great general but of a submissive clerk."
Grant did rely on clearly written orders and occasionally showed anger, such as when he snapped at his staff that he was tired of hearing "about what what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves." (p. 77). And Grant, finally, though no heir to American royalty, learned how to fight, as Lincoln said of him, and to Fuller "It was because Grant could learn such lessons as this . . . and not because he possessed a genius for war, that he commands our admiration." (p. 86)
The second half of the book is Fuller's thumbnail sketches of the key strategies and battles of the war as they reflected the personalities and skills of these generals-in-chief. He uses maps at the back of the book and small, somewhat crude drawings of battlefield placements (remember the original publication was in early-1930s printing technology) to illustrate the narrative. His quotes and descriptions of both generals and battles are footnoted, so while Fuller is unequivocal in his opinions, they are persuasively based on factual outcomes and well-documented sources.
September 10, 2020
Fuller definitely prefers Grant over Lee. He must be right, since this is my own view! Fuller is a military man who looks at the history and leadership decisions of both men from a military perspective. Part of the book includes some technical analysis which is of interest, but some of the terminology is beyond the experience of the average reader.
The book is well worth reading if you are interested in the Civil War. It does a good job debunking the popular "Lost Cause" mythology of Lee. Fuller appreciates Lee as a person and as an inspiring leader, but criticizes him severely for a too provincial view of the war and as an ineffective strategist. Grant far exceeded him, which led to Grant's ultimate victory.
The book is well worth reading if you are interested in the Civil War. It does a good job debunking the popular "Lost Cause" mythology of Lee. Fuller appreciates Lee as a person and as an inspiring leader, but criticizes him severely for a too provincial view of the war and as an ineffective strategist. Grant far exceeded him, which led to Grant's ultimate victory.
November 9, 2019
He does cover the various points of Civil War pretty well. He explains the generals backgrounds their strategies and how they relate to government policies. It was an unique take on the U.S. Civil war. I have not read a book on the generals from this angle.
The author definitely leans towards one of the characters over the other. It might be that he formed his opinion after doing the research but it is clear early on which general he favored. At points he does to try to be unbiased but I didn't feel he succeed until the very end when he was doing the summary.
It is interesting that the book was written in 1957 by a British military expert about U.S. civil war generals.
The author definitely leans towards one of the characters over the other. It might be that he formed his opinion after doing the research but it is clear early on which general he favored. At points he does to try to be unbiased but I didn't feel he succeed until the very end when he was doing the summary.
It is interesting that the book was written in 1957 by a British military expert about U.S. civil war generals.
March 25, 2023
Originally written in the 1930s and revised in the ‘50s, this dated but valuable examination of the two great commanders of the Civil War uncovers fascinating insights into their personalities. Both were men of genius in certain ways but Lee was more rigid and flawed, and despite some successes, was never able to fathom the grand strategy that would have have given an under-resourced Confederacy a fighting chance. Grant, on the other hand, was able to fully harness the Union’s great economic advantages, learn from his (many) mistakes, and doggedly pursue his vision of victory until accomplished.
August 20, 2019
The author is a British military historian who approached the study of these two famous Civil War generals from an objective, neutral viewpoint. And the conclusions that he draws would be controversial indeed. For so long the standard view was that Lee was the outstanding general of the war and that Grant won mostly by superiority in numbers without regards to casualties. JFC Fuller presents a convincing argument to the contrary, including casualty figures, disproving this long held conclusion. He elevates Grant to the supreme position. Judge for yourself. If you dare.
December 23, 2020
A thoroughly enjoyable book. Full of provocative claims and interesting observations. His conclusions regarding Lee are likely over-simllified but provide interesting material to consider the flaws and limits of this incredible General. His appreciation for Grant is clear. Those that do not understand Grant's strategic skill and campaign victories would do well to read this book. A quick but helpful summary of each year and campaign by these two create a sketch of the men and the war that is helpful. A thought-provoking book and one I truly enjoyed.
June 4, 2024
A comprehensive comparative analysis of two iconic Civil War generals, Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Fuller delves into each leader's distinct personality and leadership style, revealing how these differences shaped their military strategies and influenced the war's outcome.
This insightful 1932 study was written only 70 years after the Civil War ended and might be considered dated--until you realize that JFC Fuller was writing of events more recent than if an author today wrote of the Korean War. The book offers a nuanced perspective on command.
This insightful 1932 study was written only 70 years after the Civil War ended and might be considered dated--until you realize that JFC Fuller was writing of events more recent than if an author today wrote of the Korean War. The book offers a nuanced perspective on command.
May 23, 2021
This was a very cool comparison and in depth review of the civil war generals Grant and Lee. I learned a lot of interesting facts about both Generals. At times I found it hard to read. The quotes from the civil war era really slowed me down since their writing style was so much different than what is now and at times the authors writing style made me have to really slow down and re-read the sentences or paragraph to understand what he was trying to say. Overall I still enjoyed it.
April 10, 2019
The author was a British general and he gives a non- partisan look at the generalship of Grant and Lee, the former underestimated and the latter perhaps overrated by most historians. The book game me some new insights on the Civil War from a career military man, especially concerning grand strategy, technology change, and political leadership. Worth the read.
December 23, 2020
Brilliant analysis of the generalship of the two primary leaders on each side in the Civil War. Lee, often idolized and whose leadership has been idealized by many, is seen by Fuller as flawed and mistake prone.
Grant's tenacity has frequently been noted, but here Fuller recognizes his genius in the direct and creative ways Grant presses the war to conclusion.
Grant's tenacity has frequently been noted, but here Fuller recognizes his genius in the direct and creative ways Grant presses the war to conclusion.
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August 3, 2024In my humble opinion, I know better the Civil War than anything prior. Author is clear that Grant is much better than Lee though Lee would probably be a better subject for a friendship despite his penchant lean toward religion.
Anyway, Grant probably better strategy and tactics and leader of men than Grant just check the losses by 1000 of the two in the civil war.
Anyway, Grant probably better strategy and tactics and leader of men than Grant just check the losses by 1000 of the two in the civil war.
October 17, 2024
Grant and Lee by JFC Fuller
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A look at two of America’s most revered Generals, Ulysses S Grant and Robert E Lee. A short and concise overview of the leadership qualities, military tactics and strategy, and personality traits of both as men and generals. And the reasoning and rationale as to why Grant was the better General and tactician compared to Lee, leading to the Union victory of the Civil War.
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#civilwar #america #usa #usa🇺🇸 #army #union #confederacy #history #bookstagram #readersofinstagram #read #book
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A look at two of America’s most revered Generals, Ulysses S Grant and Robert E Lee. A short and concise overview of the leadership qualities, military tactics and strategy, and personality traits of both as men and generals. And the reasoning and rationale as to why Grant was the better General and tactician compared to Lee, leading to the Union victory of the Civil War.
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#civilwar #america #usa #usa🇺🇸 #army #union #confederacy #history #bookstagram #readersofinstagram #read #book
July 13, 2019
A contrarian view by a famous military theorist argues in favor of Grant as the better general and Lee simply choosing the wrong strategy that didn't take into account the South's military resources. This view of Grant as a great general and leader is much more widely accepted today.
May 24, 2022
For understanding Grant and Lee, there may be no better book. Both are fascinating and equally as different from each other as the armies they lead. This book is a must read for anyone looking to read more about the generals, their idealisms, leadership methods, etc...
April 5, 2023
This book was definitely revolutionary in its masterful defense of Grant's military genius and making note of Lee's mistakes but unfortunately the beginning does still contain some lost cause mythology about "states' rights"
May 9, 2025
Overall, a solid and engaging read. A bit dry at times, but that is to be expected, given that it’s a monograph. I enjoyed Fuller’s contrasts of the two generals and his analysis of their impacts on the war. He neglected to mention Grant’s unfortunate drinking habit, however…
February 28, 2019
It was an easy reading book. Very well written and I enjoyed the history
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