A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West

by Ronald D. Asmus

The brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 seemed to many like an unexpected shot out of the blue that was gone as quickly as it came. Former Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Ronald Asmus contends that it was a conflict that was prepared and planned for some time by Moscow, part of a broader strategy to send a message to the United that Russia is going to flex its muscle in the twenty-first century. A Little War that Shook the World is a fascinating look at the breakdown of relations between Russia and the West, the decay and decline of the Western Alliance itself, and the fate of Eastern Europe in a time of economic crisis.

Genres: History, Russia, Politics, Nonfiction, International Relations, Political Science, Military History

272 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2010

Reviews

[Toni · Rating 3 out of 5]

I picked this book up while on a work trip to Tbilisi in order to gain a better understanding of the Russo-Georgian war of Aug. 2008. The book gives a decent factual account of the diplomatic tensions and missteps of all of the parties involved (Georgia, Russia, EU, US) in the days prior to the war. Asmus puts the war in the context of a greater narrative of post Cold War western democratic expansion coming up against the Russian nationalism of the Putin era. In general, the book is informative and interesting, however, I felt that there was some information that was glossed over (i.e. the historical background of the separatist ideologies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia - he too easily laid the impetus at Russia's feet), while other subjects were dealt a heavier representation throughout the book. The book did drag a bit as well. I was very interested to see the explanation of the parallels with Kosovo and how independence of that region affected the motivations of both sides of the Russ-Georgian situation. Having also worked in Kosovo, it was easy for me to see the similarities and differences in how the different situations were handled. Of course, the book is also written from a very specific perspective, ie. American ally of Georgia. While I am no Putin fan, the book is clearly written in a biased tone and I would definitely be interested in reading other perspectives. All in all, a good read, especially as I have seen little published on this subject.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Little War is a great candid account of the distant days of 2008, from a very Washington D.C. perspective. Asmus describes a reactive, divided, and unstrategic Washington-European diplomatic apparatus that failed to defuse a situation as it arose, precipitated a crisis by failing to understand Moscow, and left Georgia in the lurch in its moment of need.

Ultimately, blame for the war rests on Moscow, which maintained an untenable ceasefire over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for over a decade, resisted efforts at mediation, and then moved in with over a division of troops with armor, air, and naval support. However, the trigger for the war was very much the independence of Kosovo, which NATO and the EU saw as a one off event, and which Russia saw as the political dismemberment of a close ally by a unilateral and expansionist alliance which indicated that the rules had fundamentally changed, and the start of a process for admitting Ukraine and Georgia to NATO.

Georgia, a much smaller country, had little that it could do to meaningfully defend itself, yet still managed to be caught entirely off guard. President Saakashvili took the worst of all possible actions, a counter-attack that brought international opprobrium and played into Russia propaganda, while failing to meaningfully disrupt the actual attack. He was forced to act, because accepting the dismemberment of his country would be political suicide, on par with the 1921 submission to the Bolsheviks.

In the end, President Sarkozy of France managed to broker a tenuous and unsatisfying ceasefire. Russia started on a course of opposition to the West. The incoherence of Washington and Brussels was revealed. and Georgia and its separatist provinces probably suffered most of all. So yes, this book is biased, but it wears its bias on the sleeve, and a detailed and coherent account of significant events from the invaluable perspective of a diplomatic insider.

[Interzone · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've studied this area for a few years now and followed Georgian Russian relations for quite some time before this book was written. Three years after the war, I find this book to be spot on. Its amazingly accurate and has left out only a few instances of pre-war Russian aggression. I don't really care about those who reviewed it and I am not claiming that American foreign policy is correct however I do believe it documents the Kosovo precedent with the utmost care and also goes into great detail about the view from the Georgian side, which few publications do.

[Cherith Cutestory · Rating 1 out of 5]

This is the first time in my life that I've bought a book and had it to put it down before even completing the first chapter. No matter what my reservations usually are, I finish all the books I buy. Ronald Asmus, author of this book, has opened my eyes to a new fact: yes, literacy *can* be a curse.

The first thing that gave me pause is when I was reading the back jacket and saw praise from Madeleine Albright (who once said unhesitantly that 500,000 dead Iraqi civilians, mostly children, is a "fair price" to pay for Iraqi sanctions) and John Mccain. At that point, I knew I'd made a huge mistake. Regardless, guilt by association has never been one of my principles, and I thought I should read the book and judge it on its merits, not its association with malevolent politicians.

I start reading the book, and the first thing I find is an admission from Asmus that he knows the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, at least socially. They sat at a long dinner once at an international gathering, and had lunch with him weeks later, both times advising him on the increasingly tense situation. In symbolism that's impossible to overlook, and after allegations of Russian troop and arms buildup in South Ossetia and painting a scary picture of the Russians, Asmus asks, "Was the empire getting ready to strike back?". Frustrating. Any hope I'd had that the author might at least *try* to give this book a semblance of objectivity evaporates. You realize you are about to read a 236-page account of what "really" happened, written by the Georgian Interior Ministry, supervised by Saakashvili.

Well, that's not an exaggeration; that's how the book practically unfolds. Asmus portrays the Georgian side like poor little Cinderella and the Russians like Darth Vader. He pens the narrative like a bad novel, contrived ad nauseum, with sweet, wide-eyed Georgian politicians "turning pale" and "taken aback" numerous times by the bad news reported about those evil Russians. He keeps slowly detailing alleged Russian troop buildup in South Ossetia. By the time he's finished, you're convinced that Russia had put its entire military apparatus there, even though Western sources (including the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think tank) had stated that it was the Georgians who assembled 12 thousand troops, and that's the lowest estimate, mind you. Keep in mind that Georgia is pro-West and the Western world 'rooted', so to speak, for Georgia in this conflict, providing it with intelligence and satellite reports on the Russian movements. 12 thousand (16 thousand by other accounts), as opposed to a mere 1,500 on the other side, including both South Ossetian militants *and* Russian peacekeepers -- a term that Asmus keeps surrounding by quotation marks. Asmus is so bold, he even alluded several times that the Russians not only were there to assist the South Ossetians against possible Georgian aggression, but that it was very likely that they ultimately wanted to invade Georgia as well! Asmus mentions a huge billboard in South Ossetia reading "Vladimir Putin, our president", and simply decides that this means Russia is running things there now. Mccain also parroted the same thing when he was running for president.

I got discouraged as the book went on, but I tried to stay as patient and objective as possible. But how can you? In page 24, he claims that "Kremlin pundits had hinted darkly on television about assassinating him", referring to his pal Saakashvili. And there's a note there. I flip to the notes section expecting to find a whole legion of official Kremlin spokespeople, detailing graphic scenarios on how they'd love to kill Saakashvili and serve his head to Putin on a platter, lo and behold, the "Kremlin pundits" is just one nutjob named Gleb Pavlovsky who hosted a TV show. Yep, this the kind of biased, dishonest garbage this book is filled with. I look above at the blurbs in this page and see the words "Credible and convincing" by the Financial Times or "...offers the details. And clarity" by NYT, and I smile. Check the sources above that praised this book. Write them down. Put a question mark on them from now on.

By now, Asmus is not content with those levels of lies and selectivity. So he inserts an irrelevant, ridiculous and remarkably superfluous claim about a tactic that "the world knows well from the Middle East, the use of human shields", and claims the Palestinians do it all the time, apparently taking joy in the death of their sons and mothers by the hands of the ever-running Israeli war crime machine, just so the international community would give Israel a look of disapproval. You follow? Yeah, neither do I.

Going on, Asmus keeps quoting Saakashvili on the importance of Georgian "territorial integrity", and how that's the reason anything Georgia is about to do is justified, despite even Asmus' own numerous mentions of Western warnings to Saakashvili not to start a fight with Russia, a war he can't possibly win. Even Georgia and its supporters knew it was a mistake to start an attack, but Asmus doesn't leave those facts plainly: he tries very hard to justify them by constantly bringing up the aforementioned Georgian "territorial integrity", and only passingly mentions a very important factor in the 2008 war: Saakashvili's political survival, as the Georgians were apparently expected to cheer for him when he invaded the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Asmus almost feels forced to mention this, but don't worry, he immediately inserted some worthless patriotic twaddle about the alleged Russian buildup being a "threat to Georgian citizens". After exaggerating Russia's motives and alluding (for the umpteenth time) to Russians probably "marching on Tbilisi", he tries to justify Georgia's aggression, and Asmus is now wallowing in a pro-Georgian stupor that made him utter the following absurdity: "[Saakashvili] believed his oath as president to defend his citizens and his country's territorial integrity required him to do nothing less." By this point, it's not even bias anymore; it's indoctrination.

No matter how hard I tried to ignore these and think of them as mere blemishes, Asmus keeps testing your patience with more lies and more propaganda.

Worst money I've ever spent on a book.

[Laila Collman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ronald Asmus examines the lead-up to the 2008 war, as well as what could have been done to prevent it from ever happening, and ends with the chilling point that, "None of the issues that caused the Russo-Georgian war were resolved in August 2008. The potential for future conflict is real."

Reading this book also felt surreal given that many of the lines used to explain Russia's actions against Georgia in 2008 could be directly copied and pasted to apply to Russia's current invasion of Ukraine. Over 10 years later and sadly not much has changed in terms of the West's supportive action to either Georgia or Ukraine in the face of Russian domination.

Anyone interested in the post-soviet sphere, or in a better understanding of current events in general, should read this book.

[Regarding Russia's pretext for invading Georgia:]
"The unresolved status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were, however, only the superficial causes for this war. The real reason was the core conflict between Russia and Georgia over Tbilisi's desire to break free of what had been a quasi-colonial relationship with Moscow to become part of a democratic West. This war was fought because Georgia wanted to guarantee its future security and sovereignty and independence by aligning itself with the West, becoming a member of NATO and eventually the European Union as well- and Moscow was equally determined to prevent it from doing so and to keep it in a Russian sphere of influence."

"The Russo-Georgian war may have been small, but it raised some big questions about the future of European security. That European security system diplomats had spent two decades developing failed in August 2008. The norms, principles, and mechanisms that were supposed to prevent future conflicts were too weak to stop this one. Moscow's justification for the war laid claim to precisely the kind of sphere of influence on its borders this system was supposed to ban. One reason why past security arrangements in twentieth-century Europe failed was that when the tough cases arose - and they often involved far-away countries with complicated names and poorly understood geography - the major powers opted not to go to bat to enforce the rules because either the problem was considered too hard, the country not important enough, or one party involved too powerful not to accommodate. There are echoes of each of these causes in the run-up to the Russo-Georgian war."

[Salome Pachkoria · Rating 4 out of 5]

თუ აგვისტოს ომზე აქამდე არაფერი წაგიკითხავთ, გამოგადგებათ. მარტივად და დაწვრილებით არის ახსნილი ბევრი რამე.

[Ana Japaridze · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.5 რა. კარგი წიგნია კონტექსტისა და მოვლენების თანმიმდევრობის გასაგებად, მათ შორის, პოლიტიკოსების ტიპაჟების და ასე შემდეგ. ვისურვებდი, ახლაც იყოს ასმუსი ცოცხალი, საინტერესო იქნებოდა მისი აზრი.

[Dmitry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Надежда — самообман, но это всё, что у нас есть
Она ходит по рукам, продавая свою честь
Эта лживая тварь пыль пускает в глаза
Исчезая в тот момент, когда она так нужна
Она будет уходить и возвращаться много раз
Всегда держа на расстоянии заветный алмаз
Я без надежды убит, тоской навылет прострелен
Потому что я надеялся, а не был уверен

Пожалуй, лучшая книга о той короткой войне между Россией и Грузией 2008 года. Ценность книги представляет не только детализированное изложение событий 2008 года, но и краткий и актуальный экскурс в историю того, как и отчего произошёл давний конфликт между Грузией и мятежными регионами. Так же к положительным сторонам книги стоит отнести объективный подход автора, включая отказ автора рассматривать данную проблему с чёрно-белой позиции.

Перво-наперво возникает вопрос, насколько эффективно вела Грузия в этом конфликте. Конечно, кто-то скажет, что Грузия в этом конфликте является жертвой, поэтому данный вопрос не актуален. Но в реальной жизни всё обстоит совсем по-другому. Как пел Виктор Цой, "следи за собой, будь осторожен". В современном мире, когда крупные государства позволяют себе выходить за рамки международных норм, такая позиция не только не актуальна, но и опасна. Она опасна главным образом для маленьких государств, которые вынуждены приспосабливаться жить между крупными державами. Поэтому правильно ли поступило правительство Саакашвили в том военном конфликте, является актуальным. Автор не отвечает на этот вопрос, но пишет, что США выступали против открытого военного противосияния с Россией.

As the signs of Russian forces moving into South Ossetia multiplied, the Georgian president faced a choice fraught with peril—either to let it happen or to try to fight back. His Western allies had repeatedly urged him not to get into a fight with Russia—no matter what.
<...>
He could either acquiesce to the encroachment of Russian power and abandon and lose the separatist provinces once and for all or he could fight back in a hopeless battle to try to defend Georgian citizens and positions there with the likelihood that he would be crushed—but with some hope that a show of military force might lead the Russians to halt their plans or mobilize the West to intervene diplomatically before Moscow could crush him.
<...>
Many in the West have suggested Saakashvili should have simply hung back and waited for the Russians to make their move, absorb the consequences—thus demonstrating to the world that Moscow was the aggressor—and then wait for the West to intervene.

С моей точки зрения это является центральным вопросом. Если посмотреть на эту ситуацию с более дальнего расстояния, то можно увидеть, что Россия применяла один и тот же паттерн, как в отношении Грузии, так и в отношении Украины (2014). Формально делалось так, что первый удар нанесла Грузия (Украина - запуском АТО), а не Россия и возможно именно поэтому на Россию не наложили в 2008 году санкции. Если бы я был поклонником Путина, я бы нашёл задуманную стратегию Путина просто гениальной. Ведь что мы видим? Мятежные регионы, как в случаи Грузии, так и в случаи Украины, начинают устраивать провокации. У центра, т.е. у Тбилиси (и Киева) есть два варианта - мирный и силовой. С одной стороны, они могут попытаться решить проблему миром, но так как провокацию в этих регионах устраивают подкупленные Кремлём люди, им не нужно решение проблемы, им нужно, чтобы был выбран силовой путь решения. С другой стороны, мирный путь подразумевает большую вероятность потери контроля данных мятежных регионов, что ни Тбилиси, ни Киев не могут себе позволить, как не может позволить себе Москва выбрать путь мирного решения проблемы (в отношении Чечни). Как говорится, яблоко от яблони недалеко падает, поэтому Украина и Грузия действует подобным же способом (в отношении своих территорий) как и Россия. В данном случаи речь идёт о военных столкновениях между Грузией и мятежных регионов после крушения СССР. И вот это, довольно примечательно в рамках понимания корней войны 2008 года.

The wounds of this war ran deep. Terrible atrocities had been committed on both sides in brutal fighting that at times involved house-to-house combat. The Georgians were no saints, having committed atrocities, sacked Sukhumi, and destroyed prized Abkhaz national treasures. Even as they fled, they, too, had conducted a brutal scorched-earth policy.
<...>
The crown jewels of this small but proud population—the National Museum and States Archives—had been destroyed by Georgian forces, leaving Abkhaz history in ashes.

Как я понял, потеря мятежных территорий, политическая катастрофа для любого политика, как в Грузии, так и в Украине.

While public support for Saakashvili’s strategy of Western integration and NATO was high, hovering between 70 and 80 percent, support for regaining the lost territories was even higher. The Georgian public seemed to care far more than many Western observers wanted to believe.

Но с моей точки зрения, мирный путь решения проблемы - единственный правильный путь (при условии, что эти территории не были присоединены). Да, на некоторое время эти территории Грузия (как и Украина) могла бы потерять, но она бы не стала бы выглядеть в глазах мира страной, которая первой начала военные действия, да и в глазах граждан этих самых мятежных регионов выглядела более миролюбивой. Да, в XXI веке PR на войне зачастую более важен, чем наличие вооружения (очень условно, конечно).

Controversy centers on the remarks of Georgian brigadier general Mamuka Kurashvili, commander of the Georgian peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia. He made head-lines when he suggested late in the evening of August 7 that Tbilisi’s goal was “to restore constitutional order in the whole region.”

А вот кто бы выглядел явным агрессором, то это была бы Россия. Но тут возникает вопрос: а не пошла бы Россия завоёвывать остальные территории Грузии? Чтобы этого не произошло, армию и фортификационные сооружения, а так же минные поля нужно было бы держать на основной территории Грузии. Как я понимаю, Грузия не сделала ни первое, ни второе, т.е. она не выбрала мирный путь решения конфликта, но и не подготовилась к возможной войне с Россией (прям как Украина).

Но почему России так нужна была эта провокация? Как я отмечал во многих своих рецензиях, проблема не в расширении НАТО как таковом, а в том, что это показывает российского правителя со слабой стороны, т.е. он начинает выглядеть как в глазах элиты, так и в глазах простого народа слабым правителем, недостойным править Россией. Другими словами, это PR проблема. Плюс, в путинской России антизападничество стало чуть ли не официальной государственной идеологией.

President Yeltsin publicly opposed NATO enlargement although in private he would admit he did not consider the Alliance a threat and even expressed his understanding of the Central and Eastern European impulse to go West.
<...>
His real worry often seemed to be that the NATO enlargement issue would be used against him at home by his domestic opponents—both the nationalist right and the Communist left.
<...>
At the time President Vladimir Putin seemed completely relaxed about the prospect of other countries in the post-Soviet space eventually joining NATO. When asked at the post-summit press conference about Ukraine’s seeking membership, he answered, “Ukraine is an independent sovereign state and will choose its own path to peace and security.” Putin continued: “Such a conversation [between Ukraine and NATO] would be entirely appropriate and possible. I certainly don’t see there being anything particularly tricky here, anything that need or that could cast a shadow over relations between Russia and Ukraine.

Поэтому и Украина, и Грузия сделали одну и ту же ошибку - они начали говорить о своём желании вступить в НАТО и при этом ничего не делали на случай начала военного конфликта между их странами и Россией. С моей точки зрения, наилучшим выбором была бы стратегия, которую практиковала Финляндия, которая жила с таким опасным соседом как СССР, но такая политика позволила ей не только сохраниться, но и развить экономику и построить настоящую демократию (я говорю о времени после Сталина). Почему Саакашвили не акцентировался на дальнейшей борьбе с коррупцией, строительстве демократии и развитии экономики, пусть и под крылом России (т.е. отказе от вступления в НАТО), для меня загадка. Что удивительно, Саакашвили всё это отлично понимал.

Saakashvili’s strategy had several components. Perhaps the most important one was to fix Georgia. No one wanted to live in a broken and failing state with rampant corruption and limited economic opportunity—least of all the alienated minorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Georgia harbored any hope of convincing these lost provinces to return, it would have to create a more democratic and prosperous society to attract them.
<...>
The goal was to persuade them that a future with Georgia was not as bad as their own leaders suggested; that they would be better off in a loose confederation with a reforming Georgia that was starting to boom economically; and that Tbilisi had a fair offer for them that would respect their cultural autonomy. To back this up, Tbilisi set up an alternative Ossetian government in the town of Kurta north of Tskhinvali under Georgian protection. They started demonstration projects, ranging from free summer holidays to medical clinics to recreational facilities de-signed to lure and attract South Ossetians. It was called Project Sanakoyev.

Я не зря назвал книгу очень детализированным анализом ситуации. К примеру, возможно в книге мы находим такую вот примечательную деталь:

Putin had asked Saakashvili to keep in his cabinet, in a key position of influence, a Georgian known to be corrupt and close to Russian intelligence—the then minister of state security Valery Khaburdzania.
<...>
Saakashvili refused and quickly reformed that ministry and “promoted” Khaburdzania to another senior but less sensitive post. Relations between the leaders soon deteriorated.

Мог ли этот человек, которого продвигал Путин, быть неким эквивалентом грузинского Медведчука? Вполне возможно. Поэтому я не исключаю, что такой шаг Саакашвили послужил ясным сигналом РФ, что грузинский президент является "недоговороспособным". Кто знает, возможно, именно этот шаг был более важным в качестве причины начала военного конфликта, чем все те заявления Саакашвили о желании п��исоединиться к НАТО и ЕС вместе взятые. Опять же, меня поражают действия Саакашвили, когда с одной стороны, он идёт на обострения с Москвой, но с другой, совершенно не готовит страну к войне с Россией. Чем это может объясняться, я не понимаю.

After having uncovered and quietly dealt with numerous Russian attempts to engage in dirty tricks and interfere in Georgian domestic politics, Saakashvili publicly outed four Russian intelligence officers and charged them with espionage in the fall of 2006.

Но может быть иначе Саакашвили не мог поступить? Может быть, но тогда он должен был приготовить страну к войне, но как показывает книга, Грузия оказалась полностью не готова к военному противостоянию с Россией, включая и тот факт, что самые подготовленные войска были в Ираке (тоже большой вопрос, а стоило ли Грузии участвовать в той авантюре в Ираке?).

В книге также даётся неплохое объяснение, почему другая сторона пошла на обострение. И да, без руки Москвы тут явно не обошлось. Впрочем, кого это удивляет?

Georgia and South Ossetia had been working toward a possible peace deal and in 2000 they took a modest step forward by produced a working document called the Baden Plan.
<...>
However, Putin’s rise to power soon led to Moscow’s installing its own man in power in Tskhinvali—a former wrestling champion named Eduard Koikoty with links to organized crime and an arrest warrant in his name.
<...>
Shortly after becoming president, Koikoty is said to have held a closed meeting with a group of advisors where he reportedly dismissed the Baden Plan and instead unveiled a plan to gain independence for South Ossetia by launching a war against Georgia.

В заключении стоит отметить, что когда разразилась война ни США, ни Европа особо не рвались помогать Грузии. Что касается подписанного мирного договора или соглашения о прекращения боевых действий, то оно было подписано на невыгодных для Грузии условиях. Дело в том, что США максимально отдалились от этой истории, предоставив европейцам разбираться с этой проблемой. Если нижеследующее действительно говорил французский президент, то ситуация довольно плачевная, но и отрезвляющая.

By this time, Sarkozy was exhausted after a grueling day.
Impatient and short-tempered, he kept jumping up and insisting in a loud voice that the Georgians had to sign. “Where is Bush? Where are the Americans?” he asked the Georgian delegation. “They are not coming to save you. No Europeans are coming either. You are alone. If you don’t sign, the Russian tanks will be here soon.”

Как я понял, единственный вариант который рассматривают западные лидеры, это сугубо мирное разрешение конфликта (но он возможен лишь после того как Путин сойдёт со сцены). Я бы ещё тут отметил, что данная реакция Запада отлично показывает, что многие политики и граждане в восточной Европе излишне переоценивают желания западных стран помогать кому-либо.

[Meghan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book to gain a better understanding of the Russo-Georgian conflict, mostly because I am moving to the region shortly for work. While I did learn a lot about the factual circumstances around the war, it was clear that it was written with a specific agenda. Asmus wrote this as an argument for why the war had little to do with the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and everything to do with Russia's aggressively anti-Western ambitions.

Asmus paints Russian leadership as predatorial and neo-imperialist. I'm hardly pro-Putin, but I would have liked to hear Russia's side of the story fleshed out a little more. There is also little explanation of why the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia wanted independence in the first place; their desires are basically dismissed in the introduction. Asmus also played up Putin's personal vendetta against Saakashvili and Georgia, repeatedly claiming that Putin "hates" the man and his country. That's a heavy word to put in someone else's mouth.

Asmus was clearly committed to convincing the reader of his take on the conflict and Russia's dark motives, and many of his points were legitimate. Unfortunately, he repeated his argument so many times that I kept feeling like I had deja vu. I also wished I could have heard some more personal accounts of day life during those five days, but Asmus' perspective was high-level, focusing more on diplomats and presidents than average citizens.

Ultimately, I do recommend "A Little War" as a solid foundation for understanding the build-up and play-by-play timeline of the Russo-Georgian War. But it left me with plenty of unanswered questions, and I'm not entirely sure where to look to fill in the blanks.

[Bill Perrin · Rating 2 out of 5]

Open any page of this little book and the stench of the CIA will waft upwards.

[Erik Champenois · Rating 4 out of 5]

I first started reading this book in the summer, just a few months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At that time, reading about Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia seemed both an unheeded warning of future Russian aggression and a warning that Russia wouldn't stop with Ukraine. At the end of 2022, with Ukraine having reversed half of Russian gains in Ukraine, and significantly weakening Russian power, the likelihood of Russian aggression expanding to other neighboring countries has significantly diminished, though not yet been eliminated.

Asmus tells the story of the 2008 Georgian war from the Georgian perspective (including having personally interviewed President Saakashvili and other Georgian actors) and the American and European foreign policy perspective. He tells it less so from the Russian perspective though there is some coverage of this, mostly focused on Russian propaganda, Russian foreign policy statements and directions, and on pre-2008 Georgian atrocities against the separatists (atrocities happened on both sides but Georgia certainly wasn't innocent). While further coverage of the Russian perspective would have been interesting, I do not accept the implication of some reviewers that such coverage may have made Russia's actions more understandable or excusable.

"A Little War that Shook the World" covers the pre-2008 history of Georgia vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia and of Georgia vis-à-vis Russia and Europe. The author emphasizes that mistakes were made on all fronts: by Russia, by the West, and by Georgia. Nevertheless, the decision by Russia to launch a full scale invasion, with associated atrocities, was the worst decision of all. Asmus persuasively demonstrates how the war was aimed not just at Georgia, but at NATO and the West more generally. Russia wanted to ensure that Georgia did not go West, but stayed within its own sphere of influence.

One important question that Asmus addresses briefly in his conclusion is why Russian policy shifted from being generally more balanced/partly pro-West to an anti-western, anti-NATO and anti-EU course. After all, during Putin's first term, NATO and Russia collaborated closely, NATO was not initially seen as a threat to Russia, and Putin even at one point stated that it was Ukraine's own decision whether or not to join NATO. "Did enlarging NATO and the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe drive Russia in an anti-Western direction, as some critics have suggested? Or did Russia move in that direction for its own reasons, having little to do with the West and instead a lot with Putin's own authoritarian inclinations and his embrace of a new nationalistic ideology to preserve his rule?" (p. 228). Given the opaque and authoritarian nature of the Russian regime and the simultaneity of internal and external events, this can be a difficult question to answer. But I am inclined to agree with Asmus that the answer lies more in internal Russian developments, and that Putin, partly in shoring up increased authoritarianism at home, partly in coopting potential rival ideologies, and partly in personally embracing authoritarian and Eurasian ideologies, would have plotted an anti-Western and anti-NATO course, regardless of Western post-Cold War developments.

[Oliko · Rating 4 out of 5]

ეს წიგნი ალბათ ყველაზე დიპლომატიურია მათ შორის, რაც კი აქამდე წამიკითხავს. იგი სავსეა ფაქტებით, მოსაზრებებით და მცირე პოლიტიკური მიმოხილვებით, დაწყებული ცივი ომიდან დღევანდელ დღემდე. დეტალურად არის აღწერილი და განხილული აგვისტოს ომის პერიოდი, წინაპირობები, მოლოდინები, მოგება-წაგების საკითხები და მიზეზები. საინტერესო იყო კულუარული ინფორმაციები, პირადი მიმოწერის მცირე დეტალები და ა.შ. ეს ყველაფერი კი ძალიან ფრთხილი ენით არის აღწერილი, რამეთუ ეს წიგნი მიზნად არ ისახავს ვინმეს გამართლებას და ან გამტყუნებას, არამედ წარმოგვიდგენს ყველა მხარეს, თავისი მოსაზრებებით და მოტივებით. რაც საშუალებას გვაძლევს სხვა კუთხით შევხედოთ ამა თუ იმ მოვლენას და ზოგიერთი შეხედულება გადავაფასოთ, სხვანაირად შევხედოთ ლიდერებს და ომის წამომწყებთა შესახებ ჩვენეული ვერსიები ჩამოვიყალიბოთ. მოკლედ "არც მწვადს წვავს და არც შამფურსო" ამაზეა ნათქვამი.
და კიდევ, ერთ-ერთი მნიშვნელოვანი საკითხი პირადად ჩემთვის ის იყო, რომ ყველა მოსაზრება იყო ფაქტებით გამყარებული და წყაროებიც უხვად არის მითითებული, რაც ამ ჟანრის და სახის წიგნისთვის სასიცოცხლოც კია. ძალიან საინტერესო, ცოტა დაუსრულებლად გრძელი და მაინც, ძალიან კარგი წიგნი იმისთვის, რომ წარმოდგენა შეგექმნათ რა მოხდა სინამდვილეში აგვისტოს ქართულ - რუსული პატარა-დიდი ომის დროს.

[J · Rating 4 out of 5]

Strong account of the lead up to and the days during the brief Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. This book was a timely read because many of the things that led Putin to invade Georgia, his dislike of the West, etc., have a hand in Russia's recent attempts to intervene in Western elections and his manipulation of the Trump administration to fracture the Western Alliance.

Pacing was great, never felt bored with the book.

[Nursultan T. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Probably the best book written on the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. It offers excellent insights into the strategic thinking and decision-making processes of leaders in Georgia and the West. Moreover, the book is well-balanced, demonstrating the author's deep experience in diplomacy and thorough research, including interviews with key political actors involved in the conflict.

[Rhys Jones · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent

An excellent read which gives great background and also allows us to feel involved in the processes of decision making. We have all attended these types of meetings in our workplaces.

[Dale · Rating 4 out of 5]

phase one

Very interesting look at the Russian aggression in Georgia as a response to a growing NATO. This book is well written and has peeked my interest as Russian activities in Georgia look similar to how they responded to an ever more western looking Ukraine.

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Short report of a scary conflict in 2008 that most people barely noticed.

[Indrė Puzinaitė · Rating 5 out of 5]

A story about the indecisive and naive West.

[Linde · Rating 2 out of 5]

DNF. The subject matter is important, but I just cannot get through this book. It was written very dryly, and you could tell the author was biased towards Georgia. 2.5 stars.

[Daniel Roth · Rating 4 out of 5]

You can tell an actual EXPERT wrote this book. Incredibly well researched

[Julia · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is amazing how little Russian playbook changes and how little western countries learn.

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

I wanted to read something that could give a kind of "on the ground" perspective of what happened in the war between Russia and Georgia, but so far this is the best thing I've been able to find on the topic.

It's not that this is a bad book; it just isn't the right book for my query. Asmus works on the level of heads of state, diplomats, and NGOs, and he gives the immediate and historical causes of the war in South Ossetia (or at least recent history: since the fall of the Soviet Union, and mostly since the war in the Balkans). He makes clear points, he had a level of access that feels impressive, and he's forthright about his judgement on the players. But he lacked the real sense of what it felt like in the moment, and overall he doesn't have those crucial details that would have made even this take on the war come alive.

In other words, I don't think this book is the ideal version of the book Asmus set out to write. There were patches in nearly every chapter where I got lost, my mind wandered, and who knows what happened then. These came, in part, because Asmus is really repetitive about some of his ideas, without ever going deeper into them when he repeats them. In fact, everything in his book, it seems, occurs at the same distance. Also, each chapter has an intro and a conclusion, it felt like, so each one was complete in itself but never seemed like it would offer too much to the other chapters. They were stand alone, topical, but not necessarily cumulative.

Again, there's a lot here to like in terms of the players behind the war and the weird situation the Georgian administration found itself in. But as a book, it kind of doesn't fully satisfy.

[Frank Kelly · Rating 4 out of 5]

The "Little War" between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 garnered signficant international attention and outrage. Lasting only five days, Russia effectively beat Georgia and changed the security architecture in Eastern Europe as envisioned by NATO (and Georgia). Ron Asmus, one of the leading thinkers (and doers) in building out NATO has given us an interesting analysis of what exactly happened -- and what, from his perspective, we can expect as a result of Western inaction to the situation. Asmus is clear - no, blunt -- in assessing Georgia's many mistakes, particularly those of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. But in reading this book, I did come away not thoroughly convinced Asmus' assertion that everything had changed was exactly correct. Has the European security been seriously eroded? And was this simply a matter of Georgia wanting to go more to the West at exactly the moment Moscow decided to exert her influence and power on former satellite states? Maybe. But maybe it was as much self-inflicted by Georgia's leadership. The situation has appeared to cool considerably although Russian troops remain in the disputed lands. In short, I think the jury may still be out. But Asmus has given hearty food for thought and presented an excellent history of the sitution.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Asmus looks at the 2008 Russian-Georgian War in a wider context of what it means for the international community, and what led to it. A former member of the Clinton Administration who was an advocate in NATO expansion, Asmus personally knew many of the individuals involved, especially on the Georgian side. This both helps and hinders the overall book, as it allows him to get a better understanding of what happened internally (at least in Georgia), though he is also somewhat sympathetic to the Georgian cause as a result.

The book places major emphasis on recent developments, namely the declaration of independence by Kosovo and the NATO Summit in Bucharest, both in 2008. Asmus doesn't really get into any history of the region, which he perhaps should have as that is critical to properly understanding the issues, but in what he does cover it does well. Though I didn't particularly agree with his conclusions, he does back them up, and overall the book is probably the best out there on the war.

[Arzan Raimalwala · Rating 4 out of 5]

A riveting and balanced account of the 5 day war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. I was looking for a book to read before traveling to Georgia and Abkhazia and could not have chosen a better title. Asmus not only provides a detailed inside account of how events unraveled but also puts the conflict in context of the broader regional and international tussle between the US, Europe, Russia and CIS states. Some may complain that Asmus could have gone in to more detail about certain shadow subjects such as the further backdrop of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia movements and the reasons for Russia's U-turn away from reconciling itself to the current Western world order, however I believe he provided sufficient coverage without turning the book in to an expansive volume.

[Diane · Rating 5 out of 5]

History of the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia from an "insider" who spent years as a diplomat in the region. He puts the war in a larger context of Georgia's desire to become a full-fledged Western nation, and Russia's growing opposition to this development. He also discusses the responsibilities of the Western world towards Georgia (and by extension, other emerging states that seek to join the West).

[Andy Kramer · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is concisely written, well organized, and methodical in its treatment of the subject. The author's bias permeates the entire book however, so for someone unacquainted with the topic it is difficult to completely trust entire sections of the book. R. Asmus does present a well-grounded look into the historical and immediate causes of the 2008 war and makes convincing arguments for his positions.

[Terry Quirke · Rating 3 out of 5]

An excellent topic opener, the author concentrates upon the political/ diplomatic context of the conflict, what caused it and why and the repercussions of it. Some of the military strategy is covered, but mainly it is concerned with the political dimension and squarely puts the ball in Russia's court for the invasion (compounded by Georgian political errors). A worthy introduction to a subject which has so far seen little in-depth analysis.

[Josh · Rating 3 out of 5]

The huge flaw of this book is that it is told solely from the Georgian and Americans points of view, with not even an attempt to figure out what Russia was thinking, other than by faithfully passing on the worst interpretations of Russian actions that were given to him by his Georgian sources. Still, there is a lot of good detail from the Western side, and he doesn't shy away from showing the warts of U.S./European policy.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book. The author stays at the strategic level of the conflict, and looked more towards the root causes of the conflict. The analysis of the Kosovo precedent was an aspect I had not seen before and helps to set the stage for the conflict. The irony of a nation training to and working with NATO making it less prepared for a major conflict with Russia was a little sad to read, but true.