Exploring the usefulness of the study of history for contemporary military strategists, this volume illustrates the great importance of military history while simultaneously revealing the challenges of applying the past to the present. Essays from authors of diverse backgrounds--British and American, Civilian and Military--present an overwhelming argument for the necessity of the study of the past by today's military leaders in spite of these challenges. Part I examines the relationship between history and the military profession. Part II explores specific historical cases that reveal the repetitiveness of certain military problems.
Williamson "Wick" Murray was an American historian and author. He authored numerous works on history and strategic studies, and served as an editor on other projects extensively. He was professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University from 2012 until his death.
This is a high-quality collection of essays by a mix of historians and career military officers. Some of the more academic historical chapters drag at times, but the officer-authored contributions are outstanding. The essay by retired Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine’s View," is an outstanding gem of biographical writing and reflection. And as an artillery officer myself, retired British Major General Jonathan B. A. Bailey's discussion of Western nations' failure to learn from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and appreciate the centrality of indirect artillery fire to modern warfare was deeply instructive.
I expected this book to stimulate and launch my reading of military history, but of the 14 essays only 3 were interesting in my opinion (especially the one of LtGen (Ret.) Van Riper. The others basically conveyed the same message: be aware of the context, history isn't exact science.
American strategic thought is cyclic. Ever since the end of the Civil War the study of military history has fallen in and out of style, even within U.S. Military War Colleges and Command and Staff Colleges. During the 1960s, the organizational and business accounting theories of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his "whiz kid" advisors stated that war could be reduced to number crunching and statistical analysis. As a result military history suffered. By the 1980s, military history was reborn with the wide acceptance of the writing of Carl von Clausewitz. The application of his theories played a major part in the complete rebuilding of American military operational art and the success of Operation Desert Storm. By the mid-1990s, the tide began to shift. "New" theorists began to opine on the wonders of "network-centric" warfare and "effects-based operations". Once again the study of history was replaced by computer networks and mathematical formulas.
"The Past as Prologue" is a brilliant defense of the need for military officers and policymakers to continue to vigorous and constant study of military history and resist attempts to reduce warfare to scientific analysis. The book is a collection of essays from some of the top military theorists and historians of our time. The famous historian Michael Howard's essay on the role of military history in warfare is worth the price of the book alone. LtGen Paul Van Riper's essay demonstrates that military history is not for other academics, but was a critical element in his success as a battlefield commander. His respect for the topic lead him to be a major force in the rebirth of professional military education within the United States Marine Corps.
The essays on Thucydides and Clausewitz clearly show their continued relevance in today's post 9/11 world. The second half of the book is a collection of essays that demonstrate how ignoring the lessons of history led to eventual battlefield defeat. While excellent, essays they did seem to drift a bit away from the central themes of the book and often got bogged down in detail.
The first 2/3 of the book were outstanding and should be required reading during the first week of all major defense colleges and universities, not to mention the need for policy makers to take the time to delve into these critical topics.
This book is a great introduction for anyone interested in military history and what it can "learn" to us for the present and the future of warfare. As the book is a collection of essays, the reader can pick only the ones that address the most relevant themes. Some essays address general ideas about the point in studying history and some are more focused on specific eras that provide great examples about the use or misuse of history. Overall, very good quality papers that I strongly advise.
Good primer for someone interested in studying history. The book provides a collection of essay arguing why both civilian and military leaders should study history, specifically to prepare them for future decision-making. Several essays give examples of military leaders in different domains of war using history to inform their decisions and anticipation of future operating environments. A couple of the essays are very specific, particularly Gray's essay about Clausewitz's continued relevancy today.
I think this is a great book to introduce officers to the importance of the study of history. Because this title is a collection of essays, leaders don't have to read the entire book from cover to cover as part of a reading program. I would highlight the essays by Sir Michael Howard and Paul Van Riper as the two that made the greatest impression on me.