A PHILOSOPHER CONTRASTS THE "HUMANISTIC" VIEW WITH THE "SCIENTIFIC"
Owen Flanagan (born 1949) is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Neurobiology at Duke University; he has written other books such as 'Science of the Mind,' 'The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World,' 'The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 2002 book, "This book is about the conflict between two grand images of who we are: the humanistic and the scientific. The humanistic image says that we are spiritual beings endowed with free will... The scientific image says that we are animals that evolved according to the principles of natural selection... The question is this: Which is it? The two images ... are incompatible. The answer can't be both." (Pg. ix)
He adds, "'The problem of the soul' is a shorthand way of referring to a cluster of philosophical concepts that are central components of the dominant humanistic image... It is the survival of these concepts that ordinary people fear are at risk from scientific progress, and this fear is at the root of the deep-seated resistance to the scientific image." (Pg. xi)
He says, "my main aim is to show that the scientific image can give us pretty much everything we can sensibly want from the concept of a person. Most of what we traditionally believe about the nature of persons remains in place even without the unnecessary philosophical concepts of the soul and its accompanying suite. Furthermore, the moral and communal functions of religion need not lose their meaning... I hope to show that we can preserve much of what we mean when we speak of 'mind,' soul,' 'the self,' and 'free will' without continuing to endow them with that part of their meaning that comes from their religious and theological roots." (Pg. xiii-xv)
He asserts, "Evolution says there is no need for a creator God who stands outside the universe... This idea will have to go. Our animal part is our only part. Once we shed it, once we die, we are gone. Is this bad news? I don't see why. Is it bad news that, insofar as our lives have meaning and purpose, we have to find and make our meaning and purpose and not have them created and given to us by a supernatural being or force?" (Pg. 12)
He states, "The idea of a completely unconstrained will is this inconsistent with the scientific image. But I want to claim something stronger still. The idea of agent causation is incoherent independently of what the scientific image says." (Pg. 124) He adds, "My proposal is this: stop talking about free will and determinism and talk instead about whether and how we can make sense of the concepts of 'deliberation,' 'choice,' 'reasoning,' 'agency,' and 'accountability'... within the space allowed by the scientific image of minds... it will be best to call my view neo-compatibilism. I do claim that we can make sense of rational deliberation and choice in a causal universe." (Pg. 127)
He admits, "I am open to there being genuine ontological indeterminacy at both the quantum level and the level of neural processing. But the attempt to gain free will from indeterminacy at the quantum level or at the level of global brain processes is a bad idea. The last thing anyone wants is for free will to be the result of random causal processes." (Pg. 128)
He says, "My own view is that there is no self, if by self we mean some permanent, immutable, abiding essence that determines who we really are and that accompanies us on our ride through life... What we call 'the self' is an abstract theoretical entity." (Pg. 162)
He argues further, "the cosmological argument offers no basis to choose a spiritual creator that always was over a world in which matter and energy always were... astrophysicists and philosophers of science will, if they are honest, admit that they have no resources with which to speak of what happened before the Big Bang... Quietism about the matter is warranted... belief in God, being unwarranted, cannot help the defender of the view that I am possessed of a soul, a Cartesian ego." (Pg. 205-207)
This book will interest those interested in the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.