Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism

by Eli Berman

How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals. In Radical, Religious, and Violent , Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels some radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite the vast pool of potential recruits -- young altruists who feel their communities are repressed or endangered -- there are less than a dozen highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What's special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers religious radicals? Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a common their leaders have found a way to control defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out "free riders" and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when incentives to defect are strong.These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious practice, being drawn into theological debates with Jihadists, or endangering civilians.

Genres: Politics, Economics, Terrorism, Religion, Nonfiction, History, Society

300 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2009

Reviews

[Andrew Murano · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book examines religiously narrated insurgency using rational choice theory. Eli's discussion of mutual aid networks was interesting, its an important point to consider with how and why non-state actors exist and out compete each other, and the communal bonds of recruiting new members. However, the language of the book showed a clear bias, and the chapter on "counterterrorism" turned out to be a staunch advocate for American imperialism. Effectively ignoring all state and global violence throughout the book, Eli even goes as far as proposing to send an armed American "Peace Corps" to all "troubled" countries, and allocating more of America's "development" budget to the military. Answering George W. Bush's 2001 question: "why do they hate us," Eli postulates that the spread of "Western free markets" threatens their aid networks by spreading global "prosperity." Written from the perspective of an economist, it is unsurprising the author had no grasp of international relations, development or humanity, and should have left the final two chapters out.

[Nickdepenpan123 · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book reminded me of Freakonomics, despite its aspiration to be more academic and serious.

There are some very good points, and the theories and data are presented in an organized, logical manner, with serious (yet, simple and readable) language. I also like that the author doesn't treat terrorists as monsters but tries to understand their actions and motives. He attributes to them logic, rationality, common sense, loyalty and also empathy, an approach that may displease some readers I guess.

Personally, I found the fixation on cold, cost benefit rationality (of terrorists) which forms a large basis of the book, as a bit too much, humans in general aren't that rational. The (wrong) assumption of high-level rationality has a long (and often embarrassing) history in economics. Yet, my problem isn't in the ideas argued, but more on if it's an informative and well written book. I prefer it when books give story, facts and research and devote a smaller part (usually at the end of sections or chapters) trying to explain and conclude. Here, the book has a mission and kind of repeats the same points again and again. Also, there are many thought experiments, cost benefit analyses and theorizing, but the density of new research or practical data is low. There's a lot of repetition for things that seem obvious to me (and I can't claim any great knowledge on the topic), say, chapters about the importance of defection and why some groups fail (German groups of the extreme left in the seventies or Jewish underground organizations) with the conclusion that public support for the cause matters. It'd be surprising if it didn't.

Speaking of public support, the author focuses on how successful terrorist organizations gain public support (for example, by providing social services) but avoids considering that some causes may be more just or appealing to the wider population than others in the first place (however, I didn't have a problem with that, wider politics are beyond the scope of the book).

Also, as often happens with social scientists' writing, the language tries too hard to be scientific and prove the points beyond doubt. I think there's an art element in most social science analysing/writing in topics such as this one, and that there should be some modesty, since you can't have the unambiguous elegance of a controlled, pure science experiment. The real world is too complicated and messy, and good evidence provides usually valuable insights, not irrefutable proofs.

I'd give the book two and a half stars if I could, I didn't enjoy it but other readers may get more from it than I did.

[Jim Good · Rating 3 out of 5]

Berman uses economic theory to try and explain the expansion of suicide bombing in this century. His conclusion is that the club culture and mutual aid nature of radical religious groups combined with the hardening of targets in homogeneous populations is the cause. Interesting from the explanation of economic theory and the nature of club and mutual aid culture. This may explain the rise of Hamas, the Taliban and Hezbollah to some degree, but certainly does not pertain to Al Qaeda. His statistics on terrorist attacks correlating to deaths caused misses the most “successful” terrorist group of all. To his credit Berman does point out that little is known of the nature of Al Qaeda’s recruitment methods and therefore doesn’t lend itself to scholarly review. The lack of knowledge on Al Qaeda leaves his discussion of root cause and a strategy to reduce the threat flat in the end.

[Greg · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a very provocative book. It proffers an explanation for why religiously motivated terrorist organizations that feature a mutual aid provision--e.g., Hamas, Hizbollah, Taliban--are more effective than religious terrorist organizations that do not--e.g., Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The book uses the homo oeconomicus model of Ianaconne to explain how these organizations solve the defection constraint to be more effective than other terrorist organizations. It isn't the entire answer because it discounts all symbolic behavior, but it is probably part of the answer. Recommended for a graduate level class or a general readership with a grasp of micro economics.

[Anandh Sundar · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book goes beyond the simplistic Freakonomics type mindless number crunching and explores an issue of practical importance. After all, if there's a common thread linking Asia, Europe, Africa and Americas, it us the spectre of religious terrorism. While Berman's recommendation(providing enhanced social services) seems simplistic, it is backed up by research and analysis. His bursting several myths also makes for an engaging read. He feels that organized religious sects(with strong mutual aid provision ensured by early sacrifices like kid's schooling etc) can become dedicated terrorists.

[Jacob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Shows the motivations behind modern terrorist organizations rather than just painting them as crazy radicals.

[Kartikey Sharma · Rating 4 out of 5]

Re read this brilliant book, extremely timely given the current global political scenario