Science, Strategy and War

Strategy and History

by Frans P.B. Osinga

John Boyd is often known exclusively for the so-called OODA loop model he developed. This model refers to a decision-making process and to the idea that military victory goes to the side that can complete the cycle from observation to action the fastest.

This book aims to redress this state of affairs and re-examines John Boyd 's original contribution to strategic theory. By highlighting diverse sources that shaped Boyd 's thinking, and by offering a comprehensive overview of Boyd 's work, this volume demonstrates that the common interpretation of the meaning of Boyd 's OODA loop concept is incomplete. It also shows that Boyd 's work is much more comprehensive, richer and deeper than is generally thought. With his ideas featuring in the literature on Network Centric Warfare, a key element of the US and NATO 's so-called military transformation programmes, as well as in the debate on Fourth Generation Warfare, Boyd continues to exert a strong influence on Western military thinking. Dr Osinga demonstrates how Boyd 's work can helps us to understand the new strategic threats in the post- 9/11 world, and establishes why John Boyd should be regarded as one of the most important (post)modern strategic theorists.

Genres: War, History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Philosophy, Business, Science

313 pages, Hardcover

First published March 11, 2006

Reviews

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 5 out of 5]

John Boyd was a genius, but he was not much of writer, preferring instead to spread his ideas through long, intensive briefings (supposedly he delivered his lectures on the OODA loop and modern strategy about 1500 times over the course of two decades.) Frans Osinga has performed an invaluable service rendering his ideas into a single coherent narrative that follows the intellectual origins of Boyd's theory through their development (including exact quotes of Boyd's key points) and their influence and relevance today.

Boyd recognized the task of strategy as organizational learning to preserve one's own freedom of action while denying that same freedom to an adversary. The battlefield is not just a time and place, it is also moral and intellectual, and the greatest victories come from scattering and paralyzing an enemy by maximizing his internal 'friction' rather than mass firepower or attrition. Osinga clearly demonstrates that there is for more to Boyd that "getting inside the bad guys' OODA loops."

The problem with this book (and the reason why it loses a star) lies with Boyd himself. For all his brilliance, he was on the obscure side. He was a post-modern strategist, a zen engineer, and he produced a mindset rather than maxims. Boydian perspectives can be used to justify nonsense as well as sound action. But for all their difficulty and amorphous form, Boyd remains the best guide to strategic thinking in the 21st century. Read this book, then despair.

[Rich · Rating 5 out of 5]

Highly recommend! Frans Osinga's Science, Strategy, and War was a rich and esoteric examination of John Boyd's conceptualizations. Not for the faint of heart! Osinga's work remains far above the fray of hagiography, a common critique of Boyd biographies, which highlights a common strategy of ad hominem, too cowardly or simpleton to adequately counter Boyd's theories directly. Osinga does well to present the reader with the context and background that were the catalysts for Boyd's body of work.

The USAF, the service to which Boyd dedicated his career and life to, has hardly sought to purposefully encapsulated his concepts. For those areas where the USAF has attempted it grossly missed the mark. The "big Air Force" fearfully revolted at Boyd's requirement for deep and challenging thinking, the raison d'être for Osinga's examination. Let me clear: this was fortuitous, for had the USAF not significantly dismissed Boyd's presentations and limited writings Osinga wouldn't have needed to write his book (based upon his thesis for School of Advanced Airpower & Strategic Studies, the Air Force's preeminent center for strategic learning).

Osinga's work embarks upon the deep dive beyond the USAF's limited understanding of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. Osinga himself describes this succienctly:

[The] common perception is incomplete, as the OODA loop contains more elements for success than only tempo and information. This integral rendition of his work thus indicates that the popular notion of the 'rapid OODA loop' idea does not adequately capture what Boyd meant by it, and that Boyd must be remembered for more than only the idea that one can gain military victory by more rapidly OODA looping than the opponent.

The greatest value of Osinga's work is three-fold. First, Osinga places into words the deeply vast concepts that John Boyd only presented in person in presentation form. This is rather impressive, as Boyd would give his presentations only in one-sitting, typically lasting for several hours or a whole day. Osinga is meticulously sourced, with pages and pages of endnotes supporting his presentation of Boyd's concepts, even pointing out Boyd's own notes from the margins of his own primary sources. Clearly, Osinga's book is as near-to the writing that Boyd largely chose not to perform (although he had his reasons).

Second, Osinga places Boyd's theories within the context of a very learned man. In fact, this is probably the most illuminating aspect of his work: marching the reader through the rationale of Boyd's own conclusions, carefully demonstrating the philosophical and scientific tools by which Boyd made his logical leaps. Osinga masterfully leads the reader through Boyd's zeitgeist, which serves to highlight the synthesis of the ideas of Popper, Polanyi, Kuhn, Capra, Priogogine, Waldrop, Skinner, Monod, Gell-Mann, van Creveld, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart to name just a few (as the 'select bibliography' is no less than 12 pages in length of 10-point font) but most importantly the ideas encapsulated within Heisenberg, Godel, and the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. Understand this: without that vast and learned background, with particular emphasis upon the last three, there is no OODA Loop. This eclectic background is fascinating, but extremely esoteric, and Osinga arranges this knowledge fruitfully and masterfully for the discernment of the dedicated reader.

Finally, and most importantly, Osinga's book emphasizes Boyd's true novel contribution to humankind is in learning theory. This is refreshing as my previous frame of reference hinged upon a very poor impression of OODA through my USAF professional military education. While not ignoring OODA, but contrary to the USAF's educational focus, Osinga more appropriately focuses upon Boyd's fundamental premise of how we as human orient ourselves to our unpredictable and chaotic surroundings. Further, Osinga provides the reader Boyd's methodology for perceiving the world and creatively innovating mental models to successfully adapt and overcome unpredictability and chaos. Uncertainty is constant, and the ability to learn to adapt and overcome uncertainty equates to winning. Boyd's lesson is clear, constant learning portends success. Boyd explains it succienctly:

Since survival and growth are directly connected with the uncertain, ever-changing, unpredictable world of winning and losing we will exploit this whirling (conceptual) spiral of orientation, mismatches, analysis/synthesis, reorientation, mismatches, analysis/synthesis ... so that we can comprehend, cope with, and shape, as well as be shaped by that world and the novelty that arises out of it.

With these tools, the reader is better prepared in my opinion to do as Boyd says:

...to survive, and to survive on one's own terms, or improve one's capacity for independent action. Due to forced competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires, one is probably compelled to diminish their adversary's capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible to survive at all.

Life is conflict, survival and conquest.

This is a deep and introspective-creating book by Frans Osinga. It will challenge your cognitive abilities. However, if you do not fear difficult and deep thinking you will be well served by it.

[John Carter McKnight · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm so glad I read this book. I can't think of anything like it since Plato's "Trial and Death of Socrates:" the works of an epically brilliant mind, not otherwise available, filtered through a very skilled analyst. Colonel John Boyd was a revolutionary military strategist in the US post-Vietnam era, perhaps the greatest in his field in a century, and one of the all-time greats. His work isn't broadly known because his form of production was the military slide-deck briefing, not the article or book. Few copies of his work are extant: Osinga had access.

Osinga's interpretation provides essential context, not only of the US military of Boyd's time, but of millenia of strategic thought. It's a masterpiece of analysis, grippingly written, clear and convincing.

This book really deserves to be taught in STS programs: it's a wonderful example of the application of STS principles outside the laboratory and of how scientific beliefs are repurposed into other fields. A brilliant little book.

[Kars · Rating 4 out of 5]

I went from getting intrigued about Boyd's ideas on Ribbonfarm, to learning about his life in the highly enjoyable biography by Coram, from there to getting a handle on the application of his ideas to business in Certain to Win, and finally buckling down and committing to reading this, in the hopes of getting a fuller understanding of Boyd's ideas, to in turn be able to apply in in my own work as a designer, and a (reluctant) entrepreneur. I was not disappointed.

Osinga does a great job describing the various influences on Boyd's thinking, both military and scientific. He then goes on to describe each of Boyd's briefings in detail, and they turn out to be veritable treasure troves of insight into the nature of decision-making, uncertainty, conflict, collaboration, adaptation, learning, agility and more. Don't be fooled into thinking this is a book only relevant to those in the business of war fighting. Anyone who is committed to, as Boyd puts it, "survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for independent action" should read this.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

File this under challenging – Frans P. B. Osinga’s work thoroughly explores the strategic theory and thought of Colonel John Boyd. In some circles Boyd’s work has been superficially treated – a problem compounded by the fact that Boyd’s preferred medium was the spoken word briefing supported by a slide presentation. Now that Boyd is gone and we are left with just his slides there has been plenty of room for misunderstandings to proliferate. And so there was a clear need for a book-length scholarly treatment of Boyd’s thought. Osinga’s “Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd” fills that void nicely.

By spending whole chapters on Boyd’s influences, Osinga demonstrates the depth of Boyd’s thought showing how he took the latest scientific discoveries and made their findings applicable in the world of military thought. In doing so, Osinga effectively addresses those critics of Boyd’s work who are content with presenting a superficial appraisal of the OODA loop as the sum total of his thought.

What is drawn out within these pages is that Boyd’s main concern is with organizational adaptability – within the context of adaptability being the essence of survival and evolution (In short: winning). Here resides the deeper significance of the OODA loop. (For a short introduction to this concept may I suggest this excellent article: “The Tao of Boyd: How to Master the OODA Loop.”) What Boyd presents is a blueprint for adaptation.

The reader should expect the rewards to be commensurate with the effort involved. The chapters regarding the scientific advances which influenced Boyd are written in a way appropriate to the subject matter. After providing this crucial context, Osinga moves on to examining the individual briefings (and essay) which make up Boyd’s “A Discourse on Winning and Losing” and here the reader may relax as the reading lightens and the engrossing nature of Boyd's work becomes apparent.

One last note: A recording, with rather poor audio, of Boyd delivering his briefing “Patterns of Conflict” is available on youtube. The interested (and dedicated) will want to make their way through it after they have completed the book.

[Andrew Carr · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a first rate analysis of a strategic thinker. Osinga has parsed an often complex, diffuse, dialectic based thinker who worked through largely verbal presentations and slides and presented John Boyd's thoughts in clear prose.

Osinga not only masters the vast output of Boyd, he produces two valuable chapters which detail the scientific and philosophical developments of the 1960s and 1970s which directly informed Boyd's work (Ideas such as Structuralism, postmodernism, chaos and complexity theory, network and systems analysis, non-linear models etc).

Osinga helpfully refutes the view that Boyd's work is just about fast OODA looping (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) and instead is fundamentally about how organisms (individuals, units, armies, nations etc) can survive in an ever changing world. Boyd followed Sun Tzu, Liddle-Hart, Fuller and the Maneouver school, while bringing in a whole new language and approach that goes beyond notions of mere cunning to encourage fundamental evolutionary fitness. This is to be achieved by improving our capacity to understand the limitations of our world views, break them apart where they don't match up with the new circumstances of our ever-changing environment, and adjust and adapt.

Boyd's view of strategy is thus fundamentally about the efficacy of the mental models we take into the world, and our ability to understand where and how they fall short and rapidly adjust them to find a more viable path. In this way, and given his dialectic focus, Osinga describes Boyd as the first Postmodern strategist.

This book takes some chewing through, but for anyone interested in one of the key origins for the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and the relationship between evolutions in scientific, philosophical and strategic though it is an outstanding effort.

[Gleb Posobin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very thorough dive into Boyd. The author spends the first half of the book just describing all ideas that inspired Boyd (apparently he looked through Boyd's old books and went through all the margin notes in them?), and then dissects his essay and his presentations. The same ideas are repeated over and over again from slightly different angles, which I think is good, though I still haven't constructed a coherent overall picture of Boyd's framework. Hopefully just thinking some more about them and going through my notes will fix that.

[Jes · Rating 2 out of 5]

***Review for personal recollection and reflection only*** ***SPOILERS***

I certainly did not enjoy this book, and in terms of pleasure and interest, I would easily rate this book a 1. I decided to rate it a 2, however, because I thought the author, at least at times, effectively communicated Boyd's theory, some of the underpinnings of that theory, and some of the deeper meanings of the theory.

I read this book because the "OODA loop" concept came up in the context of an officer-involved shooting case I am working on at the office. When listening to officers describe the "OODA loop", I felt it was a far too simplistic system. Fortunately, Boyd's system is, as Osinga demonstrates, much more complex. Law enforcement just unintentionally or deliberately misunderstands and misapplies the "OODA loop" to argue that the only way to "win" a potential conflict with a potential suspect is to "get inside" his loop and "OODA-loop" faster than the suspect. Law enforcement pairs this concept with the oft-stated "action is faster than reaction." In other words, it's always a you or them situation and you need to be the one who gets completes your OODA loop and gets to action (shooting) first. After reading this book, I feel even more confident than I did at the time, that law enforcement's view was overly simplistic and could not be what Boyd intended. It clearly is not. Though Boyd did stress the importance of temp0 in conflict, his theory was not concentrated on just OODA-looping as rapidly as possible. Instead, he focused on the importance of maintaining one's own ability to adapt to a complex and dynamic situation while destroying that capacity in your enemy. The theory is far more than the simplistic model generally attributed to Boyd: Observe--Orient--Decide--Act. Instead, the OODA loop is a complex, feedback driven, double-loop in which Orientation is central and essential. According to Boyd, Orientation is the way we see the world. It is shaped by genetic heritage, cultural traditions, previous experiences, new information, and analysis and synthesis. Orientation then significantly shapes our observations, decisions, and actions. It is the more important part of the loop. Also, Boyd notes that, while fast-paced decision-making (e.g., rapid OODA-looping) may have some relevance and importance at the lowest level of conflict (the tactical level), that is not the only, or indeed the most, important level of conflict and rapid OODA looping is not the only consideration at even that level.

After introducing the purpose of the book, which is mainly to describe Boyd's theories and demonstrate that they are more complex than generally stated, Osinga starts by illustrating some of the experiences and ideas that influenced Boyd. HIs experiences in the military, especially with aircraft formed many of his ideas on conflict. Osinga notes that Boyd's work rested heaving on Sun Tzu, including the ideas of preservation (war as important issue for state, war should be avoided as long as possible until all other alternatives exhausted, and state should act to preserve life and resources of all involved), shih (relative power position, important to have "foreknowledge" about environment), importance of deception, importance of readiness and flexibility. Boyd also synthesized many ideas from science: (1) Karl Popper--science makes progress through falsification and science is never complete; denied that scientists can "prove" theory through repeated tests because next test could contradict everything; what sets science apart is that it only entertains theories that are capable of falsification (as distinguished from, for instance, religion); (2) Polanyi--importance of knowledge and intuition; two levels of awareness are knowing and integrating; knowledge grows out of "networks" of scientists working together; (3) Kuhn--scientific revolutions and shifts in paradigms; progress does not occur through gradual accumulation of knowledge, but through paradigm shifts which occur due to investigation of mismatch between reality and what we use to describe/approximate reality. Boyd was persuaded by the departure from the deterministic / mechanistic Newtonian science, and the movement toward more modern notions of entropy, uncertainty, relativity, and thermodynamics. Boyd notes the importance and prevalence of uncertainty. Darwin's theories convinced scientists to abandon the idea of the world as a machine; more than billiard balls in random motion. Adopted a more holistic view, recognizing the interconnectedness of the world. The "new worldview" recognized by scientists and Boyd also focused on the importance of open systems. Open systems are living systems. A system cannot be a living system if it is closed off from the environment, from information, communication, and connections. Boyd espoused the idea that winning involves maintaining one's own ability of independent action while diminishing that of an adversary. The importance of feedback loops and self-organization was recognized.

After discussing the underpinnings of the theory, Osinga then goes through each of Boyd's presentations that developed the theory. These sections are a bit repetitive, likely at least partially because each presentation built on those before. Boyd discussed the importance of different levels of conflict, the physical, mental, and moral. Conflict is about much more than amassing large armies. One must have a grand strategy with the purpose of making the enemy unable to adapt. Many of Boyd's statements--as is admitted by Osinga--are vey general and abstract. I also found many to be completely obvious. Maybe they weren't at the time, but they certainly are now, such as his insight that a system should maintain flexibility by avoiding rigid internal hierarchies and overspecialization. Boyd also focuses a lot on analysis and synthesis--destruction and creation, taking something apart and putting it back together in a novel form.

The essay "Destruction and Creation" sought to find verification for "principles Boyd knew instinctively to be true" (131). That statement is somewhat concerning, as it sounds very much like confirmation bias and suggests a biased search through military and scientific history to find illustrations or arguments that appear to match his own thoughts. And often, Boyd's works did feel just like that--like a person who read books and is now presenting on something of great interest to him, using bits and pieces of other thinkers to support something he intuits. I don't mean that his conclusions are incorrect or not interesting, but his method certainly bothered me. In this essay, Boyd focuses on the prevalence of uncertainty, and the need for deduction and analysis, as well as induction and synthesis. These contrary terms and processes are used together to create something novel. This essay also acknowledged the idea of entropy.

"Patterns of Conflict", Osinga writes, should be seen as an application of "Destruction and Creation". This presentation provided a survey of military history and strategic theory, though Osinga notes that the survey is quite biased. Boyd's stated purpose is to find a "grand strategy" that will result in an adversary's collapse. The goal is to remove or diminish an adversary's ability to adapt to change and to act independently. Boyd states that variety (of responses), rapidity, harmony, and initiative are important for survival. He then draws similarities between Blitzkrieg and modern guerilla campaigns and describes those techniques work.

Osinga then discusses the other presentations given by Boyd as a way of expanding upon or clarifying the main ideas. It is one of these presentations that Boyd emphasized orientation as a central part of the OODA loop. Boyd noted in "The Strategic Game of ? and ?" that it is important to increase your own ability to interact while isolated an opponent. Novelty is a recurring theme in the presentations. Osinga finishes with some general statements about how Boyd's principles may continue to apply in "postmodern" warfare, which is largely driven by information.

Osinga notes that Boyd intentionally left his theory incomplete. I do understand that. It was a fluid theory that was largely built upon continued study and interaction with his audience. Yet, much of the theory is just too general and abstract to feel truly useful. He notes, for instance, the importance of creating and exploiting ambiguity, but doesn't actually describe much about what that would look like in actual conflict or how each level of a system could work toward that goal. Osinga's discussion of the theory was, at some points effective, but also repetitive, boring, and often not particularly illuminating.

[Levie Galapon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thoughts on the book: This is not an easy read by any measure. It would be useful to understand some military history and terminology to grasp the important concepts of where Boyd's theories lie in strategic thinking. Boyd's multidisciplinary approach is detailed almost painstakingly too much. Osinga points out in early chapters about theories from other disciplines such as Physics and other hard sciences. This led to a harder understanding of the read and at times begs the question why its here in so much detail. It could have easily been distilled to fewer pages in terms of covering his multidisciplinary approach. It is about midway through the reading where it becomes easier to read since it forgets about all the thermodynamics and goes straight to military history and theory. The whole point of the read shows how all of Boyd's experiences and learnings have culminated into the OODA loop. Which comes to the conclusion that the OODA loop is more than just an idea to think faster than the opponent. And it really is, which, makes this ridiculous read actually insightful and at times inspiring in how we should conduct our personal studies differently and multidisciplinary.

Summary:

John Boyd is a military strategist best known for his OODA loop diagram. The OODA loop helps emphasize speed and maneuverability in warfare. Because of this, Boyd’s OODA loop is normally analyzed to mean, that the key to succeed, is to be faster than your opponent. However, John Boyd’s OODA loop means more than just speed. To illustrate the complexity of the OODA loop, Osinga points out the application of the OODA loop in organization, maneuver, and modern warfare.

Analysis:

Although the essence of the OODA loop is about speed and maneuverability, the way it is applied to certain concepts becomes more intricate. In terms of organization, Boyd would insist on a decentralized form of organization. Boyd argues for small-decentralized groups that can work cohesively as a whole. This is due to the idea that smaller groups can cycle through the OODA loop faster than larger groups. This would mean that at the tactical level, there should be flexibility to allow for initiative. If the opponent doesn’t allow for the same amount of flexibility and control then the enemy will be a decisive disadvantage. This is due to the fact that enemies won’t be able to perform a counter-attack at any efficient time. However, Boyd believes that there should be centralization on the strategic level. According to Osinga, centralization at the strategic level is important as “a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions”. In other words, it helps to coordinate war aims created at the strategic level, with decisions made at the tactical level. As John Boyd once stated “exploit lower-level initiative yet realize higher level intent”. This also interesting because it shows how destruction in war could be justified through the pursuit of war goals.

When it comes to understanding maneuver conflicts, the OODA loop, could be used to show how maneuverable tactics are superior to attritional tactics. The basic point of maneuver warfare is to either paralyze the enemy or break the enemy apart piecemeal. With the OODA loop in mind, it could be seen that maneuver tactics, is a way to speed up the OODA looping process against the enemy. A classic example of this would be the German breakthrough of the trenches during WWI. Entente forces would use trenches to cause attrition, while Ludendorff, countered with small maneuverable infiltration units. An interesting analysis made by Boyd in terms of maneuver conflict is on the similarities between Blitzkrieg and guerilla warfare. Boyd shows that both aim to create confusion among the enemy camp by use of “superior mobility and sudden violence”. The OODA loop diagram shows how these two tactics could be used to an advantage. By utilizing speed and maneuver, you would be able to out think your opponent and essential paralyze them with fear and pressure.

When it comes to applying Boyd’s thinking, to modern warfare, it is easy to see where is being used to an advantage. Osinga pointed out that Boyd’s ideas are important today since warfare is going to be based on “disrupting” or “destroying information and communication systems”. These changes to warfare are due technological changes and the recent revolution in military affairs. Because of this, modern warfare is essentially network-centric warfare aimed at “obtaining “an information advantage” over enemies. This allows for “flexibility” and the ability to achieve “decisive effect…without the need to maneuver”. It could be seen that these modern advances, could be used to quicken ones’ OODA loop cycle while, slowing down an enemies’ OODA loop cycle. This is due to the information advantage that NCW will be able to achieve. With superior knowledge, it could be used to speed up decision making, while opening up the possibilities for deceptive tactics.

Overall, John Boyd was an interesting strategist for many reasons. The OODA loop cycle could be seen as one of his greater achievements. However, the way the OODA loop idea could be expanded upon and applied to other topics makes it a multifaceted achievement. An achievement that could be used to identify ways to counter threats we are facing today such as asymmetrical warfare.

[Ged · Rating 5 out of 5]

TL;DR - Read this and you realise how little Dominic Cummings understands about John Boyd's thinking.

Science, Strategy and War isn’t a book that would have normally made it on to my reading list, but we’re living in strange times. The book is an analysis of the history and strategic theory created over time by John Boyd.

Boyd’s thinking led to the development of post-Vietnam, pre-stealth fighter aircraft that dominated the world’s skies. Boyd employed his experience and the insight that a ‘Swiss Army knife’ approach seldom provided an adequate design solution. A lesson that the US failed to learn when it created the F-35.

Boyd was also responsible for creating the ideas that encouraged the US to move war into the IT space. Boyd’s thinking on strategy has shaped military thinking on tools, structure, integration and responsibility. What military-types call network-centric warfare. This seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive advantage.

We saw the potential of this thinking in the first Gulf War when sensors, missiles and satellite imagery changed the face of modern warfare. What was less appreciated at the time by commentators is that this form of warfare was uniquely aided by Iraq’s flat terrain; which aided remote sensors and wireless networks. But the network-centric aspect really came into its own with William Owens’ paper on the system-of-systems which was emerging as the military followed Boyd’s approach.

Ok, whilst there is some crossover with technology concepts such as Kevin Kelly’s ‘mirrorworld‘; where AR knits together networked information with location this is all pretty arcane stuff.

Boyd breaks out of military circles

John Boyd is particularly famous for a model called OODA which has broken out from its military origins. Probably the most high profile fan at the moment is Dominic Cummings – the special advisor to Boris Johnson and political activist.

Cummings has talked about Boyd in terms of disruption and marketing of his political messages – through getting inside their OODA loop.

Boyd’s ideas have also been picked up by sports coaches and even litigation teams in the US.

OODA

OODA or observe–orient–decide–act, is often described as a ‘loop’ and shown that way. However this deceives the audience of its true nature. As Osinga correctly points out; observe and orient are continual flows of information that feed into the decide and act functions. Strategists talk about ‘getting inside the enemies OODA loop’; that is disrupting their intelligence, understanding of their situational awareness and ability to act.

Osinga’s critique of Boyd

In Science, Strategy and War, Osinga sets out to do achieve a number of things with regards John Boyd’s ideas.

First of all Osinga provides context, by providing a history of Boyd’s career in military service and as a retired service member and academic. Osinga brings a great deal of understanding to this part of the book as he also served in an air force and is an academic.

John Boyd standing up in the cockpit of the F-86 Sabre that he few during his military service.
Secondly, he explains how Boyd developed and honed his ideas over time. Boyd’s OODA model was borne out of empirical experience as a combat pilot. It was first used to change fighter pilots about engaging with the enemy. Use of it then expanded to encompass bigger strategic outlooks.

Boyd read widely and had a deep understanding fo scientific principles due to his engineering background. He applied meta analysis to the great strategies and military campaigns of history and the literature describing them. He drew on his understanding of science to try and provide analogies for the many areas of uncertainty in implementing a strategy. He drew on the social sciences and concepts like post-modernism.

Whilst Boyd was technical; Science, Strategy and War makes it clear that he wasn’t technocratic in nature. Boyd was keenly aware of human factors including the different aspect of moral power. I think that this one of the least understood aspects of Boyd’s thinking.

I don’t think that Osinga’s book is essential reading for marketing. It was never meant to be. Instead, it provides a good insight into how many of our thinkers operate only at the surface level without truly understanding the concepts they talk about. Boyd was not a surface player, he thought deeply about things and read widely. In that respect I think he can be an example to us all. Osinga did a really good job at bringing this to light in an accessible way.

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 4 out of 5]

The central difficulty in Osinga's work is his portrayal of Boyd as a diviner of the zeitgeist of his time. Osinga depicts Boyd as an avid consumer of science and philosophy who adopts the post-modern and complexity perspectives of the community to develop a more agile and maneuverist approach to war and strategy. While this might be true, it debunks Boyd as necessarily the launchpoint for OODA-like maneuverist approaches. It's difficult to say Wass de Czege plagiarized Boyd in AirLand Battle if you also maintain that Boyd was primarily packaging ideas that were prevalent and available at the time. To be fair, Boyd's renown contribution, the OODA loop, is distinctive enough, but he was not the only theorist developing postmodern perspectives on combat at the time.
Boyd has a number of interesting thoughts on initiative although he interchanges the concepts of initiative as action, freedom of action, and advantage with no consistency for levels of war. His C2 philosophy does seem to be remarkably evident in the concept of Mission Command, likely due to the similar orientation on Auftragstactik and the fact that by 2012 TRADOC had read and accepted Boyd. Central to this philosophy is the concept of individual initiative nested by purpose (terribly redefined as disciplined initiative in ADP 6-0). Boyd groups harmony and initiative together as enabling factors for overcoming friction in Organic Design but does not adequately address that those two concepts are themselves in contention. Initiative pulls at synchronization/harmony. At the tactical level this may be accomplished purely through trust but at the operational level time is still a significant factor and resources/capabilities must be allocated to engagements (moral-mental-physical) arranged in time and space requiring some elements of the direct synchronization Boyd lambasts in WW1 (consequently, this emphasis of synchronization over initiative was essential given the available C2 mechanisms at the time and actually the 1905 FSR contradicted). I do like how Boyd attempted to draw clear distinction between C2 as a concept and as a technology. Mission Command as a warfighting function has been equated with S6 responsibilities. If we mean signals/communications then we should say so instead of applying a confusing philosophical term for the sake of consistency. Consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds.

[Nate Huston · Rating 4 out of 5]

Boyd was a smart, smart, smart dude. Same with Osigna. In a discussion with the author, he said that his proudest achievements were the two chapters discussing Boyd's inspirations. I had hoped he wouldn't say that, as they were the two that made my brain hurt the most. With that said, they were definitely intriguing and I'd like to take another look...perhaps sometime when I have more than a night to read the whole damn book.

Boyd was an esoteric dude. His thoughts on strategy reflect his brilliance as well as his complex nature. If he has a tagline, it's definitely adaptability. Osinga argues that the OODA loop Boyd is known for is actually much more complex and nuanced than is generally understood. At the heart of it, he suggests that Clausewitz's fog and friction can be the strategist's friend...that the strategist's aim ought to be to inflict confusion upon the enemy. While kinetic force will most likely be required, the successful strategist is one focused first on disruption of the enemy's mental and moral system. Once this disruption has been achieved, once you are inside his OODA loop, success is likely. The key is to bring the opponent to his tipping point so that minimal force is required to topple him.

[Alper Çuğun · Rating 5 out of 5]

That was some climb to the top of this pyramid but in the end there was definitely a pot of gold. Essential reading for anybody interested in strategy, learning and operations.

[Jurgen Rose · Rating 5 out of 5]

Slogged through this in the original thesis format. It is dense reading but very well researched and a must read for any student of maneuver warfare, John Boyd, and third generation warfare.

[Ben Peyton · Rating 5 out of 5]

John Boyd didn’t put many of his ideas to paper so most of the remaining work of his is in the form of various presentation slides and a few short papers. This book does an excellent job of going into detail on Boyd’s work and the intellectual ideas Boyd drew upon. The book is broken up into two general sections. The first is an analysis of the scientific ideas and military history that Boyd drew upon. The second half of the work goes through the presentations and work that Boyd became most famous for. This section of the book is almost like a compendium to the actual works. It is full of context, analysis, and additional ideas and thoughts on Boyd’s works.
I think the idea I will take away from the book is that while Boyd is most famous for his idea of the OODA loop that is only one idea of many that Boyd left behind on how organization and individuals need to act if they want to succeed in life. Boyd drew upon biology, physics, and new sciences like chaos theory to explain that just like all life forms, their environments limit organizations and that the ability to adapt is the ability to succeed. Those organizations that can adapt the easiest and fastest will have the greatest chance of surviving and flourishing. Boy talks a lot about non-linearity. Organizations need to be prepared for the effects of non-linearity. Leaders should design organizations so that non-linearity effects improve the organization instead of harming it.
Boyd talks a lot about the need for organizations to have a shared moral ideal, which brings a sense of togetherness and centers the groups’ mind on the goal. These shared moral ideals provide the group with a shared purpose and can be used to persuade non-believers or outsiders in the merits of the groups' cause.
The book, obviously, is much more interested in how Boyd’s ideas apply to war and conflict, but, I think these ideas are very interesting even for those not interested in grand strategies on war but in how the world works. This is a dense read in some parts, a can feel a little repetitive, but if you are interested in Boyd’s ideas this is a must read.

[Cedric Chin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the Boyd book I was looking for in my reading program. Osinga is thorough — not only does he walk you through Boyd's thinking, he spends Chapters 2-4 (out of a total of seven) to guide you through the changes in science and philosophy that must have influenced Boyd's work. If you have passing familiarity with the epistemological wars of the 60s and 70s, and if you have some knowledge of what a complex adaptive system is, you may skip all of that and jump from Chapter 1 to Chapters 5-7. Those contain the core analysis of Boyd's various briefings.

As it is, Osinga has written a self-contained book with everything you need to understand Boyd. The earlier chapters are all that is needed to bootstrap an understanding of Boyd's ideas. The latter chapters contain the best material I've seen on Boyd's briefings. (Do note you're going to want to pull up these briefings and have them open in a screen as you read those chapters; Osinga references them regularly throughout the latter chapters).

Before this book, I thought that the OODA loop was interesting, but not particularly profound. There are more useful descriptive models for decision-making and thinking out there. I thought that Boyd's primary contribution was the usage of the OODA loop as an explanation of how to 'get inside the enemy's mind'. Osinga's book reveals that the OODA loop idea is really an outcropping on a larger, hidden iceberg; Boyd's major contribution is a method of thinking under uncertainty in a complex adaptive system. Such thinking, he believed, would lead to winning, and the defeat of one's enemies.

[Doug McColgin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredible.

It's a slow, long, difficult read. But it is so extremely dense with insight, that I voluntarily wrote a book report for my own consumption after I finished. This is one of the most important, holistic books on strategy, organizational structure, knowledge, and philosophy that I've ever read.

I'm a big fan of Lean Startup, Steve Blank's work, design thinking, and other "pop" business topics. They all offer tremendous lessons, but in a vacuum, I've seen each of them misapplied and abused as bludgeons. Boyd's work predates all of these and ties them together in such a fashion that it enables the reader to see how people, process, environment and information all ebb and flow together.

I have no idea (yet) how I will apply this, but for weeks now I have obsessed over the lessons that I've been acquiring from this book. One of the most important I've ever read.

[The Warfighting Society · Rating 4 out of 5]

Frans Osinga’s work is currently the only detailed academic analysis of John Boyd’s theories in existence. Osinga assesses each of Boyd’s presentations as well as the seminal essay “Destruction and Creation,” which formed the kernel around which Boyd’s later theories coalesced. Digging down into the wealth of sources Boyd used as foundations for his briefings, Osinga explains the intellectual background of Boyd’s theories on conflict to help the reader understand the life-long learning process in which Boyd engaged. I’d add another star if the book were easier to read; Osinga is not a natural English speaker and so his prose can be a little heavy. Regardless, if you want to explore Boyd’s mind, you need to read this book.

[John Schneider · Rating 4 out of 5]

Osinga does a great service to John Boyd by writing this grand overview of his work. He also does the average reader a great deal of stress in how he does so. To be fair Osinga is writing an obviously academic work to convince academics that John Boyd should be studied. Still, Osinga’s poor prose literally caused me to throw the book down at points. For example, “ Boyd’s works conceptually follows, clearly, closely in the footsteps of ....” Don’t use adverbs like that! Embedding an adverb in commas makes the whole sentence less clear not more so. Whole paragraphs obscure things before Osinga clarifies matters. Since little has been written about Boys, this works ought to be read and will be worth the effort. Just don’t be surprised by how much.

[SR Bolton · Rating 5 out of 5]

An incredibly thorough dissertation. His chapters on theory and complexity as they relate to war as a social phenomenon are excellent stand-alone works. He unpacks Boyd’s autodidactic process in great detail and lays bare the tremendous depth of insight Boyd pursued by consulting expertise across many disciplines. If you’re tired of all the OODA-loop-thin tropes about Boyd, this is the best single book to puncture that contact layer and understand the depth of Boyd’s accomplishment. But buckle up, bring a thick notebook, and plan extra reading hours; this is a dense and relentless read.

[Loh Rui · Rating 5 out of 5]

And awesome deep dive into Boyd's theories and constant meandering down multi-disciplinary rabbitholes from which the theories were based on. Probably the best thing I've read this whole year - just read it, no summary could do the depth and breadth of the book justice.

[Rodrigo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Osinga manages to provide both detailed comments and the grand context in this review of the works of Boyd. Greatly recommended. As others have pointed out, it's better to take it slow and devote time to processing the content. But if you do, you will truly be rewarded.

[Christopher Cagle · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very dense read—like a very long doctoral thesis. But this is for sure the most thorough study of Lt. Col. John Boyd’s work. If you think the OODA Loop and “looping faster” is all there is to his theory you are mistaken. I can think of no better book to correct your misunderstanding.

[Iskandar Muhammad · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for anyone studying Boyd or anyone interested in military strategy. Osinga provides background information and sufficient explanation on Boyd's theories that are hard to find and collate since Boyd's works were mostly in the form of presentation slides with no explanation.

[Turgut · Rating 5 out of 5]

Rewarding book.

[Amanda Deno · Rating 4 out of 5]

Heavy book that was slow to start but picked up beautifully and leads to understanding of how our of America's military strategists developed throughout his life.

[Abhi Yerra · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book took me while to get through as Osinga essentially deconstructs all of John Boyd's presentations and papers and attempts to figure out how his ideas were shaped. It is a challenging book to read especially since it covers so many different things from postmodern deconstructionism, complexity theory, Godel's Incompleteness theory, evolutionary theory and more to help understand John Boyd's OODA loop and the complexity around that idea.

Boyd's ideas are to move war away from a Clausewitzian method of war where two conventional armies fight to the warfare and strategy of rapidly capturing the enemy by surprise whether in terms of psychological or direct. Moving through the OODA loop is to move through the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act cycle. The observe point is to take observation of things as they happen and gaining that knowledge rapidly. Orient is to decide what to do with that information. What are the mental models that can be acted on. What is it similar to? What kind of destructive or creative action will compose the most damage. During the orient phase is when multiple models are created to respond to the observation and it is the most important part of the OODA loop. The decide point is figuring out which hypothesis that you came up with in the orient phase will have the most damage and Act is acting on that hypothesis. Essentially the OODA loop is strategy as the scientific method.

The book gets into much more complexity and some of it is a bit dry but Osinga definitely synthesizes Boyd's ideas. Further, I am simplifying a little bit by only covering the OODA loop but Osinga also discusses Boyd's ideas for organizational structure, mental models, and comparison to different war strategists throughout history.

Overall a great, if dense, book and many of the ideas are applicable to business as much as they are to war.

[Eric Walters · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the greatest limitations we have in understanding the thinking of John Boyd--widely credited as the father of Maneuver Warfare theory in the United States--is that he didn't write a book or a series of articles. All we have are his briefings and recollections of others regarding his ideas. Frans Osinga has done us great service by outlining Boyds theories and providing the sources and intellectual bases for them. This is not a book for the novice--deep familiarity with military history and existing Maneuver Warfare literature are essential to get the most out of this rich work. It stand alone as the best compilation of Boyd's thinking on strategy and warfare. Most highly recommended, but only for those who are willing to take their time and come prepared for the intellectual journey.

[Christoph Weber · Rating 4 out of 5]

Oh boy. Das Buch hat mich ein Monat lang beschäftigt. Es ist sehr dicht geschrieben, und ohne ausreichender Konzentration verpasst man zuviele Details.
Es erinnert ein wenig an andere Autoren mit militärischer Laufbahn, die irre lange Textwüsten produzieren - nur hat Osinga seine auf 300 Seiten verdichtet.

Das Thema ist John Boyd, der vielen als der Erfinder des OODA Loops bekannt ist: Observe - Orient - Decide - Act. Viele interpretieren ihn als genau so simpel, und dass man im Krieg oder auch Selbstverteidigungsfalle nur schneller durch diesen Loop durch muss als der Gegner. Osinga zeigt aber, dass Boyd sehr viel mehr darunter verstanden hat. Er widmet sich genau der wissenschaftlichen Literatur, die Boyd beeinflusst hat. Das macht es zu einem sehr spannenden Buch.

[Greg]

This isn't light reading by any stretch of the imagination. It is one of the most densely written books I've ever read. It uses information from all of Boyd's presentations, but is more concerned with the background of how Boyd came to develop his principles. This one is best read by a scholar of Boyd himself rather than someone looking to get useful, actionable, explanations of concepts like the OODA loop.